

828

## DRAFT PRESS RELEASE

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Although the volume and its supplement have been in preparation for several years, they cannot be published until 1997 because the editors are continuing to add recently located documents that are essential to publishing a complete record of this critical set of events in American foreign policy during the Kennedy administration. At the same time, the Department wants to assure that the necessary delay in publishing this volume does not thwart public access to and use of the many documents that have already been declassified for the volume. Carrying out this objective is especially urgent in light of the President's Executive Order 12958 of April 1995 aimed at making the nation's Cold War historical record open and available as soon as possible. The anniversary this week of the tragic events at the Bay of Pigs is all the more reason to postpone no further the fuller access to the relevant records.

Releasing this list of documents now is also consistent with the recommendation of the Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation at its quarterly meeting in March. The Committee, which was established by the same October 1991 law that sets standards for compiling and deadlines for the publication of the *Foreign Relations* series, unanimously urged that the list of already declassified documents be made public for any volumes significantly delayed beyond the statutory 30-year publication line and not already in the final publication process. Apart from the aforementioned Cuba volume and one other covering the 1961-1963 period (Vol. V, Soviet Union) all of the other volumes delayed beyond the 30 year line will be published within the next year.

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OPTIONAL FORM 99 (7-90)

## FAX TRANSMITTAL

# of pages 2

From Jim P. Grogan	To David Herscovici - State
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Most of the State Department documents on the list released today are among the many Department files turned over in recent years to the National Archives and Records Administration II in College Park, Maryland. The original copies of Presidential and other White House documents included in *Foreign Relations*, 1961-1963, Vol. X are mainly at the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library in Boston, Massachusetts. Because the originals of the documents declassified for the volume do not exist as a single separate file but are located in their appropriate archival depositories, arrangements are underway now to facilitate public access to these documents. In the interim, the State Department will make available a copy of the working manuscript of the still incomplete volume at the Department's FOIA Reading Room. This manuscript will also include the texts of those Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency documents declassified thus far for the volume but included in larger files not yet available to the public. Neither the list released today nor the manuscript can in any way fully substitute for the volume to be published next year with its complete scholarly editorial apparatus.

The list of documents released today will be available on the Internet (gopher://dosfan.lib.uic.edu) and this notice will be posted to H-DIPLO, the E-mail list for diplomatic historians.



April 16, 1996

FRUS DATA SORTED BY SOURCE

SRCE	TITLE	VOL	COMP	DOC#	PGS	FILE	ORIGIN	FINAL
DOD	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	17	3	OSD FILES FRC 65A3464	JCS	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	18	1	OASD/ISA FRC 64A2382	JCS	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	43	25	OASD C A FILES 71A2896	JCS	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	44	3	OSAD C A FILES 71A2896	JCS	E
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	59	10	OASD C A 71A2896	JCS	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	140	1	OASD C A FILES 71A2896	DOD	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	144	2	OSD FILES 65A3464	WH	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	149	1	OASD C A FILES 71A2896	DOD	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	153	4	OASD C A 71A2896 CUBA 381	WH	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	159	16	OASD C A 71A2896 CUBA 381	JCS	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	167	5	OASD C A 71A2896 NITZE	CIA	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	171	1	OASD C A 71A2896 CUBA 381	DOD	R
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	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	186	1	OASD C A 71A2896 YARMOLIN	DOD	R
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	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	231	1	OASD C A 71A2896 CUBA 381	DOS	R
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	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	245	3	OASD C A 71A2896 MC NOTEB	CIA	R
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	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	264	1	OASD/ISA 65A3501 CUBA 62	DOD	R
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	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	320	2	OASD C A 71A2896 YARMOLIN	DOD	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	324	1	OASD/ISA 65A3501 CUBA 62	DOD	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	328	2	OSD HISTORIANS OFFICE CF	DOS	R
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	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	351	2	OASD C A 71A2896 YARMOLIN	DOD	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	355	9	OASD C A 71A2896 MC NOTEB	CIA	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	356	1	OASD C A 71A2896 CUBA 381	WH	R

PAGES BY SOURCE DOD: 141

NUMBER OF DOCS: 36

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE IS RELEASING  
TODAY A LIST OF NEARLY 450 DOCUMENTS  
DECLASSIFIED FOR INCLUSION IN A PLANNED  
VOLUME IN THE FOREIGN RELATIONS SERIES  
COVERING CUBA FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY 1961-  
SEPTEMBER 1962, AS WELL AS A MICROFICHE  
SUPPLEMENT. THESE DOCUMENTS PRESENT A  
DETAILED AND AUTHORITATIVE RECORD OF U.S.  
POLICY TOWARD CUBA, INCLUDING THE ILL-FATED  
BAY OF PIGS OPERATION THAT TOOK PLACE 35  
YEARS AGO THIS WEEK.

BECAUSE OF THE ADDITION OF MANY DOCUMENTS  
LOCATED ONLY RECENTLY, THE PRINTED VOLUME AND  
SUPPLEMENT WILL NOT BE READY FOR PUBLICATION  
UNTIL 1997. THE DEPARTMENT DOES NOT WISH,

OPTIONAL FORM 99 (7-90)

## FAX TRANSMITTAL

# of pages ► 4

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5099-101

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

HOWEVER, TO DELAY PUBLIC ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS MORE THAN 30 YEARS OLD, WHICH AN OCTOBER 1991 LAW SET AS A STANDARD FOR THE FOREIGN RELATIONS SERIES.

THE DOCUMENT LIST AS WELL AS A COPY OF THE WORKING MANUSCRIPT OF THE DOCUMENTS NOW DECLASSIFIED FOR THE PRINTED VOLUME, INCLUDING 81 EXCISED DOCUMENTS, ARE AVAILABLE FOR PERUSAL IN THE DEPARTMENT'S FOIA READING ROOM.

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## U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Office of the Spokesman

For Immediate Release

April 19, 1996

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(49)

CU-17

~~(Declassified in full  
see attached copy from  
Naval Library)~~

(50) Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense /McNamara/

828

(18) JCSM 444/61. → (19) Washington, January 27, 1961.

(20) Subject: U.S. Plan of Action in Cuba

32 (11) 1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are becoming increasingly concerned with the situation presented by steadily increasing military strength of the Castro Government and the tight grasp of the Communists over the means of counter-revolution, including the military, the police and governmental financial resources as well as the organs of propaganda. Unless the United States takes immediate and forceful action, there is a great and present danger that Cuba will become permanently established as a part of the Communist Bloc, with disastrous consequences to the security of the Western Hemisphere. Cuba provides a Communist base of operations for export of similar revolutions to an already unstable and potentially explosive Latin America.

(11) 2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the primary objective of the United States in Cuba should be the speedy overthrow of the Castro Government, followed by the establishment of a pro-U.S. Government which, with U.S. support, will accomplish the desired objectives for the Cuban people. Great emphasis is placed on the urgent necessity for the United States to locate, train and support such Cuban nationals as will be capable of establishing a new non-Communist government once Castro is overthrown.

(11) 3. The current Political-Para-Military Plan does not assure the accomplishment of the above objective nor has there been detailed follow-up planning to exploit that plan if it succeeds or for any direct action that might be required if the plan is found to be inadequate. ✓

(93) Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, China/Cuba, 1961. Top Secret.

(43) ✓ For a summary of this plan, see Document <sup>referred to as the Trinidad Plan,</sup> in

(CIA memo, 1/4)

~~500-1-100  
FRC 65 A 3464  
China-Cuba, 1961~~

4. As you recall, at the conference between the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 22 January 1961, this problem was addressed. At that time the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff presented a Joint Staff concept of an ascending scale of U.S. supported or directed actions to accomplish the overthrow of the Castro Government. This concept, which is appended hereto, was intended to demonstrate the key elements in the development of an over-all U.S. Plan of Action for the overthrow of the Castro Government. That conference informally agreed that an Inter-Departmental Planning Group should be established to develop a detailed over-all U.S. Plan of Action along the general lines indicated in the Appendix.

CU-17/2  
3  
45

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, therefore, recommend that:

a. An over-all U.S. Plan of Action for the overthrow of the Castro Government be developed by an Inter-Departmental Planning Group.

b. Such an over-all U.S. Plan of Action for the overthrow of the Castro Government include, but not be limited to the following:

(1) Mission

(2) Each feasible course of action (as set forth in the Appendix hereto, or as revised by the planners), with sub-elements as follows:

(a) The concept of operations for the course of action.

(b) Specific Tasks required of Executive Agencies concerned to accomplish the course of action.

33 (3) Coordinating Instructions

(a) Designation of Agency or individual responsible for inter-departmental coordination and arrangement for reviewing and approval of the Plan.

(4) Requirements for supporting plans.

(5) Special provisions for continuous evaluation of the situation as a basis for determining U.S. course of action.

(6) Command relationships for implementation of each course of action.

c. The resultant over-all U.S. Plan of Action, after review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other appropriate agencies and approval by the President, be supported by detailed plans by the cognizant Executive Agencies for the implementation of tasks set forth in the over-all U.S. Plan of Action.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are prepared to assign personnel to participate in this Inter-Departmental Planning for the Department of Defense.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

no H  
L. L. Lemnitzer  
L. L. LEMNITZER  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff  
89 94

See Document

1/m

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CU-18

35 44  
 50 Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense *McNamara*

47 Washington, January 27, 1961.

18 JCSM 45161

26 Subject: <sup>27</sup>Increased Tempo of the U.S. Information Offensive Toward Cuba (C)

11 1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that it would serve the National interest to intensify the information offensive of informing the Cuban citizens of the dangers inherent in the Castro government's alignment with the Sino-Soviets and their isolation from the Inter-American System. Such increased activity would definitely tend to offset the distorted view of U.S. objectives and policy that the Cuban populace now receive from their government and would contribute to the internal problems of the Castro regime.

11 2. One means of accelerating the information offensive could be through the greater employment of the Voice of America and Radio Swan, using increased power, and the long wave band so as to reach the largest possible segment of the Cuban populace. Consideration should be given to the employment of continental U.S. stations which would transmit regular commercial news and selected television programs using increased power for these broadcasts. It may be feasible to employ commercial stations in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, as well as leading dissident Cubans now residing in these areas to assist in this offensive.

11 3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Secretary of Defense forward the memorandum in the Appendix to the Secretary of State.

28 11 For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

17 L. L. LEMNITZER

28 Chairman

28 Joint Chiefs of Staff 89 94

43 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, Cuba 1961 000.1-1-092. Secret.

43 1 Not printed.

43 2 Printed from a copy which <sup>that</sup> bears <sup>this typed signature</sup> a stamped indication that the original was signed.

indicated Lemnitzer signed the original.

(44) 92 (CU-43)

~~(Original copy of document)~~ 124

(50) Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense McNamara

(19) Washington, March 10, 1961.

(8) JCSM 146461

(26) Subject: <sup>9</sup> <sup>(27)</sup> Evaluation of the CIA Cuban Volunteer Task Force (S)

(11) 1. JCSM 146461, dated 3 February 1961, which forwarded the conclusions of the Military Evaluation of the CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba, pointed up the desirability for the conduct of an independent evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the invasion force and detailed analysis of logistics plans by a team of Army, Naval and Air Force officers if practicable without danger of compromise of the Plan.

(11) 2. At a meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 8 February 1961, the Director of Central Intelligence concurred and requested that such an evaluation be conducted.

(11) 3. The report by the inspection team is attached as an Appendix hereto.

(16) a. The conclusions contained in paragraphs 6 through 10 of the report are generally valid. In view of the odds for achieving surprise as expressed in paragraph 10 of the report, CIA should investigate means for improving the security and cover for movement of the Task Force. If this investigation reveals that appreciable improvement in security is not practicable, then the chances of success of the CIA Para-Military Plan should be reevaluated.

(16) b. Implementation of the recommendation contained in paragraph 12 of the report would give more assurance of surprise. However, there are serious drawbacks to a totally airborne operation in these particular circumstances. Any damage to the airstrip or crash of an aircraft on the strip would probably hinder operations for a considerable period of time. This would be particularly serious since

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24 Oct 61

Secret Cont. No. 328

(743) Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD

(C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381 (Sensitive). Top Secret;  
Limited Distribution.

(93) ✓ Document  $\frac{1}{m}$

no alternate strip is available. Also, if only one Cuban combat plane escapes destruction and interdicts the field, the operation would be seriously handicapped. Therefore, it is not believed that the increased surprise achieved outweighs the risk of possible failure.

93 (114) 4. Based upon a general review of the military portion of the plan, an evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the forces, and an analysis of the logistics plans, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that, from a military standpoint, since the small invasion force will retain the initiative until the location of the landing is determined the plan could be expected to achieve initial success. Ultimate success will depend on the extent to which the initial assault serves as a catalyst for further action on the part of anti-Castro elements throughout Cuba.

(116) 5. It is recommended that:


(16) a. The Secretary of Defense support the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as expressed in paragraph 4 above.

(16) b. A decision with respect to the employment of this task force be made at the earliest practicable date in order to initiate final preparation and training.

(16) c. A military instructor, experienced in operational logistics, be assigned to the training unit immediately for the final phase of training.

(16) d. The views expressed in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, and the recommendation contained in subparagraph c above, be transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence, together with three copies of the report in the Appendix hereto, for his information and consideration.

(170) For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

  
(17) L. L. LEMNITZER  
(28) Chairman  
(28) Joint Chiefs of Staff

~~ATTACHMENTS~~  
3 copies of Appendix

~~2~~

(55) EVALUATION OF CIA TASK FORCE

(55) THE PROBLEM

- (II) 1. To inspect the Cuban Volunteer Force in order to evaluate its military effectiveness and determine the adequacy of its logistic support.

(55) FACTORS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

- (II) 2. Approval of paragraph 1<sup>1</sup>/<sub>p</sub> of JCSM 57-61, 3 February 1961 required an evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the invasion force and a detailed analysis of logistic plans.

- (II) 3. The evaluation team left CONUS 24 February, spent two days in the training area, and returned to CONUS 27 February 1961.

- (II) 4. For additional factors, see:

- (II) a. Enclosure "A" for air factors.  
b. Enclosure "B" for ground factors.  
c. Enclosure "C" for logistic factors.

(55) DISCUSSION

- (II) 5. a. See Enclosure "A" for a discussion of the military effectiveness of the Cuban Volunteer Air Force.

- (II) b. See Enclosure "B" for a discussion of the tactical training of the ground element and its capability to carry out its contemplated mission.

- (II) c. See Enclosure "C" for a discussion of the adequacy of logistic support for Cuban Volunteer Forces relative to the assigned mission.

(55) CONCLUSIONS

- (II) 6. By 15 March 1961 the aircrews and support elements of the Volunteer Cuban Air Force will have achieved adequate military effectiveness to permit accomplishment of the air mission.

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- ⑦ 7. By 15 March 1961, the ground element of the task force will have achieved adequate military effectiveness to permit it to successfully carry out its mission.
- ⑧ 8. The Cuban Volunteer force is not able to sustain itself logistically for an extended operation. There is a marginal capability of operating for a period of thirty days with the present logistic organization.
- ⑨ 9. The logistic organization is not well defined, solidly constituted, nor adequately trained. Assignment of a qualified military instructor for logistic training should increase the logistic capability to an acceptable minimum.
- ⑩ 10. Surprise is essential to the success of the mission. However, odds against achieving surprise are believed to be about 85 to 15. Loss of surprise would likely create conditions beyond the military effectiveness of the Volunteer Cuban Force. This could lead to the destruction of part or all of the invasion force.

#### ⑤ RECOMMENDATIONS

- ⑪ 11. It is recommended that a decision to use this force against Castro be made at the earliest practicable date in order to permit final preparation and training to be initiated.
- ⑫ 12. It is recommended that serious consideration be given to airlifting the troops of the invasion force, rather than continuing with the amphibious operation, except as it might be used as a cover, and for major logistic support.
- ⑬ 13. It is recommended that a military instructor experienced in operational logistics be assigned to the training unit immediately for the final phase of training.

- ⑭ AIR EVALUATOR  $\frac{T}{m}$  Lt Col B. W. Tarwater, USAF
- ⑮ GROUND EVALUATOR  $\frac{T}{m}$  Col J. R. Wright, USA
- ⑯ LOGISTIC EVALUATOR  $\frac{T}{m}$  Lt Col R. B. Wall, USMC

⑬ Printed from a copy on which all the evaluators names are typed.

(44) (50) ENCLOSURE "A"

## (55) EVALUATION OF AIR ELEMENT CIA TASK FORCE

## (55) THE PROBLEM

- (11) 1. To evaluate the military effectiveness of the Cuban Volunteer Air Force.

## (55) FACTORS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

- (11) 2. FACTS: The Cuban Volunteer Air Force has:

(11) a. 16 B<sub>J</sub><sup>1</sup>26 pilots, 9 of these have between 1800 and 11,500 hours total flying time, with between 76 hours and 33 minutes, and 99 hours 25 minutes training in the B<sub>J</sub><sup>1</sup>26 at Retalhuleu. Each of these pilots has flown approximately 20 strafing sorties, fired 16, 5 inch rockets and dropped 30 bombs  $\frac{1}{m}$  15 skip and 15 glide. The other 7 B<sub>J</sub><sup>1</sup>26 pilots have between 1200 and 6000 hours total flying time, with between 20 hours and 10 minutes, and 48 hours and 45 minutes training in the B<sub>J</sub><sup>1</sup>26 at Retalhuleu. Each of these seven pilots has flown approximately 5 strafing sorties, fired 6, five inch rockets, and dropped 9 bombs  $\frac{1}{m}$  3 skip and 6 glide.

(11) b. They have 16 navigator-co-pilots for the B<sub>J</sub><sup>1</sup>26s with Loran and low level navigation qualifications.

(11) c. They have 7 crews trained in the C<sub>J</sub><sup>1</sup>46, and eight crews trained in the C<sub>J</sub><sup>1</sup>54.

(11) d. Nine of the sixteen B<sub>J</sub><sup>1</sup>26 crews, three of the C<sub>J</sub><sup>1</sup>46 crews, and five of the C<sub>J</sub><sup>1</sup>54 crews have flown missions over Cuba from Retalhuleu. As far as is known all these crews successfully reached the assigned drop zones.

(11) e. Except for one ride with a Cuban pilot on a strafing,

rocket firing, and bombing mission, evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the aircrews is based on second hand reports.

(II) f. All Americans and Cubans queried as to the operational effectiveness of the aircrews agreed that it was definitely adequate to accomplish the assigned mission.

(II) g. The Volunteer Air Force at Retalhuleu has an overall in-commission rate of approximately 92%.

(II) h. The para-drop personnel at Retalhuleu are daily successfully preparing para-drops.

(II) i. The armorers at Retalhuleu are daily successfully arming B-26 aircraft for strafing, rocket, and bombing training.

(II) j. There are adequate support personnel, aircraft, aircraft parts, P.O.L. and munitions on hand, on the way, or on order, to permit mission accomplishment.

(See the Appendix for additional Facts Bearing on the Problem.)

(II) 3. ASSUMPTIONS <sup>1</sup>/<sub>m</sub> on which CIA bases its current plan:

(II) a. The air strikes will be conducted with the benefit of surprise.

(II) b. The combat aircraft of the Cuban Air Force will probably be located on three, and not more than six airfields.

(II) c. Intelligence estimates indicating very poor Cuban air defense capabilities are accurate.

(II) d. The anti-aircraft gunners will continue to be required to receive permission from their headquarters in Havana before firing on unidentified aircraft.

- (11) e. The B<sub>1</sub>26 missions will be flown from Puerto Cabezas.
- (11) 4. <sup>(13)</sup> ASSUMPTION <sup>(10)</sup> of the evaluator:
- (11) a. As indicated by personnel in charge of the air operation:

(11) (1) Simulated strikes against an airfield with dispersed aircraft, and a maximum effort refueling and rearming exercise, will be conducted by the B<sub>1</sub>26 crews during the first week in March, and any apparent weaknesses which may develop will be eliminated.

(11) (2) After the B<sub>1</sub>26s have moved to Puerto Cabezas nine B<sub>1</sub>26 will be simultaneously refueled and rearmed in minimum time, and any apparent weaknesses which may develop will be eliminated.

(11) b. As indicated by personnel in charge of the air operation they will have adequate runway clearing equipment available during the air operation.

(11) c. As indicated by personnel in charge, the operation will be conducted during the dry season, or a shelter will be built for the preparation and loading of the para-drops, and pierced steel planking will be provided to assure all weather parking for the aircraft.

(11) DISCUSSION

97 (11) 5. Due to operational and scheduled training requirements it was impossible to observe the Volunteer Cuban Air Force in simulated tactical operations as requested. Consequently, with the exception of one ride with a Cuban pilot on a strafing, rocket firing, and bombing mission, the evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the aircrews is based on an examination of personnel and training records, and conversations with



Cuban and American personnel.

⑥ 6. In evaluating the military effectiveness of the aircrews the following factors were considered:

- ① a. The pre-flight procedures, air work, gunnery, rocketry, bombing, and emergency procedures of the Cuban pilot, with whom the evaluator flew, were outstanding.
- ① b. The Cuban pilots have much more total time than the average US pilot that went into combat in World War II.
- ① c. Nine of the B<sub>N</sub><sup>1</sup>26 pilots have had between 76 and 100 hours in flying, navigation, and gunnery training in the B<sub>N</sub><sup>1</sup>26 at Retalhuleu; and the other seven B<sub>N</sub><sup>1</sup>26 pilots have received between 20 and 48 hours in flying, navigation, and gunnery at Retalhuleu, and also have more total time than the average US pilot that went into combat in World War II; and henceforth the seven pilots with the least training will be given priority in B<sub>N</sub><sup>1</sup>26 training at Retalhuleu until their time in the B<sub>N</sub><sup>1</sup>26 equals that of the first nine B<sub>N</sub><sup>1</sup>26 pilots.
- ① d. All of the sixteen B<sub>N</sub><sup>1</sup>26 navigator-co-pilots are former pilots and have received Loran and low level navigation training at Retalhuleu.
- ① e. The B<sub>N</sub><sup>1</sup>26 crews will participate in simulated tactical operations during the first week in March. Any weaknesses which may become apparent will be eliminated.
- ① f. All Cubans and Americans queried as to the operational effectiveness of the aircrews agreed that it was definitely adequate to accomplish the assigned mission.
- ① g. Nine of the sixteen B<sub>N</sub><sup>1</sup>26 crews, three of the C<sub>N</sub><sup>1</sup>46 crews, and five of the C<sub>N</sub><sup>1</sup>54 crews have flown missions

over Cuba from Retalhuleu. As far as is known all of these crews successfully reached their assigned drop zones.

(11) h. Aircrew effectiveness can be most realistically evaluated when measured against the mission requirements. The primary mission requirement of the Cuban Volunteer Air Force is the destruction of Castro's combat aircraft. The airstrikes against these aircraft are being planned on the basis of the assumption that surprise will be achieved. As a consequence, Castro's combat aircraft will remain based almost entirely upon three airfields, with possibly a few on three other airfields. Furthermore, with the benefit of surprise the numerous anti-aircraft guns at these six airfields, and other primary targets, will not be used against the initial strike, since Castro's anti-aircraft gunners are under orders not to fire on any aircraft without permission from their Headquarters in Havana. The rest of the air mission includes air strikes against 4 communication centers, destruction of interdiction targets, and other targets that may develop just prior to or during the invasion. Air drops and logistic support on an emergency basis will also be provided by the Volunteer Cuban Air Force.

(11) 1. In addition to the Cuban aircrews listed above, 6 American B<sub>7</sub>26 pilots, with between 3 to 6000 hours total time each, and combat time in World War II or Korea or both, will be given refresher training in the B<sub>7</sub>26 and used in the initial air strikes. One of the American pilots will be used in the strikes against each of the six airfields on which Castro's combat aircraft are based.

(11) 7. On the basis of the factors listed above it is logical

to conclude that the aircrews of the Volunteer Air Force have sufficient military effectiveness to achieve the mission requirements.

⑧ 8. Inasmuch as:

① a. The volunteer Air Force at Retalhuleu has an overall in-commission rate of 92%.

② b. The para-drop personnel at Retalhuleu are daily successfully preparing para-drops.

③ c. The armorers at Retalhuleu are daily successfully arming B<sub>N</sub><sup>1</sup>26 aircraft for strafing, rocket and bombing training.

④ d. There are adequate personnel, aircraft, aircraft parts, P.O.L., and munitions, on hand, enroute, or on order to permit mission accomplishment. (See the Appendix)  
In view of the factors listed above, it is concluded that the maintenance, armament, para-drop, and supply capability of the Volunteer Cuban Air Force is adequate to promote military effectiveness to the extent necessary for mission accomplishment.

⑨ 9. Based on an understanding of Castro's and the USSR's vital concern in maintaining Castro in power, first hand observations of security conditions at both Retalhuleu and Puerto Cabezas, and conversations with people assigned at both bases, it is concluded that the odds are about 85 to 15 against surprise being achieved in the attack against Castro's Cuba. If surprise is not achieved, it is most likely that the air mission will fail. As a consequence, one or more of Castro's combat aircraft will likely be available for use against the invasion force, and an aircraft armed with 50

caliber machine guns could sink all or most of the invasion force.

(11) 10. The reasons for believing that the odds are about 85 to 15 against surprise being achieved are as follows:

(11) a. With a communist infiltrated town approximately one mile from the airfield, and a railroad on one side of the base and a highway on the other, and trees surrounding the entire base, all providing a constant opportunity for observation of activities at Retalhuleu, it is believed the Castro-communists will know when the main invasion force is airlifted from Retalhuleu to Puerto Cabezas over a period of three nights.

(11) b. The airfield at Puerto Cabezas is presently being developed as the primary strike base. A tent city has been erected off one end of the main runway with adequate facilities for approximately 160 men. Plastic bags are being filled with aviation gas and placed on parking areas off the main runway. The airfield, which is three miles from the town of Puerto Cabezas, has been placed off limits and is guarded by 60 of President Somoza's best troops, thereby alerting anyone interested that something unusual is happening at the airfield. Furthermore, several commercial flights arrive daily on this same airstrip, and 50 Nicaraguans from the town of Puerto Cabezas are employed in readying the strike base; and of course they return to their homes in town each night. The docks from which the troops will move into ships for transport to Cuba are three miles from the airfield via a road which runs along the town. So again,

in view of Castro-communist interest in maintaining Castro in power, it seems likely that they are aware of the present activities at Puerto Cabezas, and will know when the main invasion force goes aboard the ships for their two day trip to Cuba. Knowing this, it then becomes a not too difficult submarine or air search problem, or both, to determine where and when the force will land. Furthermore, once the main force boards the ships, and it became obvious the force is on its way, Castro's combat aircraft could be scattered from the six primary airfields, and the anti-aircraft crews alerted, and orders given to shoot unidentified aircraft on sight. These two actions, as well as others that could be taken, could create conditions beyond the military effectiveness of the Volunteer Cuban Air Force. This in turn could lead to the destruction of part or all of the invasion force.

(11) 11. A cursory consideration of some of the major factors concerned indicates that the troops of the invasion force could be air rather than amphibious lifted. This would reduce the time necessary to transport the invasion force from Guatemala to Cuba from five days to one day - thereby increasing the chances of achieving surprise by a factor of five to one.

(11) 12. Consequently, its believed serious consideration should be given to airlifting the troops of the invasion force, rather than continuing with the amphibious operation, except as it might be used as a cover, and for major logistic support.

(55) CONCLUSIONS

(11) 13. If the assumption of surprise is correct, and intelligence estimates of Castro's air defense capabilities are

correct, by 15 March 1961 the aircrews and support elements of the Volunteer Cuban Air Force will have achieved adequate military effectiveness to permit accomplishment of the air mission.

(11) 14. The odds against achieving surprise however, are believed to be about 85 to 15. Loss of surprise would likely create conditions beyond the military effectiveness of the Volunteer Cuban Air Force. This could lead to the destruction of part or all of the invasion force.

(55) RECOMMENDATIONS

(11) 15. It is recommended that serious consideration be given to airlifting the troops of the invasion force, rather than continuing with the amphibious operation, except as it might be used as a cover, and for major logistic support.

(17) (T1) AIR EVALUATOR  $\frac{1}{m}$  Lt Col B. W. Tarwater, USAF

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## (44)(50) ENCLOSURE "B"

## (55) EVALUATION OF GROUND ELEMENT CIA TASK FORCE

## (55) THE PROBLEM

- (11) 1. To evaluate the tactical training of the ground element of the task force and to estimate its capability to carry out its contemplated mission.

## (55) FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

- (11) 2. For facts bearing on the problem, see Appendix "A".

## (55) DISCUSSION

- (11) 3. For discussion, see Appendix "B".

## (55) CONCLUSIONS

- (11) 4. Based on observations and conversations with trainer personnel on the spot, it is believed that the ground element of this task force has been properly trained to successfully carry out its mission with the exceptions noted below.

- (11) 5. Additional tactical training is required in defensive operations, coordination, preparation of defensive positions, and counter-attack. These matters are scheduled to be included in the future programmed training.

- (11) 6. An early decision to proceed with this operation is imperative. The point of no return has been passed and a decision to abandon the scheme is untenable. In the event such a decision should be made, a revolt within the assembled force would probably occur with dire consequences both for the US trainer personnel and for US interests abroad.

## (55) RECOMMENDATIONS

- (11) 7. It is recommended that a decision to proceed with the operation be made at the earliest practicable date.

(17)(11) Ground Evaluator <sup>1</sup>/<sub>m</sub> Colonel J.R. Wright, USA

## (49) (50) APPENDIX "A"

## (55) FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

## (11b) 1. Length of service of personnel:

(16) a. Varies  $\frac{1}{m}$  few days to 8 months.

(16) b. Includes former members of the Cuban Constitutional Army, Rebel Army, militia, and personnel with no previous training.

## (11b) 2. Organization:

(16) a. Brig. Hq. (116) and 4 rifle battalions (varies 109 $\frac{1}{m}$ 162). T/O for each Bn 150. 1st Bn  $\frac{1}{m}$  parachutists. (145)(16) b. Hv. Gun Bn (104) incl. 4.2 mort., 75 mm recoilless rifles, (6 $\frac{1}{m}$ 4.2 mort., 3 each RR).

(16) c. Tank Bn (25) now training at Ft. Knox.

## (11b) 3. Training:

(16) a. Guerrilla Opns  $\frac{1}{m}$  by civilian contract pers.(16) b. Basic military training  $\frac{1}{m}$  some by own personnel, remainder by Special Forces Teams.(16) c. 40 days at 16 hours per day supervised  $\frac{1}{m}$  additional on own time.(16) d. Airborne  $\frac{1}{m}$  Physical conditioning, 4 & 8 ft. platform, mock door, harness (chute) control, at least 3 jumps  $\frac{1}{m}$  jumpmaster at least 5 jumps.(16) e. Infiltration course  $\frac{1}{m}$  day and night  $\frac{1}{m}$  all pers.(16) f. Reaction course  $\frac{1}{m}$  all personnel.(16) g. Close combat, unarmed defense  $\frac{1}{m}$  all personnel.(16) h. Maps and compass  $\frac{1}{m}$  incl. night compass course.(16) i. Raids, ambushes, patrolling  $\frac{1}{m}$  day and night.(16) j. Weapons  $\frac{1}{m}$  familiarization firing on all weapons  $\frac{1}{m}$  cross training  $\frac{1}{m}$  field firing exercise.(16) k. Battalion and Brigade staff procedures and tactical operations including infantry  $\frac{1}{m}$  tank team theory, but no practical work  $\frac{1}{m}$  organization and conduct of the defense.

(16) l. Demolitions and field fortifications.

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- m. Bayonet training.
- (16) n. Communications  $\frac{T}{m}$  nets and procedure.
- o. Approximately 25% of all training conducted at night.
- (16) p. Physical conditioning stressed in all training.
- q. Forward air controllers trained to mark targets and call in air strike, communications adequate.
- (16) r. Unit training through battalion (company) completed. Brigade (battalion) level training in progress. Will include simulated beach landings on terrain similar to objective area.

(115) 4. Observed Training:

- (16) a. Brigade (battalion) in attack;
  - (23) (1) Included drop of parachute battalion (company) air support (2 B<sub>N</sub> 26), simulated supporting fires by 4.2" and 81 mm mortar sections  $\frac{T}{m}$  blank ammo used.
  - (23) (2) Use of terrain  $\frac{T}{m}$  good  $\frac{T}{m}$  covered routes used.
  - (3) Control  $\frac{T}{m}$  fair.
  - (23) (4) Leadership  $\frac{T}{m}$  good.
  - (5) Reorganization on objective  $\frac{T}{m}$  good.
  - (6) Organization of position  $\frac{T}{m}$  good.
- (16) b. Battalion (company) in attack;
  - (1) Live ammunition used in pre-set problem.
  - (23) (2) Demolition charges used to simulate incoming fire.
  - (3) Supporting weapons fired live overhead fire on objective.
  - (4) Tactics were restricted due to nature of area.
  - (23) (5) Use of weapons  $\frac{T}{m}$  good to excellent.
  - (6) Fire and maneuver  $\frac{T}{m}$  excellent.
  - (7) Evacuation of casualties  $\frac{T}{m}$  good.
  - (23) (8) Control  $\frac{T}{m}$  excellent.
  - (9) Physical fitness  $\frac{T}{m}$  superior.
  - (10) Morale  $\frac{T}{m}$  superior.

(16) c. Firing demonstration  $\frac{T}{m}$  Heavy Gun Battalion;

(23) (1) Included 4.2" mortars, 81 mm mortars, 75 mm recoilless rifles and .50 cal MG.

(2) Accuracy  $\frac{T}{m}$  excellent.

(23) (3) Control  $\frac{T}{m}$  excellent.

(4) Condition of equipment  $\frac{T}{m}$  superior.

(5) Immediate action  $\frac{T}{m}$  excellent.

(16) d. Individual Training;

(23) (1) Mechanical training, cal 30 light MG, M1917A1, Reaction course, field demolitions.

(23) (2) Instructor personnel  $\frac{T}{m}$  good  $\frac{T}{m}$  used interpreters to communicate with trainees.

(23) (3) Effectiveness of instruction  $\frac{T}{m}$  good  $\frac{T}{m}$  interest was high  $\frac{T}{m}$  almost all practical work.

(116) 5. Equipment:

(16) a. There are no shortages of equipment which adversely effect training  $\frac{T}{m}$  except  $\frac{T}{m}$  proper maps of the local area.

(16) b. Minor shortages in T/O&E are enroute to area and are arriving as rapidly as air lift permits.

(16) c. Equipment is well cared for and when all enroute is received will be adequate for contemplated mission.

(16) d. Communications equipment is partly military and partly commercial. These are 72 PRC  $\frac{T}{m}$  10's, 10 PE  $\frac{T}{m}$  33's, and 10 TP  $\frac{T}{m}$  1's used for tactical communications within the Brigade. Equipment is in excellent condition and all in working order. There is an adequate supply of batteries on hand.

(16) e. Parachutes are repacked in the area by well qualified riggers. There have been no chute failures to date.

(16) f. 5  $\frac{T}{m}$  M41 light tanks are at Ft. Knox where the tank unit is currently undergoing training. It was reported that driver training was completed and gunnery training was beginning.

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①⑥ 6. Future Training Programmed:

①⑥ a. Brigade exercises;

- (1) Brigade in attack  $\frac{T}{m}$  2 ea of 2 days duration.  
②③ (2) Brigade in defense  $\frac{T}{m}$  2 ea of 2 days duration.  
(3) Simulated beach landing  $\frac{T}{m}$  5 ea  $\frac{T}{m}$  1 day exercises.

①⑥ b. Brigade march  $\frac{T}{m}$  35 miles cross-country to beach and return  $\frac{T}{m}$  2 days each way.

①⑥ c. Final shakedown, rehabilitation of equipment, repair and testing of weapons  $\frac{T}{m}$  7 days.

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## (4450) APPENDIX "B"

## (65) DISCUSSION

- (11) 1. Individuals observed demonstrated a high degree of competence, considering the quality of personnel and the amount of time that they have been in training.
- (11) 2. All personnel observed demonstrated excellent physical condition, high morale, and an apparent desire to get on with the job.
- (11) 3. The leadership appears to be good. Leaders have been carefully selected and replaced when required by personnel who exhibited better potential than those originally selected. There have been very few leaders replaced in the course of the training. None of the leaders appears to harbor any personal political ambitions, nor a burning desire to make the service a career after the operation is completed.
- (11) 4. All personnel can fire their weapons effectively, can and do maintain them properly, and are cross-trained on other weapons. Most of them have already fired more rounds than the average US soldier would fire in a two-year term of service.
- (11) 5. The greatest problem facing the Brigade is the long confinement to the area which, while not now an immediate problem, could lead to a breakdown of discipline and control if prolonged or if the incentive which binds them together is removed.
- (11) 6. Personnel appear eager to learn and it was reported that they devote long hours outside of training time to study and practice.
- (11) 7. The quality of the personnel is amazing. College graduates with degrees in engineering are employed in the FDC as computers. All forward observers and their radio operators are qualified to adjust the fire of the mortars. Most of the personnel are young, generally from 18 to 31 years of age, and come from the middle class. There are a

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few older men in camp, but they are not favored and if they can't keep up are returned to Miami.

⑪ 8. Security

⑪ a. Every effort has been made to keep this operation secret, but it is obvious that many people in the area are aware of what is going on. Although all troop movements are made at night, firing, explosions, aircraft orbiting over an objective area, parachute drops, and an abnormal number of unfamiliar aircraft in the area are a dead giveaway. A clandestine radio transmitter is known to be operating in the Retalhuleu area. The mayor of Retalhuleu is a card-carrying communist and lives about a mile from the airstrip. Leaflets have been circulated in Guatemala City by the Communist Party giving many of the details of the activity. Although there are some inaccuracies in this material, much of it is accurate. It can therefore be presumed that Castro knows practically all about the operation <sup>(19)</sup>except <sup>(17)</sup>when, where, and in what strength.

⑪ b. There have been some cases of AWOL among the trainees. At the time of our visit, a group of eight including one company (platoon) commander was missing. On Saturday night, a group of 21 men left the camp and went into a small village nearby to attend a fiesta. By Sunday noon, 19 of this group had returned. Obviously, the presence of Cubans in fairly large groups is known to the people in the area.

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4450 ENCLOSURE C

(55) EVALUATION OF THE LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF THE CIA TASK FORCE

(66) 1. THE PROBLEM

(11) a. The purpose of this inspection was to evaluate the adequacy of logistic support for Cuban Volunteer Forces relative to the assigned mission.

(66) 2. FACTORS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

(11) a. Cuban Volunteer Forces are now in a field bivouac situation while conducting training operations.

(11) b. There are no personnel in the training area either in the Special Forces instruction group or within the Cuban Volunteer Forces who are qualified to instruct in operational logistics.

(11) c. Minimal training of Motor Transport drivers is being conducted due to political considerations.

(11) d. No formal training in operational logistics is being conducted.

(11) e. Aerial delivery equipment and capabilities are adequate for emergency air resupply requirements.

(11) f. No significant shortages of equipment and material were evident. Items not in the training area were described by instructor personnel as being in the backlog of material in CONUS. There were no means by which the inspecting officer could verify this assertion.

(66) 3. DISCUSSION

(11) a. Cuban Volunteer Forces are now in a field bivouac situation. Supply operations within the bivouac area are satisfactory. Supply support from CONUS to the training area is by air. Recent inclement weather caused a backlog of supplies to build up in CONUS. Planes did not fly

to the training area for over one week. Airlift has been resumed, however supplies delivered from backlog stocks are not responsive to immediate needs. It appears that planes are loaded with material available and receiving units are unaware of items delivered until they open boxes after delivery. No action was being taken to designate priorities since all items were so considered. There was a lack of logistic coordination in this instance.

(11) b. Personnel are receiving limited logistic training due to the on-the-job situation in bivouac. Preparation of meals, break-down and issue of supplies, and repair and maintenance of equipment are being conducted in camp. No training is being conducted in the amphibious aspects of logistics. No shore party organization has been formed nor is training being conducted in shore party operations. No training is being conducted in the assault aspects of logistics to include: establishment and operation of supply points, inventory control, movement and distribution of supplies to deployed units, or field messing operations. The logistic concept of instructor personnel was that tonnages of supplies could be deposited in the objective area and units could help themselves to fulfill their requirements.

(11) c. The motor transport officer is receiving adequate training in convoy and general operational procedures. Local laws require that vehicles be operated by citizens of that country or by instructor personnel. Cuban Volunteer Force Motor Transport drivers receive no training in night and blackout driving. Actual driver training is extremely

limited. In view of the complicated process of backing vehicles over sand and beach matting in to LCU's, this deficiency is considered of major importance.

(11) d. Facilities in the training area for the preparation and packaging of supplies for air drop were inspected. The capability is adequate for operations of an emergency resupply nature. Delivery is limited to parachute delivery or air landing of supplies.

(11) e. The medical organization of the force is well organized and equipped. The planning and procedures to be employed during the operation are simple, clear, concrete, and appear to be understood by all personnel involved. Equipment is adequate, clean, well cared for and properly packed. Personnel appear competent and adequate.

(11) f. Service functions are adequate. Enough trained personnel are available to perform the second and limited third echelon maintenance required. Tools and equipment are adequate.

(11) g. Clothing, weapons, individual, and organizational equipment are in good condition and well cared for. Vehicles utilized in the training area will be replaced for the operation. Rough terrain and maximum utilization have resulted in inordinate wear to tie-rods, springs, and various organic parts of the vehicles. This is understandable since the vehicles are standard, commercial types and are being utilized under field conditions.

(11) h. Morale appears excellent. There was some indication in remarks made by individuals that they were anxious to enter the objective area. Instructors indicated anxiety



over the fact that delay in definitely indicating D-day would result in deterioration of morale. Many troops have been confined within the camp area on a rigorous training schedule for six months or more and are living under austere conditions. Their primary incentive is the prospect of moving to the objective area.

- (11) 1. A decision as to whether or not the operation will take place is necessary in the near future due to the impending rainy season. It is considered that operations during the rainy season would present unsurmountable difficulties in view of the limited equipment available. Logistic requirements for the shipment of supplies by railroad to POE; loading and sailing time for ships; etc., necessitate approximately a three-week leadtime. The estimation of time involved was provided by CIA since they are handling shipping arrangements.

(66) 4. CONCLUSIONS

- (11) a. The Cuban Volunteer Force is not presently able to sustain itself logistically for an extended operation. It has a marginal capability of operating for a period of thirty days with its present logistic organization.
- (11) b. The logistic organization within the Cuban Volunteer Force is not well defined, solidly constituted, nor adequately trained. It needs emphasis to provide a cohesive, effective logistic support capability.
- (11) c. It is imperative that an instructor experienced in operational logistics be provided to the training unit at the earliest practicable date.
- (11) d. An organized shore party unit needs to be formed and trained as soon as possible.
- (11) e. More vigorous action is needed in training motor transport drivers to handle vehicles. This could be

partially accomplished by night operations within the camp areas.

(14) f. The Cuban Volunteer Force is adequately supported medically for operational functions well in excess of 30 days.

(11) g. The service capabilities of the Cuban Volunteer Force are adequate for the operation.

(66) 5. ACTION RECOMMENDED

(11) a. That a military instructor experienced in operational logistics be assigned to the training unit as soon as practicable. (84) (94)

(177) LOGISTIC EVALUATOR  $\frac{1}{m}$  Lt Col R. B. Wall, USMC

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(18) JCSM 149<sup>1</sup>/<sub>61</sub> → (19) Washington, March 10, 1961.

(20) Subject: (27) Evaluation of Proposed Supplementary Phase, CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba (S)

(11) 1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have evaluated the military aspects of a supplementary phase to the CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba, which is being proposed by the CIA to meet certain Department of State objections to the basic plan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff military evaluation of the basic plan was forwarded to you by JCSM<sup>1</sup>/<sub>57</sub><sup>1</sup>/<sub>61</sub>, subject: "Military Evaluation of the CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba," dated 3 February 1961. ✓

(11) 2. The details of the proposed supplementary phase to the CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba, are set forth in the Appendix hereto.

(11) 3. The conclusions of the evaluation of the military aspects of the proposed supplementary phase are as follows:

(16) a. The selected objective area and the landing beach are suitable and adequate for the proposed operation.

(16) b. In the time available the company can be assembled, organized, and reasonably well trained to accomplish its mission.

(16) c. The company can be transported to and landed in the objective area.

(16) d. The concept of the plan and the known or expected location of Cuban military forces indicate that surprise should be achieved and that the landing will be unopposed.

(16) e. The company will have the capability to protect the provisional government representation and to sustain itself ashore for a minimum of three to four days and will have a good chance of sustaining itself indefinitely.

(16) f. The proposed operation can be supported logistically.

(11) 4. It is recommended that:

(11) a. The Secretary of Defense support the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as expressed in the above conclusions.

(11) b. The views expressed in the above conclusions be transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence for his information.

(170) For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

(17) L. L. Lemnitzer  
(28) Chairman  
(28) Joint Chiefs of Staff

(43) Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD

(C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381 (Sensitive). Top Secret.

(43) ✓ Document 1 m

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## APPENDIX

(55) DETAILS OF PROPOSED SUPPLEMENTARY PHASE  
TO THE CIA PARA-MILITARY PLAN, CUBA

(11) 1. The purpose of this supplementary phase is to land an element of the provisional government and a Cuban volunteer infantry company of 162 men, in a separate objective area in Cuba prior to the implementation of the basic plan.

(11) 2. To accomplish this, CIA proposes to take the following measures:

(11) a. Move 130 of the Cuban volunteers currently recruited in the Miami area to [B] 1-1/2 lines of source text not

declassified [C]

to join a cadre of 32 Cuban para-military trained personnel

[B] less than 1 line of source text not declassified [C] These 162 volunteers will be organized into a company and receive concentrated training by a cadre of US Army Special Forces personnel, from those currently assigned in Guatemala, for a period of approximately 12 days. The cadre of 32 para-military personnel have received approximately 9 month guerrilla training in Panama as action teams. Some of the 130 recruits have had previous military training.

(11) b. This company will be equipped with small arms, mortars, and 57 mm recoilless rifles.

(11) c. The company, with the provisional government representation, will be loaded on a 1500 ton Cuban commercial ship presently under contract to CIA and transported to the objective area. At the objective area, the landing will be effected at night by using four outboard motor fishing craft transported by the merchant ship. This landing will be made 24 1/2 hours prior to the implementation of the basic plan. After the main landing has been made this company will continue to act as guerrillas in support of the main effort.

[B] less than 1 line of source text not declassified [C]

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and the instructions of the President of the United States

and the instructions of the Secretary of Defense

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(11) d. The company will be provided with communications equipment for contact with CIA base and aircraft.

(11) e. The CIA plan envisions the company moving onto the high ground approximately two miles from the beach where it will provide protection for the provisional government representation.

(11) f. Plan calls for utilization of airdrop for logistic support.

(11) 3. The Cuban provisional government in the US will announce through news media the establishment of provisional government representation ashore in Cuba. The implementation of the CIA propaganda plan will immediately follow.

(11) 4. The basic para-military plan, details of which are set forth in the staff study, subject: "Military Evaluation of the CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba," dated 3 February 1961, will then be implemented. To give the Task Force an increased capability a fifth infantry company is currently being organized in Guatemala. This company will have the mission of performing basic logistic tasks and constitute a reserve element for the Task Force. (89)(94)

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(41)

CU-59

~~(This is a copy of the original in full in the report of the Kennedy Library 1971)~~

(50) Memorandum from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer) to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)

(14) Washington, March 25, 1961.

(18) CM-154-61

(20) Subject: Tasks, Para-Military Plan, Cuba

Enclosure: Copy No. 2 of Memo for SecState, SecDef, and DCI Dated 23 March 1961, Subject as Above

✓ 1. Recommend you approve the enclosed memorandum which sets forth the tasks to be accomplished by the Department of State, Department of Defense, and Central Intelligence Agency Representatives charged with the coordination of planning and conduct of the subject plan. The memorandum includes a time schedule for the completion of tasks set forth for the Pre-D-Day Phase.

14 2. In accordance with your desires, Brigadier General David W. Gray, USA, Chief, Subsidiary Activities Division, J-5, the Joint Staff, has been designated the DOD Representative and has been directed to keep your office informed on the status of plans and operations.

(17) L. L. LEMNITZER  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

(93) Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381 (Sensitive). Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.

✓ (93) 1 According to the Chronology of JCS Participation in Bumpy Road, maintained in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, on March 28 McNamara approved the agreed list of tasks to be accomplished by the Department of Defense, as outlined in CM-154-61. (Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials)

(93) 2 Printed from a copy that ~~bears this~~  
~~stamped signature~~ indicates Lemnitzer signed the original.

4150 ENCLOSURE

19 Washington, 23 March 1961.

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CU-59/2

26 MEMORANDUM FOR: 24 Secretary of State  
Secretary of Defense  
Director of Central Intelligence Agency  
26 FROM: 27 Tasks, Para-Military Plan, Cuba

11 1. The Working Group assigned to work out the detailed tasks for the planning and conduct of the CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba, and act as members of a Central Office for the operation, has agreed upon the tasks to be accomplished by the representatives of your respective departments and agency. The tasks are set forth for three phases: Pre-D-Day Phase; D-Day and Post-D-Day Phase until Recognition; and Post-Recognition Phase.

11 2. The tasks for the Pre-D-Day Phase are set forth in Enclosure A hereto.

11 3. The tasks for the D-Day and Post-D-Day Phase until Recognition are set forth in Enclosure B hereto.

11 4. The Tasks for the Post-Recognition Phase are set forth in Enclosure C hereto.

11 5. The proposed time schedule for the Pre-D-Day Phase is attached as Enclosure D hereto.

17 Department of State Representative

17 Department of Defense Representative

17 CIA Representative

~~Enclosure D is attached.~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~This document is for the use of the Department of State and is not to be distributed outside the Department.~~

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CU-59/3

(49) (50) ENCLOSURE A  
(55) PRE-D-DAY PHASE

- (11) 1. Department of State representatives will:
- (11) a. Prepare White Paper for Presidential approval.
- (11) b. Provide assistance to Mr. Schlesinger in preparation of material for Presidential statements.
- (11) c. Provide Working Group with Policy Statement as to what "recognition" really means.
- (11) d. Determine action, if any, to be taken regarding disclosures to Latin American countries <sup>T</sup><sub>m</sub> e.g.
- (16) (1) Guatemala
- (16) (2) Nicaragua
- (10) and other countries, e.g.
- (16) (1) United Kingdom
- (16) (2) France
- (11) e. Provide policy guidance for all aspects of the development of the Free Cuba Government.
- (11) f. Prepare plans for overt moral and other possible non-military support prior to recognition of the Free Cuba Government of the objectives of the Cuban Volunteer Force and of the Revolutionary Council, including possible action in the United Nations or in the Organization of American States.



⑪ g. Prepare plans for overt moral and other possible non-military support of the objectives of the Free Cuba Government when established.

⑪ h. Provide policy guidance to USIA to support this plan.

⑪ i. Prepare plans for Post-D-Day actions.

⑪ 2. Department of Defense representatives will:

⑪ a. Continue to provide training and logistic support to the Cuban Volunteer Force as requested by CIA.

⑪ b. Prepare logistics plans for arms, ammunition, and equipment support beyond the capabilities of the initial CIA logistics support.

⑪ c. Prepare plans for provision of support from operational forces as required.

⑪ d. Prepare letter of instruction to the Services, CINCLANT and CONAD for support of this operation.

⑪ e. Keep CINCLANT planners informed.

⑪ 3. CIA representatives will:

⑪ a. Establish a Central Office from which Executive Department and Agency representatives will coordinate planning and conduct operations.

⑪ b. Continue to supply guerrilla forces in Cuba as feasible and required.

⑪ c. Assist in the organization of a Free Cuba Government.

⑪ d. Conduct an interrogation of two or three members of the Cuban Volunteer Force to determine full extent of their knowledge of actual facts and provide information to the President as soon as possible.

201  
CU-59/5

(10) e. Finalize detailed plans for the employment of the Volunteer Force in Cuba and follow up plans. Execute these plans on order.

(11) f. Continue to recruit, train and equip the Cuban Volunteer Force.

(12) g. Prepare detailed plans for establishing contact with the internal opposition, establishing such control, coordination and support of this opposition as may be desirable and feasible.

(13) h. Exert effort to arrange defection of key Cuban personnel.

(N.B: The defection of the military commander of the Isle of Pines, or at least officers who could control the Isle, would be particularly desirable.)

(14) i. Continue detailed intelligence collection on Castro activities throughout Latin America particularly his efforts to export revolution.

(15) j. Support the preparation of a White Paper to be issued by the Free Cuba Government.

(16) k. Review cover plans.

(17) l. Coordinate with DOD representatives logistic follow-up support requirements.

(18) m. Review and implement a pre-D-Day psychological warfare plan.

(19) n. Review Psychological Warfare Plan for D-Day and Post-D-Day Phase.

(20) o. Intensify UW activities in Cuba.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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(1450) ENCLOSURE B

(55) D-DAY AND POST-D-DAY PHASE UNTIL RECOGNITION

1. Department of State representatives will:

- (11) a. Take such steps as may be feasible for the protection of U.S. citizens in Cuba.
- (11) b. Execute plans for support of the Revolutionary Council or Free Cuba Government in the United Nations or Organization of American States and to counter communist and/or Castro charges in the United Nations or Organization of American States, as appropriate.
- (11) c. Lend support to the objectives and actions of the Cuban Volunteer Force and the Free Cuba Government.
- (11) d. Revise plans as necessary for support of the Free Cuba Government.
- (11) e. Recognize Free Cuba Government as appropriate.

2. Department of Defense representatives will:

- (11) a. Provide follow-up logistic support as requested by CIA and/or in accordance with logistics plan.
- (11) b. Provide support from operational forces as directed.
- (11) c. Prepare detailed plans to support the U.S. aid plan for the Free Cuba Government for implementation when overt support is given.
- (11) d. Coordinate support by DOD agencies and commands.

3. CIA representatives will:

- (11) a. Execute and support over-all para-military plan.
- (11) b. Inform DOD representatives of logistics requirements.
- (11) c. Continue execution of psychological warfare plan.
- (11) d. Be responsible for the continuous operation of the Central Office and present briefings of the situation as required or directed.
- (11) e. Introduce representatives of the Revolutionary Council and of the Free Cuba Government into Cuba at an appropriate time.

(1450) ENCLOSURE C

(55) POST RECOGNITION PHASE

The Departments and the Agency will prepare, coordinate and execute, appropriate, such contingency plans as may be required and will, moreover, plan for the resumption of their regularly assigned functions in relation to the new Cuban government.

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CU-59/7  
49 50  
ENCLOSURE D

55  
TIME SCHEDULE

11 1. ③ D-14  
N

11b a. Department of State Representatives:

- 116 (1) Complete White Paper for Presidential approval.  
116 (2) Provide policy guidance for all aspects of the Free Cuba Government (continuous).

119 b. Department of Defense Representatives:

- 116 (1) Continue to provide training and logistic support to the Cuban Volunteer Force as requested by CIA.

11b c. CIA Representatives:

- 116 (1) Establish a Central Office.  
116 (2) Continue to supply guerrilla forces in Cuba as feasible and required (continuous).  
116 (3) Assist in organization of Free Cuba Government.  
116 (4) Continue to train and equip the Cuban Volunteer Force.  
116 (5) Coordinate with DOD representatives logistic follow-up support requirements (continuous).  
116 (6) Intensify UW activities in Cuba.

11 2. ③ D-11  
N

11b a. Department of State Representatives:

- 116 (1) Provide assistance to Mr. Schlesinger in preparation of material for Presidential statements (continuous).  
116 (2) Complete plans for overt moral and other possible non-military support of the objectives of the Free Cuba Government when established.

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CU-59/8

11 3. <sup>(3)</sup> D - 10  
N

11b a. DOD Representatives:

11b (1) Complete letter of instruction to the Services, CINCLANT and CONAD for support of this operation.

11 4. <sup>(3)</sup> D - 9  
N

11b a. Department of State Representatives:

11b (1) Provide Working Group with Policy Statement as to what "recognition" really means.

11b (2) Have approved policy position regarding action, if any, to be taken regarding disclosures to foreign countries.

11b (3) Complete plans for overt moral and other possible non-military support prior to recognition of the Free Cuba Government of the objectives of the Cuban Volunteer Force and of the Revolutionary Council, etc.

11b (4) Complete plans for Post-D-Day actions.

11g b. DOD Representatives:

11b (1) Complete logistics plans for DOD follow-up support.

11b c. CIA Representatives:

11b (1) Finalize detailed plans for the employment of the Cuban Volunteer Force.

11b (2) Complete detailed plans for establishing contact with the internal opposition and for establishing such control, coordination and support of this opposition as may be desirable and feasible.

11b (3) Initiate effort to arrange defection of key Cuban personnel.

11b (4) Complete review and implement a pre-D-Day psychological Warfare Plan for D-Day and post-D-Day phase.

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CU-89/9

~~TOP SECRET~~

(16) (5) Complete review of Psychological Warfare Plan for D-Day and post-D-Day phase.

(11) 5. <sup>(13)</sup> D-8

(11b) a. CIA Representatives:

(16) (1) Complete support of a white paper to be issued by the Free Cuban Government and arrange to have that Government issue same.

(11g) 6. <sup>(13)</sup> D-7

(11b) a. CIA Representatives:

(16) (1) Complete review of cover plans.

(11g) 7. <sup>(13)</sup> D-6

(11b) a. CIA Representatives:

(16) (1) Conduct an interrogation of two or three members of the Cuban Volunteer Force to determine full extent of their knowledge of actual facts and provide information to the President as soon as possible.

(11g) 8. <sup>(13)</sup> D-5

(11b) a. DOD Representatives:

(16) (1) Brief CINCLANT and CONAD planners.

(11g) b. CIA Representatives:

(16) (1) Complete contingency plan for the disposition, if necessary, of the Cuban Volunteer Force.

(16) (2) Complete preparation of final briefing on entire operation.

(11g) 9. <sup>(13)</sup> D-3

(11b) a. Department of State Representatives:

(16) (1) Provide policy guidance to USIA to support this plan.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~  
(119) b. CIA Representatives:

(16) (1) Complete detailed intelligence collection on Castro activities throughout Latin America.

(119) 10.  $\frac{D-12}{N}$

(116) a. DOD Representatives:

(16) (1) Complete plans for provision of support from operational forces as required.

(117) (119) b. CIA Representatives:

(16) (i) Present final briefing on entire operation (if not given prior to this date). (89) (94)

~~SECRET~~

390

(41) CU-140

(50) Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense /McNamara/ to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer)

(17) Washington, April 20, 1961.

(11) The President has asked that the Defense Department develop a plan for the overthrow of the Castro government by the application of U. S. military force. The plan should include:

201  
(11b) 1. An appraisal of the strength of the Cuban military forces.

(11) 2. An appraisal of the probable behavior of the Cuban civilian population during the period of military action.

(11) 3. An analysis of alternative programs for accomplishing the objective; e.g., a complete naval and air blockade vs. an armed invasion.

(11b) 4. For the recommended program:

(16) a. A detailed statement of the U. S. forces required.

(16) b. A timetable and a description of the specific actions considered necessary to accomplish the objective.

(16) c. An estimate of the potential U. S. and Cuban casualties.

(16) d. An estimate of the time required to accomplish the action.

(16) e. A list of contingencies which we should be prepared to face during the action.

(16) f. A detailed statement of the U. S. air, ground, and sea forces available for action elsewhere in the world during the period of the Cuban operations, and an appraisal of the extent to which such forces could cope with potential military conflicts in Laos, South Viet-Nam, and Berlin.

(11) The request for this study should not be interpreted as an indication that U. S. military action against Cuba is probable.

(11) By what date may I expect to receive a draft of your report on this subject?

SIGNED

(17) Robert S. McNamara ✓ 8964

Source:

(93) Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files:

FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381 (Sensitive). Top Secret.

(13) ✓ Printed from a copy that ~~contains this typical~~  
~~signature.~~ indicates McNamara signed  
the original.



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CU-144

Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to the President Kennedy

Washington, April 21, 1961.

SUBJECT: The Problem We Face

1. Right now the greatest problem we face is not to have the whole of our foreign policy thrown off balance by what we feel and what we do about Cuba itself. We have suffered a serious setback; but that setback will be trivial compared to the consequences of not very soon regaining momentum along the lines which we have begun in the past three months.

[Here follows Rostow's assessment of the existing lines of U.S. foreign policy and his recommendations concerning reestablishing initiative and momentum.]

9. As for Cuba itself, I have little background and little wisdom. There are, evidently, three quite different threats which Cuba poses, which are now mixed up in our minds and in our policy. There is the military question of Communist arms and of a potential Soviet offensive base in Cuba. If we are not immediately to invade Cuba ourselves, we must decide whether we shall permit Castro, so long as he remains in power, to acquire defensive arms; and we must decide what the touchstones are between defensive arms and the creation of a Communist military base threatening to the U.S. itself. I assume that evidence of the latter would take virtually as a cause of war, although we should bear in mind what the placing of missiles in Turkey looks like in the USSR. Second, there is the question of Cuba as a base for active infiltration and subversion in the rest of Latin America. Here, evidently, we must try to do more than we are now doing, and we should seek active hemispheric collaboration wherever we can find it in gathering and exchanging information on the networks involved and on counter-measures. This is, however, essentially a covert, professional operation. The more we talk about it the more we overtly seek to pressure Latin American nations to join with us the less likely we shall be able to get their cooperation in doing anything useful. Third, there is the simple ideological problem. Cuba is a Communist state, repressing every value we treasure. But on that ground alone we are prevented by our treaty obligations from acting directly and overtly. On the other hand, we are overtly also committed beyond sympathy to the support of those Cubans fighting for freedom. Here, how we proceed in what is to be done overtly and covertly is a most searching question. I have no advice to give except this: Let there first be a first-class and careful intelligence evaluation of the situation inside Cuba; of Castro's control methods; of the nature and degree of dissidence of various groups; of recent trends and their pace; and an assessment of vulnerabilities.

Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, China/Cuba, 1961. Top Secret. A note in the source just reads: 'This memorandum found in OSD Files bears the notation "For: Secretary McNamara and Mr. Gilpatric Only."' The copy of this memorandum found in OSD Files bears the notation "For: Secretary McNamara and Mr. Gilpatric Only."

~~TOP SECRET~~

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CU-144/2

⑪ 10. As I said to the Attorney General the other day, when you are in a fight and knocked off your feet, the most dangerous thing to do is to come out swinging wildly. Clearly we must cope with Castro in the next several years <sup>J</sup><sub>m</sub> perhaps sooner, if he overplays his hand and gives us an acceptable legal and international basis. But short of that, we must think again clearly and coolly in the light of the facts as they are and are likely to be. We may emerge with a quite different approach to the Castro problem after such an exercise, or we may proceed with more of the same. But let us do some fresh homework.

⑪ 11. In the meanwhile, what we must do is to build the foundation and the concepts, in Latin America, the North Atlantic Alliance, and the UN, which would permit us, next time round, to deal with the Cuban problem in ways which would not so grievously disrupt the rest of our total strategy.

*Here follows Rostow's recommendation*

⑪ [Rostow concludes by recommending that the President make a speech outlining "urgent action items" at home and abroad.] (89/64)

~~TOP SECRET~~

USO Files,  
FRC 65 A 346A  
CRNA-Cuba, 1961

CU-149

(50) Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke)

(14) Washington, April 22, 1961.

(11) In accordance with the discussions at today's NSC meeting, please have J2 move at once to coordinate with CIA in the prompt presentation of the material exposing the degree of Soviet Bloc military support to Cuba, and if possible Bloc participation in recent military actions. The object of this project should be to produce the most forceful possible public exposure on this matter. If some sacrifice of intelligence sources should be required to make the presentation effective, this could be considered. This project should be completed by Wednesday, the 26th.

*Robert S. McNamara*

(17) Robert S. McNamara (84'94)

(43) Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD  
 A  
 (C) Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381 (Sensitive). Confidential.

CU-153

(50) Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)

(19) Washington, April 24, 1961.

(26) SUBJECT: Notes on Cuba Policy

(H) Herewith, as promised, some notes on a possible approach to the problem of Cuba. You may wish to consider these tentative notions as you develop your own views in coming days.

(11b) 1. (B) The Approach. (7) The line of approach suggested has these two characteristics:

(16) a. — it would deal separately with each of the five separate threatening dimensions of the problem represented by Castro.

(16) b. — it would deal with these problems in ways consistent with <sup>1</sup>m- and, if possible <sup>1</sup>m- reinforcing to our world-wide commitments and, especially, to our relations with other Latin American states.

(11b) 2. (B) The Five Threats. (7) The argument begins by identifying these five threats to us represented by the Castro regime.

(16) a. — it might join with the USSR in setting up an offensive air or missile base.

(16) b. — it might build up sufficient conventional military strength to trigger an arms race in the hemisphere and threaten the independence of other Latin American nations.

(16) c. — it might develop its covert subversive network in ways which would threaten other Latin American nations from within.

(14) d. — its ideological contours are <sup>a</sup>moral and political offense to us; and we are committed, by one means or another, to remove that offense, including our commitment to the Cuban refugees among us.

R4 & R6 sent 2 Oct 61  
R1 sent 1/18/62

~~TOP SECRET~~

SecDef-Gent. No. 695

Source:

(43) Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A  
Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381 (Sensitive). Top Secret. Also sent to <sup>Rusk and ~~Robert~~ Dulles,</sup> the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence.

~~TOP SECRET~~

(16) e. — its ideological contours and success may tend to inflame disruptive forces in the rest of Latin America, accentuating existing economic, social, and political tensions which we, in any case, confront.

(119) Notes on possible lines of action towards each follow.

V (11) 3. (13) The Threat of an Offensive Base. (11) Following the opening in Khrushchev's latest note, Thompson should be instructed, at an early but cooler moment, to tell Gromyko: we note with satisfaction the Soviet commitment to forego an offensive base in Cuba; that, in line with the President's speech to the newspaper publishers, this is one of the minimum conditions for world stability. A further action on this threat is noted in paragraph 4, below. 2

(11b) 4. (13) The Threat of an Arms Build-up. (11) An OAS meeting should be called soon, but after careful diplomatic preparation. The objective would be to achieve common assertion of the following propositions:

(16) a. — The constructive tasks of this Hemisphere  $\frac{1}{m}$  symbolized by the Alliance for Progress  $\frac{1}{m}$  are such that we cannot afford to divert excessive resources to arms, picking up here from the proposal of Alessandri for hemispheric arms limitation.

(16) b. — We are not prepared to see extra-hemispheric military forces emplaced in the Western Hemisphere.

(119) On the basis of such declarations, the OAS would immediately mount arrangements for: hemispheric arms limitation; cooperative military arrangements to cope with any military extension of Castro's power; a demand that Castro accept arms limitation appropriate to the size of his country, under the common rules of the game; an assertion that the hemisphere will jointly act to prevent the creation of a foreign military base or other form of intrusion into the hemisphere.

(11) If Castro failed to play, we would move towards a selective OAS blockade of Cuba, designed to prevent arms shipments to him by sea, if not by air.

(13) 1 ✓ See Document  $\frac{1}{m}$  ~~supra~~

(13) 2 ✓ See footnote 2, Document  $\frac{1}{m}$  — (Coerr memo, 4/20)

⑪ 5. <sup>(3)</sup> The Threat of the Castro and Other Communist Networks. <sup>(7)</sup>

Quite independent of the OAS actions suggested under 4, above, we should begin covert cooperation with Latin American states to build up knowledge of the Communist network and to develop common counter-measures. Latin American governments will be able to work with us seriously to the extent that the effort is not made an overt political issue. Moreover, this is mainly a professional, not a political, job.

⑪ 6. <sup>(3)</sup> The Ideological Threat of the Castro Regime Itself. <sup>(7)</sup>

Here the first step is to make a fresh analysis, on the basis of all the rich intelligence available to us, of the vulnerabilities of the Castro regime. This involves two things. First, a detailed assessment of the Cuban order of battle; of Castro's control mechanism; of attitudes of key individuals <sup>located</sup> at strategic points in the regime; of class and regional attitudes towards the regime and recent and foreseeable trends in those attitudes. We need a map of the cohesive forces and tensions within the Castro system. Second, we require a systematic analysis of various alternative means of exploiting in our interest the weaknesses of the regime that lie within our present capabilities or capabilities that might be developed.

⑪ It is possible that we shall conclude that an invasion of one sort or another is the only way to unseat the regime; but alternative forms of action may emerge. In any case, it is essential that we think again before acting in the old grooves.

⑪ 7. <sup>(3)</sup> The Threat of Castroism in Other Latin American States. <sup>(7)</sup>

The roots of Castroism lie in Latin American poverty, social inequality, and that form of xenophobic nationalism which goes with a prior history of inferiority on the world scene. The vulnerability of the Latin American populations to this form of appeal will depend on the pace of economic growth; the pace at which social inequality is reduced; and the pace at which the other Latin American nations move towards what they regard as dignified partnership with the U.S. What is required here is a radical acceleration and raising of sights in the programs being launched within the Alliance for Progress.

⑪ 8. <sup>(3)</sup> A Contingency Plan. <sup>(7)</sup>

We do not know what Castro's policy towards the U.S. will be; nor do we know what Soviet policy towards Cuba will be. A situation may arise at any moment when it will be required in the national interest to eliminate that regime by U.S. force. A fully developed contingency plan is evidently required.

~~TOP SECRET~~

OASO(C) A File, FRC-77A2896

Cuba 381 (Sensitive)

① 9. <sup>(13)</sup> The Ottawa Speech. <sup>(7)</sup> If we can develop and agree a new line of approach to the Cuban problem in coming days, one possible occasion for suggesting some of its elements might be the President's address in Ottawa, scheduled (I believe) for 17 May. This would be particularly appropriate if we propose to induce Canada to join in the OAS. Other occasions, however, could easily be found; and it is, of course, essential that we make various soundings in the Hemisphere before committing ourselves to this course, notably those outlined under paragraphs 4 and 5.

① 10. <sup>(3)</sup> A Final Point. <sup>(7)</sup> In two of the four areas where we inherited Communist enclaves of power in the Free World on January 20, we have, initially, not done terribly well. Laos, at best, will yield in the short run a muddy and weak Free World position; in Cuba our first effort at a solution failed. There is building up a sense of frustration and a perception that we are up against a game we can't handle. This frustration and simple anger could lead us to do unwise things or exert scarce national effort and resources in directions which would yield no significant results, while diverting us from our real problems. There is one area where success against Communist techniques is conceivable and where success is desperately required in the Free World interest. That area is Viet-Nam. A maximum effort <sup>T</sup><sub>m</sub> military, economic, political, and diplomatic <sup>T</sup><sub>m</sub> is required there; and it is required urgently.

① It is not simple or automatic that we can divert anxieties, frustrations, and anger focussed on a place 90 miles off our shores to a place 7,000 miles away. On the other hand, I believe that the acute domestic tension over Cuba can be eased in the short run if we can get the OAS to move with us along the lines suggested here; and a clean-cut success in Viet-Nam would do much to hold the line in Asia while permitting us <sup>T</sup><sub>m</sub> and the world -- to learn how to deal with indirect aggression.

① In the end <sup>T</sup><sub>m</sub> given our kind of society <sup>T</sup><sub>m</sub> we must learn to deal overtly with major forms of covert Communist aggression. And we must teach the Free World how to do it. The combination of the suggested approaches to Cuba and Viet-Nam could help. <sup>84</sup> <sup>44</sup> <sup>3</sup> ✓

① <sup>3</sup> ✓ On April 26, Paul Nitze sent a memorandum to McNamara discussing the Cuban aspects of Rostow's April 24 "Notes on Cuba Policy". He concluded that: "The suggestions which have merit are the proposed actions (a) to quietly build up the internal capabilities of Latin American countries, (b) to develop all possible intelligence on the Castro regime, (c) to exploit this intelligence, (d) to develop a contingency plan, and (e) to "think again before acting in the old grooves." The suggestions <sup>that</sup> ~~which~~ he felt were of doubtful merit were: "(a) to deal separately with individual dimensions of the Castro problem, (b) to make consistency with our other policies a criterion of action against Cuba, and (c) to make public statements to the Soviets and to the world indicating the approach we intend to take toward Cuba." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381 (Sensitive))

⑤ Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense McNamara

④ Washington, April 26, 1961.

⑧ JCSM 278 161

② Subject Cuba (U)

⑪ 1. Reference is made to your memorandum to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 20 April 1961, subject as above. This memorandum with Appendices is responsive to questions posed by you in reference memorandum.

⑪ 2. Appendix A contains an analysis of courses of action. Appendix D contains a brief outline plan based upon CINCLANT Operation Plan 312 61 which will provide for the overthrow of the Castro government by the application of US military force, the course of action considered best suited to accomplishment of the objective.

⑪ 3. This plan, with appropriate additional instructions to CINCLANT as to timing and manner of execution, is responsive to the requirement for a military plan to accomplish the desired objective. The plan is well conceived, has been reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and will insure quick overthrow of the Castro government.

⑪ 4. There is a need for a well conceived political program to insure rapid turnover of control of government to designated Cuban authorities and permit the rapid withdrawal of US forces. It is recommended that the Secretary of State be requested to develop guidance in support of this operation.

1. Key Force 344 302 602  
Full-time mil 380 302 602  
Part 170 157 502  
Castro Equip. destroyed in battle

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

⑦ Earle G. Wheeler

ARLEIGH BURKE  
Chief of Naval Operations

Attachments

Copy of 10 Copies each of 1 pages series "A"

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Source:

RG 330,

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④ Washington National Records Center, OASD (C) Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381 (Sensitive). Top Secret.

④ - 1 Document in

④ - 2 Not found.

④ - 3 Signed for Admiral Burke by General Wheeler.

Wheeler signed for Burke above Burke's typed signature.



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CU-15912

49(50) APPENDIX A  
2

(SS) ANALYSIS OF COURSES OF ACTION

- (II) 1. The objective as stated by the Secretary of Defense is to overthrow the Castro regime by the application of military force.
- (II) 2. The analysis which follows has taken into consideration the world reaction to the abortive invasion of Cuba. Most nations apparently believe that the United States was wrong to give any support to this operation, particularly since there was no resultant uprising by the Cuban people. In the United Nations the prestige of the United States has deteriorated, and there are indications that the Latin American nations have lost some confidence in the United States. Within Cuba the incident has probably had the effect of strengthening the control held by the Castro government, instilling confidence and loyalty in the militia and other forces, and demoralizing the dissident elements which remain.
- (II) 3. Any military effort undertaken by the United States against Cuba will engender strong criticism by most of the world. If a military action or series of actions take appreciable time to accomplish the overthrow of the Castro government, this time can be used to the advantage of the Sino-Soviet Bloc and Castro in strengthening his defenses. More important, world Communism can use this period of time to advantage in building up a massive, world-wide, anti-US propaganda effort against the United States course of action, including introduction of a resolution to the UN. If the United States were to embark on such a course, and then, through the pressure of world opinion be forced to abandon its action, the result would be a severe blow to the prestige, the objectives, and the national interests of the United States. Achieving world-wide surprise in an undertaking like this is extremely important. It seems apparent, therefore,

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that any military operation undertaken to accomplish the above objective should be swift, sharp, and overwhelming and should present the remainder of the world with a fait accompli.

⑩ 4. The following alternative programs have been considered:

⑪ a. <sup>⑫</sup>Naval and Air Blockade. <sup>⑦</sup> A blockade could be instituted immediately and could be effective. It would stop the influx of Bloc military equipment and personnel, and would do much to halt the export of Communism from Cuba to Latin America. The Cuban economy, in particular the oil industry, is especially vulnerable to blockade, and it is believed that a blockade, by itself, could reduce the Cuban economy to chaos. However, a blockade would force great hardships on the Cuban people regardless of political belief, and it is likely that their plight would generate strong resentment in all of Latin America. Since a blockade must be time-consuming, world resistance could be skillfully built up by the Bloc, as pointed out previously, and the blockade might have to be abandoned. Since use of blockade would not, by itself, assure the objective it is not recommended as the only course of action. However, blockade should be utilized to complement a military invasion and, if such an invasion is to be delayed for an appreciable period of time, a limited blockade against military supplies and equipment should be instituted to prevent build-up of Cuban military strength.

⑪ b. <sup>⑬</sup>Overt Support of Cuban Dissident Forces. <sup>⑦</sup> This course of action would strengthen the dissident elements both materially and psychologically. The recent defeat of the invading dissident elements has undoubtedly had a demoralizing effect on them, and has probably weakened them in numbers and organization. Reorganizing these

⑬ 4 McNamara added a marginal handwritten note at this point which reads: "how soon would it force [illegible word] capitulation?"

groups, and attracting additional numbers in face of current repressive measures taken by Castro will be extremely difficult. Even if sufficient numbers could be organized, their training would take much time, and it seems evident that their quality could never come up to US standards. These factors all seem to indicate that this course of action by itself would give little assurance of accomplishing the objective, and it is therefore not recommended. While support to dissident elements should not be chosen as the main course of action, it should not be abandoned. These elements can be of great assistance in intelligence collection, serve as focal points for uprisings, and assist in military operations and continual harassment of the Castro regime. Some form of support in Cuba is necessary to give encouragement to resistance movements in Cuba and other countries and to impress them with the fact that the United States will not abandon them. The success of a military operation against Cuba, however, should not be made dependent upon the actions of any dissident elements.

346 (11) <sup>(13)</sup> c. Military Intervention by the Organization of American States. In world opinion, the US has replaced its previous policy of unilateral US action to prevent extra-continental interference in the affairs of this hemisphere, fundamental to the Monroe Doctrine, with a policy of collective action through the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Rio Pact. While instability in Latin America is due fundamentally to the lack of social and economic progress, instability has been increased and intervention by the Sino-Soviets in the affairs of this hemisphere has occurred partly because of the unwillingness of the United States to act unilaterally in the face of its treaty restrictions and the unwillingness of the OAS to act. The unwillingness of

the OAS nations to act against Cuba may be attributed to a long-standing fear of intervention by any country (particularly the United States) in their own internal affairs, as well as fear of reaction within their individual countries. Actually, the organization itself is weak. It is a system of 21 sovereign nations, each of which has equal vote. Any decision by the OAS must be a compromise that is acceptable to two-thirds of the member states. OAS military actions would be unlikely unless a majority of the states were convinced that they were faced with a clearly discernible external threat. Communist tactics, however, are subtle and cleverly screened. Although there is a growing awareness among the Latin American nations that the totalitarian Castro government is becoming a threat to their security, they do not yet consider it a clear and present danger. For these reasons OAS military action against Cuba is unlikely for the present.

(11) d. <sup>(13)</sup>Overt US Actions Supported by Latin American Volunteers. (17)

Participation by volunteers from Latin America in direct US military action against Cuba would soften the impression that the United States would be taking unilateral action contrary to the spirit of the UN and the OAS. In order to be convincing, it would have to be evident that there was a large number of volunteers coming from a variety of Latin American nations. The assembly and organization of these volunteers would be time-consuming, and all security of the operation would be lost. The success of this course of action seems unlikely and it is not recommended in any form.

(16) e. <sup>(13)</sup>Unilateral US Action

(16) (1) Unilateral military action by the United States offers the advantages that there need be no compromise in pursuing US objectives, and that a reasonable degree of surprise can be achieved. Disadvantages are that strong criticism will be voiced by many nations of all political beliefs, and that the Latin American nations may become particularly distrustful of the United States.

347  
(16) (2) If the United States could overthrow the Castro government through a swift and decisive action, it is believed that all nations would, even while criticizing, accept a fait accompli, especially since they recognize the inherent danger to the basic security of a nation posed by a hostile regime located in close proximity. There is also a good possibility that a decisive action taken by the United States against Communism would renew the confidence of many in the Free World whose faith in our leadership has been faltering.

(16) (3) An overt US action, if taken, must be assured of success. Physical capture and control of the Cuban government and key facilities is the only means of insuring that the objective of overthrowing the Castro government is achieved. CINCLANT Operation Plan 312<sup>1</sup>/<sub>N</sub> 61 (Cuba), which has previously been reviewed and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provides the means of achieving this objective. Implementation of the plan should be in such a manner as to achieve surprise, both world-wide and tactical, and to accomplish the objective in the shortest time possible.

(16) (4) Concurrent supporting actions should be taken as required, to assist in the accomplishment of the objective and to insure the establishment in Cuba of a situation satisfactory to the United States following the overthrow of the Castro government. Appropriate agencies of the Federal government should participate in this planning. One action that is recommended is the creation of an incident which will provide justification for the overthrow of the Castro government by the United States. Such an incident must be carefully planned and handled, to insure that it is plausible and that it occurs prior to any indication that the United States has decided to take

military action against Cuba. Premature exposure of the fact that the incident was created by the United States could cause a shift in sentiment by the Cuban people against the United States.

⑪ 5. More deliberate action

⑪ a. Another alternative to be examined is that of following a more deliberate course, characterized by extensive preparations both military and political. The military forces to be used in the operation could be brought to peak effectiveness at the time desired, and logistic arrangements could be thorough and complete. If the military posture in Cuba continued to improve, requiring additional assault forces to invade Cuba, these forces could be obtained through a selective increase of forces as shown in Annex C to

5 Appendix F. The time of assault could be chosen during a period when world tensions are low, minimizing the risk of having to conduct military operations in more than one place. The chances of achieving tactical surprise might be enhanced by planning the invasion for a time which coincided with routine training exercises.

⑪ b. With sufficient time available a "Freedom Brigade" composed of Cuban Volunteers inducted into the US Army could form the basis for a flexible organization which could contribute to guerrilla and unconventional operations, the spearhead of any overt military action and post combat reconstruction. Such a force would also have a psychological effect on Cuba and could be used to absorb Cuban manpower in the US and Caribbean area. The unit, as US leadership is replaced by indigenous leadership, could be discharged to be utilized as a purely national force.

345 c. Politically the United States could make a concerted effort to establish world support and acceptance of the necessity for taking action against the Castro government.

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Advantage could be taken of favorable political situations as they develop. Military action could be planned for a time when international bodies such as the UN and the Organization of American States are not in session, and when nations are preoccupied with other problems. Particular effort could be made to get OAS to propose or support action in Cuba.

① d. While a more deliberate course of action offers some advantages, past history seems to indicate that time is on the side of Castro. An invasion should not be conducted during the hurricane season, which lasts from August through November. The Castro regime could use this time to strengthen itself militarily and internally to the point that it would require a large-scale effort to overthrow him. Since this course of action would probably require large military effort, and shows little assurance of achieving the implicit political objectives, it is not recommended.

① 6. From a military point of view, it is recommended that the course of action proposed in paragraph 4 e above, in conjunction with the courses of action discussed in paragraphs 4 a and 4 b, be adopted if it is decided to accomplish the stated objective.

① [Here follows Appendix B, "An Appraisal of the Strength of the Cuban Military Forces", and Appendix C, "An Appraisal of the Probable Behaviour of Cuban Civilian Population During the Period of Military Action".]

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Appendix A

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## (49/50) APPENDIX D

## (55) OUTLINE OPLAN

(55) TASK ORGANIZATION (See Annex A Attached)(11) 1. Situation

- (11) a. Current Intelligence.
- (11) b. Enemy forces are organized Cuban military forces, Cuban militia, para-military groups and mobs, and possibly, Pro-Castro "volunteers" from Latin America communist elements.

## (11b) c. Friendly Forces:

- (11b) (1) US Department of State is responsible for evacuation of non-combatants, establishment of "Status of Forces" agreements, provisional local law enforcement agencies, base rights and overflight rights as required; and will provide for logistic support to indigenous personnel after the first five days of the operation.
- (11b) (2) MSTs and MATS will provide augmenting transportation as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- (11b) (3) Central Intelligence Agency will support the operation.
- (11b) (4) RIO Pact forces and indigenous forces may offer assistance.

(11g) 2. Mission

- (11) Commander in Chief Atlantic will, when directed, conduct military operations in Cuba in order to accomplish the following: Defend the Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay; restore and maintain order; Support or reestablish the authority of a Cuban Government friendly to the United States, and support the national policy of the United States.



(11) 3. <sup>(13)</sup>Execution

(11b) a. In the event that military operations are directed, any or all of the following courses of action may be undertaken by CINCLANT:

- (11b) (1) Reinforce and actively defend the Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay.
- (11b) (2) Interdict Cuban lines of communication.
- (11b) (3) Neutralize Cuban offensive capability by overt attack against military installations.
- (11b) (4) Conduct Naval and air blockade of Cuba.
- (11b) (5) Conduct assault operations to accomplish the mission.

(11g) b. <sup>(13)</sup>Concept of Operations

- (11g) (1) <sup>(13)</sup>Western Cuba. <sup>(7)</sup> When directed, operations in Western Cuba will be conducted by Army Airborne, Naval Amphibious, and Air Force and Naval Air Forces with the objective of seizing the Havana port and airfield complex, communications and government facilities in order to establish a base for further operations. Thereafter, operations will be expanded as required in order to accomplish the over-all mission.
- (11g) (2) <sup>(13)</sup>Eastern Cuba. <sup>(7)</sup> Naval and Marine forces under command of COMNAVBASE GTMO, will conduct operations to (a) defend the Naval Base at Guantanamo, (b) protect and/or evacuate United States and other designated nationals, (c) maintain a base for further operations.
- (11g) (3) It is essential that operations be conducted with rapidity and decisiveness by a concurrent amphibious and airborne assault in Western Cuba. This will require that the

amphibious elements be mounted and sail prior to deployment of airborne elements to the objective area. The combined airborne-amphibious assault and link-up of forces will ensure early availability of medium tanks and artillery in support of the airborne forces. The army seaborne echelon must be loaded out and sail so as to be available to commence off-loading on D-day.

(16) (4) Amphibious forces in Western Cuba will be relieved and withdrawn as soon as practicable for further operations in the Eastern Cuban area.

(16) (5) By 60<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub> 90 days after the initial landing of combat forces it is expected that conditions will permit the utilization of other forces as occupation troops.

(16) (6) The "objective areas" are initially the Western Cuba area for Army<sup>1</sup>/<sub>4</sub> Naval<sup>1</sup>/<sub>4</sub> Air Force operations and the Guantanamo area for Naval operations. Other objectives such as the Isle of Pines, specific cities, industrial plants or transportation facilities will be designated, dependent upon conditions prevailing at the time.

119 c. <sup>(12)</sup> Phasing

(16) (1) <sup>(13)</sup> Phase I

- (23) (a) Activation of operating headquarters.
- (23) (b) Reinforcement and defense of Naval Base at Guantanamo.

(16) (2) <sup>(13)</sup> Phase II

- (23) (a) Naval Task Force deploys to objective areas.
- (23) (b) Army Task Force deploys combat and service units to staging bases, prepared for airborne assault operations; deploys to objective area on order.

(43) <sup>(14)</sup> McNamara added a handwritten marginal note at this point which reads: "Should not Eastern and Western plans be carried out simultaneously?"

(43) <sup>(14)</sup> At the bottom of this page of the Outline Plan McNamara noted: "Too much boiler plate and not enough detailed planning".

(23) (c) Air Force Task Force deploys tactical elements to advanced operating airfields as required and air lifts elements of the Army Task Force to staging bases.

(14) (3) <sup>(13)</sup> Phase III

(23) Commander Joint Task Force conducts concurrent airborne and amphibious assault operations in the Havana area and supports defensive operations in the Guantanamo area.

(16) (4) <sup>(13)</sup> Phase IV

(23) (a) Commander Joint Task Force conducts amphibious assault and other operations in the Eastern Cuban Area to seize Santiago and other objectives as required.

(23) (b) Offensive land operations will be subsequently conducted to link up Army Forces, Western Cuba and Marine Forces, Eastern Cuba, if required.

(11) 4. <sup>(13)</sup> Administration and Logistics <sup>(11)</sup> are normal for Joint

Operations and will be based on the anticipation of sustained operations for a period of 60 <sup>1</sup>/<sub>N</sub> 90 days.

(11) 5. <sup>(13)</sup> Command and Signal <sup>(11)</sup> matters are normal for Joint Operations. 20

Commander Amphibious Force, US Atlantic Fleet will be alternate Joint Task Force Commander to Commander Second Fleet. Communications will be in accordance with current CINCLANTFLT procedures. 21

55 TASK ORGANIZATION

- 11 1. Atlantic Command  $\frac{1}{m}$  CINCLANT
- 11 a. US Atlantic Fleet  $\frac{1}{m}$  CINCLANTFLT
- 11 b. Joint Task Force  $\frac{1}{m}$  COMSECONDFLT
- 16 (1) Naval Task Force  $\frac{1}{m}$  COMSECONDFLT

23 (a) Striking and covering forces which comprise combatant air and naval elements plus underway replenishment group.

23 (b) Amphibious Task Force which comprises amphibious shipping, one command ship, eight destroyers and a landing force (II Marine Expeditionary Force) made up of:

- 25 Headquarters, II MEF
- 25 2nd Marine Division (-)
- 25 2nd Marine Air Wing (-)
- Force troops, Atlantic

16 (2) Army Task Force

- 23 (a) XVIII Airborne Corps Headquarters
- (b) 82nd Airborne Division
- (c) 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment
- 23 (d) 4th/68 Tank Battalion

- (e) 2nd Infantry Brigade
- 23 (f) 56th Artillery Group
- (g) Special forces and civil affairs teams

16 (3) Air Force Task Force

- (a) One Command Headquarters
- 23 (b) Two Troop Carrier Wings
- (c) Four Tactical Fighter Squadrons
- 23 (d) One Tactical Control Element
- (e) One half Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron

11 c. CIA Force Atlantic (when activated)

11 d. Special Operations Task Force Atlantic (when activated)

11 e. On Call Forces

16 Additional US forces as designated and directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, if required. It is anticipated that "On Call" forces will be the 4th Infantry or 101st Airborne Division, one Armored Combat Command, two additional Tactical Fighter Squadrons and uncommitted forces of the Atlantic Fleet. STATE OF READINESS TO BE DETERMINED BY JCS.

11 f. Augmentation of Air and Surface Lift

11 MATS and MSTs provide air and surface lift as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

93 In the margin at this point McNamara posed the question: "Is this enough?" He asked At the bottom of the page, for the total number of men involved in the Army Task Force.

1. The Castro regime is currently occupied in rounding up those dissident elements which have been exposed or which are in any way under suspicion. Time affords the regime the opportunity of crushing most opposition, imposing tighter control, strengthening its military posture, and propagandizing the public. If time passes without an indication that outside help will be provided to the Cuban resistance movement, the will to resist will be progressively weakened. Time allows world communism to marshal opposition to any move taken by the United States to overthrow Castro.

2. The hurricane season in the Caribbean normally begins in August. A military operation in that area should not be started later than July.

3. National Guard and Reserve Army divisions are brought to active duty for annual training commencing in June. If the Communist Bloc creates incidents in other areas these divisions could remain on active duty and other forces such as the 1st and 2nd US Army divisions released for action in other areas.

4. Subsequent to the overthrow of the Castro government a regime which is satisfactory to US objectives must be established in Cuba. In view of the current disorganization within the Cuban resistance movement, the time required to insure that such a government is prepared to take firm control is unknown. Since the political actions which will follow military operations will probably determine the long-range success or failure of the entire operation, this factor assumes great importance.

5. With no previous warning it will take a period of 18 days from the time preparatory actions are started until the first assault landings can be made in Cuba. Prior warning, permitting preliminary preparation, could reduce this time to ten days without giving advance notice to the rest of the world. Every effort should be made to conceal the purpose of the operation once troop embarkation has commenced.

6. If it is decided to overthrow the Castro government, the operation should be initiated as soon as possible.

43-10 A note in McNamara's hand at this point reads: "between 7/15 + 12/1?"

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ANNEX C TO APPENDIX D

CU-159/15

ESTIMATE OF TIME TO ACCOMPLISH OBJECTIVES

(11) D-day and A-hour are the day and time of the coordinated airborne and Marine assault on Western Cuba in the Havana area. Specific military actions, in phases, as included in current planning are shown below:

Phase	Day	Events	
Phase I	D+18	Decision to implement or prepare to implement plan for US intervention in Cuba.	1
		Alert CINCLANT, CIA, Department of State and other Unified and Specified Commanders.	2
		- CINCLANT notifies his component commanders, forces alerted. Joint Task Force Headquarter activated.	3
		- Implementing forces prepare for deployment.	4
		- Amphibious shipping proceeds to embarkation ports.	5
		- Reinforcement of Guantanamo.	6
		- Evacuation of dependents from Guantanamo.	7
		- Marshalling of supporting MSTs sea lift.	8
		- Commander Special Operations Task Force Atlantic reports to Commander Joint Task Force.	9
		- Form and deploy Naval Task Force.	10
		- Deploy Army forces to staging bases and loading out ports. Load and deploy on order.	11
		- Deploy Air Force tactical elements to advanced airfields and prepare for air operations.	12
Phase II	D-5	- Decision to accomplish plan for US intervention in Cuba, if not previously determined.	13
Phase III		- Departure of Army ground forces via sea lift.	14
		- Departure of Marine forces in amphibious shipping.	15
		- Diversions, as may be planned by CINCLANT concerning weather, and cover activities.	16
	D-day	- Coordinated airborne and Marine assault Western Cuba with supporting air strikes, air reconnaissance and blockade as required.	17
	D+2 to D+4	- Isolation of Havana	18
	D+6 to D+8	- Control of Havana	19
	D+17 to D+19	- Control of Santiago De Cuba.	20
	D+24 to D+34	- East-West Linkup of US forces.	21
	D+30 to D+54	- Cessation of Organized Resistance.	22
	D+60 to D+90	- Withdrawal of combat forces.	23
Phase IV			24

Table

(93) McNamara noted at this point: "could be cut to D<sup>1</sup>/<sub>N</sub>10 with prior warning"

(93) At this point McNamara posed the following question in the margin: "Should not force be expanded to permit simultaneous strikes West and East Cuba?"

## (49)(50) ANNEX D TO APPENDIX D

## (55) ESTIMATE OF CASUALTIES

- (11) 1. No reliable estimate of either friendly or enemy losses can be stated at this time. Such losses will be directly related to the intensity of Cuban resistance and inversely related to the speed and effectiveness of the assault by US forces. 1  
2  
3  
4
- (11) 2. Assuming that Army forces are committed in both the number and manner envisioned in the current operations plan, Army planners have estimated that ground forces would sustain approximately sixteen (16%) percent casualties. This estimate includes casualties of all types and is based upon a thirty (30) day operation with four (4) days of heavy fighting, the intensity of combat tapering off after that time. 5  
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- (11) 3. In view of the influence of political, psychological, and other similar considerations, the effect of which is unknown at this time, any estimate of Cuban casualties would be so hypothetical as to have little practical value. No estimate of Cuban casualties, therefore, is provided. 17  
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(11) [Here follow Appendix E "Contingencies that the US Should Be Prepared to Face in the Event of Operations in Cuba" and Appendix F "Residual US Forces".] (89)(94)

(43)(12) McNamara added a marginal note at this point asking for a specific number of projected casualties.

(44)

CU-167

~~Handwritten in file~~ 510  
CIA, 3/29/61

(50) Paper Prepared in the Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency

(19) Washington, April 28, 1961.

(26) <sup>(27)</sup> ~~SUBJECT~~ SNIE 85<sup>1</sup>/<sub>N</sub>61: OUTLOOK FOR THE CASTRO REGIME

Regime

(55) THE PROBLEM

(11) To assess the internal strengths and weaknesses of the Castro regime in Cuba and to estimate its prospects for survival, over the next six months and over the longer term, assuming that the US continues to encourage opposition to Castro but takes no overt military action against him.

(55) WORKING OUTLINE

(66) I. BASIC STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE REGIME

(11) A. On the eve of the abortive opposition landings in Cuba the Castro regime had changed greatly from that which took power

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(43) Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Nitze Files, Cuba Papers, 1961.. Secret. This draft of SNIE 85<sup>1</sup>/<sub>N</sub>61 was found in the Nitze files and was apparently circulated for comment at least to the Department of Defense. There is nothing on the source text to indicate reaction to the draft or any subsequent revision of the estimate. SNIE 85<sup>1</sup>/<sub>N</sub>61, as finally approved and circulated, has not been found.



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some two years earlier with plaudits of all but small proportion of Cuban population. In its transformation from a liberating movement appealing to all classes to a radical revolutionary regime it had lost many of its initial assets and acquired various liabilities. At the same time it had developed new and important sources of strength.

(11) B. Liabilities

(16) 1. Progressive alienation of most of those with stake in society, including much of organized labor and students as well as middle and upper classes. Alienation of some of peasantry. Internal and external opposition stirrings.

(16) 2. Economic problems and disruptions.

(16) 3. Dissipation of initial support in 26th July movement and in military.

(11) C. Strengths

(16) 1. Continuing importance of Castro as symbol of authority and prophet of reform  $\frac{1}{m}$  appeal of Castro and program to rural and urban poor.

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ONSD (C) A File: FRC 71A2896  
Nitzje File, Cuba Papers, 1961

(16) 2. Growing strength, experience and self-confidence of Communist and other activists manning the apparatus  $\frac{1}{m}$  increasing going concern value.

(16) 3. Increasingly effective controls over all phases of economic and social life and progressive elimination of dissidents.

(16) 4. Development of militia as security arm specifically tied to regime  $\frac{1}{m}$  impact of equipment and training.

(16) 5. Impact of Bloc economic, military and moral support, both in meeting specific problems and shortages and in bolstering confidence and prestige of regime.

(16) 6. Continuing usefulness of US as scapegoat.

(66) II. REPERCUSSIONS OF DEFEAT OF OPPOSITION LANDINGS  $\frac{1}{m}$  SHORT TERM PROSPECTS

(11) A. Assessment of internal advantages gained, with caveats about continuation of grumbling and opposition, reaction to mass arrests, probable misgivings in militia.

(16) 1. Likelihood of stepped up military and security preparations.

✓✓✓

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ONASO (C) A Files: FRC 71A2896  
Tutse Files, Cuba Papers, 1961

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(11) B. Outlook over next six months

(16) III. LONGER TERM PROSPECTS

(11) A. Over next 1 $\frac{1}{2}$  years regime likely to face serious problems in consolidating its position:

(16) 1. Regime will probably continue to face at least latent hostility of large proportion of population and has still to reconstitute broad, organized following among peasants and urban poor. Possibility of flareup.

(16) 2. Problems of adjustment and deferred maintenance likely to plague economy, increasing sources of discontent.

372 (16) 3. Regime still overly dependent on Castro as individual, though growth of Communist apparatus is likely to reduce this.

(16) 4. In time coherence, dedication, freedom from corruption and other distractions among those manning the state apparatus may decline  $\frac{1}{m}$  and at least some possibility of dissension at the top remains.

(16) 5. Probable decline in usefulness of US as scapegoat.

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OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71A2896  
Tutse Files, Cuba Papers, 1961

(14) B. On other hand, Castro regime has important opportunities:

(14) 1. In time, economic and social reform program likely to tie well-being of increasing numbers to the state, thus reducing incentives to buck the system.

(14) 2. The longer Castro goes on, the more likely the regime is likely to be accepted by Cuban people and rest of hemisphere as a going concern  $\frac{1}{m}$  grumbling (as in Yugoslavia) will not seriously threaten the regime. Impact of indoctrination.

(14) 3. Little likelihood of serious slackening in Bloc support.

(14) 4. Internal acceptance of exile groups likely to decline.

(11) C. The extent to which latent and active opposition will continue to pose serious problems for the regime will probably depend primarily on:

(14) 1. The extent to which the regime does in fact provide a tolerable livelihood for the Cuban people.

(14) 2. The extent to which hopes of successful (if eventual) overthrow are kept alive:

(23) a. Ability of opposition elements to maintain at least symbolic opposition in the mountains.

(23) b. Impact of apparent acceptance of regime by its neighbors  $\frac{1}{m}$  whether or not Cuba remains isolated or is accepted by Latin neighbors. (84)94

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UASD (C) A Files: FRC 71A2896  
Tutze Files, Cuba Papers, 1961

CU-171

(50) Memorandum From ~~the~~ Secretary of Defense /McNamara/ to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

(19) Washington, May 1, 1961.

(26) Subj: Cuban Contingency Plans

(11) On Saturday, 29 April, Admiral Burke and I reviewed with the President Contingency Plan 1 for the invasion of Cuba by U.S. troops. As you will recall, the Plan was designed to minimize U.S. and Cuban casualties, minimize the time required for subjugation of Cuba, and maximize the assurance of a successful operation. The Plan provided for the use of approximately 60,000 troops, excluding naval and air units, and required 25 days between the date of decision and D-Day. It was estimated that complete control of the island could be obtained within 8 days, although it was recognized that guerrilla forces would continue to operate beyond the 8th day in the Escambray Mountains and Oriente Province. The land, sea, and air forces required for the invasion were to be secured from existing forces ~~in~~ no additions to existing forces, with the possible exception of a few merchant ships, would be required prior to D-Day.

(11) The President concurred in the general outline of the Plan.

377 (11) Please assign to the Joint Staff and CINCLANT the responsibility for preparing the detailed instructions necessary to implement the Plan. These instructions should be designed to minimize the lead time required, and maximize security during the period between the decision and the invasion.

(11) I want to repeat again that work on these plans should not be interpreted as an indication that U.S. military action against Cuba is probable.

(17) Robert S. McNamara

(89) (94)

(43) Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381 (Sensitive). Top Secret; Sensitive.

(42) ✓ Not found. This was an apparent revision of the Outline Plan sent by the Joint Chiefs to McNamara in JCSM<sup>N</sup> 278761, April 26; For text, see Document <sup>1</sup>/<sub>m</sub>

(43) - 2/ Printed from a copy with a stamped indication that the original was signed by McNamara. *first indicates the original.*

CU-176


39A (44)  
(50) Memorandum From the Secretary of the Air Force (Zuckert) to the Secretary of Defense ~~/~~McNamara

(19) Washington, May 3, 1961.


(11) This is a follow-up to our discussion on Cuba yesterday morning. The Air Staff, in conjunction with the Tactical Air Command, has prepared a plan which would airdrop six Army battle groups plus necessary support (roughly two Airborne Divisions) into Cuba. This operation could start within 28 hours after receipt of the order of execution and would require 114 hours to complete. Fifty-seven squadrons of troop carrier airlift would be used, including 16 squadrons of Reserve Forces C-119's. The use of the Reserve squadrons is consistent with their combat capability and is necessary to preclude stretching out the assault time and thereby reducing surprise and shock effect.

(11) The plan is now in being in outline form and work is underway in developing the details. It is being coordinated with the Army. ✓

(11) I recommend you consider the type operation envisaged in this plan before any firm Department of Defense decision is made in this regard.

(17) ez (84) (94)   
Eugene M. Zuckert

(13) Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD.  
(C) Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381 (Sensitive). Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates that McNamara had seen the memorandum.  
(43) ✓ Not found.

  
Eugene M. Zuckert

Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to the Secretary of Defense's Special Assistant (Yarmolinsky)

CV-186

Washington, May 5, 1961.

(11) Today at the NSC meeting, the Department of Defense recommended against the formation of a "Cuban Freedom Brigade." Instead, we proposed, and the President approved, the induction of Cuban volunteers into the U.S. military forces.

(11b) I should like to ask you to assume the responsibility for working with each of the Services, ISA, Manpower and the State Department to develop a plan for carrying out this policy. The plan should provide for recruiting the Cubans in such a way as to avoid any implication that they would ever participate in an invasion of Cuba. Instead, they should clearly understand that their role would be the same as that of any other individual accepted into the U.S. forces. The Services should:

(11c) a. Consider the possibility of associating with the Cuban volunteers, volunteers from other South American and Central American nations.

(11c) b. Plan to identify the Cuban volunteers in such a way as to permit their consolidation into a Cuban unit, should the need for such a unit ever develop.

(11c) c. Outline the special type of training to which the Cuban volunteers might be exposed, e.g., "special forces" training.

(11c) d. State the changes required in our current recruiting regulations to permit the enlistment of foreigners.

(11g) I should like to be kept informed of the progress of your work. By what date do you anticipate it will be possible to present a plan to me which has been coordinated with all the parties concerned? Along with the plan, please send to me a brief memorandum to the President outlining what we propose to do.

Robert S. McNamara

Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Yarmolinsky Files, Cuban Volunteer Program. Secret.

In a separate memorandum to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and the Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, McNamara instructed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to respond to NSC Action No. 2422 by preparing plans for creating a Caribbean security force, and for initiating a naval patrol to prevent Cuban invasion of other states in the Caribbean. He instructed the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs to work with the Department of State to implement that element of the NSC Action which called for U.S. military officers to be prepared to "discuss the Castro threat to Latin America with Latin American officers."

(Ibid., Cuba 381 (Sensitive))

701

(44) CW-198

50 Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense's Special Assistant  
(Yarmolinsky) to ~~the~~ Secretary of Defense (McNamara)

(27) (19) Washington, May 18, 1961.

(26) SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation

(11) A meeting was called today at 11:00 A.M. by Mr. Richard Goodwin to consider the status of the Cuban exiles program now being developed. The following were present: Mr. Richard Goodwin, Mr. Arthur Schlesinger Jr., from the White House; Dr. Arturo Morales, Liaison Officer for State with the Cuban Revolutionary Council, Mr. Leon Ulman from Attorney General's Office, Commissioner of Social Security, Mr. William Mitchell, from HEW; Mr. James M. Quigley from the Office of Education and Mr. Adam Yarmolinsky and Mr. Maurice Mountain from Defense.

(11) Mr. Goodwin said there were three problems to be considered; first, the general program for exiles; second, relations with the Revolutionary Council and third, what sort of support might be given to any possible covert activities of the exile group. Only the first two items, however, were discussed.

(11) For the time being, Mr. Goodwin says, we are to deal only with the present Revolutionary Council and on an open basis, both because it will simplify our relations with the exiles and because it may have the effect of keeping them somewhat unified. This means we are to work with Miro Cardona and consult with him and his associates before taking any measures affecting the exiles. In this connection the primacy of the Department of State is to be recognized, with Dr. Morales the individual at State through whom we should work. There is no intention of having Dr. Morales handle all details, but it is desired that he be kept informed and his concurrence obtained on any significant actions.

5/12 (11) The program outlined by HEW is one of relief and resettlement with language training to be added. It was indicated that funds could be made available either through the foreign aid bill or the HEW budget. A decision on this, Mr. Goodwin indicated, would be reached within a week.

(11) Mr. Quigley reported an estimated cost of \$400 to \$600.00 per trainee for 8 weeks of intensive English language training. Mr. Mitchell said that any needed subsistence support of the trainees could be tied in with HEW's cash assistance program. Although no specific location was determined for conducting such training there were some expressions of disapproval of the idea of using vacant Army facilities. Mr. Mitchell, in particular, stressed the general objection to anything resembling a concentration camp.

(43) Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD  
(C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Yarmolinsky Files, Cuban Volunteer Program. Confidential.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CU-198/2

702

⑪ In general the Defense presentation indicated that other than for language training and some questions on security which are yet to be resolved there appear to be no insuperable obstacles to carrying out a program of accepting volunteers in the armed services. ✓

⑫ Defense was asked to provide as expeditiously as possible authoritative information on the methods used and problems encountered in the language training of Puerto Rican volunteers at Fort Buchanan. This information is being obtained now.

⑬ Mr. Muntain of Defense will join Dr. Morales tomorrow when he meets with representatives from the Cuban Revolutionary Council.

⑪ AY 85 94  
≡

ADAM YARMOLINSKY  
The Special Assistant

⑨3 ✓ In a note to Yarmolinsky on May 26, General Lansdale warned that past experience indicated that the major obstacle to accepting foreign volunteers into the U.S. armed forces might be the minimum mental and physical qualifications established by the armed forces.

(Ibid.)  
7

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CU-200

50 Memorandum of Conversation <sup>1961</sup> Washington, May 19, 1961, 4 p.m.

20 SUBJECT: <sup>27</sup> Meeting with Representatives of the Cuban Revolutionary Council

11 At the request of Dr. Morales Carrion, Dept. of State, a meeting of representatives of several departments of the U.S. Government with representatives of the Cuban Revolutionary Council was held at the Department of State at 4:00 p.m., 19 May 1961.

11b The participants for the Revolutionary Council were:

- 25 Mr. Varona <sup>1</sup> Military Affairs
- 25 Mr. Hevia <sup>2</sup> Foreign Affairs
- 25 Mr. Maceo <sup>3</sup> Welfare
- 25 Mr. Carrillo <sup>4</sup> Finances & Propaganda
- 25 Mr. Ray <sup>5</sup> Underground Activities
- 25 Mr. Aragon <sup>6</sup> Secretary to Mr. Miro Cardona, who is ill in Miami

11 On the part of the United States, in addition to Dr. Morales there were several representatives of the Department of State chiefly from the Caribbean area and the following:

- 25 Mr. James Hennessey <sup>1</sup> Immigration and Naturalization Service, representing Dept. of Justice
- 25 Mr. Leon Uhlmann <sup>2</sup> Office of the Attorney General
- 25 Mr. James Quigley <sup>3</sup> Assistant Secretary, Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare
- 25 Mr. William Mitchell <sup>4</sup> Commissioner of Social Security
- 25 Mr. Maurice J. Mountain <sup>5</sup> Policy Planning Staff, ISA, Dept. of Defense

11 After introductory remarks by both Dr. Morales and Mr. Hevia to the effect that this was an initial meeting to bring the Council and the United States representatives together in order to see what needs to be and can be done from here on to establish a free and democratic Cuba, Mr. Hevia raised the first problem.

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11 He said that extra planes were needed to get the people out of Cuba who have papers to leave, but who are daily turned away by PanAm because no space is available. PanAm carries out about 100 per day and they are

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INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
DEPT. OF STATE

SECRET

SEC DEF CONT NO. 2-808-1-12-507

93 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD  
(C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Yarmolinsky Files, Cuban Volunteer Program. Secret. Drafted by Mountain on May 22.

CU-20042

booked up through October of this year. Each day, Mr. Hevia said, as many as 500 are turned away. Mr. Brown of the Department of State was assigned the task of finding out what could be done about the matter.

(11) The second problem was that of obtaining waivers of visas for members of the underground who, for their own safety, should get out of Cuba. These people do not qualify for waivers on ordinary grounds since they have no relatives already in the U.S. When the discussion disclosed that a figure of about 40 people were involved, the problem did not appear to be insuperable to the Immigration and Naturalization Service and Mr. James Hennessey agreed to see what could be done.

(11) The third problem was how to get those Cubans who were now living in various Embassies in Havana, where they had sought asylum, to the United States without having them travel first to the country affording them asylum. The Council was aware of the fact that a Cuban granted asylum in, for example, the Argentine Embassy could claim safe-conduct only to Argentina. They wished to know how such people could be brought to the United States without first having to go to Argentina. The Department of State will study the problem.

(11) The fourth problem was how the Council could dispatch its representatives <sup>Dr</sup> teachers, workers, etc., on official missions abroad and be sure that they would be readmitted to the U.S. on their return. The status of the Cubans as refugees and the absence of customary documentation for reentry now makes it technically impossible for them to return to the United States once they leave. Mr. Hennessey and the Department of State will try to find a solution to this problem.

(11) The fifth problem was what to do about those persons who held four-year visas for the United States which are about to expire. Dr. Maceo explained that he personally was in that position since his four-year visa would expire in another five or six weeks. Mr. Hennessey indicated that this was related to the previous problem and that he would seek a solution for both.

(11) The sixth problem was a question of whether the United States would bring before the United Nations Commission on Human Rights or the Organization of American States, or both, the charge against the Castro regime of inhuman treatment of its citizens. A representative of the Department of State suggested that there were a number of reasons why the United States should not bring this charge, and he suggested that the Council work with other Latin American States to have them take the initiative. He assured the Council that the United States would support such a move; provided the initiative came from some other country.

222 (11) The seventh problem was a question of finances. First, the Council wanted to know about financial support for the refugees as a group; second, the special problem of survivors and families of the invasion force; and third, the financial support needed for future Council activities, particularly in the field of propaganda. They said that members of the invasion force had been paid \$175 per month with \$25 per month additional for each child. A total of about 2400 fighters were involved. 1,000 are now

7-50 (C) A Files, FRC 77A-896  
Karmolinsky Files, Cuban  
Volunteer Program

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prisoners, 200 are dead or missing, and another 1,200 have returned. They felt these payments should be continued so long as, for those who returned, they are not gainfully employed.

⑪ The Commissioner of Social Security, Mr. Mitchell, explained that the United States was now supplying cash assistance to the extent of \$100 per month per family, and that there were several reasons why this would have to remain the maximum. In addition, he pointed out, the United States is providing surplus foodstuffs free, is making available free education, extensive health services, and resettlement costs for those for whom employment can be found. For unaccompanied children all costs for their complete care are assumed by the United States.

⑫ In the discussion which followed, there seemed to be some confusion as to who was paying the \$175 per month. The Council members said it was CIA, but it was not clear whether these payments had been cut off for all, or were continuing for some, or what their status was. It was clear, however, that both Mr. Quigley and Mr. Mitchell would take up the question of support for the survivors of those killed, missing or captured in the invasion. Mr. Varona estimated that the fighting force and their families together numbered about 10,000 people. In response to a question by Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Varona stated that he was not asking support for those Cubans, resident in the United States, who travelled, sometimes from as far away as California, to join the invasion army. He had in mind only those Cuban refugees who had no other means of support. At this point in the discussion there was no further reference to support of the Council's activities.

⑬ The eighth problem was brought up by Mr. Ray who suggested a program should be set up at once and carried out vigorously to train doctors, engineers, public administration personnel. It became apparent that he was talking about a morale problem and that such training would be a morale booster to the extent that these people would feel they were training for a post-Castro Cuba. Mr. Mitchell responded to this question by pointing out the efforts that were being made to find employment for exiles who wished to utilize their skills and training in the United States. The Council reiterated their belief that a vigorous program to train people of this sort was needed and that it should be promoted in such a way as to improve the morale of the Cuban exiles.

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⑭ The ninth problem was posed by Mr. Varona and was addressed to the representative of the Department of Defense. Mr. Varona stated that it was the firm purpose of the exile group to continue the fight to free Cuba and to bring about the downfall of the Castro regime. He delivered an increasingly impassioned statement ending it with the following question which, he said, was the most important of all with which they were concerned. In accomplishing their objective of ridding Cuba and the world of the Castro government, what help, when, where and in what form could they expect from the United States.

⑮ Mr. Mountain responded by saying that the question Mr. Varona had asked was a most serious one. He said that he believed there was no American who did not share the desire of the Council to see the establishment

ASO (C) Files FRC 71A-876  
Palaminsky Files, Cuba  
Volunteer Program

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of a free and democratic Cuba. The answer to Mr. Varona's question, however, could only come from the highest levels of the U.S. Government, by which he meant the President and his principal advisers. He wished to assure Mr. Varona that the Department of Defense would do whatever the President and the high councils of the U.S. Government demanded of it. However, it was not a question which the Department of Defense, alone, could answer.

(10) Mr. Varona replied saying that he did not expect to get an answer, but that he wanted to bring this matter up at this initial meeting to emphasize the importance that they attach to this matter. Mr. Mountain answered that he understood Mr. Varona's purpose and that Mr. Varona could be assured that his question and the seriousness with which he raised it would be made known to the Secretary of Defense.

524 (11) Mr. Mountain then went on to say that the Department of Defense was now working on the development of a program along the lines of Mr. Ray's suggestion about further training for Cuban exiles. He explained that for those among the exile group who would like to receive military training a program by which they could be trained as individuals within the U.S. armed forces was being worked out. Mr. Hevia asked whether the trainees would be separated and scattered or whether they would train as a group. Mr. Mountain replied that it was the view of the Department of Defense that their training would be helped most by being placed within the established units of the U.S. armed forces. The council as a group took a dim view of any arrangement which would tend to split up the exile group. Mr. Ray said that the psychology of the Cuban group was more important than the efficiency of their training. He said it was absolutely necessary to keep them together, to keep their spirits up, to give them hope for the future, and to give some sense of purpose to their pursuits. He was against any program which would split them up. Dr. Morales entered the conversation by saying that we had apparently identified an area where there was an important difference of views and he was glad to see the Council express itself frankly and openly on the matter. He suggested that perhaps this was a matter which, having been identified, could now be taken up in another forum where the alternatives could be explored. The Council agreed. Mr. Varona said that if it was publicity that the Department of Defense was worried about, the same problem would exist if an attempt were made to train Cuban soldiers scattered throughout the U.S. forces.

(12) Mr. Maceo asked if the Defense program could make provision for keeping Cuban officers in training, and Mr. Hevia asked what provision could be made for military personnel in the age group over 26 but perhaps not older than 35 or 36. Mr. Maceo also asked what provision could be made for doctors in the armed forces.

(13) Mr. Mountain said that the problem of training Cuban officers posed some special difficulties which were not easily solved; that the defense program dealt only with the 17 to 26 age group; and as for the training of doctors, that was a problem which was not specifically a Defense matter. If some such program as Mr. Ray had proposed were worked out perhaps the doctors could be trained in that way. Mr. Maceo, however, repeated that it was training in the armed forces for doctors as well that he thought was important.

93 On May 26 Yarmolinsky, acting on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, circulated a plan for "Service of Cuban Volunteers in the U.S. Armed Forces" to the various branches of the armed services for comment. The plan was based on the assumption that the Cuban volunteers inducted would be spread throughout the several services for training and incorporated into existing military formations. (Ibid.)

He pointed out that many of them had been soldiers as well as doctors and he felt that training in military medicine or in medicine within a military organization would be highly desirable. Mr. Mountain agreed that Defense would explore these matters further.

(11) Mr. Carrillo then read a prepared paper on the Council's plans for a world-wide propaganda effort. The paper itself was turned over to Dr. Morales. In effect, it proposes to make of the exile group an activist anti-Communist organization which will engage in propaganda, mobilization of public opinion, and popular agitation principally in the Western Hemisphere, but also in Europe and Asia. They will seek the integration of different local groups in each country, principally against Communists, and will employ for the purpose Cuban exiles and people native-born in the country of their operations. They intend to operate not only in South and Central America, but also in the United States and Canada. They visualize this effort not only as directed toward the overthrow of Castro, but also as a movement to destroy communism. They expect within the next two to three months to have committees established in all Latin American countries and to have enlisted some 50,000 people in their work.

(11) The immediate need, however, they said, and all the Council emphatically agreed, was to construct at Key West a long-wave radio station which could overcome the jamming effect of Castro's device of having 500 ham radio operators in Cuba go on the air to prevent reception of long-wave radio programs from the U.S. They said he had confiscated all short-wave radios, and it was necessary for the people of Cuba to get encouragement and hope from the exile group, but this was not possible without a radio station which could cut through the Castro jamming system.

(11) Dr. Morales said that he felt this whole area of propaganda activities was an important one, and that it should be taken up in an appropriate forum. The Department of State would be the agency to which the Council should look for further exploration of these possibilities.

(11) One of the Council members mentioned that before the invasion the passports of about 400 of the fighters in the invasion force had been collected, he did not know by whom, but that he would like to have them returned to the individuals to whom that had been issued. A representative of the visa section of the Department of State said he would look into the matter.

(11) Mr. Ray brought up the question of some 13 Cubans still being held in Camp McClelland and wanted to know what could be done about their release. Mr. Uhlman and Mr. Hennessey promised to look into the matter.

(11) Dr. Morales suggested, and it was agreed, that a similar meeting be scheduled on a regular basis, initially every two weeks in Washington to canvas whatever major and pressing problems existed and to receive reports on progress made in solving them. He suggested that he be kept informed of actions taken, but that the Council consult with the representatives of the Departments on specific matters without clearance through him. This was agreed, but Mr. Mountain noted that the questions addressed to the Department of Defense had implications extending beyond the competence of the Department of Defense. He, therefore, suggested that more fruitful discussion of some of these problems might be possible if Dr. Morales was present at least for the first few meetings with Department of Defense representatives. This was readily agreed to and the Council will, for the present time, contact the Department of Defense through Dr. Morales.

*Maurice J. Mountain*  
(17) MAURICE J. MOUNTAIN

(28) Director, Policy Planning Staff

(89) (94)

CV-203

50 Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
(Lemnitzer) to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)

17 Washington, June 8, 1961.

18 CM-224-61

20 SUBJECT: Cuba

11 In response to your request, the Director for Intelligence,  
Joint Staff, in consultation with the Central Intelligence Agency,  
has prepared an estimate of usable guerrilla areas, the political-  
police control mechanism, key pro-Castro sub-leaders, and possi-  
ble guerrilla centers in Cuba, enclosed herewith.

17 L. L. LEMNITZER ✓  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

~~Enclosure~~

~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

43 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD  
(C) Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381 (Sensitive). Top Secret. A note  
on the source text indicates that McNamara's office received the  
memorandum on June 9.

43 ✓ Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

original

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1. <sup>B</sup> Preamble <sup>n</sup> It is impossible to estimate the amount of really hard-core pro-Castro residual which would remain in Cuba after the overthrow of Castro. Many factors would contribute to increase or decrease the guerrilla potential facing any successor government. Some of these factors are:

- II a. Degree of acceptability of new government to Cuban population.
- II b. Policy of new government with regard to good agrarian reforms instituted by Castro.
- II c. Extent of vindictiveness practiced by new governmental bureaucracy against Castroites.
- II d. Efficiency with which campaign to overthrow Castro <sup>was</sup> were executed and degree of success quickly attained.

Almost all factual information on Cuba is old. New information is very fragmentary and mostly laced with gossip, rumor, and propaganda. Current sources are not considered trained intelligence observers and their information is not subject to check or confirmation, hence is of little value. Any estimate on Cuba at this time must necessarily be based on background rather than current information.

II 2. <sup>B</sup> Pro-Castro Areas of Cuba

II a. <sup>B</sup> Geographically. <sup>n</sup> Pro-Castro sentiment exists throughout the island. The degree to which a particular area or province should be regarded as pro-Castro or anti-Castro cannot be determined with any precision. Localities which, on the surface, appear mostly pro-Castro might react violently anti-Castro if the political-police control apparatus were removed or if US forces were in the area. We have no reliable evidence upon which to base a precise judgment that certain geographic areas are more or less pro-Castro than others but Havana province and parts of Oriente province are probably the most pro-Castro localities.



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11 b. <sup>13</sup>Sociologically.<sup>n</sup> Within the Cuban society, Castro's principal support comes from the peasant or <sup>13</sup>campesino<sup>n</sup> group and the underprivileged. Identification of these groups with the Castro regime has given them a sense of importance in the Cuban scene far beyond that which they formerly enjoyed. Continued identification with Castro promises them a far better life than they heretofore had any reason to expect. Many of these people have become so tied to the Castro regime by their own acts that their lives would be forfeit under any successor government. Hence, it is probable that many of them would at least attempt to flee to the hills and continue to fight if Castro was able to gain sanctuary in the mountains. Important Castro strength also exists in the ranks of urban labor and among the students although in both groups considerable anti-Castro sentiment is evident. The Havana Dock Workers Union and the Electrical Trades Union have both exhibited displeasure over working conditions and pay scales under Castro. The students are angry over the loss of autonomy of their institutions of learning, long a Latin American tradition, and there have been some anti-Castro manifestations as a result. However, offsetting factors include the infusion of many rural students by Castro who would otherwise have been unable to attend.

11 c. <sup>13</sup>Governmental.<sup>n</sup> The large governmental bureaucracy which extends into every province, city, town, village, and hamlet on the island can be regarded as staunchly pro-Castro, although defections do occur from time to time. All governmental officials including the rural police owe their jobs to loyalty to and support of Castro. However, it is probable that, faced with the overthrow of Castro's government, many of these people would immediately switch sides.

2 11 3. <sup>13</sup>Areas Favorable for Guerrilla Activity.<sup>n</sup> (See Appendix "A")) Traditionally, the mountainous areas of Cuba have been used for guerrilla activity, and these areas still provide the most favorable areas from which to conduct this type of activity.

43 <sup>2</sup> Appendix A, not printed, is a map of Cuba with the areas cited in the text highlighted.

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CW-203/4

Suitable areas exist in Pinar del Rio province (Sierra de los Organos and Sierra del Rosario), Las Villas province (Sierra de Trinidad, also known as Sierra de Escambray), and Oriente province (Sierra Maestra, Sierra del Cristal, and Cuchillas de Toar). Historically, the Peninsula de Zapata has also harbored guerrilla bands, but because of the difficulties of egress, especially in the rainy season, has not seen extensive use.

4. <sup>13</sup>Political-Police Control Mechanism

a. <sup>13</sup>Provincial Organization <sup>71</sup> The political-police mechanism in Cuba is based on the provincial organization and all provinces follow the same pattern. Each province has a rural police regiment whose headquarters is located in the provincial capital city. Subordinate to the police regiment are a reserve company and several police squadrons each of approximately 165 officers and men, varying in numbers according to the size of the province and the number of important urban localities in the province. Squadron headquarters are located in the principal towns in the province. Squadrons, in turn, establish police posts (usually 8-10 men each) in the smaller towns and villages, and patrol outlying areas and beaches. Communication is via both police and commercial facilities, including radio communication with patrol vehicles. Under Castro, a system of "block informants" has been established which keeps the police informed of anti-Castro or counter-revolutionary activities. Local part-time militia units are based on the local police post or squadron headquarters where their arms are normally stored and where orders are received.

b. <sup>13</sup>National Organization <sup>71</sup> Rural police regiments are controlled from Havana by the Ministry of Armed Forces. The total strength of the Rural Police (a part of the Army) is 9,600. Within Havana itself, police power is exercised by the National Police, a force of about 9,000 whose current subordination is unknown. The National Police have not heretofore been a part of the Cuban Armed Forces.

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CW-203/5

(11) 5. <sup>(13)</sup> Key Pro-Castro Sub-Leaders. <sup>(1)</sup> In view of the paucity of credible information currently coming out of Cuba, any listing of key sub-leaders would necessarily be based on past, rather than current, performance. Further, given Castro's penchant for rapidly disposing of "friends" who do not fully agree with him, it may rapidly be outdated. However, the list of personalities at Appendix "B" represents some of the key second and third line leaders as nearly as can be determined at this time. Additional names are filed by the intelligence community and are watched as information becomes available. However, it can be assumed that all governmental and military leaders including local mayors, governors, cabinet ministers and sub-ministers could be considered in the key sub-leader category.

(11) 6. <sup>(13)</sup> Possible Guerrilla Centers. <sup>(7)</sup> As indicated in paragraph 3 supra, certain areas of Cuba lend themselves favorably to guerrilla activity. However, the exact location of guerrilla centers could only be determined after they develop, with one notable exception. In January 1961, a report from a trained observer in Cuba indicated that arms and ammunition were being placed in an abandoned mine in the Sierra Maestra in Oriente province. Since that time, additional reports have indicated that a military camp was under construction at the same place, the remnants of the only parachute-trained unit in the Cuban Army are reported stationed there, and the same area has been used to train Latin American youths invited to Cuba for revolutionary training. Significantly, this area was Fidel Castro's base before his successful seizure of power from Batista, and knowing the difficulties he experienced in obtaining arms and ammunition during his stay on the Pico Turquino in the Sierra Maestra, it is a logical place for his stockpiling weapons against the possibility of his overthrow. This location is known as Minas del Frio. It must be noted, however, that there is no evidence of recent date to confirm this analysis.

(11) 7. If the Cuban populace failed to support the overthrow of Castro and chose to support pro-Castro guerrilla bands, the

CV 203/6

following general areas could become guerrilla centers and might possibly support guerrilla populations as noted:

34

<u>Province</u>	<u>Area</u>	<u>Supportable Guerrilla Population</u>
Pinar del Rio	Sierra de los Organos	100
	Sierra del Rosario	100
Las Villas	Sierra de Trinidad	2,000
Oriente	Sierra Maestra	5,000
	Sierra del Cristal	300
	Cuchillas de Toar	200

Guerrillas in these areas would exist by foraging on the local population for food, clothing, and medical supplies.)

(89-94)

CU-204

Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense ~~McNamara~~ to the President,

Kennedy

Washington, June 8, 1961.

SUBJECT: Service of Cuban Volunteers in U. S. Armed Forces

In response to your instruction at the NSC meeting of 5 May 1961, the Department of Defense has prepared the attached program to enable Cuban volunteers to serve in the U. S. armed forces.

There is at present no census of the Cuban exile population in the United States which accurately reflects the number of males between the military ages of 17 to 26. However, from figures supplied by the Cuban Refugee Emergency Center in Miami, out of a total of 25,000 of all ages registered at the center 17,350 are adults of whom approximately 75% fall within the 18-30 age group. On this basis it appears likely that no more than 3,500 are of military age. If this figure represents the upper limit, the number who would be interested in volunteering for service with the U. S. armed forces will probably be considerably smaller. In the absence of a census, the plan has assumed that the number of volunteers will be not more than 2,000 and may be as few as 800.

There are some legal barriers to the enlistment of aliens in the U. S. armed forces. These barriers, however, do not prevent their voluntary induction if they are between the ages of 18-26. It is therefore planned to make use of the existing mechanisms of the U. S. Selective Service System to provide special quotas for induction into the three services of Cuban volunteers in this age group as they become identified and available. An exception in the law allows the enlistment of aliens up to age 31 in the regular Army and up to age 28 in the regular Marine Corps. The plan makes use of this provision as well.

Special measures for security screening have been stipulated.

The Department of Health, Education and Welfare has agreed to provide and fund any needed English language training prior to actual induction of volunteers. The purpose of this arrangement is to avoid

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REGRADING: DOD DIR-6200-10

Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330,  
OSD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, Cuba 1961 121-353. Confidential.  
Drafted in OASD/ISA by Mountain.

See Document

Not printed.

CU-20412

OSD, Subject: Service of Cuban Volunteers in U. S. Armed Forces

the necessity for assembling Cuban personnel in one place for training under military auspices. With their English language training completed before entry into the armed services, Cubans can be processed and trained as individuals along with U. S. personnel. In addition, this arrangement assures the military services of trainable people from the start, and will tend to cut down attrition rates after induction.

Although the Cuban volunteers will join the armed forces as individuals and will be trained as such along with U. S. personnel, the military services will be given informal instructions to make provisions for readily identifying and locating each of these volunteers should it ever become necessary.

The services will be required to give these volunteers the most advanced individual training possible. However, assignment to training or duty requiring access to classified information will be held to a minimum.

No increase in manpower ceilings is proposed. Once language training has been funded by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, additional costs to the military services for the processing of these volunteers can be handled within present budgets.

Signed  
ROBERT S. McNAMARA  
Secretary of Defense

~~1. Initial~~  
~~Subject Plan~~

~~Orig. & 2nd. President~~ Receipt #C-39440

~~Info. ops.~~

2 cc: Sec of State Receipt #C-39441

1 cc: Sec, Health, Education & Welfare Receipt #C-39442

1 cc: Dir, Sel Service System Receipt #C-39443

1 cc: Army Receipt #C-39444

1 cc: Navy Receipt #C-39445

1 cc: Air Force Receipt #C-39446

1 cc: ASD (Manpower) Receipt #C-39447

1 cc: ASD (PA) Receipt #C-39448

1 cc: Gen Counsel Receipt #C-39449

1 cc: OSD files

1 cc: R&C files

1 cc: Plans Gen Chron

1 cc: Plans subj file

1 cc: Chron, Mr. Mountain

Mr. M. J. Mountain/ymh/7 Jun 61  
Policy Planning/30283/72247

I-4991/61

93-3 On July 10, McNamara sent a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force indicating that the President had concurred in the program for the induction of Cuban volunteers into the U.S. armed forces, which was outlined in McNamara's memorandum to the President on June 8. McNamara instructed that the program be implemented by each of the services as quickly as possible. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, Cuba 1961 121-353)

53/ 93-4 Printed from a copy that DECLASSIFIED  
stamp signature

CU-211

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Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense *McNamara*

Washington, June 16, 1961.

JCSM-414-61

Subject: Contingency Outline Plan (Cuba) (S)

1. On 1 May 1961, in a memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you requested that the Joint Staff and CINCLANT be assigned the responsibility for preparing instructions necessary to implement a Cuban Contingency Plan which would minimize the lead time required and maximize security during the period between the decision and invasion.

2. CINCLANT has developed an outline plan with a 5 day lead time. This plan has been reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The following major considerations are involved:

a. Cost Requirement for shipping and repositioning of units results in an estimated initial cost of \$52.4 million and a cost of maintenance on a 30 day basis of \$8.2 million.

b. Redeployment The redeployment of the Marine Expeditionary Brigade from PACOM will reduce the capability of CINCPAC to react to contingencies in his area as long as those forces and related shipping are deployed in Atlantic or Gulf Coast waters.

c. Training and Morale A short reaction time requires that units be on a continuing alert status over a long period of time. This adversely affects a unit's ability to maintain training efficiency and may affect morale. This could offset the advantages gained by a short reaction time.

d. Repositioning The plan requires the repositioning of two major Army combat units to a presently inactive Army post (Fort Polk, Louisiana) and the possible closing of another (Fort Devens, Massachusetts). This may have serious domestic political implications.

Washington National Records Center, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381 (Sensitive). Top Secret. The source text bears a stamped indication that it was seen by the Secretary of Defense.

See Document *m*

Not found.

RG 330

CSO D-5-75-02-8-97

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CU-211/2

~~TOP SECRET~~

⑪ e. Security - The required movement to pre-position forces as envisioned in the plan would be impossible to conceal. Accordingly, it is unlikely that any cover plan would hide the intent and purpose of proposed actions. However, deception plans could be designed for the purpose of misleading the Cuban forces as to the specific areas and timing of the assault.

⑫ 3. CINCLANT has stated that a more economical use of forces can be achieved if more time is allowed between the order to execute and the initial assault. He estimates that he could implement a modification of his current operations plan for Cuba in 18 days from "Execute" to "Assault" and this plan would bring Cuba under control in a relatively short period of time.

⑬ 4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude, therefore, that more leeway must be provided in the reaction time; and that with activation of some additional amphibious shipping CINCLANT will be able to achieve a reaction time within 18 days from "Execute" to "Assault". This is the course of action recommended.

72 ⑭ 5. In the event emergency conditions, such as an immediate requirement to succor US citizens whose welfare has been placed in serious and immediate jeopardy, an airborne assault of approximately two divisions could be initiated against the Havana area with a lead time of five to six days. The combat elements of the force could close in 81-1/2 hours. All combat elements and scheduled support units could close in 114 hours. Marine augmentation forces could be air landed at Guantanamo for defense and expansion of control in that area, a Marine BLT could seize a beach-head in the Havana area as a diversionary support of the airborne assault, and follow-on forces would be phased in as rapidly as possible. It is recognized that this course of action is less desirable and is intended to be used if the situation so warrants.

3 ⑮ 6. As a result of our review, a memorandum has been prepared for dispatch to CINCLANT giving him additional guidance.

⑰ ⑱ For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

*Arleigh Burke*

⑰ ARLEIGH BURKE  
⑲ Chief of Naval Operations ⑳ ㉑

⑳ Not found.



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CU-231

~~Accompanied in full~~  
~~75F-505, 1/8/76~~  
831

(50) National Security Action Memorandum No. 100

(19) Washington, October 5, 1961.

(26) SUBJECT: <sup>(27)</sup> Contingency Planning for Cuba ✓

(11) In confirmation of oral instructions conveyed to Assistant Secretary of State Woodward, a plan is desired for the indicated contingency in Cuba.

(17) McGeorge Bundy ✓ <sup>(89)(94)</sup> 2

(93) Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381 (Sensitive) Top Secret. The memorandum was addressed to Secretary of State Rusk. Copies were also sent to the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and Richard Goodwin, as Director of the Cuban Task Force.

(93) - ✓ For the nature of the contingency planning required, see the Document ~~in~~ <sup>that</sup>

(93) - ✓ Printed from a copy ~~which~~ <sup>that</sup> bears this typed signature.

CU-239

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④  
⑤ Memorandum From the Director for Intelligence of the Joint Staff  
(Collins) to ~~the~~ Secretary of Defense (McNamara)

①④ Washington, November 28, 1961.

①⑧ J2DM-455-61.

②⑥ Subject: ②⑦ SNIE 85-61, "The Situation and Prospects  
in Cuba" ✓

②⑩ Enclosure: ②⑦ Brief of SNIE 85-61

①① On 28 November 1961, the United States Intelligence Board  
approved the Estimate on "The Situation and Prospects in Cuba"  
(SNIE 85-61). A brief of this Estimate is attached for your  
information in advance of the regular distribution which will  
be forthcoming.

*Richard Collins*  
①⑦ RICHARD COLLINS  
②⑧ Major General, USA  
②⑧ Director for Intelligence

⑦④ Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ISA Files:  
FRC 64 A 2382, Cuba, 1961, 121-353. Secret.

④③ ✓ Not Printed. (Department of State, INR/NIE Files)

629

846  
CU-239/2

~~SECRET~~  
(49) (50) Enclosure

(55) BRIEF

(55) SNIE 85<sup>1</sup>/<sub>N</sub>61: THE SITUATION AND PROSPECTS  
IN CUBA

(11) This Special National Intelligence Estimate was approved by the United States Intelligence Board on 28 November 1961. Significant judgments of this Estimate are as follows:

(11) The Castro regime has sufficient popular support and repressive capabilities to cope with any internal threat likely to develop within the foreseeable future. The regime faces serious, but not insurmountable, economic difficulties. The contrast between the regime's roseate promises and the grim actuality is causing increasing dissatisfaction and **disillusionment** which, however, is manifesting itself more in widespread apathy and resignation than in active resistance. There has also been some recent increase in small-scale guerrilla activity and sabotage. Nevertheless, the bulk of the population accepts the regime as the effective government in being or is at least resigned to it for want of a feasible alternative. The regime retains positive support of at least a quarter of the population, and the enthusiastic support of substantial numbers of zealots. At the same time, the regime's reorganization of both its political system and its military forces is increasing its capabilities for control. Moreover, the political reorganization will enhance the position of the Communist Party and its leader, Blas Roca, in Cuba.

(89) (94)

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~~OSD/ISA File~~

~~FRC 64A 2382~~

~~1961~~

~~121--353~~

Washington, January 17, 1962.

CU-245

SNIE 80-62

# THE THREAT TO US SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE CARIBBEAN AREA

## THE PROBLEM

To estimate the threat to US security interests in the Caribbean area over the next two decades.

## THE ESTIMATE

1. US security interests in the Caribbean relate principally to the maintenance of independent and friendly states in the Western Hemisphere. The Caribbean is not only the basin around which are located a large number of American republics, but it is the link between the US and the larger American republics in the southern continent. In addition, the US is concerned with keeping its southern flank free of hostile military power, and with maintaining the unrestricted operation of the Panama Canal and of other US installations.
2. Threats to US interests could arise from a variety of sources: the vulnerability of the area to attack from outside the hemisphere; the establishment of a military presence within the area by hostile powers; attempts by the Communist powers, with the help of the present Cuban Government, to spread Communist revolution to other parts of the area by military action or subversion; the growth of indigenous radical nationalism; and instability rising from attempts by governments in the area to interfere in the affairs of their neighbors or to impose their will upon them. A discussion of each of these threats follows in the paragraphs below.
3. *Vulnerability to outside attack.* The area of the Caribbean is within range of Soviet ICBMs and long-range bombers, and cities, canals, and military installations could also be attacked by missile-carrying submarines. In the event of general war, some US installations, such as the canal and air and naval bases, probably would be subjected to Soviet attack.
4. *Establishment of a hostile military presence.* Cuba and any other Caribbean state which fell under Communist control could be used by the USSR as areas in which to establish missile, submarine, or air bases, designed to bring North America under attack or to add to the deterrents to any conceivable US military action in the Caribbean or elsewhere. On the whole, we believe the establishment of such Soviet bases is unlikely for some time to come. Their military and psychological value, in Soviet eyes, would probably not be great enough to override the risks involved.
5. The Soviet leaders would be concerned lest steps toward the establishment of such bases would provoke the US to overthrow the Castro regime before bases could become operational and would generally heighten the risk of war. Moreover, Soviet bases in Cuba could involve

Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD

(C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, McNamara Briefing Notebooks, 12 Jan.

Secret.

63. A covering note indicated that this estimate, submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, was prepared by CIA, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Joint Staff, and NSA. All members of the <sup>USIB</sup> United States Intelligence Board concurred with the estimate on January 17, <sup>w/pt</sup> with the exception of the representatives of the AEC, and the FBI who abstained on the grounds that the topic was outside their jurisdiction.

the USSR in difficult political and control problems with the Cuban Government; the Soviets have been very careful to retain control over situations which involve them in any serious degree of risk, and they would be mindful of the danger that Cuban initiatives could expose the USSR to serious risks of general war. Finally, the Soviet leaders, for the present at least, appear to prefer not to make their presence too obvious or apparent, lest they discourage rather than encourage the spread of communism to other Latin American countries. Since their essential aim in Latin America is not military conquest but Communist revolution, we believe they will prefer to use Cuba as a symbol of spontaneous popular revolution and as a base for subversive operations.

structure, economic organization, and political direction. A few states have had or are passing through full-fledged social revolutions; in others the pressures for revolution are building up. Some states have very backward economies, while others are moving toward modern industrial societies. Many are single crop or commodity exporters; others are moving toward more balanced economies. In each country there are groups seeking to overthrow the existing order; even Mexico, which can be considered to have completed its revolution, harbors groups who believe that the revolution has been arrested and that a new leftward movement should be set in train. Some of these revolutionary groups are Communist led; some are not.

(49) (11) 6. Nevertheless, the USSR can and probably will augment its naval, air, and communications capabilities in the area by the development of arrangements or facilities not openly identifiable as Soviet military bases. For example, the improvement of Cuban naval and air installations would provide facilities suitable for Soviet use, and special installations and arrangements could be set up for intelligence collection or subversive purposes.

(11) 7. This reluctance to establish military bases might not extend over the entire period under review. If communism spread to other countries in the area, and if the US appeared to be weakening in world power and national will, the Soviet leaders might be emboldened to buttress their gains by openly establishing Soviet military bases in the area, with the object of further weakening US prestige and further strengthening and protecting their local satraps. If such bases were established, the first step might be the establishment of jointly-operated submarine or air bases, on the theory that the establishment of such bases would be less likely to incur risk of a US reaction than would the establishment of missile bases, while at the same time constituting a demonstration of Soviet presence and protection.

(11) 8. *Possibilities of the spread of communism in the area* (11) The area of the Caribbean presents a picture of great variety, in terms of social

(11) 9. It appears to us very likely that during the next decade or two the Communist element among the revolutionary forces will grow in size, although its growth in influence would not necessarily be proportionate to the growth in size. The important question is not whether communism grows, but whether the non-Communist revolutionary forces can grow more rapidly, can control the revolutionary movement, and can achieve an acceptable level of momentum and progress in social, economic, and political change. This question cannot be answered at this stage of Latin American history; much depends upon such factors as the degree of success of the Alliance for Progress in achieving real social change, the skill and determination of local non-Communist leaders, and the activities and achievements of Castro's Cuba and of the local Communists in exploiting and subverting revolutionary unrest. (650)

(11) 10. We believe that Castro's Cuba will continue to do what it can to export its revolution. It has to some degree handicapped itself by openly espousing Marxism-Leninism, but to the extent that it can capitalize on the failure of non-Communists to achieve real reform, it may yet succeed in bringing sympathetic forces to power elsewhere. For some of these countries, Venezuela for example, the critical choice between communism and non-communism may come within the years immediately ahead. For some of the others it

~~ASO(C) A Feb. FRC 11A 2886~~

~~McNamara Briefing Notebook, 12 Jan 63~~

may come later. During the next two decades, all could escape communism, but some may fall under Communist control. Local factors of an unforeseeable character, such as the quality of emerging leadership, may prove more decisive than existing political trends or degree of backwardness. In addition, factors external to the area, such as Communist successes or reverses in other underdeveloped countries, developments within the Communist Bloc itself, or changes in the appreciation of the general power balance between the Communist Bloc and the Free World will play a part.

11. (1) *Growth of indigenous, non-Communist, radical nationalism.* Those states which experience a profound social, economic, and political transformation without coming under Communist control will almost certainly develop a greater sense of national identity and a stronger impulse to assert political independence. As broad-based political movements replace military or personal rule, there will develop a much stronger feeling that the Latin American states can be masters of their own destinies, and the new political leaders will be obliged to stress their devotion to national sovereignty and especially their independence of US policy. In some instances national sovereignty may come to mean that anything can be attempted with little concern for US reaction.

12. (1) This is not to say that the growth of nationalism will necessarily be accompanied by a rise of anti-US attitudes. To the extent nationalism will necessarily be accompanied by the US succeeds, it will tend to reduce the antagonism toward the US among the broad mass of the people, but at the same time it will win the enmity of established elites. In any event, the very emergence of new forces, and the identification—rightly or wrongly—of the old order with the US, will tend to promote suspicion of US motives and policies and will encourage the new leaders at least to

strike a pose of independence and self-determination. As a consequence, the US role in the control and operation of canals or other US installations will almost certainly come under heavy attack, and the US freedom of action will probably become increasingly restricted. In the event of open differences with the US, an opportunity might be presented for hostile extra-hemispheric powers to gain a measure of influence.

13. Such a trend toward radical nationalism appears to us to be unavoidable, although it will probably move at a variable and indeterminate pace. In some countries it probably will gather force more slowly than in others. In Panama today, where the Canal Zone offers a visible target for agitation, it appears to be particularly strong; in some of the more isolated countries of the area it may mature only after major reforms have occurred and a new sense of self-confidence develops.

14. *Rivalries and tensions within the area.* Historically, the Caribbean area has been rife with personal feuds and petty tensions between states. Conspiracies and revolts against some leaders or countries have been organized, armed, and initiated on the soil of others. Combinations and alignments have been developed among groups of countries or leaders against others. We believe this kind of activity will continue in the years ahead, although it may take a somewhat different form than in the past. The pace of social, economic, and political change will not be uniform. Oligarchs cut off from power in one state may move to others and may receive aid and comfort in their plots to reassume control at home. Similarly, frustrated revolutionists will, as in the past few years, use asylum in sympathetic countries to organize and plan revolutions in their home countries. While the form may be the same as in the past, the ultimate stakes will not be personal power so much as the social and economic structure of the nation itself.

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OASD (C) A Files; FRC 71A 2896

McNamara Briefing Notebook, 12 Jan 63

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CU-251  
Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the President Kennedy

19 Washington, January 31, 1962.

26 SUBJECT: Service of Cuban Volunteers in U. S. Armed Forces

11 In accordance with instructions contained in National Security Action Memorandum No. 54 dated June 26, 1961, the Department of Defense, in coordination with the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, and the U. S. Selective Service System, instituted a program to offer qualified Cuban males career opportunities for service in the U. S. Armed Forces on a volunteer basis, with the clear understanding that they were not being prepared as a combat force.

11 A suitable interval has now elapsed since the initiation of this program in August 1961 to report on its progress. Through the period ending 15 January 1962, 3,504 Cubans who expressed an interest in the program have been interviewed at the Cuban refugee center in Miami. Of this number 980 were determined to be eligible and had sufficient interest in the program to register with the local Selective Service Board.

11 Of this number 817 reported and were processed at the Armed Forces Examining Station in Miami. On the basis of mental, medical and security examinations, 441 were rejected as not meeting minimum U. S. service standards.

11 Of the remaining 376 otherwise qualified, 182 demonstrated an adequate level of English language ability, while 194 did not.

11 Of the former group, 39 entered the U. S. military services. A special school which, for international political reasons, operates under the auspices of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, has provided English language training for volunteers otherwise eligible and qualified. As of 15 January 1962, 29 graduates of this training had entered the U. S. Armed Forces. Out of the total of 376, 194 individuals are currently being processed and 34 have dropped out.

43 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD  
Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Cuba, 342.18 (31 Jan 1962). Confidential.  
The memorandum was drafted in DOD/ISA and was forwarded by Assistant Secretary Paul H. Nitze on January 30 for Secretary McNamara's signature. Gilpatric signed for McNamara. In his covering memorandum on January 30, Nitze noted that the recommendation to terminate the recruitment policy as of June 30 had the concurrence of the Departments of State and Health, Education and Welfare, as well as that of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, and the respective Armed Services. (Ibid.)

45 ✓ Document



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⑪ In sum, during the five-month period ending 15 January 1962, the program has resulted in 88 individual Cubans entering the U. S. Armed Services, 11 in the Army, 18 in the Navy, 18 in the Marine Corps and 41 in the Air Force. These modest results when compared to the number of Cubans initially expressing interest in the program are attributable to the following factors:

⑪ 1. By far the largest drop in numbers comes after the first interview with those Cubans expressing an interest in the program. Apart from those determined to be ineligible by reason of age or some obvious physical limitation, most who drop out at this stage appear to do so as a result of learning that it is actually volunteer service in the U. S. Armed Forces and not in a new invasion force which is being offered. There is some evidence that many do not accept this explanation and continue in the program only to drop out at some later stage when they become convinced that it is not, as they seem disposed to believe, a cover operation for building a new Cuban combat force.

⑪ 2. The next point in the processing where a major drop-out occurs is in the medical, mental and security examinations stage. Of the total of 441 rejected, 190 were for mental and medical reasons and almost all of the remaining 251 were found unacceptable on the basis of admitted sexual deviations.

⑪ 3. Among the 376 who passed the mental, medical and security tests, 77 voluntarily dropped out of the program at one point or another for unexplained reasons, while 17 were unable to qualify in English tests after having completed language training.

⑪ This attrition rate, while high, is not surprising when compared to our experience with some groups of U. S. citizens where the rate of rejection for service in the U. S. Armed Forces has been 1 out of 2 and there is no language barrier to be overcome. Nevertheless, to the extent that this program is intended to assist Cuban exiles now in the United States to maintain themselves and to usefully employ and further develop their individual skills and abilities, it cannot be regarded as a marked success. The cost, particularly in the case of the language training funded by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, when compared to the numbers who ultimately qualify and enter the U. S. Armed Services, suggests that this is a somewhat expensive process for the results obtained.

⑪ There is little likelihood that our experience with this program will be appreciably different in the months ahead. Interest in it among the Cuban exile population continues but is not great.

⑪ I recommend that this program be terminated by 30 June 1962 unless a review by the Department of State should determine that there are sufficient reasons to justify its continuance.

Signed  
⑪ ROSWELL L. GILPATRICK 3/89 ⑪ 14  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Doc:  
DepSecDef (2 cys)

DDO 66A 3542

(1962 Sec of  
Def File)

Cuba 340.18 (31 Jan 1962)

⑪ 2. Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature



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CU-264

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50 Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer)

19 Washington, March 13, 1962.

26 REFERENCE 27 (a) SecDef Multi-Media Ltr of 10 Jul 1961 Subj: Service of Cuban Volunteers in U. S. Armed Forces

26 SUBJECT 27 Service of Cuban Volunteers in U. S. Armed Forces

11 On January 11, 1962 the Department of Defense reported to the President on the status of the program to offer Cuban exiles opportunities to volunteer for service in the U. S. Armed Forces. In view of the fact that the program has not succeeded in bringing any considerable number of Cubans into the U. S. Armed Forces, the Department of Defense recommended that the program be terminated by June 30, 1962.

11 By a memorandum dated February 21, 1962 from Mr. McGeorge Bundy, copy of which is attached, this recommendation was approved.

11 It is therefore directed that appropriate measures be undertaken to terminate this operation by June 30, 1962. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower) will be responsible for necessary coordination.

1 Enclosure  
Sent March 21, 1962

Signed  
17 ROSWELL L. GILPATRIC  
Deputy Secretary of Defense

43 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Cuba 1962, 121-373.5. Official Use Only. Drafted in DOD/ISA by Mountain. Also sent to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for International Security Affairs, Manpower, and Public Affairs, the General Counsel, the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, and the Assistant to the Secretary for Legislative Affairs.

- 13 - 1 Not found.
- 13 - 2 Document
- 13 - 3 Not found.

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19 Washington, March 21, 1962.

15 NIE 85-162, C

## THE SITUATION AND PROSPECTS IN CUBA

### THE PROBLEM

To analyze the situation in Cuba and the relationships of the Castro regime with both the Soviet Bloc and the Latin American republics, and to estimate the prospects over the next year or so.

### FOREWORD

Cuba is now, in effect, surrounded by an iron curtain. Our information on internal developments is not as complete or as reliable as we could wish. On some important matters, it is seriously inadequate. These deficiencies are expressly noted where applicable in the text of this estimate: e.g., paragraphs 19, 30, 106, and 111. In general, the information available is sufficient to support the estimate. The estimate will be under continuing review as additional information is obtained.

### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

1. The pattern of events in Cuba clearly reveals the historical step by step Communist procedure for attaining complete control of a country. During the past year Cuba has, in effect, gone behind an iron curtain. The regime has thoroughly reorganized its political, economic, police, and military systems in the classic Communist ideological fashion. It has also sought to identify itself with the Soviet Bloc in terms that would obligate the USSR to protect it. The Bloc, however, has avoided any explicit military commitment to defend Cuba. (Paras. 17-29)

Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD

(C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, McNamara Briefing Notebooks, 12 Jan.

63. Secret. A covering note indicated that this estimate, submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, was prepared by CIA, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff, and NSA. All members of the United States Intelligence Board concurred with the estimate on March 21, except the representative of the AEC, who abstained on the grounds that the topic was outside his jurisdiction.

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(11) 2. In Cuba there is in process of development a single party organization essentially Communist in character. It is designed to be the means of directing and controlling the operations of the government, the economy, and the mass organizations through which revolutionary indoctrination and leadership are transmitted to the people. Fidel Castro will presumably be the titular head of this organization, but the real political power in Cuba is likely to be vested in a collective leadership including Castro but dominated by a group of veteran Communists. Some degree of friction is probable in this relationship, but an open conflict is highly unlikely. (Paras. 30<sup>1</sup>/<sub>N</sub>37, 133)

(11) 3. The regime has sought to commit the Cuban people to positive personal identification with it through propaganda, indoctrination, and mass organizations. At the same time, it has developed a pervasive system of surveillance and police control. (Paras. 38<sup>1</sup>/<sub>N</sub>53)

(11) 4. The forces available to the regime to suppress insurrection or repel invasion have been and are being greatly improved, with substantial Bloc assistance through the provision of materiel and instruction. Cuban military capabilities, however, are essentially defensive. We believe it unlikely that the Bloc will provide Cuba with strategic weapon systems or with air and naval capabilities suitable for major independent military operations overseas. We also believe it unlikely that the Bloc will station in Cuba combat units of any description, at least for the period of this estimate. This attitude would not preclude the liberal provision of Bloc advisers, instructors, and service personnel, the provision of such defensive weapons and equipment as surface-to-air missiles and radars, and such improvement of Cuban naval and air facilities as would enable them to service Soviet units. (Paras. 54<sup>1</sup>/<sub>N</sub>69)

77A (11) 5. The state has taken over the direct control of all important economic activities in Cuba, and has developed a more elaborate organization for economic management. (Paras. 70<sup>1</sup>/<sub>N</sub>77)

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- (ii) 6. Cuba is now faced with an economic crisis attributable in large part to an acute shortage of the convertible foreign exchange required to finance greatly needed imports of foodstuffs and of replacement parts for machinery and equipment of US origin. The Bloc provides a guaranteed market for Cuban sugar and minerals, and supplies foodstuffs, other consumers' goods, and industrial raw materials in return, but not in sufficient quantity to meet Cuba's needs. The Bloc has also extended credits for Cuban industrial development, but the actual implementation of these projects is slow. Castro has now told the Cuban people that they face years of privation. (Paras. 78-94) *nm*
- (ii) 7. The initial popular enthusiasm for the revolution has steadily waned. Many men who fought against Batista have been alienated by the even more dictatorial character of the Castro regime and its increasingly Communist complexion. The vaunted agrarian reform has done little to improve the lot of the peasants. Moreover, people are becoming fed up with the privations, exactions, and regimentation that characterize life in Castro's Cuba. (Paras. 95-103) *nm*
- (ii) 8. Nevertheless, Fidel Castro and the Revolution retain the positive support of at least a quarter of the population. The hard core of this support consists principally of those who now have a vested interest in the regime: the new managerial class and the Communists. These are reinforced by the substantial numbers of Cubans, especially those in the mass organizations, who are still under the spell of Castro's charismatic leadership or are convinced the Revolution has been to their advantage. (Para. 104) *nm*
- (ii) 9. There is active resistance in Cuba, but it is limited, uncoordinated, unsupported, and desperate. The regime, with all the power of repression at its disposal, has shown that it can contain the present level of resistance activity. (Paras. 107-114) *nm*
- (ii) 10. The majority of the Cuban people neither support the regime nor resist it, in any active sense. They are grumbling and resentful, but apparently hopeless and passive, resigned to acceptance of the present regime as the effective

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government in being with which they must learn to live for lack of a feasible alternative. (Para. 106) *nm*

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11. The next year or two will be a critical period for the Castro regime. The 1962 sugar crop will be the smallest in years; the difficulty of acquiring convertible foreign exchange will be greater than ever. Want of convertible exchange will limit Cuba's ability to purchase foodstuffs and other needed supplies in the Free World. No substantial increase in the supplies provided by the Bloc is likely during 1962. In these circumstances it is unlikely that the total output of the Cuban economy in 1962 can rise above the 1961 level. Under consequent privations, the Cuban people are likely to become more restive. Much will depend on whether the regime succeeds in directing their resentment toward the US, or whether it comes to focus on the regime. (Paras. 92, 94, 106, 129)

12. The regime's apparatus for surveillance and repression should be able to cope with any popular tendency toward active resistance. Any impulse toward widespread revolt is inhibited by the fear which this apparatus inspires, and also by the lack of dynamic leadership and of any expectation of liberation within the foreseeable future. In these circumstances, increasing antagonism toward the regime is likely to produce only a manageable increase in isolated acts of sabotage or of open defiance on the part of a few desperate men. A sequence of disaffection-repression-resistance could conceivably be set in motion, but would be unlikely to cause major difficulties for the regime in the absence of considerable external support. (Paras. 114, 132) *nm*

13. The overriding concern of Cuban foreign policy is to obtain external support and protection against the hostility of the US. The USSR and other Bloc states will continue to render such aid and support to the Castro regime as they consider necessary. If the overthrow of the regime should be seriously threatened by either external or internal forces, the USSR would almost certainly not intervene directly with its own forces. However, interpreting even an internal

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threat as US intervention, the USSR would seek to deter the US by vigorous political action, including threats of retaliation on the periphery of the Bloc as well as ambiguous references to Soviet nuclear power. Nevertheless, the USSR would almost certainly never intend to hazard its own safety for the sake of Cuba. (Paras. 23<sup>1</sup>/<sub>N</sub>-27, 122, 130, 134) (um)

14. By the end of 1960, Castro had few admirers left among politically active Latin Americans, except the Communists, extremist splinter groups broken off from the established social revolutionary parties, and certain student and labor elements. (Para. 116) (um)

15. At Punta del Este the OAS unanimously condemned communism in Cuba as incompatible with the inter-American system and laid the ground work for increased efforts to combat Castro-Communist subversion. However, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, and Ecuador abstained on the operative resolution excluding the Castro regime from the organs of the OAS. The Castro regime will seek to cultivate those Latin American governments which have shown reluctance to support measures against it and will probably refrain from flagrant acts which could provide the occasion for US or OAS intervention in Cuba. (Paras. 115<sup>1</sup>/<sub>N</sub>-120, 128) (um)

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16. The Castro-Communist threat in Latin America results from the ability of a well-organized subversive movement centered in Cuba to exploit the natural tendency of entrenched oligarchies to resist the growing demand for radical social reform. What is seen by radical revolutionary elements in Latin America is that, while others have talked of social reform, Fidel Castro has actually accomplished a radical social revolution in Cuba, and has done so in defiance of the Yankees with the support of an apparently more powerful patron. Relatively moderate reformist regimes are now ascendant in most Latin American countries, but, if the Alliance for Progress should fail to produce its intended social reforms in time to meet rising popular demands, the conviction will grow that Castro's way is the only way to

get timely and positive results. Thus, despite Castro's alienation of the moderate reformists, there remains a danger that the Cuban example will set the pattern of the impending social revolution in Latin America. (Paras. 66<sup>1</sup>/<sub>N</sub>-69, 115<sup>1</sup>/<sub>N</sub>-118, 120<sup>1</sup>/<sub>N</sub>-121) (um)

11 [Here follows the 21-page Discussion section of the estimate.] (84/94)

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(50) Memorandum from the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Anderson) to the Secretary of Defense McNamara

(18) JCSM-426-62f  
N N  
→ (19) Washington, June 5, 1962.

(20) Subject: Cubans in the US Armed Forces (U)

*that the language has been changed to the US Armed Forces*

1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 21 May 1962, on the above subject, in which it was requested that the necessary detailed plans be developed to implement the President's instructions that selected Cuban refugees be inducted into the US Armed Forces.

2. The attached plan, which follows the basic planning guidance provided, has been developed. The plan requires the lowering of current induction standards to permit induction of those individuals who have dependents and who do not possess the required facility in the English language. These individuals will be organized into Cuban units through basic and advanced individual training and at the end of that time will either be selected for further special forces type training, integrated into regular units or separated for the convenience of the government.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the success of the plan is dependent upon overcoming the difficulties previously encountered. Although the lowering of induction standards will permit many to serve who otherwise would be ineligible and the Cuban unit type organization with special forces training may serve to stimulate greater interest, there still remains the problem of motivation for service in the US Armed Forces. Since no definitive objective for utilization of trained Cuban personnel has been established, it is anticipated that there still will be a distinct loss of interest when these personnel come to the full realization that they are not being trained specifically for return to Cuba.

4. Implementation of the attached plan will entail expenditure of funds which have not been budgeted for the coming fiscal year. The training of the Cuban refugees is considered an additional mission and, as such, will not contribute to the accomplishment of prior missions for which Service manpower ceilings have been authorized. It is, therefore, requested that necessary funds and personnel spaces be provided to implement the program, and that those Cubans inducted under this plan not be charged against current Service ceilings. Since the Army is best equipped to provide the type training envisioned, it is anticipated that primary responsibility for implementation of the plan will be placed with that Service.

(17) For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

(17) GW Anderson (84/94)

*George W. Anderson*  
GEORGE W. ANDERSON  
Acting Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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⑬ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD  
Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Cuba 342.18. Top Secret.

⑬ ✓<sup>1</sup> Not found.

⑬ ✓<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

⑬ ✓<sup>3</sup> The attached plan envisioned that approximately 3,000 Cuban refugees in the 17-35 age bracket would volunteer for induction and training, and that 1,500 of that total would meet the reduced standards for induction.

⑬ ✓<sup>4</sup> A <sup>June 6</sup> covering memorandum, ~~dated June 6~~ from <sup>Lieutenant</sup> Lt. Colonel Sam Wilson (USA) to Brigadier General George S. Brown, Military Assistant to Secretary McNamara, indicated<sup>s</sup> that Lansdale had already discussed the plan with Gilpatric. The status of the project, Wilson noted, would be reported to General Taylor in the Special Group on June 7, and Taylor would then pass the information to the President "in view of latter's strong personal interest in this undertaking." ~~EX-114~~

(Washington National Records Center,  
RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542,  
Cuba 342.18)



(5) NIE 85-2-62

(14) Washington, August 1, 1962.

## (55) THE SITUATION AND PROSPECTS IN CUBA

### (55) THE PROBLEM

- (ii) To analyze the situation in Cuba and to estimate the prospects over the next year or so, with particular reference to Castro's relations with the Communists and to the potential for resistance to his regime.

### (55) CONCLUSIONS

- (ii) A. Fidel Castro has asserted his primacy in Cuban communism; the "old" Communists have had to accommodate themselves to this fact, as has the USSR. Further strains may develop in these relationships, but they are unlikely to break the ties of mutual interest between Castro and the "old" Communists and between Cuba and the USSR. (Paras. 1-10) *nm*
- (ii) B. By force of circumstances, the USSR is becoming ever more deeply committed to preserve and strengthen the Castro regime. The USSR, however, has avoided any formal commitment to protect and defend the regime in all contingencies. (Para. 11) *nm*
- (ii) C. The Cuban armed forces are loyal to the personal leadership of the Castro brothers. Their capabilities have been and are being greatly enhanced by the Soviet Bloc's provision of military equipment and instruction. Cuban military capabilities, however, are essentially defensive. We believe it unlikely that the Bloc will provide Cuba with the capability to undertake major independent military operations

(93) Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD

(C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, McNamara Briefing Notebooks, 12 Jan.

63. Secret. A covering note indicated<sup>S</sup> that this estimate, submitted by ~~the Director of Central Intelligence~~, was prepared by CIA/ and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and NSA. All members of the ~~United States Intelligence Board~~ concurred with the estimate on August 1, ~~with the exception of~~ the representative of the AEC, who abstained on the grounds that the topic was outside his jurisdiction.

(93) ✓ This estimate is designed to bring up-to-date NIE 85-62, "The Situation and Prospects in Cuba," dated 21 March 1962. The background information contained in that document remains generally valid. [Footnote in the source text. For NIE 85-62, see Document .]

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overseas. We also believe it unlikely that the Bloc will station in Cuba Bloc combat units of any description, at least for the period of this estimate. (Paras. 12-29) *nm*

④ D. The Cuban armed forces are well able to intimidate the general population and to suppress any popular insurrection likely to develop in present circumstances. They are probably capable of containing and controlling any threat to the regime through guerrilla action and of repelling any invasion short of a direct US military intervention in strength. (Paras. 22-23) *nm*

④ E. The Cuban economy is in deep trouble, in part because of the US embargo and a consequent shortage of convertible foreign exchange, in part because of agricultural and industrial mismanagement. Despite remedial measures, it is unlikely that agricultural and industrial production can be significantly increased within the next year or so. The expected increase in capital imports from the Bloc is unlikely to produce a net growth of the economy before the end of 1963. (Paras. 30-35) *nm*

④ F. The Castro regime retains the positive support of about 20 percent of the population, but disaffection is increasing. This trend is manifested in growing passive resistance and in occasional open demonstrations of resentment. Few, however, dare to accept the risks of organized active resistance in present circumstances, for fear of the regime's massive apparatus for surveillance and repression. (Paras. 36-41) *nm*

④ G. If arms and supplies became available and if confidence were created in the likelihood of outside support for a major Cuban uprising, resistance activity and potential would increase. Even so it is unlikely that the regime could be overthrown unless events had already shaken the regime and brought into doubt its capacity for survival, and unless substantial outside support for the insurgents were forthcoming. (Paras. 42-51) *nm*

④ H. The Castro regime still seeks to lead the "inevitable" revolution throughout Latin America, but its preoccupation with domestic problems tends to limit its activity in this

respect. In Latin America there is widespread disillusionment regarding the Cuban revolution. Nevertheless, militant pro-Castro groups exist in several countries, and Cuban subversive activity could prove effective in certain unstable situations: e.g., in Guatemala or Venezuela. The appeal of the Cuban example will increase in Latin America if reform lags there and hopes and promises remain unfulfilled. (Paras. 52-59) *nm*

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55 DISCUSSION

I. CASTRO AND THE COMMUNISTS

① 1. Developments in 1962 have tended to define more clearly the relationships between Castro and the leaders of the prerevolutionary Cuban Communist Party (PSP) and between Castro and the USSR. For the time being, at least, Castro has established his primacy in Cuban communism, and the PSP and USSR have been constrained to accommodate themselves to that situation.

② 2. Differences between Castro and the "old" Communists of the PSP developed in 1961 and reached a climax in early 1962. Castro had accepted "old" Communists in every branch of his government and had relied heavily on them for their expertise. However, he was anxious to preserve his own authority as leader of the Cuban revolution and wanted the "new" Communists, his followers of the 26th of July Movement, to play a role at least equal to that of the veteran PSP members. Castro was also anxious to have Cuba accepted as a member of the "Socialist camp" and resented the appellation of "national democracy" (as opposed to "socialist democracy") which was invented for Cuba in 1960 at a world congress of Communist Party leaders in Moscow. The Soviets were reluctant to make these concessions to a regime that they did not consider to be Communist and that was not under their firm control.

③ 3. Castro kept up the pressure for full recognition, proclaiming Cuba a socialist state and himself a Marxist-Leninist. Meantime elements of the PSP pushed ahead as rapidly as possible to establish "old" Communist control of Cuba through the machinery of the Integrated Revolutionary Organizations (ORI), an interim party set up to bring together the various political forces behind the regime and

create a single dominant political party. Veteran Communist Anibal Escalante, the organizing secretary of ORI, was the key figure in this effort.

④ 4. The result was a head-on clash between the "old" Communists and Castro, who realized that they were threatening his position and that of his loyal followers of the 26th of July Movement. After careful maneuvering a new National Directorate for the ORI was agreed upon, in which power was shifted from "old" to "new" Communists. Then on 26 March Castro denounced Anibal Escalante and by implication all "old" Communists for seeking to dominate the Cuban revolution.

⑤ 5. Further reorganization of the ORI and of other elements of the regime's political machinery followed, with the general effect of strengthening the position of the "new" Communists. These changes, however, can by no means be described as a wholesale purge of the veteran Communists. Many, including Blas Roca, the PSP chairman, have remained in important positions and Castro has made it clear that the differences between "old" and "new" Communists are not over the goal of communizing Cuba. The overall effect of the "Escalante affair," and of the changes in the regime which followed, was the assertion of Castro's personal leadership of Cuban communism.

⑥ 6. Neither the PSP nor the Soviets proved willing to contest the issue with Castro. Both moved quickly to acknowledge his authority and to reaffirm their close ties with him. Blas Roca gave his approval to Castro's move against Escalante. There followed an article in *Pravda* which expressed firm support for Castro as the leader of the Cuban revolution and granted the most forthright recognition to date of the Cuban regime's claim to be

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Communist. Moscow then proceeded to elevate Cuba in the "socialist" hierarchy by placing it next after the Bloc states and ahead of Yugoslavia on the list of May Day greetings and by such minor but significant moves as referring to the Cuban premier as "Comrade Fidel."

(11) 7. In yielding to Castro's desire to have Cuba brought into a closer relationship with the Bloc, the Soviet leaders have made a significant concession. That they should have done so, fully aware of Castro's undisciplined nature, is a measure not only of the importance they attach to Cuba, but also of the narrow field of choice open to them.

(11) 8. The Soviet Union has also made a considerable concession in its agreement to supply a line of credit for the purchase of consumer goods. It has, in effect, reaffirmed its willingness to pay the increasing costs of keeping Cuba afloat, despite the Cubans' failures in the field of economic reorganization and development. In exchange for this concession the Soviets are apparently insisting on more influence over the management and direction of the Cuban economy. The Soviets probably continue to believe that Cuban economic development should be based primarily on Cuban resources, effort, and sacrifice, and are likely to show restraint in their response to Cuban appeals for relief from a situation better than that which prevails in many Bloc countries. Questions relating to the management of Cuba's economy are now a major source of friction between the Soviets and the Castro regime.

(11) 9. We believe that the USSR is likely to concentrate on the problem of the economic restructuring of Cuba. For the present, the Soviets have committed themselves to getting along with Castro and have had to accept the risks involved. They would prefer a better disciplined and more orthodox Communist and may hope some day to replace him, but

they recognize that he will remain, on the whole, an asset for some time to come. Moscow, the PSP, and Castro are all moving over unfamiliar and hazardous ground, and we expect that disagreement and even conflict will flare up among them from time to time. Such conflicts are unlikely, however, to destroy the ties of mutual dependence linking Castro to the PSP and Cuba to the USSR.

(11) 10. On balance, Castro is in a stronger position now than appeared likely a few months ago. He has asserted his leadership and it has been accepted by the USSR and by the "old" Communists in Cuba. He has demonstrated remarkable political skills and an ability to engage in carefully calculated maneuvers which had been obscured by his generally erratic and bombastic behavior. He seems to be well in control of the apparatus of government and security. His attack on Escalante and the efforts of the "old" Communists and the reshuffling of the top leadership of the ORI and the armed forces have apparently satisfied the majority of the "new" Communists, who were becoming restive. At the same time he has retained the cooperation of the "old" Communists and the USSR. He probably believes that he can handle them and that both the "old" Cuban Communists and Moscow must continue to accept him as the indispensable man in Cuba.

(11) 11. The USSR is becoming more deeply committed to the preservation and advancement of the regime in Cuba. However, the Soviets have made no formal commitment to ensure Cuba's security and would almost certainly never intend to hazard their own safety for Cuba's sake. They have sought to create the impression that Cuba was under the protection of their missile power, but they have carefully avoided a categorical commitment to protect and defend the Castro regime in all contingencies.

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II. THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

12. The Ground Forces

1112. The capabilities of the Cuban armed forces to suppress insurrection or repel invasion have been greatly enhanced by the Bloc's provision of military equipment and instruction and by a thoroughgoing reorganization initiated in the fall of 1960. This reorganization and concomitant training programs are now well advanced, although not completed.

1115. The Cuban ground forces are believed to consist of a standing army of about 75,000 men and a ready reserve of about 100,000 men. Some of the standing army personnel serve as full-time cadres in ready reserve units. In addition, there are homeguard type militia units numbering about 100,000 men.

1116. The standing army has received intensive training in the use of Bloc-supplied arms and equipment and tactical training through the battalion combat team level. It has acquired capabilities for the combat employment of armor and artillery (including antiaircraft and antitank weapons) hitherto unknown in any Caribbean country.

1117. The ready reserve battalions are less heavily armed and less thoroughly trained. Each has a full-time cadre varying from 40 to 150 men. The remaining personnel are available for only one or two drills a week and a month of active duty training each year. The arms are kept in the custody of the full-time cadre. These battalions are based on places of employment and are generally capable of rapid mobilization.

1118. The homeguard militia units have no significant combat capability. Their function is to augment the police as necessary to control the population.

1119. For operational purposes, Cuba has been divided into three territorial commands designated as the armies of the West, the Center, and the East. Each has operational control over all standing army, ready reserve, and tactical air units within its area and is intended to be logistically self-sufficient. The basic combat unit is the battalion combat team. Active operations are conducted by task forces established according to the requirements of the occasion and operating under the direct control of the appropriate territorial army command.

1113. Up to 350 Bloc military advisers and instructors are believed to be now in Cuba. Bloc advisers are probably assigned to the principal staffs throughout the military establishment. Most of the instructors are stationed at established military schools and training areas. In addition, several hundred Cuban military personnel have received or are receiving military instruction in Bloc countries.

1114. Almost certainly the present military establishment as a whole is politically reliable. Successive defections and purges have eliminated the seriously disaffected elements. The principal commanders have been selected for their personal loyalty to the Castro brothers. Great attention has been paid to the political indoctrination of the troops. Morale probably has been adversely affected, in some instances, particularly among reserve components, by the discontent of the general population. However, the military establishment as a whole will almost certainly support and defend the Castro regime, unless its overthrow seems imminent.

3. 2. See the tables in the Annex for inventories of Cuban ground force arms and equipment, aircraft, and naval ships from all sources, including the Bloc. (The bulk of heavy equipment from the Bloc arrived in Cuba between September 1960 and February 1962. Shipments since then are believed to have been largely replacement parts, small arms, and ammunition.)

[Footnote in the source text.

The annex attached to the source text is not printed.]

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20. Within the three armies there are corps and division headquarters having administrative and training responsibilities, but as yet no apparent operational role, although the divisions, as territorial commands, probably do have internal security and static defense responsibilities within their respective districts. As the reorganization of the ground forces progresses further, the divisions may be developed as operational units.

21. There are believed to be some 265 battalions in the Cuban ground forces. A full-strength standing army battalion probably numbers about 1,000 men; a full-strength ready reserve battalion, about 600, including the full-time cadre. However, they all now vary greatly in strength and efficiency. At present we are unable to determine how many battalions are standing army and how many are ready reserve.

22. The Cuban ground forces are well able to intimidate the general population and to suppress any popular insurrection likely to develop in present circumstances. They have not been able to eliminate the low level of sporadic guerrilla activity which now exists in Cuba, but they are probably capable of containing and controlling any threat to the regime through guerrilla action.

23. The equipment, organization, and training of the Cuban ground forces appears to be designed primarily to prepare them to resist an anticipated invasion from abroad. They could probably repel any invasion short of a direct US military intervention in strength. Their plans for that contingency evidently contemplate a strong initial resistance, followed by a determined defense of preselected key points and finally by protracted guerrilla warfare.

#### The Air Force

24. In the emergency of April 1961, the Castro regime could get only six aircraft into the air. Since then, a virtually new air force

has been in process of creation through Bloc delivery of jet fighter aircraft and related ground equipment and Bloc training of pilots and ground personnel. This process is not as far advanced as is the rehabilitation of the Cuban ground forces. Cuban air defense and ground support capabilities remain very limited. However, the new Cuban Air Force includes about 45 MIG jet fighters and about 60 fighter pilots with some Bloc training.

#### The Navy

25. As in the case of the air force, a new navy is now in the process of creation. Hitherto, coastal patrol has been accomplished chiefly by militiamen in confiscated fishing and pleasure craft. Recently, however, the USSR has provided six submarine chasers (PC's) and 12 motor torpedo boats (PT's) and several hundred Cuban naval personnel have received training in the Bloc.

#### Prospects

26. The capabilities of the Cuban armed forces will continue to improve through further training and experience. The Bloc will almost certainly continue to support this development through the provision of equipment, instruction, and advice.

27. It is notable that Bloc military deliveries to date have been such as to enhance Cuba's capabilities for defense against external attack and for the maintenance of internal security, but not such as to contribute primarily to the development of an independent offensive capability. Although the Cuban ground forces have been made formidable by Caribbean standards, Cuba lacks the air and naval capabilities required for major overseas operations, even at Caribbean distances. The bomber force is still limited to a few inherited B-26's.

28. We believe that the Bloc will continue to limit its military assistance to Cuba in this way. Such a policy would not preclude the

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provision of more advanced jet fighters, surface-to-air missiles, and modern radars, or even the provision of a token number of IL-28 jet light bombers to replace the B-26's now in service.

⑪ 29. We also believe it highly unlikely that the Bloc would station in Cuba Bloc combat units of any description. This attitude would not preclude the liberal provision of Bloc advisers, instructors, service, and intelligence personnel. It is likely that special Soviet communications and intelligence facilities have been or will be established in Cuba.

### ⑪ III. ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

⑪ 30. Mid-year 1962 finds the Cuban economy in deepening trouble. A highly vaunted economic plan and the record budget officially announced for 1962 have by now, for all practical purposes, been abandoned. The pervasive disruption which was evident in industry and transportation last year manifested itself this year in the agricultural sector as well, most conspicuously in the sugar industry, the very heart of the economy and the principal earner of foreign exchange.

⑪ 31. Cuba's foreign exchange earnings in 1962 will be reduced substantially because of declines in both volume and value of sugar exports. The 1962 sugar crop was hard hit by a prolonged drought, growing apathy and passive resistance among the cane-cutters, and bad managerial judgment, such as the decisions to reduce the rate of replanting and to divert cane land to other crops. Production of 4.8 million metric tons not only fell far short of last year's extraordinary harvest, but also came to only 83 percent of the average annual crop during 1957-1960. Because the total supply of sugar available in 1962 is less than in 1961, exports will decline. Exports to the Bloc will be somewhat below 1961 levels, but the major reductions will be in exports to Free World countries. Convertible exchange income from sugar will also be re-

duced because world sugar prices averaged less during the first half of 1962 than during 1961.

⑪ 32. With respect to other agricultural products Cuba has clearly not achieved the much needed expansion called for under the regime's plans. Cuba's own production of food has remained insufficient to support the population, and food rationing has become necessary. Meanwhile, in the industrial sector the deterioration of plants, equipment shortages, poor quality of raw materials, and gross mismanagement continue. Because of the US embargo and the shortage of foreign exchange, the Cubans have not been able to find adequate sources for the machinery and parts formerly imported from the US and other Western countries. Only the first beginnings have been made in the reconstruction of Cuban industry with Bloc equipment; though announced Bloc development credits total \$457 million, few deliveries have yet been made. Mismanagement of plants by unqualified personnel, often selected for their political reliability, continues to be the rule.

⑪ 33. The regime has responded to the agricultural crisis with a series of changes in policy and organization. The National Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA), the chief instrument of government direction over agriculture, has been taken over by Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, an old-line Communist with considerable competence in economics. New regulations have been announced easing governmental controls over private farmers and tightening controls over the collectivized sector of agriculture.

⑪ 34. However, the chief immediate effect of Cuba's economic troubles has been to increase its dependence on the Bloc. In the spring of 1962, Cuba began a new series of negotiations with Bloc countries concerning the 1962 trade protocols signed several months earlier. In May, a supplemental protocol was signed with the USSR providing for an increase of \$50

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million in the proposed level of trade for 1962<sup>1</sup> the increase to cover Soviet shipments of food, raw materials, and capital goods. New agreements were also signed with the European Satellites, but there is no evidence indicating that significant changes were made in the original protocols. Since the new USSR protocol does not call for increased Cuban exports, it appears that the additional Soviet exports to Cuba will be financed by a commodity credit. The Soviet decision to finance current purchases on credit, rather than to confine itself to developmental loans, is a new departure in Soviet relations with Cuba, and in fact is contrary to general Soviet practice. It almost certainly reflects Moscow's recognition of the seriousness of the Cuban situation.

390 35. Cuban economic prospects for the remainder of 1962 and for 1963 are bleak. Cuba will not be able to build up significantly its dangerously low holdings of convertible foreign exchange. The expected increase in capital imports from the Bloc is unlikely to bring about net growth of Cuba's economy in the next 18 months, although it may establish preconditions for some improvement over the longer run. The effect of the new agricultural policy remains uncertain; in any case it could not result in a significant increase in production within the next year or so. Supply and management problems will continue to plague industry; transportation difficulties will probably get worse. No substantial overall improvement in the Cuban economy is likely to occur for several years.

66 IV. POPULAR ATTITUDES

36. Active support for the Castro regime has declined to about 20 percent of the population, but this includes a high proportion of the youth of the country (ages 15-30). The hard core of this support consists of those who have a vested interest in the revolution, especially the new managerial class and the Communists. Others support the revolution

because they have been influenced by indoctrination and participation in the mass organizations. A substantial proportion of supporters are persons who still see in Castro the personification of their awakened national consciousness.

37. Disaffection is increasing primarily because of the growing inability of the regime to provide the goods and services to which most of the Cuban people have been accustomed. The shortages of food, ordinary household items, medicines, public transportation, etc., have underscored, in terms understandable to the individual Cuban, the regime's failure to live up to its original promise. Others have become bored with years of repetitious propaganda. One factor which is likely to have an increasingly adverse effect on public attitudes is the deterioration of public health conditions and services.

38. The majority of the Cuban population has for some time been indifferent toward the regime. In the past few months, however, there has been an increase in passive resistance, including absenteeism and slowdowns, and in the open expression of disaffection by public protests and demonstrations.

39. In the past four months Fidel Castro and other regime spokesmen have themselves acknowledged two causes of popular discontent and have begun corrective measures. One of these is the dissatisfaction and insecurity aroused by the increasingly obvious "old" Communist takeover which threatened to destroy the loyalty of a large segment of the "new class" until Castro took action in March. The other is the fear of collectivization on the part of farmers, which the regime has also taken steps to allay. Public hostility to Communist regimentation is likely to continue to be a factor in the ability of the regime to control the population, but it is the effect of such regimentation on them personally, rather than communism itself, that seems to arouse

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43 <sup>3</sup> ✓ On August 2, ~~CIA Director~~ McCone sent a memorandum to the other members of the Special Group (Augmented), <sup>and</sup> ~~plus~~ Rusk and McNamara, asking for comments on NIE 85-2-<sup>i</sup><sub>N</sub>62<sup>i</sup><sub>N</sub> in advance of its consideration at the scheduled meeting of the group on August 10 to review progress on the Mongoose operation. (Memorandum from Walter Elder, ~~Executive Assistant to McCone, to McNamara and others~~, August 2; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 1962, McN Working Papers) In an undated ~~copy of a~~ memorandum to McCone, U. Alexis Johnson replied that ~~the~~ Department of State officers who had reviewed the estimate found it to be generally well-balanced and adequate in coverage of points of interest to the Department. He noted, however, that with respect to the discussion of Cuban economic prospects in paragraph 35, the outlook in the Department was for further deterioration of the Cuban economy during the remainder of 1962 and 1963, rather than stagnation, as seemed to be suggested in the NIE. (Department of State, S/S Files: 65 D 438, Mongoose)



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the Cubans. Increasing communization is likely to continue to provoke discontent, but it is unlikely to produce much active resistance.

40. Many people still in Cuba hate and detest the regime, but few of them are willing to take the risks involved in resistance activity of any kind. The number who are willing to do so is strongly influenced by what appear to be the chances of engaging in resistance activity and coming out alive, as well as the chances of achieving some effective result against the regime.

41. The outlook is for the steady increase of popular dissatisfaction, but it is likely to continue to find expression largely in passive resistance or unorganized and sporadic opposition at a level that can be controlled by the regime. Yet such resistance may provoke the regime to use force on such a scale as to alienate greater numbers of the population. A cycle of disaffection-repression-resistance might be set in motion, but would be unlikely to cause major difficulties for the regime in the absence of substantial external support.

#### V. RESISTANCE

42. There has been some increase in active resistance to the Castro regime despite its massive and expanding security apparatus and its constant efforts to intimidate, harass, and immobilize those who take action against the government. The armed forces are used extensively to guard against sabotage, to control public demonstrations against the regime, and to sweep areas of rebel activity. The Ministry of Interior, run by a loyal Castro follower, exercises checks and controls over the Cuban public through its extensive police apparatus, its network of informants in the Committees of Defense, and the antisabotage People's Defense organization. Between 400 and 500 thousand Cubans—one in every 14—are involved in this elaborate security machinery.

43. This widespread security effort by the Castro government does effectively limit and harass the active opponents of the regime. Nevertheless, there are at least six nationwide resistance groups in Cuba, with a claimed membership ranging from a few hundred to a few thousand, only a small part of whom are active at any one time. In addition there are a number of small guerrilla bands and local groups which operate on their own without effective communication or liaison with the national groups. Guerrilla activity has been greatest in the mountains of central Cuba, including the Sierra del Escambray, but some has occurred in the mountains of eastern Cuba, including the Sierra Maestra, and in western Pinar del Rio Province. In plains areas, like Matanzas Province, and in urban areas, resistance groups are smaller than in the mountainous areas and tend to live separately, coming together only occasionally. Many individuals who are not members of organizations or of guerrilla bands engage in occasional actions against the regime.

44. The activity of resistance groups reflects the operating situation and their resources, human and material. Activity fell off markedly after the massive roundup of suspects following the April 1961 invasion attempt. It has increased since April 1962 primarily in response to the rise of popular resentment of shortages of foodstuffs and other consumer goods. This increase in activity has been limited, however, by government drives to clean out areas in which guer-

45. 1. The People's Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo—MRP);

43. 2. The 30 November Movement (Movimiento 30 Noviembre);

43. 3. The Christian Democratic Movement (Movimiento Democratico Cristiano—MDC);

43. 4. The Revolutionary Recovery Movement (Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria—MRR);

43. 5. The Student Revolutionary Directorate (Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil—DRE);

43. 6. Rescue Movement (Rescate).

[Footnote in the source text.]

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rillas have been active and the capture of several important resistance leaders. The size of many guerrilla bands is limited by their lack of arms with which to equip potential recruits.

193. 45. There is some coordination of the activities of the national organizations and there have been reports of a recent agreement among them for unified action. In practice, however, activities tend to be planned, directed, and carried out on a local level. In frequent instances members of several different organizations have cooperated to carry out an operation. These operations are still largely limited to sabotage (particularly setting fire to cane fields, government buildings, and public conveyances), attempts to obtain arms, and the operation of an "underground railroad" to get persons sought by the government out of Cuba. In recent months resistance organizations have been fostering campaigns of planned waste of electricity, city water, etc.

46. The effectiveness of the guerrillas is extremely limited; confronted by large and well-equipped security forces, the small guerrilla groups lack arms, food, medical, and other supplies. One of their principal problems is keeping Castro agents and informers out of their ranks. They just barely survive, if they survive at all. Their activities are made possible by their superior familiarity with the terrain and with hiding places. Effective government security measures impede coordination between groups in different geographical areas. Noncombatant opposition elements maintain some liaison with guerrillas operating in nearby territory and provide some support, mostly intelligence. Guerrilla forces have at times escaped capture because of the lack of interest, ineptitude, or passive disloyalty of segments of the forces sent against them. Some of the guerrilla bands claim actually to have recruited some of their membership from the militia.

47. At present the primary effect of resistance operations is psychological: they are an embarrassment to the regime and force it to commit large resources to meet security requirements. To a lesser extent they are an inspiration to the civilian opposition, proof that the regime's forces of oppression are not all-powerful.

48. The national resistance organizations have representatives in the US who are authorized to speak on certain matters for the groups in Cuba. Effective collaboration in Miami and between groups there and in Cuba is complicated by factionalism, personal feuds, general politicking, and the difficulty of communications. There is also a tendency on the part of those who remain in Cuba to distrust the exiles and to condemn them for their failure to supply those who are continuing the fight in Cuba with the arms and equipment they so badly need.

49. The Cuban Revolutionary Council (Consejo Revolucionario Cubano, CRC) seeks to represent the combined views of the resistance organizations, but it now represents only half of them and is relatively ineffective. The CRC actively propagandizes its anti-Castro position through representatives in most Latin American countries. In June 1962, CRC President Jose Miro Cardona traveled through Central America for this purpose.

50. Several other exile groups have undertaken to coordinate resistance activities in Cuba and to organize "armies of liberation" among the exiles. One of them has sought to establish a government-in-exile in collaboration with President Ydigoras of Guatemala and to develop an armed force to invade Cuba. None of these efforts has made much progress.

51. In present circumstances, the prospects for a resistance effort in Cuba capable of threatening the government are nil. If arms and supplies became available and if confidence were created in the likelihood of out-

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side support for a major Cuban uprising, resistance activity and potential would increase substantially. Even so it is unlikely that the regime could be overthrown unless events had already shaken the regime and brought into doubt its capacity for survival, and unless substantial outside support for the insurgents were forthcoming.

VI. EXTERNAL RELATIONS

52. Castro seems to have no doubts about the desirability of facing the rest of the world as a member of the "Socialist camp." He will continue to associate Cuba with the Bloc and to seek to make the most of Soviet commitments. For their part, the Soviets must regard the situation in Cuba as a net gain for their international position, despite the misgivings they must feel about the Latin American reaction to the proclamation of an avowedly Communist regime in Cuba and about the attendant risks in Soviet-US relations. The Soviets are aware of the psychological and political influence, actual and potential, of a revolutionary Cuba on Latin American states on the brink of revolution, and will seek opportunities to make use of it.
53. Castro's vitriolic anti-US position continues unchanged. Anti-Americanism is deeply ingrained in the regime and in much of the Cuban populace. The authority of the regime depends in significant part on its so-far successful defiance of the US, and the regime is unlikely to see any advantage to be gained by changing its attitude toward the US. Opponents of the regime hope for help from the US, but their expectations of assistance are at a very low ebb.
54. The Cuban regime continues to try to appeal to the Afro-Asian neutralist bloc, even while proclaiming its adherence to Marxism-Leninism. It seeks to play a role at such neutralist-sponsored conferences as the "World without the Bomb" meeting in Ghana and the underdeveloped nations economic conference

in Cairo. However, the conduct of the Cuban emissaries at these meetings has generally been such as to antagonize the Afro-Asian neutrals.

55. The appeal of Castroism has dimmed considerably in other Latin American states as a consequence of the Cuban leader's avowal of Marxism-Leninism, his obvious toadying to the Bloc, and the self-acknowledged failings of the regime. After a period in which Castro and Cuba were the focus of attention through the area, Latin Americans have turned back to their own problems. However, there are militant pro-Castro minorities in several Latin American states and many neutralists and protagonists of reform who look with favor on Castro. In Brazil, Bolivia, and Mexico there are significant elements in government who sympathize with the Castro regime.

56. Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, and Uruguay are now the only Latin American countries maintaining diplomatic relations with Cuba. Relations between Cuba and Uruguay have been strained on account of the nearly 400 asylees in the Uruguayan Embassy in Havana. The Mexican Government has been irritated by the use of the Cuban news agency office in Mexico City to foster anti-US activity during President Kennedy's visit there in June.

57. Cuban leaders, although preoccupied with domestic problems, still seek to assert Cuban leadership of the "inevitable" revolution in Latin America. They have been very active in attempts to organize a new and ostensibly neutral Latin American labor organization. Cuba operates schools for indoctrinating and training in guerrilla warfare Latin American students who eventually return home to apply what they have learned. The first half of 1962 has seen an increase in reports of Cuban arms shipments to other countries in the area, but no such shipments have been confirmed. There is firm evidence that Cuba has provided at least \$10,000 to Guate-

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malan revolutionaries <sup>i</sup>/<sub>m</sub> the 13th of November group <sup>i</sup>/<sub>m</sub> in Mexico City.

(11) 58. Communist parties in other Latin American states have been disturbed by events in Cuba, and particularly by the Soviet Union's acceptance of Castro as a Communist, because they feel that the role and the prerogatives of veteran Communists have been cast in doubt. Uruguayan Communists were disturbed by statements made by Blas Roca at a Communist Party meeting in Montevideo to the effect that it had been demonstrated that a non-Communist could lead a successful revolution against the capitalists and imperialists. There has been dissatisfaction among Guatemalan Communists over the Cubans' support of the 13th of November group, which includes Communists but is not Communist-dominated.

(11) 59. The present image of the Castro regime in Latin America is that of a client of the Bloc and a failure in the conduct of its own affairs, particularly in the important area of economic development. Nevertheless, the Cuban regime has proven that violent social revolution and a break with the US is possible in Latin America and probably impressed many would-be revolutionaries with the possibility of gaining Soviet support without accepting Soviet control. The appeal of the Cuban example will increase in Latin America if reform lags there and if hopes and promises remain unfulfilled. Cuba is also a danger because its subversive activities might provide the spark that would set off explosions in unstable countries such as Venezuela and Guatemala.

(11) [Here follows an annex <sup>comprised</sup> <sup>three</sup> ~~consisting~~ of 3 tables providing inventories of the arms and equipment of the Cuban armed forces.] (84) (94)

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(50) Memorandum for the Record ~~by Colonel Melvin D. Henderson~~

14

Washington, August 24, 1962.

27

(26) SUBJECT: Mr. Paul's Meeting with Dr. Jose Miro Cardona

(1) At 4:00 p.m. this date, Mr. Paul met with Dr. Cardona to discuss certain matters relative to the enlistment of Cubans into the Armed Forces of the U. S. He considered this a most urgent problem, primarily because of the recent introduction into Cuba of at least 5,000 individuals whom he called soldiers. He was desirous of expediting this training to be completed within the next six months. He considered the latter time figure as very critical.

(11) He desired increased recruiting of enlisted. He desired recruiting officers and recruiting offices to be placed in New York City and Puerto Rico, and he wanted the officers school to be increased in numbers of officers attending. He wanted the length of the school to be reduced. I understood that eighteen weeks was the maximum length for the school, and that he desired to have 120 officers trained  $\frac{1}{3}$  divided 1/3 Army, 1/3 aviators and 1/3 to be miscellaneous young officers. He estimated that by increasing recruiting pressure that approximately 5,000 to 6,000 would join up.

(11) Dr. Cardona was interested in being able to make a statement to the effect that Cubans are being trained by the Armed Forces to fight in Cuba. This type of statement would bring the recruits in. I understood him to be agreeable to a statement to the effect that the Cubans were being trained to fight communism anywhere. If the above former statement was not made, the program would not be satisfactory according to Dr. Cardona.

(11) Mr. Paul provided the following information  $\frac{1}{m}$  that a new program to be announced within the next two or three weeks should increase the number of Cubans interested. Among other things, this program would permit Spanish speaking individuals to be enlisted, and that all instruction would be in Spanish. He advised that the standards were being lowered, and that more would be permitted to be trained in units. He further advised that additional recruiting offices would be opened in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles and others. He told Dr. Cardona that he would look into the idea of opening one up in Puerto Rico. Mr. Paul indicated that he was not certain as to the exact number of officers being trained and did not commit himself or the Defense Department to the

(43) Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD

(C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Yarmolinsky Files, Cuban Volunteer Program. Secret.

(43) ✓ Norman S. Paul was an Assistant to the Secretary of Defense.

~~COPY~~  
training of additional officers.

CU-300/2 1302

(11) As a result of Dr. Cardona's meeting with Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. Paul advises that Mr. Gilpatric desires that the implementation of the program be expedited.

(11) Two items of interest were mentioned regarding the past program:

(16) (1) They noted that the recruiting offices were turning men down when they had more than one dependent.

(16) (2) Two Cubans had been sent to Germany for duty.

(11) They were concerned about both of the above and both merit attention.

(11) With regard to Dr. Cardona's desire to make a statement that Cubans are being trained to fight in Cuba, Mr. Paul stated that this was a matter that could not be decided by the Defense Department.

(11) Dr. Cardona also stated, at the present time they have 125 pilots, mostly commercial, among the refugees. None of them are qualified in jets.

61 (11) Mr. Paul prefaced his remarks at the outset of the meeting that the substance of his remarks were not for publication and were for Dr. Cardona's information only. He reiterated this comment in Mr. Gilpatric's office.

(17) Melvin D. Henderson ✓  
~~Colonel Melvin D. Henderson~~

(28) Military Assistant (89) (94)

~~Col. Gus Lee~~

(13) 2 Printed from a copy that indicates Henderson signed the original.

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ONSD (C) A Files: FRC 71A2896  
Yarmolinsky Files, Cuban  
Volunteer Program

(50) Letter from the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the President of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (Cardona).

(19) Washington, August 28, 1962.

(11) (14) Dear Dr. Cardona: (11)

9/1/66  
It was a great pleasure to meet with you last Friday to discuss the Department of Defense program for the enlistment of Cuban refugees in the United States Armed Forces. As you know, we are anxious to provide opportunities for training and service to these men, many of whom have already distinguished themselves in the service of freedom.

(11) I am writing now to confirm the steps we have taken to revamp our Cuban refugee program so that we shall be better able to take advantage of the skills of Cuban refugees.

(11) As Mr. Paul told you, the new program for enlisted training, which should be announced within the next two or three weeks, will permit the recruitment of Spanish speaking individuals who will receive their basic training in the Spanish language and in units made up primarily, if not exclusively, of their fellow countrymen. We will be able to accept applications for this program in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles and New Orleans, as well as in Miami, and we are looking into the possibility of accepting applications in Puerto Rico. Under the new program, the fact that a man has several dependents will not be a bar to enlistment, and applicants will be informed that their training will prepare them specifically for combat-type assignments.

(11) You will recall that in the former program several enlistees claimed they had understood they were being recruited for action against Cuba, although they had been clearly informed to the contrary by U.S. authorities. In order to avoid this kind of unfortunate misunderstanding, every applicant in the new program, as a part of his regular processing, will receive specific briefing on this point, explaining also that he will be given the same opportunity to serve in the U.S. Armed Forces as is provided U.S. citizens, including service overseas and, if necessary, in combat.

(11) In the matter of training for former Cuban officers, we are, as you know, making plans for the assignment of twelve former officers to service schools. We are planning to provide these officers two consecutive 18-week training courses at Army and Air Force schools. At some future time we may want to consider increasing the number of such officer assignments.

(11) I look forward to our continued cooperation.

(11) Sincerely yours,  
(17) Roswell Gilpatric. (84) (64)  
*Roswell Gilpatric*

(43) Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Cuba, 1962, 121<sup>1</sup>/<sub>N</sub> 373.5. The letter was addressed to Dr. Jose Miro Cardona in Miami Beach, Florida.



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Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, August 31, 1962 5:56 p.m.

561.

DEPARTMENT TELEGRAM 501.

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CAP  
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ENR

IN THE ABSENCE UNMISTAKABLY CLEAR AND OFFICIAL INDICATION FROM US OF SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH UNUSUALLY LARGE SHIPMENTS OF HEAVY MILITARY GOODS IS VIEWED, SEE NO REASON WHY SOVIETS SHOULD NOT CONTINUE INCREASINGLY PROVIDE SUCH MATERIALS TO CUBA. PREPARATIONS FOR PRESENT SHIPMENTS MUST HAVE BEEN UNDERWAY FOR LONG TIME AND PRESUMABLY WERE KEYED TO SOVIET BELIEF THAT AMERICAN COMMENTS ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE SIGNIFIED SERIOUS INTENT TO MOUNT FULL SCALE AND OVERWHELMING INVASION. THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT (VIZ HUNGARY) THAT IN AN EQUIVALENT SITUATION THE SOVIET UNION WOULD HAVE UNDERTAKEN IMMEDIATE MEASURES TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM IN TERMS OF SHEER FORCE. THUS PRESENT SHIPMENTS APPEAR EXPLAINABLE APART FROM ANY INTENDED PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT IN THE REST OF LATIN AMERICA.

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DISTRIBUTION	
Sec. Def.	X
Dep. Sec.	
Adm. Sec.	
Gen. Larnsdale	
Compt.	
Manpower	
I. S. A.	2
Gen. Con.	
L. A.	
R. & E.	
ARPA	
I. & L.	
Atom. E.	
O. A. S.	
P. A.	
C. C. S.	
D. I. A.	
D. C. A.	
O. C. D.	
J. C. S.	2
Army	

SOVIET PRESS PLAY OF SO-CALLED "CANNONADING" OF HAVANA GIVES NO INDICATION THAT ARMAMENT OF ATTACKING SHIPS WAS NO GREATER THAN 20MM CAPACITY. SOVIET PEOPLE THEREFORE, SHOULD THEY LEARN OF THE EXTENT OF SOVIET MILITARY MATERIEL SHIPMENTS, WOULD HAVE NO REASON TO THINK CUBA IS NOT, IN FACT, IN DANGER OF EARLY ALL-OUT INVASION.

SUGGEST DESIRABILITY OF EARLY UNPUBLICIZED DEMARCHE TO SOVIET GOVERNMENT POSSIBLY DOBRYNIN WOULD BE BEST CHANNEL EXPRESSING ACTIVE AND SERIOUS CONCERN U.S. GOVERNMENT OVER PENETRATION SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT ACCOMPANIED BY LARGE NUMBERS OF AT LEAST TECHNICAL PERSONNEL IN AREA PRACTICALLY IMPINGING ON U.S. FRONTIER. IT MIGHT BE INDICATED THAT OUR

CONCERN IS NECESSARILY BASED ON WHAT MAY BE NOT ENTIRELY ACCURATE INFORMATION AND THAT WE WOULD WELCOME A STATEMENT BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT OF THE KINDS OF AID BEING GIVEN WHICH WOULD REMOVE THESE DOUBTS. IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH CLARIFICATION, WE CAN ONLY ASSUME THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS, FOR REASONS OF ITS OWN, PUTTING IN THE HANDS OF WHAT THEY AS WELL AS WE KNOW TO BE AN UNSTABLE DICTATOR, EQUIPMENT WHICH, IF IMPROPERLY USED, COULD IGNITE A CONFLAGRATION WHICH WOULD EXTEND FAR BEYOND THE CARIBBEAN.

IT WOULD FURTHER APPEAR HELPFUL IN OUR APPROACH TO ALLIES FOR COOPERATION (REFTEL) IF US ITSELF HAD TAKEN FURTHER DIRECT STEP VIS-A-VIS USSR.

MC SWEENEY 89 94

(93) Source: Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Historian's Office, Cable Files, Cuba, Jan. <sup>1</sup>/<sub>N</sub> Aug. 1962.

Secret.

(93) 1 Document <sup>1</sup>/<sub>m</sub>.  
Supra.

(93) 2 ~~The~~ Reference is to an incident <sup>that</sup> which occurred on the night of August 24, when two motorboats armed with .20 calibre guns and piloted by a group of young Cuban exiles penetrated Havana harbor to within a kilometer of shore and opened fire on several buildings in the Miramar section of the city for several minutes before escaping out to sea. Cuba protested the attack to the United Nations as an instance of U.S.-sponsored aggression. (Telegram 633 from New York, August 30; Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/8<sup>1</sup>/<sub>N</sub>3062)

Within the senior levels of the Kennedy administration, a debate developed, involving President Kennedy, the Attorney General, and Under Secretary of State Ball among others, over whether to arrest and prosecute the Cuban exiles involved after they returned to Florida. President Kennedy decided to issue a statement deploring such "spur-of-the-moment" raids as counter-productive, and warning against any future raids. (For memoranda of a number of telephone conversations on August 25 involved in this debate, see Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Subject Series, Cuba, 1/24/61<sup>1</sup>/<sub>N</sub>12/30/62)

44

CU-337

B87

50 Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense's Military Assistant  
(Brown) to the Secretary of Defense /McNamara/

19 Washington, September 4, 1962.

20 SUBJECT 21 Facts and Estimates Concerning Cuba

11 Attached for your information is a memorandum for the record of Captain Hadden's conversation with Secretary Rusk concerning Cuba, together with a fact sheet on the SSN-2 Soviet missile corrected in pencil to agree with the NIE, and a fact sheet on the Komar boat.

11 I am informed that in Oriente Province there is estimated to be approximately 40,000 organized military troops including regular and militia. In the immediate Guantanamo area there are estimated to be 7 battalions at a strength of 300,000 men per battalion. The troop strength in the Guantanamo area has varied since January 1962 from "a few hundred" up to 5,000, 6,000. There are estimated to be 30-50 tanks and artillery of all types. There is a prepared anti-tank defensive line north of the Base which is being extended south to the west of the Base. There are many prepared artillery positions in the hills and in the rain forest to the east, north and west of the Base.

11 The current U.S. strength at Guantanamo is:

	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Officer</u>	
Marine	754	36	
Naval Ships Complement	1627	152	
MCB4	<u>437</u>	<u>11</u>	
TOTAL	2818	199	- 3017

11 A paper on capability of U.S. destroyer against the Komar boat should be in my hands by 5:30 this afternoon. I can give you the essentials of the paper briefly should you need them prior to that time.

17 GSB 89 94

~~George F. Brown~~

OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71A 2896  
Cuba 1962  
(McN Working Papers)

050-08-75-028-89

(93) Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 1962 (McN Working Papers). Top Secret. A stamped note on the source text indicates that McNamara saw the memorandum.

(93) 1/ The attached memorandum by Captain M. A. Hadden, USN, recorded a conversation on September 3 in which Hadden briefed Rusk, at Rusk's request, concerning the defenses of the Guantanamo base. Rusk indicated that it might be wise to consider the desirability of reinforcing and augmenting the Guantanamo defenses. (Ibid.)

(93) 2/ The NIE in Reference is <sup>to</sup> NIE 85<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub> 2<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub> '62. ~~For the text, see~~ Document <sup>1</sup>/<sub>W</sub> . (8/1) The fact sheet <sup>have</sup> cited has not been found.

(93) 3/ In a memorandum to McNamara, also dated September 4, General Benjamin T. Harris outlined the capabilities of U.S. destroyers if confronted in combat by the missile-equipped KOMAR class patrol being supplied to Cuba by the Soviet Union. Harris noted that the information was being provided in response to questions posed by President Kennedy. Briefly, Harris concluded that World War II vintage destroyers might be at a disadvantage in such a confrontation, but that with post-<sup>World War</sup> II destroyers with missile capability, "the outcome would be in our favor." (Ibid.)

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1389

(50) Memorandum from the Department of Defense Operations Officer for Operation Mongoose (Harris) to ~~AN~~ Secretary of Defense ~~McNamara~~

(27) (19) Washington, September 4, 1962.  
(20) Subject: Air Defense in Southeast US Area

(11) 1. Pursuant to oral instructions, the following represents a brief statement of the facilities and aircraft involved in the defense of the Southeastern US.

(11) 2. Prime radar installations exist at Naval Air Station, Key West (an Air Force installation operated on a full time basis and with a full crew; also used for training of Navy operators), and at Miami (FAA operated but with a full time military crew). These prime installations have a capability of about 160 NM against small targets, such as MIG type aircraft. Additionally, there is one picket ship station and one AEW aircraft station off the Southern Tip of Florida. These provide low and high intercept cover respectively. Three gap filler radar installations (unmanned automatic stations) are being installed in the Southern Florida area to provide additional low altitude coverage. These should be operational in October at which time the picket ship station will be removed.

(11) 3. Current aircraft devoted to the defense of the Southern Tip area include a detachment of eight F4D Navy fighters at Key West and four F4102 Air Force fighters at Homestead. These aircraft are in a continual alert status.

(11) 4. Backup defense-in-depth can be provided by Naval fighters in the Jacksonville area; the aircraft carrier(s) normally in the Mayport area; the F4101, F4102 and F4106 (a total of 59) Air Defense Command augmentation aircraft at Tyndal AFB, Florida; one F4102 ANG squadron at Jacksonville; one F4101 squadron at Charleston, S. C.; one F4102 squadron at Seymour Johnson AFB, N. C.; etc.

(11) 5. Additionally, CINCONAD has been authorized to request that CINCSTRIKE provide from his own resources a second AEW station and SAM units on a contingency basis. Air Force is currently studying means of aircraft augmentation for Southern Tip.

(17) BENJAMIN T. HARRIS  
(28) Brig General, USA  
(28) DOD/JCS Representative  
(28) Caribbean Survey Group

85 94

(93) Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD  
(C) A Files: FRC 71 A 28 96, Cuba 381, 22 Oct 27 Oct 1962. Top  
Secret; Special Handling; Noform.

(93) Printed from a copy ~~which~~ bears this typed signature.

CU-345

44

Memorandum <sup>Kennedy</sup> From ~~the~~ President to ~~the~~ Secretary of Defense <sup>McNamara</sup> ~~McNamara~~ <sup>RM</sup>

Washington, September 7, 1962.

I would appreciate an up-to-date brief report on the number of Cubans who joined the U.S. armed forces as a result of our interest in this matter last year, and an idea of how many applied who were not acceptable.

I would also like your reaction and the reaction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the formation of a Cuban brigade in which we would enlist Cuban nationals for a period of six to nine months for training, with no guarantee, of course, that they would be returned to Cuba, but a promise that if the need arose, a Cuban brigade would be used. It is my understanding that to make a success of this brigade we would have to alter the present physical standards for Army service so that a greater number of Cubans who might want to participate could be included.

John F. Kennedy 85 84

JOHN F. KENNEDY

Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Cuba 342.18 (31 Jan 1962). Secret. <sup>A</sup> ~~The~~ <sup>note on the source text</sup> ~~memorandum~~ stamped <sup>is the</sup> indicates that McNamara saw it. ~~There is an~~ unsigned copy of this memorandum in Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 9/62.

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1422

49  
50 Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to the President  
Kennedy  
19 Washington, September 13, 1962.

11 This memorandum is in response to your request for a report on the program to enlist Cubans in the US Armed Forces, which terminated last June, and on my reaction and the reaction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the formation of a Cuban Brigade at the present time. ✓

11 Under the previous program, only 142 Cuban nationals joined the US Armed Forces between 29 July 1961 and 31 July 1962, and of these, 30 have already been discharged for the convenience of the government. Of some 4,000 who expressed interest in the program, only 1,000 were registered by the Selective Service local boards as volunteers for military service. This attrition occurred either because the men were disqualified by reason of age and number of dependents, or because they lost interest when informed that they would not serve in Cuban units. Of the remaining group, more than two-thirds were disqualified at the Armed Forces Examining Station. The largest number of disqualifications (half of the total) was based on "moral and security" grounds. Substantially all of these disqualifications occurred when the volunteers were given lie detector tests (required procedure in the absence of the usual background investigation data) and admitted histories of sexual deviation. Only 135 failed to qualify on medical grounds. Additional drop-outs along the way, particularly in the English language training phase of the program, reduced the number of inductees to 142.

11 At the direction of the Special Group (Counterinsurgency), the Joint Chiefs of Staff have prepared a plan for a new Cuban volunteer program which should overcome some, if not all, of the difficulties that arose in the previous program. We are proposing to train Cuban nationals in all-Cuban units, the training to be conducted in Spanish. Volunteers would not be excluded as they were in the previous program, by reason of number of dependents or the inability to speak and understand English. Voluntary induction would be for a minimum of two years, as required by present law. After completion of 20 weeks of ✓

93 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Yarmolinsky Files, Cuban Volunteer Program. Secret.

93 See Document  $\frac{1}{m}$  (Kennedy memo. 9/7)

93 JCS memorandum JCSM 713 1/62 from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, September 12, 1962. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Cuba 432.18 (31 Jan 1962)).



basic and advanced individual training, the volunteer may be discharged, transferred to reserve status, or retained on active duty and integrated into a regular military unit. Those who meet requisite standards would be permitted to enter Special Forces training, within available quotas.

(1) Individuals who are placed on reserve status would be organized into separate reserve units, where residence permits. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the possibility of organizing such reserve units with a brigade or similar organization as suggested. It is their opinion that an organization of this nature may, at this time, be premature; however, should experience indicate that there are sufficient volunteers and qualified officer and non-commissioned officer personnel from among the Cuban refugees to support such an organization, further consideration may well be warranted.

(2) The over-all plan has been discussed in some detail within the Special Group (Counterinsurgency) and with Dr. Miro-Cardona. I understand Dr. Cardona feels that it would be adequate to stimulate recruiting of qualified Cuban refugees. Because of the experience gained from last year's program, I am still somewhat skeptical as to the number of Cubans who will volunteer and qualify. The prospective establishment of all-Cuban reserve units should assist in attracting additional volunteers for the program. Further, it could also provide means of long-term control over personnel who have received at least 20 weeks of active duty training.

(3) On the other hand, I do not believe that the possible additional recruiting value of an active duty Cuban brigade would offset the numerous additional problems of a political and administrative nature that such an organization might produce.

(4) We expect to put the plan into operation in the very near future, after we have reached agreement with the Department of State on the timing and nature of a public announcement.

(5) As indicated above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were consulted in the preparation of this reply.

cc: Mr. N. S. Baugh, Asst to Sec (JCS)  
B/G E. C. Landale, Asst to Sec  
B/G W. A. Ennemark, OASD (ISA)  
Mr. Nils A. Lennartson, DAS (PA)  
Chairman, JCS (4 cc)  
Mr. [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

(14) Robert S. McNamara<sup>3</sup>

(89) (74)

(B) Printed from a copy that indicates McNamara signed the original.

OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71A0896

Larmolinsky Files, Cuban  
Volunteer Program



CU-355

(18) SNIE 85-3-62 / → (19) Washington, September 19, 1962.

(55) THE MILITARY  
BUILDUP IN CUBA

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1 line

(55) THE PROBLEM

(11) To assess the strategic and political significance of the recent military buildup in Cuba and of the possible future development of additional military capabilities there.

(55) CONCLUSIONS

1065  
(11) A. We believe that the USSR values its position in Cuba primarily for the political advantages to be derived from it, and consequently that the main purpose of the present military buildup in Cuba is to strengthen the Communist regime there against what the Cubans and the Soviets conceive to be a danger that the US may attempt by one means or another to overthrow it. The Soviets evidently hope to deter any such attempt by enhancing Castro's defensive capabilities and by threatening Soviet military retaliation. At the same time, they evidently recognize that the development of an offensive military base in Cuba might provoke US military intervention and thus defeat their present purpose. (Paras. 1411)

(11) B. In terms of military significance, the current Soviet deliveries are substantially improving air defense and coastal defense capabilities in Cuba. Their political significance is that, in conjunction with the Soviet statement of 11 September, they are likely to be regarded as ensuring the continuation of the Castro regime in power, with consequent discouragement to the opposition at home and in exile. The threat inherent in these developments is that, to the extent that the Castro regime thereby gains a sense of security at home,

(93) Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD

(C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, McNamara Briefing Notebooks, 12 Jan.

63. Secret. A covering note indicated<sup>S</sup> that this estimate, submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, was prepared by CIA, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and NSA. All members of the <sup>USIB</sup> ~~United States Intelligence Board~~ concurred with the estimate on September 19, <sup>except</sup> ~~with the exception of~~ the representative of the AEC, who abstained on the grounds that the topic was outside his jurisdiction.

(93) ✓ See Document

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~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ (CIA Report 9/12)

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it will be emboldened to become more aggressive in fomenting revolutionary activity in Latin America. (Paras. 18<sup>1</sup>/<sub>N</sub>21)

(11) C. As the buildup continues, the USSR may be tempted to establish in Cuba other weapons represented to be defensive in purpose, but of a more "offensive" character: e.g., light bombers, submarines, and additional types of short-range surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs). A decision to provide such weapons will continue to depend heavily on the Soviet estimate as to whether they could be introduced without provoking a US military reaction. (Paras. 22<sup>1</sup>/<sub>N</sub>28)

(11) D. The USSR could derive considerable military advantage from the establishment of Soviet medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles in Cuba, or from the establishment of a Soviet submarine base there. As between these two, the establishment of a submarine base would be the more likely. Either development, however, would be incompatible with Soviet practice to date and with Soviet policy as we presently estimate it. It would indicate a far greater willingness to increase the level of risk in US-Soviet relations than the USSR has displayed thus far, and consequently would have important policy implications with respect to other areas and other problems in East-West relations. (Paras. 29<sup>1</sup>/<sub>N</sub>33)

(11) E. The Latin American reaction will be to the evidence of an increased Soviet commitment to Cuba, rather than to the technical implications of the military buildup. Many Latin Americans will fear and resent a Soviet military intrusion into the Hemisphere, but will regard the problem as one to be met by the US and not their responsibility. We estimate the chances are better now than they were at Punta del Este to obtain the necessary two-thirds OAS majority for sanctions and other steps short of direct military action aimed at Cuba. If it became clear that the USSR was establishing an "offensive" base in Cuba, most Latin American governments would expect the US to eliminate it, by whatever means were necessary, but many of them would still seek to avoid direct involvement. (Paras. 34<sup>1</sup>/<sub>N</sub>37)

OASO(C)A File, FR 11A 2896  
McLennan Briefing Notebook, 12 Jan 63

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## (55) DISCUSSION

## (106) I. CONSIDERATIONS UNDERLYING SOVIET POLICY IN CUBA

(11) 1. We believe that the USSR values its position in Cuba primarily for the political advantages to be derived from it, and that the main purpose of the present military buildup in Cuba is to strengthen the Communist regime there against what the Cubans and the Soviets conceive to be a danger that the US may attempt by one means or another to overthrow it. The Soviets evidently hope to deter any such attempt by enhancing Castro's defensive capabilities and by threatening Soviet military retaliation. At the same time, they evidently recognize that the development of an offensive military base in Cuba might provoke US military intervention and thus defeat their present purpose.

(11) 2. The Soviets consider that the Cuban Revolution and their association with it have severely damaged the prestige of the US and greatly enhanced that of the USSR, throughout the world. They see in the case of Cuba an effective demonstration that, anywhere in the world, a "colonial" people can throw off the "imperialist yoke" and, with the indispensable aid and protection of the USSR, successfully maintain its independence against "imperialist" counteraction. They especially value the effect of this demonstration in Latin America and also value Cuba as an advanced base for the support of radical revolutionary elements in Latin America.

(11) 3. Although initially the Soviets were guarded in their relations with the Castro regime, in the past year both they and Castro have undertaken moves which make their ties much closer. Thus Moscow's commitment to the survival and success of the Cuban Revolution is deepening. The Soviets have appar-

ently concluded that they must invest more heavily to protect their stake in Cuba.

(11) 4. Because of heightening Soviet concern over the state of the Cuban economy, Moscow last spring agreed substantially to expand and liberalize its economic assistance program to Cuba. Indeed, Soviet economic aid to Cuba now involves an extensive program planned to sustain and gradually to develop the economy. The Soviets have thus clearly demonstrated their belief that Cuba, with Soviet support, can achieve sufficient progress to serve as a stimulus for revolutionaries elsewhere in Latin America.

(11) 5. During roughly the same period (last spring), the Soviets also apparently concluded that the Castro regime would have to be provided with accelerated military aid. Castro almost certainly had long demanded a much more substantial Soviet program. More important, however, we believe the decision reflected Soviet concern that its expanding role in Cuba might be terminated by a US move to overthrow the Castro regime. The rapid military buildup in Cuba was thus intended in large part to impress the US with the increased costs and risks of any attempt to overthrow the Cuban regime by force.

(11) 6. In line with this objective, the Soviet statement of 11 September was in part designed to dissuade the US from making any decision to intervene in Cuba. By stressing the "defensive" nature of the Cuban buildup, it sought to convince the US (and the world at large) that the military buildup in Cuba does not constitute a threat. At the same time, however, by raising the spectre of general war, it stressed the gravity of the risks involved in US intervention. The statement as a whole is probably a substitute for the

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guarantees which the Castro regime almost certainly has demanded. While it carefully avoids an explicit commitment to defend Cuba in the event of US attack, it does further engage Soviet prestige to ensuring the survival of the Castro regime.

⑪ 7. The absence of such an explicit commitment reflects the Soviets' basic disinclination to hazard their own safety for the sake of Cuba. They are willing, indeed anxious, to deflate US prestige and power in Latin American opinion and to provide the Cubans with the economic instruments of survival and progress, but they remain wary of provoking the US—or of allowing Castro to provoke the US—by going too far and too fast with a military buildup. In their 11 September statement they sought to undercut speculation about Soviet missile bases in Cuba for possible use against the US by, *inter alia*, stressing the defensive nature of armaments supplied Cuba and by denying any military need for such bases in view of their capability to attack the US from their own territory.

⑪ 8. While Soviet policies in Cuba may have initially been devised almost entirely in terms of Cuba and Latin America, Moscow now also views the situation in terms of the broader East-West struggle. They relish the demonstration that Soviet power can be extended to an area adjacent to the US, and are using the strong US reaction to justify their own resentment of the "offensive" US bases on the Soviet periphery. Further, in their 11 September statement, the Soviets implied that US action against Cuba would be countered by Bloc moves elsewhere in the world and for the first time publicly linked the Berlin and Cuban crises. The Soviets are also aware that a drastic heightening of tension over Cuba is an important factor in their general relations with the US and has an impact on various other issues. Thus developments in the Cuban situation probably influenced the re-

cent Soviet decision to let the Berlin situation simmer, rather than boil, for the time being.

⑪ 9. The current Soviet buildup marks a dramatic change of pace in Soviet operations, probably occasioned by a reappraisal of policies and increased determination to insure the survival of the Castro regime. However, we believe that the military buildup which began in July does not reflect a radically new Soviet policy toward Cuba, either in terms of military commitments or of the role of Cuba in overall Soviet strategy. Without changing the essentially defensive character of the military buildup in Cuba and without making an open pledge to protect Cuba under all circumstances, the Soviets have enhanced Cuban military capabilities, repeated in stronger terms their warnings to the US, and tied the Cuban situation to the general question of the East-West confrontation.

⑪ 10. The Soviets themselves are probably still uncertain about their future military program for Cuba. Indeed, they probably intend to test US and Latin American reactions as they proceed. At the same time they are obliged to tailor their policy to minimize risks of confrontation with the US, avoid friction with Castro, and maintain the best possible propaganda stance in the eyes of Latin America and the world in general.

⑪ 11. The analysis of Soviet policy toward Cuba given here is based on an overall evaluation of Soviet interests and intentions and on evidence of Soviet actions in and with respect to Cuba to date. While it is our judgment that, even in the light of recent developments, Soviet policy remains fundamentally unaltered, we cannot exclude the possibility that Moscow is at least considering a change in this policy. Consequently, in the sections which follow, we examine in some detail not only the Soviet military buildup in Cuba to date and possible developments in that buildup which might follow, but also the nature and implications of military assistance which the

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Soviets could provide Cuba in the event of a major change of policy.

## II. THE BUILDUP TO DATE

12. In the first phase of the provision of military supplies, from 1960 to early 1962, the Soviets concentrated on substantial amounts of conventional combat weapons for the ground forces. A number of Bloc technicians were supplied and a training program for Cuban military personnel was inaugurated. The buildup proceeded at a deliberate pace and eventually, after some training of Cuban pilots, about 60 jet fighter aircraft were supplied to Cuba. In addition, some submarine-chasers and motor torpedo boats were delivered. This phase was largely completed by February 1962 with the result that Cuban forces were much better prepared to handle incursions upon their territory.

13. In July the Soviets began a rapid effort to strengthen Cuban defenses against air attack and major seaborne invasion. Between mid-July and early September some 70 ships have delivered various types of military supplies and construction equipment, and more ships are en route. These new shipments have consisted in part of further deliveries of types of weapons already available to Cuban forces. More tanks, self-propelled guns and other ground force equipment have been supplied. But the bulk of the material delivered is related to the establishment of SA-2 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), which will form the basis for a new air defense system.

14. Thus far, 12 SA-2 SAM sites have been installed in the western half of the island. It is likely that similar coverage will be provided in the eastern half. Some missile sites could now be operational. The Soviets are also providing a number of more advanced jet interceptors; about a dozen MIG-21's may have been delivered. The standard armament for this type of aircraft includes two

infrared homing air-to-air missiles (AAMs). It is likely that such missiles have accompanied the MIG-21's to Cuba.

15. The current buildup also reflects an effort to improve Cuba's coastal defenses. For this purpose, the Soviets have provided the "Komar" class guided-missile patrol boats which carry two short-range (10-15 n.m.) cruise-type missiles, primarily for use against shipping. This boat has a range of about 650 n.m., but is designed primarily for use in coastal waters. Eight "Komar" class boats have already been delivered and other similar craft may be on the way. In addition, a land-based cruise-type missile installation has been observed near Banes.

its range is likely to be limited to 20-35 n.m. by its radar horizon. This range might be extended by installing the radar on a height, or by employing ships or aircraft for forward observation. We believe that this will prove to be a coast defense installation and that others of this type will be deployed, but we cannot estimate at present the ultimate size of this program.

16. Equally important, particularly in terms of overall Soviet involvement, is the substantial increase in the number of Soviet military specialists in Cuba, from about 350 early this year to the current level of about 4,000. We anticipate that a large proportion of this group will remain in Cuba for some time. Six months to a year would be required before the SA-2 and other sites could be operated solely by Cuban personnel.

17. Because of the extent and rapidity of current deliveries and limitations in our intelligence coverage, we cannot yet identify all of the new equipment which has been introduced. Recent shipments include a great deal of electronic gear, with many vans, crates, and large boxes which could contain various types of this equipment. There is tenuous evidence of the presence of air defense ECM

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equipment. Although we have no specific evidence of it, we cannot exclude the possibility that COMINT and ELINT equipment is also now present in Cuba.

② Implications of the Current Buildup

⑪ 18. In terms of their military significance, the current Soviet deliveries are substantially improving capabilities in Cuba for air and coastal defense and defensive surface naval operations. When operational, the SAMs will assure that interception can be attempted under any weather condition, at altitudes up to 60,000 feet, with more limited effectiveness up to 80,000 feet. The system is probably not effective below about 3,000 feet. The MIG-21 has generally better performance characteristics than the earlier MIG models, and will considerably augment defenses against aircraft flying at medium and high altitudes.

⑪ 19. The large number of Soviet military personnel in Cuba will provide the technical assistance and training necessary to bring the newer weapons to operational readiness in the near future. If necessary, Soviet personnel could be employed to operate them before Cuban personnel are fully prepared to do so. It is likely that training and experience have already raised the proficiency of Cuban Air Force personnel somewhat above the low level noted in NIE 85-2-62, "The Situation and Prospects in Cuba," dated 1 August 1962 (paragraph 24). Soviet guidance and training will continue to raise the combat effectiveness of all branches of the Cuban military establishment.

⑪ 20. Some of the new weapons in Cuba could be used for offensive as well as defensive purposes. MIG fighters can be equipped for ground attack operations and antiship mis-

siles can be employed against well-defined land targets. Indirectly, the presence of SAMs could release some fighter aircraft for ground attack missions. Nevertheless, the pattern of Soviet military aid to date appears clearly designed to strengthen the defenses of the island, thereby protecting the Communist political beachhead in the Western Hemisphere and raising the price the US would have to pay to eliminate it by military action. The overall composition of the Cuban military establishment remains essentially defensive in character; it has not yet been provided with a significant strike capability. Moreover, the Cuban armed forces still lack the air and sealift necessary for military operations on any significant scale in neighboring territories.

⑪ 21. Limited as the offensive capabilities of the forces in Cuba are, an increased sense of security instilled by Soviet public statements and by the presence of new weapons may encourage the Cuban regime to engage in small scale filibustering expeditions. It might also encourage them to make new demands on the US regarding the naval base at Guantanamo and to engage in a program of harassment of the base.

④ III. POSSIBILITIES FOR EXPANSION OF THE BUILDUP

⑪ 22. The Soviets could expand the present buildup to include additional types of weapons. However, they are well aware that the question of offensive as opposed to defensive weapons in Cuba has become a major political issue. Their recent statement indicates that they believe a strong political case can be sustained for supplying "defensive" weapons in Cuba. Conversely they seem to realize that to provide certain other types of weapons to Cuba would pose a challenge to which the US might forcefully respond.

⑪ 23. Among the weapons which the Soviets might believe they could add to the Cuban

④ 3 [Text sanitized]



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arsenal without creating the appearance of an open defiance of US warnings on offensive weapons, are a low altitude SAM defense system and jet interceptors more advanced than the MIG-21's. However, both of these are believed to be in short supply within the USSR itself, where they are in the early stages of deployment. Moreover, the military potential of these weapons can be fully realized only in conjunction with the USSR's closely integrated system of air defense warning, communications, and control.

(11) 24. Apart from such examples, however, the distinction between defensive and offensive weapons is ambiguous. The Soviets might consider supplying BEAGLE (IL-28) light bombers, for example, which they have already provided to several non-Bloc states. These aircraft can be represented by the Soviets as "defensive" weapons, particularly if present only in small numbers. On the other hand, the IL-28 could reach targets in the southeastern part of the US and could carry nuclear weapons. If these aircraft appeared in Cuba, the US would have to decide whether or not they were to be taken as representing a serious "offensive" capability. On the whole we believe the Soviets might calculate that a modest number of IL-28's could be supplied to Cuba without serious risk of US counteraction.

(11) 25. BADGER (TU-16) medium bombers might also be supplied to Cuba, ostensibly for such "defensive" uses as armed reconnaissance against invasion shipping, but the offensive capabilities of these aircraft are considerably more obvious than in the case of IL-28's. We believe the Soviets would not supply them to Cuba.

(11) 26. It is possible that the Soviets would consider placing other short-range surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) in Cuba. The SS-1, a ballistic missile with a range of 150 n.m., would not threaten US territory other than Key West, but the 350 n.m. range of the SS-2 ballistic missile would extend to Cape

Canaveral. The Soviets also have a 350 n.m. cruise-type missile available. These weapons could employ conventional or nuclear warheads. It is possible that the Soviets would believe that some SS-2's would be tolerated by the US. On the other hand, any real military usefulness they might have to the Cuban defense establishment would be marginal, and the Soviets could not exclude that the US would react very strongly to their presence.

(11) 27. Another possibility is the provision of submarines and destroyers. We believe this may eventually be done. Some conventional submarines have already been supplied to non-Bloc countries, but the Soviets certainly realize that such action in Cuba could be interpreted by the US as violating their stated intention of limiting supplies to defensive purposes. However, the level of Soviet naval supply to Cuba will probably remain relatively high in coming months. Soviet merchant ships and trawlers will continue their frequent calls. The Soviets could test the US reaction to visits by Soviet naval ships to Cuban ports. Depending on US reactions over a period of time, the Soviets might then consider whether to turn over some destroyers and submarines to Cuba.

(11) 28. Thus the Soviets may experiment with a number of further steps in the military buildup. They may feel that some of these are necessary, if only to demonstrate their continuing support to Castro and refusal to be deterred by the US. The SA-2 defense system will provide a new degree of protection and secrecy for masking additional supplies. But the Soviets would be proceeding over uncertain ground and could not be sure of US knowledge of or reaction to each new move, or that the gains of each further step would be commensurate with the risks. They would also have to consider that Bloc personnel would be required to operate many of the additional weapons. Thus a decision to provide such weapons as bombers, submarines, or ad-

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ditional types of short-range missiles depends greatly on whether the Soviets estimate that these weapons can be introduced without precipitating a US intervention. They will realize that the nature of the US reaction will depend not only on types and numbers of weapons, but also on the offensive capability of the total military establishment in Cuba.

(12) Use of Cuba as a Soviet Strategic Missile Base

(11) 29. The establishment on Cuban soil of Soviet nuclear striking forces which could be used against the US would be incompatible with Soviet policy as we presently estimate it. It would indicate a far greater willingness to increase the level of risk in US-Soviet relations than the USSR has displayed thus far, and this would have important policy implications in other areas. However, Soviet military planners have almost certainly considered the contribution which Cuban bases might make to the Soviet strategic posture and, in that connection, the feasibility and utility of deploying nuclear delivery systems to Cuba. Therefore this contingency must be examined carefully, even though it would run counter to current Soviet policy.

(11) 30. Soviet planners might see some utility in deploying MRBMs and IRBMs to Cuba in order to supplement the limited number of ICBMs now believed to be operational in the USSR and to reach targets beyond the range of submarine-launched missiles. Cuban-based MRBMs with a range of 1,100 n.m. could reach targets as far north as Philadelphia and Cleveland and as far west as Oklahoma City; the 2,200 n.m. IRBMs could reach all US targets except some points in the Pacific Northwest. All of these targets can now be covered by ICBMs launched from the USSR. However, MRBMs or IRBMs deployed in Cuba would permit nuclear blows at an increased number of targets and would increase the total weight of the attack which could be delivered against the US in the event of general war.

(11) 31. The establishment on Cuban soil of a significant strike capability with such weapons would represent a sharp departure from Soviet practice, since such weapons have so far not been installed even in Satellite territory. Serious problems of command and control would arise. There would also have to be a conspicuously larger number of Soviet personnel in Cuba, which, at least initially, would be a political liability in Latin America. The Soviets might think that the political effect of defying the US by stationing Soviet nuclear striking power in so menacing a position would be worth a good deal if they could get away with it. However, they would almost certainly estimate that this could not be done without provoking a dangerous US reaction.

(11) 32. A Soviet submarine base in Cuba could be of considerable military value to the USSR. Submarines operating from a Cuban base could be maintained on station off the US coast for much longer periods than can now be sustained in operations from Northern Fleet bases. Such a forward base would permit Soviet missile and torpedo attack submarines, both conventional and nuclear-powered, more readily to conduct routine patrols off the US coast. It is possible that the Soviets might seek to establish such a base in connection with the provision of some submarines to the Cubans. They might reason that even when Soviet use became apparent, the US, with naval bases at Holy Loch and Guantanamo, would be in a poor position to protest. In terms of both feasibility and utility, the establishment of a Soviet submarine base appears more likely than the deployment of Soviet nuclear-armed missile forces to Cuban soil. Even so, the Soviets would probably calculate the risk of US intervention as too great for such an undertaking at the present time.

(11) 33. Although the Soviets may see some military advantages in Cuba as a strategic strike base, the risks would be great and the political

OASD(C) AFIS, IAC 11A 2896

McNamara Briefing Notebook, 12 Jan 63

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CW-355/9

implications would run counter to the kind of policy they are actually pursuing in Latin America. They do not propose to win the region for communism by military conquest. They count instead on a process of political action which will build a mass following for Communist or Communist-allied leaders who would then be capable of replacing existing governments.

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#### IV. LATIN AMERICAN REACTION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

34. Much of the Latin American public will react to the military buildup in Cuba and to evidences of Soviet intent to protect Castro without taking account of the particular weapons involved or of their capabilities and without reading between the lines of Soviet statements. Most of these Latin Americans will consider this intrusion of an extra-continental power to be a bad thing in itself, but at the same time will regard the problem as one to be met by the US and not their responsibility. Any disposition on the part of the Latin American governments to do something about it would depend greatly upon the lead given by the US, and this disposition would tend to fade if the US failed to come up with feasible courses of action. Some Latin Americans, of course, will be quick to note that the Soviets had intruded into the Hemisphere and will infer that the US had failed to rebuff this intrusion because it lacked the power or the will to do so.

35. In the Caribbean states there will be a much more pronounced tendency than elsewhere to interpret the military buildup in Cuba as a direct threat. They are not likely to expect that missiles will be fired at them, but that Soviet weapons and Soviet support will encourage Castro to intervene in their countries on behalf of radical revolutionists.

36. Among Latin American governments there are wide differences of opinion as to the role they as individual governments and as members of the OAS should play in the current situation. We estimate the chances are better now than they were at Punta del Este to obtain the two-thirds majority in the OAS required for sanctions and other steps short of direct military action aimed at Cuba. If it became clear that the Soviets were establishing an offensive base in Cuba most Latin American governments would expect the US to intervene and eliminate it, but many of them would still seek to avoid direct involvement.

37. In the longer run, if the Castro regime remains securely in power and the Cuban economy is developed substantially with Soviet help, the cohesion of the inter-American system will probably weaken further. Several countries would probably assume an "independent" position like that of Brazil. They would thereby position themselves for a closer accommodation with the Soviet Bloc, if and when desired, and would attempt to obtain assistance from both sides, in the manner of India and Indonesia.

8994

OSAC(C) A Files: TFC 71A 2896  
The Havana Review Notebook, 12 Jan 63

1444

CU-356

Kennedy

(50) Memorandum ~~from the President to the Secretary of Defense~~ McNamara

(14) Washington, September 21, 1962.

(11) At the meeting with you and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Friday, 14 September, there seemed to be lack of unanimity between General LeMay and Admiral Anderson as to losses our aircraft would incur in attacking an SA2 missile site.

11 Would it be useful to build a model of such a site for exercises to be observed by an objective and disinterested party? Judgement as to losses to be incurred should include those that would result from the addition of anti-aircraft guns to protect the site. If you believe such a program would be useful, would you provide me with an estimate as to its cost.

(11) Would you assure that contingency plans with relation to Cuba are kept up-to-date, taking into account the additions to their armaments resulting from the continuous influx of Soviet equipment and technicians.

(17) John Kennedy (89/94)

(C) A Files: ERC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381, 22 Oct, 27 Oct 1962. Top

Secret. ~~The one~~ ~~memorandum~~ ~~is stamped to indicate that it was seen by~~

~~McNamara~~ A stamped note on the source text indicates McNamara saw it.

April 16, 1996

FRUS DATA SORTED BY SOURCE

SRCE	TITLE	VOL	COMP	DOC#	PGS	FILE	ORIGIN	FINAL
USN	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	60	3	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	74	3	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	82	1	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	83	1	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	86	1	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	104	2	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	107	1	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	108	1	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	109	1	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	110	1	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	111	1	NAVAL HIST CENTER	JCS	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	112	1	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	114	1	NAVAL HIST CENTER	JCS	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	115	1	NAVAL HIST CENTER	JCS	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	116	2	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	117	1	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	118	1	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	119	1	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	120	1	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	121	1	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	123	1	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	R
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	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	126	1	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	127	1	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	128	1	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	131	1	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	133	1	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	134	1	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	135	1	NAVAL HIST CENTER	JCS	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	136	1	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	137	1	NAVAL HIST CENTER	JCS	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	146	1	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	154	3	NAVAL HIST CENTER	CIA	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	169	1	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	185	7	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	E
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	192	4	NAVAL HIST CENTER	JCS	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	197	3	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	205	3	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	224	1	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	E

PAGES BY SOURCE USN: 60

NUMBER OF DOCS: 39

CU-60

Memorandum from the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic (Dennison) to the  
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer)

Norfolk, March 28, 1961.

Subj: CIA Operation CROSSPATCH

Ref: (a) Your memo CM-152-61 of 24 Mar 1961

1. I will be prepared to execute the missions directed in enclosures A, B and C of reference (a). I will be prepared also to reinforce the Naval Base at Guantanamo with a reinforced Marine Battalion Landing Team from the Caribbean Amphibious Squadron.
2. I intend to provide at least two destroyers instead of one for the convoy. The purpose of providing two is for mutual support, defense against possible coordinated surface and air attack, and in case units of the convoy become separated.
3. The following is a summary of forces in the area and their planned employment:
  - a. The antisubmarine carrier ESSEX with seven destroyers is scheduled to be conducting ASW operations in the Gulf of Mexico during the period 3-18 April. About 7 April a squadron of jet aircraft will be flown aboard ESSEX. The ASW group will then proceed to an area southwest of Cuba. The convoy destroyers and combat air patrol will be provided from this group. The control of the combat air patrol may be exercised from the shipa best situated and equipped at the time and as directed by the Commander of the ASW Group or ESSEX.
  - b. There will be 18 destroyer types conducting routine training operations in the Guantanamo area during the two week period commencing 3 April.

(93) Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road  
Materials. Top Secret; Sensitive; Limited Distribution.

TAB A



TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE  
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

c. PHIBRON-2 with BLT 1/6 embarked will be operating in the area south of Guantanamo preceding a scheduled visit to Jamaica 13 April.

d. One jet fighter or attack squadron will be conducting routine training operations in the vicinity of each of the following bases:

Guantanamo  
Key West

4. I request that the 1st Marine Air Group be alerted to the fact that Florida may be protected from possible attack.

5. There is a necessity for issuing specific orders to units involved. Therefore, with your concurrence, I request to issue the following instructions:

a. In executing the destroyer mission a DD commanding officer will:

(1) Place his ship between the convoy and any suspicious or Cuban surface craft sighted.

(2) Warn the craft not to approach within gun range of the convoy.

(3) If the surface craft persists in closing the convoy, fire a warning shot across his bow.

(4) If he continues to close the convoy to 2000 yards or he opens fire on the convoy, open fire on him persisting until he surrenders, retires, or is destroyed.

b. In executing the combat air patrol mission pilots and air controllers will be instructed as follows:

(1) Any unidentified aircraft approaching within radar range of the convoy and closing will be investigated.

(2) If investigation reveals the aircraft to be Cuban the investigating aircraft will make successive close passes ensuring that the Cuban aircraft is aware of his presence.

TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE  
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

will continue to make close passes in an attempt to divert.

CU60/3

(4) If Cuban aircraft insists in closing and takes position to attack the convey it will be fired on until it retires or is destroyed.

6. It is noted that the subject of your memorandum is "CIA Operation CROSSPATCH". Since a number of my staff and various others in the Atlantic Command associate this code name with establishment of SWAN ISLAND radio last year it is suggested that this term not be used by DOD personnel when referring to the current operation.

Robert L.  
Dennison  
8/1/64

Crosspatch was the early CIA operational name for what later became known as Operation Bumpy Road. The operation codename was changed to Bumpy Road effective April 1 at the request of the Navy Department. The Navy believed that since Crosspatch was associated in naval minds with the establishment of the radio station at Swan Island the continued use of the name for the invasion operation would be confusing. (See JCS 2304/26, April 1, Tab B, Annex 29, Taylor Report Part III, Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report)

Operation Order from the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic (Dennison) to  
the Commander of Special Task Group 81.8 (Clark)

244

CU-74

11 Norfolk, April 10, 1961.

CINCLANTFLT No. 25-61

1 [Here follows the text of Operation Order 25-61, which outlines the units involved in the operation, the overall situation and intent of the operation, the type of friendly and unfriendly forces involved, and the tasks to be undertaken. Annex A, the first attachment to the Operation Order, briefly outlines the Concept of Operations, including the stipulation that "U.S. Naval vessels and aircraft will not enter Cuban Territorial Waters or airspace (three mile limit)." Appendix I to Annex A presents, in outline form, with scheduled times listed, a detailed Table of Events from the point at which the Cuban Expeditionary Force was scheduled to embark to the transfer to landing craft off the coast of Cuba.]

44 50 Appendix II to Annex A  
55 Rules of Engagement

177  
1 DD's assigned to provide area coverage of the CEF will avoid overt association with the CEF ships as follows:

11 (a) During daylight hours. Maintain maximum practicable range ahead of CEF ships and use patrol courses and speeds to provide protection but not appear to be screening the CEF.

11 (b) During hours of darkness. DD's may take station with respect to the CEF ships to provide adequate protection.

2 11 (c) DD's will not be used to support the landing operation and will not close within 20 miles of the objective area. After withdrawal of TG 81.8.4 from Point ODSMOBILE all DD's will proceed to join CTG 81.8.

11 2. Surface and sub-surface rules of engagement as follows:

11b (a) Prior to rendezvous of CEF ships at Point ZULU:

11c (1) If intervention by US forces is required to protect the CEF ships from surface attack or to prevent their capture, US forces will intervene as necessary to protect the CEF ship(s).

11c (2) This intervention will cancel the landing operation and TG 81.8 ships will take measures short of firing on CEF ships to cause them to withdraw to a port to be designated by the JCS upon receipt of the report of intervention.

11c (3) Subsequent to intervention and withdrawal, TG 81.8 DD's will maintain close escort of the CEF ships to provide protection and witness compliance with the withdrawal order.

11c (4) US forces will open fire only if CEF ship(s) is attacked.

11g (b) After rendezvous of CEF ships at Point ZULU on D-1 Day and until convoy has moved to a point within 20 miles of the objective area, a DD commanding officer will:

245  
CU-71/2

(93) Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Limited Distribution; CO Eyes Only/By Hand. The order was signed for Dennison by Vice Admiral Fitzhugh Lee. Special Task Group 81.8 was commanded by Rear Admiral John E. Clark. The Task Group was composed of: Carrier Unit 81.8.1, USS Essex (CVS-19); Destroyer Unit 81.8.2, commanded by Captain G. M. Slonim, composed of USS Waller (DDE-466), USS Conway (DDE-507), USS Cony (DDE-508), USS Eaton (DDE-510), USS Bache (DDE-470), USS Beale (DDE-471), and USS Murray (DDE-576); Convoy Escort Unit 81.8.3, commanded by Captain R. P. Crutchfield, composed of USS Eaton (DDE-510) and USS Murray (DDE-576); Amphibious Support Unit 81.8.4, commanded by Commander R. Cousins, composed of USS San Marcos (LSD-25); and Replenishment Unit 81.8.8, commanded by Captain P. K. Blesh, composed of USS Elokomin (AO-55).

(13) ✓ The ships of the Cuban Expeditionary Force were identified in Operation Order 25-61 as Blagar and Barbara J. which were described as ex-US Navy LCIs, SS Caribe, SS Atlantico, SS Houston, and SS Rio Escondido, identified as WW II Liberty hulls. <sup>but it was subsequently established that they weren't</sup> The LCIs would be flying Nicaraguan ensigns and the merchant ships would be flying Liberian ensigns.

(13) ✓ 2 Appendix III to Annex A gives the coordinates for the codeworded reference points listed in the operation order. Point OLEDSMOBILE is 22°01.5N, 81°02W.

(13) ✓ 3 The coordinates for Point Zulu are not given in the operation order.



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Operation Order  
CLASSIFIED No. 25-61

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CU-74/3

Appendix II to Annex A (Cont'd)

(16) (1) Place his ship between the convoy and any suspicious or Castro surface craft sighted.

(16) (2) Warn the craft not to approach within gun range of the convoy.

(16) (3) If the surface craft persists in closing the convoy, the DD will intervene as necessary to protect the CEF ships, then follow the instructions set forth in paragraph 2(a)(2) and (3) above.

(16) (c) Intervention by TG 81.8 DD's after the CEF convoy has moved to a point within 20 miles of the objective area will be limited to that required to assist CTU 81.8.4 at his request.

(11) 3. The CAP pilots and air controllers will be instructed as follows:

(11) (a) CAP will be stationed so that it will not appear to be covering the CEF ships.

(11) (b) Air rules of engagement are as follows:

(16) (1) Any unidentified aircraft approaching within radar range of CEF ships and closing will be investigated.

(16) (2) If investigation reveals the aircraft to be Castro's, the investigating aircraft will make successive close passes ensuring that the Castro aircraft is aware of his presence.

(16) (3) If Castro aircraft maintains course to close CEF ship(s), CAP will continue to make close passes in an attempt to divert.

(16) (4) If Castro aircraft commences firing on the CEF ship(s) or opens its bomb bays and commences a bomb run, CAP will open fire.

(17) ROBERT L. DENNISON  
(25) Admiral, U.S. NAVY  
~~Commander in Chief U. S. Atlantic Fleet~~

(11) [Here follows Appendix III to Annex A, which outlines reference points; Annex B, which deals with communications; and Annex C, which briefly summarizes intelligence relating to the operation.]

453174

Telegram from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer)  
to the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)

CU 82

Washington, April 13, 1961--11:30 p.m.

132245Z.

EXCLUSIVE FOR ADMIRAL DENNISON, GENERAL LEMNITZER SENDS.

1. ORIGINAL CONCEPT FOR U.S. NAVAL SUPPORT OF BUMPY ROAD WAS TO ENSURE THAT WHEN ONCE EMBARKED THIS OPERATION MUST NOT FAIL. THIS CONCEPT MODIFIED BY THE LATER PLAN WHICH PROVIDES THAT CANCELLATION POSSIBLE UNTIL LANDING PHASE ACTUALLY STARTS. CONCEPT FURTHER MODIFIED BY PROVISION IN RULES OF ENGAGEMENT THAT IF INTERVENTION BY U.S. MILITARY ELEMENT IS REQUIRED AND ACTUALLY TAKES PLACE WHILE CEF EN ROUTE TO TRANSPORT AREA THEN OPERATION MUST ABORT.

2. IN VIEW ABOVE A CHANGE OF EMPHASIS IS NOW REQUIRED. THAT IS, IT IS NOW IMPORTANT THAT PREMATURE U.S. INTERVENTION NOT OCCUR WHICH WOULD BE THE CAUSE FOR CANCELLATION OF THIS HIGHLY IMPORTANT AND DESIRABLE OPERATION.

3. TO THIS END IT IS IMPORTANT TO SUCCESS OF OPERATION THAT COMMANDERS OF ALL SEA AND AIR UNITS OF YOUR FORCES ENGAGED IN PROTECTION OF EXPEDITION CLEARLY UNDERSTAND AND APPLY RULES OF ENGAGEMENT ALONG FOLLOWING LINES:

A. IT IS DESIRED TO MINIMIZE THE NEED TO ABORT THE OPERATION BECAUSE OF U.S. ENGAGEMENT OF CASTRO SHIPS OR AIRCRAFT IN CONDUCT OF PROTECTIVE MISSION ASSIGNED TO YOU.

B. ACTUAL ENGAGEMENT OF CASTRO SHIPS OR AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE WITHHELD UNTIL LAST POSSIBLE MOMENT AND ACTION TAKEN ONLY AFTER IT BECOMES CLEAR THAT OTHERWISE TOTAL DESTRUCTION OF FRIENDLY SHIP OR SHIPS MAY BE IMMINENT. FOR EXAMPLE, NON-ENGAGEMENT IN EVENT OF INITIAL STRAFFING OR BOMB RUN BY CASTRO AIRCRAFT ON SHIP FRIENDLY IS ACCEPTABLE RATHER THAN TOO HASTY U.S. INTERVENTION WITH RESULTANT NEED TO ABORT THE WHOLE OPERATION. SAME APPLIES IMPORTANTLY TO INTERVENTION BY U.S. SURFACE SHIPS. INITIAL FIRING ON FRIENDLY SHIP BY CASTRO SURFACE SHIP IS ACCEPTABLE AND U.S. ENGAGEMENT OF CASTRO SHIP SHOULD AWAIT EVIDENCE THAT CASTRO SHIP IS BORING IN FOR A KILL OR CAPTURE.

C. PRELIMINARY MANEUVERING OF U.S. AIRCRAFT OR SHIPS SHOULD

TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE ABOVE. EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO MINIMIZE BLOWING THE OPERATION BY OVERLY ACTIVE INTERVENTION.

4. IN THE EVENT ACTUAL U.S. ENGAGEMENT OF CASTRO CRAFT TAKES PLACE IMMEDIATE REPORT SHOULD BE PASSED TO WASHINGTON TOGETHER WITH SALIENT FACTS INVOLVED. PARTICULARLY DESIRED ARE ANY FACTS WHICH WOULD SUPPORT ARGUMENT THAT IT COULD BE PLAUSIBLE THAT U.S. INTERVENTION WAS IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF CEF.

5. IN THE HOPE IS THAT OVER-ALL OPERATION WILL NOT BE ABORTED BECAUSE OF U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION AND TO THIS END BE PREPARED TO TAKE SUBSTANTIAL RISKS.

Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road

Materials. Top Secret. Sent as a JCS/OSD telegram. According to the memorandum for the record prepared by Mitchell, which outlined the evolution of the rules of engagement for Operation Bumpy Road, this telegram was drafted after General Cabell of the CIA discussed with General Lemnitzer and General Bonesteel the rules of engagement set forth in CM 179-61. (Document 4/7). Cabell was particularly concerned that U.S. naval forces might intervene before seriously needed, thus forcing abandonment of the operation. The message to Dennison was cleared with Admiral Russell, USN, General Dean, J-3, and Admiral Wellings, Deputy Director of the Joint Staff, and was then approved by General Lemnitzer. (Kennedy Library, National Security File, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report)

Doc. 87

CU-83

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Telegram from the Director of the Joint Staff (Wheeler) to the  
Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)

⑪ JCS 469761.

Washington, April 13, 1961 7:55 p.m.

EXCLUSIVE FOR ADM DENNISON, GEN WHEELER SENDS.

OPERATION BUMPY ROAD CONTINGENCY PLANNING

①. IF OPERATION ABORTED

A. MAIN FORCE WILL BE DIVERTED OR MOVED TO CAMP GARCIA VIEQUES ISLAND FOR BILLETING. IN ORDER TO PREPARE FOR THIS EVENTUALITY HQ MC IS DIRECTING INFANTRY AIRLIFT CAMP EQUIPMENT AND RATIONS FOR 1500 MEN TO CAMP GARCIA COMMENCING 14 APRIL.

B. REQUEST YOU RESCHEDULE MARCORPS BLT TRAINING EXERCISE SCHEDULED FOR 15-18 APRIL AT VIEQUES TO A DATE NOT EARLIER THAN 25 APRIL.

C. REQUEST YOU HAVE CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR USE OF ARMED MARCORPS UNIT TO SEAL COMPOUND OF CAMP GARCIA TO MAINTAIN ORDER IN CEF GROUP IF NECESSARY.

②. IF OPERATION EXECUTED

A. IF OPERATION PROCEEDS AS PLANNED, A FORCE OF ABOUT 175 CEF MEN WITH 25 US INSTRUCTORS WILL TRAIN IN THE CAMP GARCIA MANEUVER AREA FOR ABOUT THREE WEEKS COMMENCING ABOUT 23 APRIL.

B. IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT ABOUT 100 US ARMY PERSONNEL MAY BE SENT TO VIEQUES TO ESTABLISH A MEDICAL HOSPITAL IF THE NEED ARISES.

C. THE FOREGOING UNITS WILL BE SUPPORTED BY CAMP EQUIPMENT AND RATIONS PREPOSITIONED AT CAMP GARCIA UNDER PARAGRAPH 1 A ABOVE.

③. NEW ITEM SAME SUBJECT. A REPORT HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM CIA THAT A NAVY P2V7 FLEW OVER PUERTO CABEZAS, NICARAGUA AT LOW ALTITUDE DURING THE MORNING OF 13 APRIL. IF POSSIBLE, WITHOUT AROUSING UNDUE INTEREST, DESIRE US AIRCRAFT STAY CLEAR THAT AREA. CIA HAS ALSO REQUESTED US MILITARY AIRCRAFT REMAIN SOUTH OF LINE BETWEEN 2146 N 8431 W AND 1951 N 7714 W FROM 14 APRIL UNTIL OPERATION COMPLETED. WE DO NOT DESIRE UNDUE ATTENTION DIRECTED TO THAT AREA SO THIS REQUEST IS PASSED TO YOU FOR SUCH ACTION AS YOU CONSIDER APPROPRIATE AND CONSISTENT WITH PERFORMANCE OF ASSIGNED MISSIONS.

④ Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. ~~Exclusive for Admiral Dennison~~

Telegram from the Commander of Special Task Group 81.8 (Clark) to  
the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet (Dennison)

USS Essex, Caribbean, April 14, 1961, 12:26 p.m.

111141726Z.

CNO  
BT

//TOP SECRET//EXCLUSIVE//BUMPY ROAD//CAT ALFA//  
EXCLUSIVE FOR DENNISON INFO LEMNITZER BURKE SMITH MCELROY  
ODONNELL FORM CLARK.  
COMPLETED FUELING 141630Z AT LAT 18.38N LONG 83-28W. UNITS  
PROCEEDING INDEPENDENTLY TO STATION. HAVE ASSIGNED 1 DD TO  
ESCORT EACH CEF SHIP WITH ORDERS TO REMAIN OUTSIDE VISUAL  
RANGE DURING DAYLIGHT. PLAN LAUNCH FROM LAT 18.30N LONG  
81-00W AT 151030Z AS FOLLOWS: 3 VS FOR SEARCH AHEAD OF  
CEF. 1 AD TO ASSIST IN LOCATION CEF SHIPS AS REQUIRED.  
WILL BEGIN ROUTINE BUMPY ROAD REPORTING AT 151030Z.

C'Donnell

PAGE TWO  
INTELLIGENCE. NO SURFACE CONTACTS. WILL MANEUVER TO AVOID  
BEING SIGHTED. 6 AIRCRAFT CONTACTS WITHIN 60 MILES. 4 ENGINE  
TRANSPORT PASSED OVERHEAD AT 1710Z. ALL AIRCRAFT PROBABLY  
COMMERCIAL AIRLINES. NO APPARENT SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY.  
ELOKOMIN PROCEEDING VIA SOUTH MARIPOSA BANK TO STATION AT  
19-00N 80-00W ETA 171200Z. SOA CONTROLLED TO AVOID CONTACT WITH  
CEF.

Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road  
Materials. Top Secret; Exclusive; Bumpy Road. Repeated to  
Lemnitzer, Burke, Smith, McElroy, and O'Donnell.

April 14, 11:30 a.m.

April 15, 5:30 a.m.

12:10 p.m.

April 17, 8 a.m.

1248  
(55) ADMIRAL BURKE'S CONVERSATION WITH CDR WILHIDE, 18 APRIL 1961

ADM BURKE <sup>(ent)</sup> Before we got started about 1140, I went down to his office--about ten minutes after I got the word. Then he heard that McNamara and Lemnitzer were coming back. So we went down to the garage into a little anteroom there and talked for a few minutes. Then McNamara and Lemnitzer went over in their car. Gilpatric, Buzz Wheeler, Breitwiser and I went over--I guess Breitwiser went in McNamara's car--all to the White House. We got over there in the Cabinet Room. The President was talking with CIA people, State Department people and Rostow and a lot of other people. They were talking about Cuba. Real big mess.

3  
(11) Nobody knew what to do nor did the CIA who were running the operation and who were wholly responsible for the operation know what to do or what was happening. A lot of things have happened and they have caused to happen and we the JCS don't know anything whatever about. We have been kept pretty ignorant of this and have just been told partial truths. They are in a real bad hole because they were had the hell cut out of them. They were reporting, devising and talking and I kept quiet because I didn't know the general score. Once in a while I did make a little remark like "balls." It wasn't very often. It was a serious meeting. They didn't

(43) Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret. This memorandum apparently was based on a tape recording later transcribed by Wilhide. The transcription printed here begins, as indicated in mid-conversation. The earlier portion of the conversation may not have been transcribed, and no record of it has been found. *Wilhide was Burke's aide at the time.*

(43) ✓ It is not clear to whom Burke was referring at this point. A chronology prepared from the records in Burke's office indicates that Burke received a phone call from Gilpatric at 11:27 proposing arrangements to go to the White House for a meeting on Cuba.

(Ibid.) Since he went to the White House with Gilpatric, he may have stopped at Gilpatric's office.

(43) - 2 ✓ Major General Robert A. Breitwiser, Director for Intelligence of the Joint Staff.

(43) 3 ✓ The President's appointment book indicates that this meeting began at <sup>noon</sup> 12:00 and lasted until 1:25 p.m. Participants listed included, in addition to the President, Vice President Johnson, Rusk, McNamara, Robert Kennedy, Lemnitzer, McGeorge Bundy, Bohlen, and Foy Kohler. (Kennedy Library, President <sup>✓S</sup> Appointment Book) Burke's account indicates that the CIA was also represented and that <sup>other</sup> additional members of the Department of Defense, JCS and the Department of State were present at the meeting.



know what the President should do. <sup>ent</sup> When it came out as to what could the United States do--it was all Navy. The upshot of it was that the President moved into his room--his office with Rusk, McNamara, Dulles, Leannitzer and me. We talked a little bit in there about what could we do, Rusk not being in favor of doing very much. Then we came out. I was sent for again and I <sup>was</sup> asked could we find out what the score really was, by landing people in helicopters or something like that. That was all right. I wrote some dispatches and did some things. Over there. And I came back.

(11) Then Bobby Kennedy called me up and said the President is going to rely upon you to advise him on this situation. I said it is late! He needs advice. He said the rest of the people in the room weren't helpful. (call from the President)

(11) What do you do. He is bypassing Leannitzer, the Chairman, the SecDef, SecNav, CIA and the whole works and putting me in charge of the operation. That is a helluva thing. We had better ~~xxxx~~ watch this one.

CDR WILHIDE He must realize what he is doing.

ADM BURKE I told Bobby Kennedy this was bypassing. He said he knew.

(11) [Here follows discussion relating to Admiral Burke's concern about the implications of short-circuiting the usual channels of responsibility in the management of the crisis.] (84) (94)

~~6/ The ellipsis occurs in the source text.~~

~~(B) 4 See the Documents <sup>m and m</sup> and Document . (JCS tel~~

~~994317 4/18)~~

~~(B) 5~~ The transcript indicates that the President called Burke again 20 minutes later. No further information is given <sup>regarding</sup> ~~either~~ either call.

Telegram from the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke) to the  
Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)

342

CU-107

Washington, April 18, 1961 3:23 p.m.

(11) 182023Z 18 APR 61 ADM DENNISON AND RADM CLARK FROM ADM BURKE

THERE IS LITTLE INFORMATION HERE ON STATUS OF OPERATION. FEW REPORTS  
AVAILABLE INDICATE OPERATION MAY BE IN DESPERATE STAGE. NO GENERAL  
UPRISING IN CUBA YET.

WHAT IS MOST URGENTLY NEEDED HERE IS INFORMATION ON WHICH TO MAKE AN  
ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION OR A JUDGMENT ON WHAT TO DO AT HIGH  
LEVELS.

(12) FOLLOWING QUESTIONS AT HIGH-LEVEL CONFERENCE WERE ASKED:

(A) CAN ANTI-CASTRO FORCES GO INTO BUSH HARBORILLAS?

(B) COULD ANTI-CASTRO FORCES BE EVACUATED FROM BEACH BY UNMARKED  
UNITED STATES AMPHIB BOATS?

(C) IS THERE A POSSIBILITY THAT ANTI-CASTRO FORCES CAN BREAK THROUGH

FOLLOWING POSSIBLE UNITED STATES ACTIONS WERE DISCUSSED:

(1) UNMARKED NAVAL AIRCRAFT FLY OVER BEACH AREA TO PROTECT  
ANTI-CASTRO FORCES FROM AIR ATTACK.

(2) UNMARKED NAVAL AIRCRAFT DESTROY CASTRO AIRCRAFT.

(3) UNMARKED NAVAL AIRCRAFT FLY OVER BEACH TO SUPPORT REPORT

(4) UNMARKED AMPHIB BOATS FROM BEACH TO EVACUATE ANTI-CASTRO  
FORCES FROM BEACH.

(5) LAND EXPERIENCED MARINES BY HELICOPTER OR BOAT TO ASSESS  
SITUATION AND GIVE JUDGMENT ON WHAT TO DO.

(6) LARGE AIR DROPS BY UNITED STATES AIRCRAFT TO ANTI-CASTRO  
FORCES.

(7) DANGER IN ALL ABOVE ACTIONS IS CASTRO AIRCRAFT INVOLVEMENT.

NO DECISION WAS MADE TO DO ANY OF THE ABOVE. DROP THE SAME SUB-  
JECTS MAY BE DISCUSSED LATER.

(85) (94)

(13) Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road  
Materials. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. Exclusive for Admiral  
Dennison. Also sent to Admiral Clark Exclusive from Admiral Burke.

A "chronology of events on Cuba taken from the records in Op-00  
immediate office" indicates that this message was sent as a back  
channel message. (Ibid.)

(14) ✓ In his initial draft of this message Burke wrote: "Nobody  
here wants to commit United States forces to bail out this affair,  
but if situation is as bad as reported something may have to be  
done." (Ibid.)



CU-108

Telegram from the Commander of Special Task Group 81.8 (Clark) to the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet (Dennison)

USS Essex, Caribbean, April 18, 1961-4:42 p.m.

182142Z.

EXCLUSIVE FOR DENNISON, GRAY, SMITH, MC ELROY

AND O'DONNELL FROM CLARK,  
BUMPY ROAD INT SUM

1. PENDING RECOVERY MY EYEBALL. RECCO FLIGHT FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF MESSAGES INTERCEPTED BETWEEN CEF BEACH COMMANDER AND DOLORES PLUS SOME ADDRESSED TO MALLARD.

2. FROM BRIGADE COMMANDER BLUE BEACH INTERCEPTED AT 181715Z. QUOTE BLUE BEACH UNDER HEAVY JET AIR SUPPORT IN NEXT FEW HOURS OR WILL BE WIPED OUT. UNDER HEAVY ATTACK BY MIG JETS AND HEAVY TANKS. UNQUOTE. INTERCEPTED AT 1703Z. QUOTE BLUE BEACH UNDER ATTACK BY MIG 15S AND T-33S. REQUEST JET SUPPORT OR CANNOT HOLD. SITUATION CRITICAL. UNQUOTE. INTERCEPTED AT 1728Z. QUOTE WITHOUT JET AIR SUPPORT CANNOT HOLD. HAVE NO AMMO LEFT FOR TANKS AND VERY LITTLE LEFT FOR TROOPS. ENEMY JUST LAUNCHED HEAVY LAND ATTACK SUPPORTED BY TANKS. CANNOT HOLD FOR LONG. UNQUOTE. INTERCEPT AT 1509Z. QUOTE UNDER HEAVY ATTACK SUPPORTED BY 12 TANKS. NEED AIR SUPPORT IMMEDIATELY. RED BEACH WIPED OUT. REQUEST AIR STRIKES IMMEDIATELY. UNQUOTE.

3. FROM BRIGADE COMMANDER TO COLONEL MALLARD RELAYED FROM MARSOPA AT 1825Z. QUOTE UNDER HEAVY ATTACK SUPPORTED BY 12 TANKS. NEED AIR SUPPORT IMMEDIATELY. RED BEACH WIPED OUT. REQUEST AIR STRIKES. NEED AMMO OF ALL TYPES IMMEDIATELY. 4 B-26 ETA BEACH HEAD 181900Z. REQUEST NAVY AIR CAP FOR BEACHHEAD. IF NOT PROVIDED EXPECT LOSS 4 B-26. CONFIDE YOU CAN PROVIDE. ADVISE. UNQUOTE.

4. ALL ABOVE HELD BY MALLARD'S BOSS BY OTHER MEANS. MY WORK WITH CEF TO DATE INDICATES THEY ARE A WELL ORGANIZED AND PROFESSIONAL GROUP.

5. 6 B-26 PASSED OVER ME HEADING NORTH AT 182120Z.

6. MY EYEBALL RECCO REPORT IN ABOUT ONE HOUR

Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Operational Immediate; Bumpy Road. Repeated for information to JCS, COMCARIBSEAFRON, COMKWESTFOR, COMNAVBASE GTMO. Exclusive for Dennison, Gray, Smith, McElroy, and O'Donnell from Clark.

- 12:15 p.m. All times cited in the message are on April 18.
- 12:03 p.m.
- 12:28 p.m.
- 10:09 a.m.
- Code name for Blagar.
- 1:25 p.m.
- 4:20 p.m.

CU-109

Telegram from the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet (Dennison) to the Commander, Key West Forces (McElroy)

Norfolk, April 18, 1961, 4:52 p.m.

// 182152Z.

~~Note Use~~

BUMPY ROAD.  
EXCLUSIVE FOR BADM MC ELROY INFO. RADMS O'DONNELL,  
CLARK, GEN GRAY FROM DENNISON.  
UP TO 4 MIGS HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN THE OBJECTIVE AREA. IN THE EVENT WE  
HAVE TO GIVE SUPPORT AGAINST MIGS DESIRE YOU PAINT OUT US MARKINGS  
ON SIX F3H, ARM THEM WITH SIDEWINDERS AND/OR SPARROWS AND PREPARE  
THEM FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS IN THE OBJECTIVE AREA BY DAYLIGHT 19 APRIL.  
ANY LAUNCH DIRECTIVE WILL BE ISSUED BY CINCLANTFLT. HOLD CLOSE AND TRY  
CONCEAL ABOVE PREPARATORY MEASURES.

(89) (14)

Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Operational Immediate; Bumpy Road. Exclusive for Rear Admiral McElroy from Admiral Dennison. Repeated for information to JCS, COMNAVB GTMO, and CTG 81.8. Exclusive for Gray, Clark and O'Donnell from Dennison.

CU-110

Telegram from the Commander of Special Task Group 81.8 (Clark) to the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet (Dennison)

USS Essex, Caribbean, April 18, 1961, 5:12 p.m.

182212Z.

~~TOP SECRET~~ Exclusive for Dennison, Gray, Smith, O'Donnell and McElroy from Clark

BUMPY ROAD.

EVERETT RECCO REPORT OVER AREA ABOUT 2120Z.

- 1. CONVOY OF LARGE CASTRO TANKS (10 TO 14) WITH TRUCKS AND LORRIES ON ROAD FROM GALLINAS EXTENDING TO POINT ABOUT THREE MILES SOUTH MOVING SOUTH AND EAST. ONLY A FEW TROOPS SEEN WITH CONVOY. NO OTHERS SIGHTED.
- 2. CEF TANKS AND TRUCKS BURNED OUT ALONGSIDE ROAD NEAR LA SEIBA. NO SIGN OF CEF TROOPS.
- 3. NO AIR ACTIVITY SEEN. NO SIGN OF ARTILLERY OR INFANTRY ACTION.
- 4. OWN EVALUATION RED BEACH WIRED OUT. ATTACKS ON OTHER BEACHES THUS FAR HAVE BEEN ALMOST ENTIRELY BY AIR.

84 94

Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road. Materials. Top Secret; Emergency, Bumpy Road. Repeated for information to JCS, COMCARIBSEAFRON, COMKWESTFOR, COMNAVBASE GTMO. Exclusive for Dennison, Gray, Smith, McElroy, and O'Donnell from Clark.

4:20 p.m.

254

(44)

346

CU-III

Telegram From the Chief of the Subsidiary Activities Division (Gray)  
to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)

(19) Washington, April 18, 1961 5:29 p.m.

(11) JCS 994349.

(11) 1. CIA received report from BARRACUDA that she  
has been hit by bomb and 20 MM in air attack.

(11) 2. Request you render assistance. If unable to  
save, request you remove the crew and destroy. (81) (94)

Bumpy Road. Exclusive for Adm Dennison  
and Adm Clark from Gen Gray.

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(43) Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road  
Materials. Top Secret; Operational Immediate; Limited Distribution  
~~Bumpy Road, Exclusive for Admiral Dennison from General Gray.~~  
Repeated ~~for information~~ to CTG 81.8, Exclusive for Admiral Clark  
from Gray.

(43) ✓ Code name for the Barbara J.

CU-112

Telegram from the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Norfolk, April 18, 1961 6:06 p.m.

11 182306Z. Bumpy Road.

~~EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL GRAY INFO~~ ~~BADM CLARK FROM DENNISON~~

A. JCS 994317 DTG 181949Z NOTAL

B. CTG 81.8 182212Z

1. HAVE ORDERED PHIBRON 2 WITH BLT 1/6 EMBARKED TO MOVE TO AN AREA BOUNDED BY LATITUDES 21 AND 21.50N AND LONGITUDE 80 AND 81W. HE WILL PAINT OUT MARKINGS ON BOATS AND BE PREPARED TO EVACUATE CEF FORCES IF DIRECTED.

2. ~~TF 24~~ INCLUDING NORTHAMPTON AND INDEPENDENCE WITH ATTACK AIR GROUP CVG SEVEN ABOARD PROCEEDING SOUTHWARD AT 24 KTS TO MAYPORT AREA FOR POSSIBLE FURTHER MOVEMENT SOUTH.

3. PHIBRON 8 WITH BLT EMBARKED ORDERED TO EXPEDITE ARRIVAL AT GTMO OPAR ETA 222300Z.

4. COMKWSIFOR ORDERED TO SANITIZE 6 F3H2 EQUIPPED WITH AIR TO AIR MISSILES TO BE AVAILABLE FIRST LIGHT 19 APRIL.

5. CTG 81.8 (CLARK) REPORTED RESULTS EYEBALL RECCO BY REFERENCE B.

6. COMFAIRJAX UNDERTAKING ON URGENT BASIS TO OBTAIN COVERT HIGH ALT A3D PHOTO RECCO OF OBJECTIVE AREA. THIS TO BE DONE 18 APRIL IF POSSIBLE BUT GOOD RESULTS UNLIKELY BECAUSE OF POOR LATE AFTERNOON LIGHT.

7. APPRECIATE THE NEED TO DO ALL POSSIBLE TO MINIMIZE EVIDENCE OF OUR PARTICIPATION BUT POINT OUT THAT ALL US AIRCRAFT ARE EXCLUSIVELY USN TYPES AND WILL BE RECOGNIZED AS SUCH.

8. NEW SUBJECT. I TOO HAVE BEEN OPERATING IN THE DARK WHICH HAS BEEN GENERATED BY NOT BEING COMPLETELY ADVISED OF CEF OPERATIONS, THE SUDDEN LAYING ON OF REQUIREMENTS WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN FORECASTED, AND NO INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT OF SITUATION WITHIN CUBA. MY OWN ASSESSMENT BASED ON A VERY HIGH DEGREE OF IGNORANCE IS THAT CEF OPERATIONS ARE NOT GOING WELL AND THAT IF RESULT IS EITHER INCONCLUSIVE OR TOTAL COLLAPSE WE MAY EXPECT STRONG RETALIATORY EFFORT PROBABLY AGAINST GUANTANAMO.

9. IT IS INEVITABLE THAT OUR PARTICIPATION WILL GRADUALLY BECOME KNOWN TO A DEGREE AT LEAST BY MANY PEOPLE INCLUDING THOSE IN CASTRO'S GOVERNMENT. TIME IS NOT ON OUR SIDE AND IT IS CERTAINLY IMPORTANT TO DO ALL POSSIBLE TO TIP THE SCALES IN FAVOR OF CEF. HAVE NO SUGGESTIONS AT THIS TIME BEYOND CONTINUING MEASURES I HAVE OUTLINED ABOVE. (85) (14)

(93) Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Operational Immediate; Bumpy Road.

Exclusive for General Gray from Admiral Dennison. Repeated for information to CTG 81.8, Exclusive for Clark from Dennison.

(43) ✓ Document  $\frac{1}{m}$  -

(April 18, 2:49 p.m.)

(43) ✓ Document  $\frac{1}{m}$  -

(April 18, 5:12 p.m.)

(43) ✓ 6 p.m., April 22

CU-114 351  
Telegram From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief,  
Atlantic (Dennison)

Washington, April 18, 1961 7:57 p.m.

JCS 994363.

~~Secret Underlining~~

DISTRIBUTION. BUMPY ROAD. EXCLUSIVE FOR ADM DENNISON  
AND ADM CLARK FROM GEN GRAY.

For your info possibility exists that C-130 A/C  
with markings removed may be used for night drops on  
Blue Beach beginning 19-20 April until further notice.

ACTION

INFO

JCS

Dir JS

Secy JCS

Dep. Secy

J-1

J-2

J-3

J-4

J-5 2

J-6

JMAAD

NSC/JCS

JWR

JSSC

M/C

Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road  
Materials. Top Secret; Operational Immediate; Limited Distribution  
Bumpy Road; ~~Exclusive for Dennison from Gray.~~ Repeated  
information to CTG 81.8, Exclusive for Clark from Gray.

A note on the memorandum for the record prepared by  
Mitchell concerning the rules of engagement reads: "These air drops  
by C-130 were never conducted." (NDH, Taylor Papers, Box 12, Cuba,  
Paramilitary Study)

(declassified)

National Defense University

CU-115

Telegram from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief,  
Atlantic (Dennison)

Washington, April 18, 1961, 7:59 p.m.

JCS 994364.

**DISTRIBUTION. BUMPY ROAD. EXCLUSIVE FOR ADM DENNISON  
AND ADM CLARK FROM GEN GRAY**

As feasible and without violating current  
restrictions request you determine location of airfields  
from which fighter aircraft attacking CEF beachhead are  
operating. (89/94)

## ACTION

INFO

CJCS

Dir JS

Secy JCS

Dep Secy

J-1

J-2

J-3

J-4

J-5

J-6

JMAAD

NSC/JCS

JWR

JSSC

M/C File

(93) Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road  
Materials. Top Secret; Operational Immediate; Limited Distribution  
~~Bumpy Road, Exclusive for Dennison from Gray. Repeated for~~  
~~information~~ to CTG 81.8, Exclusive for Clark from Gray.

(49)

CW-116

(50) Telegram from the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke) to the  
Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)

(19) Washington, April 18, 1961, 8:37 p.m.

(11) 190137Z.

EXCLUSIVE

Exclusive for Adm Dennison from Burke. Bumpy Road.

Authorities appreciated CTG 81.8 182212Z but still want to know whether  
CEF can go into bush as guerrillas at a time Commander CEF thinks organized  
resistance no longer feasible. Johnny maybe could get dope from Mallard.

(11) Authorities would like to be sure CEF could become guerrillas whenever  
they desire so that point could be emphasized in our publicity, i.e. that  
revolutionaries crossed the beach and are now operating as guerrillas. In  
other words if CEF can not hold beach head or fight their way inland it would  
be desirable for them to become guerrillas and head for a known destination  
and be supplied by air. Anything you can do to get answer to that question  
would be appreciated.

(11) Next subject was getting wounded out if that becomes necessary. I suggested  
that wounded could be taken off beach in CEF ships who later could ask ESSEX (13)

(93) Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road  
Materials. Top Secret; Limited Distribution, ~~Bumpy Road, Exclusive~~  
~~for Admiral Dennison~~. Drafted by Burke. A "chronology of events on  
Cuba taken from the records in Op 100 immediate office" indicates  
that this message was sent as a back channel message. (Ibid.)

(13) ✓ Document in . (April 18, 8:40 p.m.)  
(13) ✓ Admiral Clark.



CW-1162

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ ROAD

to take them as humanitarian move. Clark would have to make arrangements through Mallard. Wounded should be kept in <sup>(13)</sup>ESSEX<sup>(11)</sup> until suitable hospital arrangements could be made on beach in some place inaccessible to news hawks.

(I) New subject.

(II) Authorities are concerned that if CEF cannot become guerrillas for any reason Cardona may ask United States to evacuate those who can not get into bush. I replied we could evacuate with Phibron Two tomorrow night if U.S. Government made decision to do so. Boats would necessarily have to be handled by U.S. personnel. We could send some Marines ashore, if U.S. made decision to do so, to cover evacuation. We might also have to fly air cover to protect evacuation from air attack. I did not know whether this operation should be done at night or in daylight if evacuation were necessary. Request advice.

(II) If it does become necessary to evacuate, Clark will need also to use what helicopters he can to get data as well as men.

(II) Suggest you fly another recon over beach in morning to get data but JCS should be informed you intend to do so. (84/64)

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A

Paraphrase not required except prior to Category "B" encryption. Physically remove all internal references by date-time group prior to declassification.

ORIGINATOR \_\_\_\_\_

DTG \_\_\_\_\_

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

OPNAV FORM 2110-2A (REV. 8/1/55)  
DEPT. USE ONLY

TOP SECRET

NCC

356  
CO-117

(50) Telegram from the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke) to the  
Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)

(19) Washington, April 18, 1961 9:17 p.m.

(11) 190217Z.

Exclusive for Adm Dennison and  
RAdm Clark from Burke. Bumpy Road.

EXCLUSIVE FOR ADM DENNISON AND RADM CLARK  
I WAS ASKED ONCE AGAIN IF IT WERE POSSIBLE (AN EXPERIENCED  
MARINE (OR NAVAL OFFICER WHO HAS APPLIED FOR DOPE) ON BEACH WITH  
CEE WITHOUT DANGER OF HIM BEING KILLED OR CAPTURED OR IT BECOMING  
KNOWN U.S. WAS INVOLVED. THE URGENCY OF THE SITUATION OF KNOWLEDGE  
HERE OF TRUE SITUATION ON BEACH AND THAT SHOULD BE DONE NOW WITHOUT  
COVERTLY INVOLVING UNITED STATES. IT COULD BE DONE  
WITHIN HIS OWN RESOURCES WITH LITTLE DOPE. I  
HAVE SAID IT TOO LIKELY TO FAIL BUT  
PLEASE ADVISE EXCLUSIVE TO BURKE ONLY. LONG WITH  
ANY FURTHER INFORMATION ON SITUATION. ON TO GET DOPE.

on this one

on how

COMMENTS

Johnny

81/94

(93) Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road  
Materials. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. ~~Bumpy Road, Exclusive~~  
~~for Dennison from Burke.~~ Repeated for information to CTG 81.8,  
Exclusive for Clark from Burke.

(93) ✓ Admiral Clark.

CU-118

Telegram From the Commander of Special Task Group 81.8 (Clark) to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet (Dennison)

USS Essex, Caribbean, April 18, 1961 11:52 p.m.

190452Z.

~~Do not land~~

~~TOP SECRET EXCLUSIVE FOR BUMPY ROAD~~  
~~EXCLUSIVE FOR DENNISON FROM CLARK~~

- 1. FOLLOWING CLEAR TEXT FROM BRIGADE COMMANDER TO BASE INTERCEPTED "DO YOU PEOPLE REALIZE HOW DESPARATE THE SITUATION IS? DO YOU BACK US UP OR QUIT? ALL WE WANT IS LOW JET COVER AND JET CLOSE SUPPORT. ENEMY HAS THIS SUPPORT. I NEED IT BADLY OR CANNOT SURVIVE. PLEASE DON'T DESERT US. AM OUT OF TANK AND BAZOOKA AMMO. TANKS WILL HIT ME AT DAWN. I WILL NOT BE EVACUATED. WILL FIGHT TO THE END IF WE HAVE TO. NEED MEDICAL SUPPLIES URGENTLY."
- 2. FOLLOWING INTERCEPTED FROM MARSOPAL "IF WE CANNOT GET SANTIAGO TO COVER US ON WAY IN AND OUT AND LOW JET COVER FEEL CUBAN CREW WILL MUTINY. CREW READY TO MUTINY NOW. REQUEST IMMED ANSWER."

Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Operational Immediate, ~~Bumpy Road~~.  
~~Exclusive for Dennison from Clark~~. Passed to JCS at 2:01 a.m. in CINCLANT telegram 190701Z, ~~Exclusive for Gray from Dennison~~. (Ibid.)  
Code name for Blagar.

(4)

CO-119

Telegram from the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet (Dennison) to the Commander of Special Task Group 81.8 (Clark)

Norfolk, April 19, 1961A-1:27 a.m.

11 190627Z.

~~Delate Underwriting~~

EXCLUSIVE

EXCLUSIVE

EXCLUSIVE FOR CLARK FROM DENNISON INFO GRAY

- 1. AT YOUR DISCRETION AND WITH DUE REGARD FOR SECURITY YOUR FORCES AND NEED FOR CONCEALING INVOLVEMENT U.S. CONDUCT EYEBALL RECCO OBJECTIVE AREA FIRST LIGHT 19 APRIL.
- 2. NEW SUBJECT. IF CEF EFFORT HAS NOT BEEN FULLY EFFECTIVE DESIRE ALL INFO EARLIEST AS TO WHETHER GUERRILLA OPERATIONS HAVE BEEN STARTED. IF THIS IS THE CASE THEN IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR US TO ARRANGE SUPPORT BY AIR DROPS ETC. AS YOU MUST REALIZE I AM GROPING IN THE DARK AND ANY INFO YOU CAN SUPPLY (POSSIBLY THROUGH COL MALLARDS SOURCES) WOULD BE OF GREAT HELP.
- 3. ANOTHER SUB ECT. WE MAY BE CALLED UPON FOR EVACUATION OF WOUNDED. THIS MIGHT INVOLVE HELICOPTERS AND STOP OFF IN ESSEX PRIOR TRANSFER TO YET UNDETERMINED DESTINATION.

RESTRICTION

262

(84) (94)

(43) Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Operational Immediate, ~~Exclusive~~ ~~Exclusive for Clark~~ ~~from Dennison~~ Repeated ~~for information~~ to JCS, ~~exclusive for Gray~~ ~~from Dennison~~.

44

CU-120

(50) Telegram from the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet (Dennison) to the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke)

(19) Norfolk, April 19, 1961 2:01 a.m.

(11) 190701Z.

*Delate 9-10-61*

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~EXCLUSIVE FOR ADMIRAL BURKE FROM DENNISON~~

(1) A. YOUR 190137Z  
(2) B. NY 190627Z  
(3) I. SEE REF B TO CTC 81.8 INFO JCS.

(11) 2. Evacuation of wounded is completely out of the question without overt involvement of US forces. Furthermore, I know of no haven in some place "inaccessible to news hawks." Evacuation either by day or night is a fantastically unrealistic project unless I am permitted to put sufficient force ashore, with air and gunfire support from the sea, to provide a beach head. Alternative would be for CEF ships to bring wounded from beach to sea. (89) (94)

(93) Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret ~~Exclusive for Burke from Dennison~~.

(93) - ✓ Document  $\frac{1}{m}$  . (4/19, 8:37 p.m.)

(13) 3 Document  $\frac{1}{m}$  .

CU-121

359a

Telegram from the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet (Dennison) to the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke)

Norfolk, April 19, 1961 2:11 a.m.

190711Z

Delete Underlining

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~EXCLUSIVE FOR ADMIRAL BURKE FROM DENNISON~~  
~~A. YOUR 190217Z~~  
~~IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO GIVE CHARACTER THAT I COULD LAND OBSERVER~~  
~~ON THE BEACH WITHOUT DANGER OF BEING KILLED OR CAPTURED. ON~~  
~~THE CONTRARY I COULD GUARANTEE THAT ANY OBSERVER LANDED WOULD~~  
~~BE COMPLETELY INEFFECTIVE AT BEST AND PROBABLY WOULD INVOLVE~~  
~~THE UNITED STATES. I HAVE NO INFORMATION ABOUT CONTACT SOURCES~~  
~~ON THE BEACH, NO INFO ON COMMUNICATIONS ASHORE AND NO INFORMATION~~  
~~ON POSITIONS OF OUR FORCES. THE REQUEST IS COMPLETELY~~  
~~UNREALISTIC AND I WILL HAVE NO PART OF IT.~~

Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret ~~Exclusive for Burke from Dennison.~~

Document 1/m (4/18, 9:17 p.m.)

Note on the source text at this point, ~~known~~ reads: "He may have to."

An unidentified handwritten note

363

CU-123

265

49

(1) Telegram from the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke) to the  
Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet (Dennison).

(19) Washington, April 19, 1961 3:41 a.m.

(11) 190841Z.

EXCLUSIVE FOR ADM DENNISON FROM ADM BURKE.  
YOUR 190701Z NOT VERY HELPFUL. YOU MAY HAVE TO EVACUATE CEF OR  
WOUNDED ONLY. WE REALIZE US FORCES WOULD BE INVOLVED BUT WE  
WOULD WANT TO HOLD INVOLVEMENT TO AS LOW A LEVEL AS  
POSSIBLE. IF YOU EVACUATE WOUNDED HOLD THEM IN ESSEX AND I WILL  
INFORM YOU LOCATION OF HAVEN. GOD KNOWS THIS OPERATION IS AS  
DIFFICULT AS POSSIBLE AND WE ARE TRYING TO DO  
ALL WE CAN WITHOUT MUCH INFO AND WITHOUT HAVING BEEN IN ON ALL  
INITIAL STAGES. I TOOK AM IRKED AND TIRED AND I REALIZE MANY  
OF THESE SUGGESTIONS ARE MOST DIFFICULT. YET  
WE WILL HAVE TO DO ALL WE CAN TO HELP EVEN IF IT IS NOT THE  
WAY WE WOULD LIKE TO DO IT. DON'T LET THE FLAG ETC. (89) (74)

(43) Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road  
Materials. Top Secret; Operational Immediate; ~~Exclusive for~~  
~~Dennison from Burke.~~

(43) ✓ Document  $\frac{1}{m}$  . (4/19, 2:01 a.m.)



CU-125

Telegram from the Commander of Special Task Group 81.8 (Clark) to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet (Dennison)

USS/Essex, the Caribbean, April 19, 1961 8:40 a.m.

11191340Z. Exclusive for Dennison, Gray, from Clark. Bumpy Road.

YOUR 190627Z

1. ALL EVIDENCE INDICATES CEF ASHORE STILL ARE ORGANIZED FIGHTING UNIT AND NOT SHIFTING TO GUERRILLA ACTIVITY. BELIEVE ONE BODY OF SURVIVORS FROM RED BEACH ATTEMPTING TO JOIN MAIN BODY AT BLUE BEACH. NOTHING WAS DELIVERED TO BEACH AREA BY SEA DURING THE NIGHT. INDICATIONS ARE THAT CEF ASHORE IS LOW ON ALL SUPPLIES, INCLUDING AMMO AND IS HARD PRESSED IF NOT DESPERATE. AIR DROPS BY CEF PLANES POORLY DELIVERED. MOST FALL INTO SEA.

2. ALL ABOVE FROM INTERCEPTED CEF TRAFFIC.

3. ALL THIS RADIO TRAFFIC IS ADDRESSED FOR EITHER ACTION OR INFO TO CDR. MILLARDS BOSS. WHO IS THE SAME AS COL. MALLARDS BOSS. (8194)

(93) Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret, ~~Bumpy Road, Exclusive for Dennison from Clark.~~ Repeated ~~for information to JCS~~ ~~Exclusive for Gray from Clark.~~

Document

1/m

(4/19, 1:27 a.m.)

CU-126

50 Telegram from the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet (Dennison) to the Commander of Special Task Group 81.8 (Clark)

14 Norfolk, April 19, 1961 10:46 a.m.

116 191546Z.

Handwritten signature/initials

BUMPY ROAD EXCLUSIVE FOR RADM CLARK FROM DENNISON, INFO GEN GRAY

- 16 A. CTG 81.8 191448Z
- B. JCS 994247 DTG 172035Z
- C. JCS 994309 DTG 181837Z
- D. JCS 994369 DTG 190838Z

119 1. CLOSE AIR SUPPORT CANNOT BE FURNISHED. RESTRICTIONS OF REF B ARE APPLICABLE. ONLY EXCEPTIONS TO 15 MILE LIMITATION SO FAR AUTHORIZED ARE REFS C AND D.

93 Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Operational Immediate; Exclusive, Bumpy Road, Exclusive for Clark from Dennison. Repeated for information to JCS Exclusive for Gray from Dennison.

93 In this telegram, sent to Dennison and Gray at 9:48 a.m., April 19, Clark reported a request to his Task Group from the CEF for close air support to meet an attack led by tanks against the CEF position on the beach. (Ibid.) Clark had reported 34 minutes earlier that CEF forces on Blue Beach were under artillery fire.

(CTG 81.8 telegram 191414Z to CINCLANTFLT, April 19; ibid.)

- 93-2 Document 1/m (4/17, 3:35 p.m.)
- 93-3 Document 1/m (4/18, 1:37 p.m.)
- 93-4 Document 1/m (4/19, 3:37 p.m.)

93 At 10:33 a.m., Clark reported to Dennison that the CEF commander had repeated his plea for close air support; the CEF was under continuing artillery fire and had been attacked twice by aircraft. (CTG 81.8 telegram 191533Z to CINCLANTFLT, April 19;

ibid.) And at 11:09 a.m., Clark suggested that he be authorized to take advantage of the fact that two hostile planes were circling near one of his destroyers in order to launch an air strike from the Essex. (CTG 81.8 telegram 191609Z to CINCLANTFLT, April 19; ibid.)

Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials

CU-127

(5) Telegram from the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet (Dennison) to the Commander of Special Task Group 81.8 (Clark)

(14) Norfolk, April 19, 1961 11:24 a.m.

(11) 191624Z.

~~Deliberate Unsubstantiated~~

BUMPY ROAD, TOP SECRET EXCLUSIVE FOR CLARK, INFO GEN GRAY FROM DENNISON.

1. DISPATCH 2 DD TO TAKE STATION OFF BLUE BEACH TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS ANY CHANCE FOR EVACUATION.
2. PROVIDE AIR COVER TO PROTECT DDS.
3. FLY RECCO OVER BEACH TO DETERMINE SITUATION.
4. REPORT IMMEDIATELY BY FASTEST POSSIBLE MEANS RESULTS OBSERVATIONS.
5. CEF SHIPS HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO MOVE INTO BLUE BEACH.
6. FINAL INSTRUCTIONS ON EVACUATION WILL FOLLOW.

(89) (94)

(93) Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Emergency, ~~Exclusive~~. Bumpy Road, Exclusive for Clark from Dennison. Repeated for information to JCS, ~~Exclusive for Gray from Dennison.~~

(13) ✓ At 11:18 a.m., Clark had reported to Dennison that he had received the following message from the CEF brigade ashore: "We are out of ammo and fighting on the beach. Please send help. We cannot hold. (Signed) Pepe." (CTG 81.8 telegram 191618Z to CINCLANTFLT, April 19; ibid.)

CU-128

(41) (50) Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet (Dennison) to the Commander of Special Task Group 81.8 (Clark)

(19) Norfolk, April 19, 1961 11:32 a.m.

(11) 191632Z.

~~Delete Information~~  
BUMPY ROAD EXCLUSIVE FOR RADM CLARK INFO GEN GRAY FROM DENNISON.

- (11) 1. PROVIDE CONTINUOUS AIR COVER OVER BEACHES TODAY TO PROTECT CEF FROM AIR ATTACK.
- (11) 2. PROTECTION FROM GROUND ATTACK NOT ~~RECOMMENDED~~ AUTHORIZED. (879) ✓

(93) Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Emergency; ~~Exclusive.~~ ~~Bumpy Road, Exclusive for Clark from Dennison.~~ Repeated for information to JCS, ~~Exclusive for Gray from Dennison.~~

(93) ✓ At 11:31 a.m., Clark reported to Dennison that he had received the following message from Blue Beach: "Out of ammunition. Men fighting in water. If no help given Blue Beach lost." (CTG 81.8 telegram 191631Z to CINCLANTFLT, April 19; ibid.)

CU-131

376

44

Telegram from the Commander of Special Task Group 81.8 (Clark) to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet (Dennison)

USS 42 The Essex, Caribbean, April 19, 1961, 12:06 p.m.

191706Z.

Bumpy Road.

EXCLUSIVE FOR DENNISON, GRAY, SMITH, McELROY, O'DONNELL FROM CLARK, BUMPY ROAD.

YOUR 191624Z

1. PARA 3. AREA HELD BY CBF APPEARS TO BE ONE QUARTER TO ONE HALF MILE ALONG THE BEACH TO A DEPTH OF ABOUT ONE QUARTER UNDER ARTILLERY FIRE WITH TANKS AND VEHICLES TO BOTH EAST AND WEST. BELIEVE EVACUATION IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT ACTIVE ENGAGEMENT WITH CASTRO FORCES

2. DESTROYERS ON THE WAY FOR OBSERVATION ONLY.

(93) Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Emergency; ~~Exclusive, Bumpy Road, Exclusive for Dennison from Clark. Repeated for information to JCS, COMCARIBSEAFRON, COMKWESTFOR, and COMNAVBASEGTMO, Exclusive for Gray, Smith, McElroy, and O'Donnell from Clark.~~

(93) Document 1m (4/19, 11:24 a.m.)

(93) Clark followed this telegram with another to Dennison at 12:44 which read: "2 DD are proceeding to Blue Beach but feel I must point out that they will be subjected to air attack and surface artillery fire and in my opinion will not be able to make any contribution to decision as to feasibility of evacuation which is feasible if we stand ready to support by air cover and counter battery fire and start at once." (CTG telegram 191744Z to CINCLANTFLT, April 19; ~~add~~)

Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials)

CU-133

(44)

(50) Telegram from the Commander of Special Task Group 81.8 (Clark) to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet (Dennison)

(4) <sup>USS Essex</sup> ~~The Essex~~, Caribbean, April 19, 1961, 1:57 p.m.

(11) 191857Z.

Bumpy Road.

~~Delete Under Virginia~~

EXCLUSIVE FOR DENNISON, GRAY, SMITH, MCELROY, O'DONNELL FROM CLARK  
BUMPY ROAD,  
1. AD 54 UNABLE TRACK CASTRO AIRCRAFT TO AND FROM BASES. OBSERVED UNIDENTIFIED JET FOLLOWING MY RETURNING CAP TO SEAWARD FOR ABOUT 20 MILES THEN RETURNING.  
2. CASTRO B-26 ORBITING OVER BEACH, PROBABLY GUN SPOTTER. I AM INITIATING AIR TO AIR COMBAT OVER BEACH AREA.

(83) (94)

(43) Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Emergency; <sup>Exclusive</sup> ~~Bumpy Road, Exclusive for Dennison from Clark. Repeated for information to JCS, COMCARIBSEAFRON, COMKWESTFOR, and COMNAVBASE GTMO, Exclusive for Gray, Smith, McElroy, and O'Donnell from Clark.~~

(43) 1/ In response to this message, Dennison sent an order at 2:16 p.m. to the <sup>2</sup>Commander of the air unit based at Key West, and the <sup>02</sup>Commander of the naval base at Guantanamo: "Be prepared provide fighter assistance to CTG 81.8 on his request." (CINCLANTFLT telegram 191916Z to COMKWESTFOR and COMNAVBASE GTMO, April 19; ibid.)

277

(4)

CU-134

379

(50) Telegram from the Commander of Special Task Group 81.8 (Clark) to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet (Dennison)

(14) USS B The Essex, Caribbean, April 19, 1961, 2:17 p.m.

11191917Z.

Bumpy Road.

~~Delete Underlining~~

EXCLUSIVE FOR DENNISON, GRAY, SMITH, MCELROY, O'DONNELL FROM CLARK. BUMPY ROAD.

(14) CTU 81.8.3 REPORTS FOLLOWING INTERCEPTED:  
(14) CEF SHIP COMMANDER REPORTED TO HIS 2ND IN COMMAND QUOTE "THAT BLUE BEACH WAS LOST AND NO TROOPS WERE ON BLUE BEACH. MEN FLED INTO WOODS." UNQUOTE CTE 81.8.3.2 PASSED YACHT WITH 200 PEOPLE ON BOARD POSSIBLY FROM BEACH. REPORT IS THAT NOTHING LEFT TO SALVAGE ON THE BEACH AND THAT CASTRO IS WAITING ON THE BEACH. (89) (74)

(93) Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Flash, ~~Exclusive.~~ ~~Bumpy Road.~~ ~~Exclusive for Dennison from Clark.~~ Repeated ~~for information~~ to JCS, COMCARIBSEAFRON, COMKWESTFOR, and COMNAVBASE GTMO, ~~Exclusive for Gray, Smith, McElroy, and O'Donnell from Clark.~~

(93) ✓ In light of the apparently hopeless situation on the beach, Clark reported to Dennison at 2:57 p.m. that he had ordered his air and surface units to fire only in self defense. (CTG 81.8 telegram 191957Z to CINCLANTFLT, April 19; ibid.)

CU-135

Telegram From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief,  
Atlantic (Dennison).

Washington, April 19, 1961 3:10 p.m.

JCS 994409. Bumpy Road. Exclusive for Adm Dennison and  
Adm Clark from Gen Gray.

1. Based on <sup>REPORT</sup> 1 from CEF Commander ashore that he was destroying communications CIA has assumed he has taken to the woods.
2. CIA has ordered their shipping to disperse and proceed to various Ports. <sup>13</sup>BLAGAR<sup>7</sup> and LCU's have been ordered to point CC. Request you assume operational control at CC and take action as feasible to salvage ships and cargo. ✓ (89) (94)

(93) Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Operational Immediate; Limited Distribution; <sup>Exclusiv</sup>  
~~Bumpy Road; Exclusive for Dennison from Gray. Repeated for~~  
~~information to CTG 81.8. Exclusive for Clark from Gray.~~

(93) ✓ At 7:27 p.m., the JCS amended this order to read: "Retain operational control of LCU's only." The CIA had directed that the crews of the LCU's be transferred to the <sup>13</sup>Caribe<sup>7</sup> and remain under CIA control. (JCS telegram 994463 to CINCLANT, April 19; ibid.)



(44)

CU-136

381

Telegram From the Commander of Special Task Group 81.8 (Clark) to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet (Dennison)

(19) USS 13

The Essex, Caribbean, April 19, 1961, 3:45 p.m.

(11) 192045Z.

EXCLUSIVE FOR DENNISON, GRAY, SMITH, O'DONNELL, MCELROY FROM CLARK. BUMPY ROAD.

- (11) 1. FINAL REPORT FROM CTU 81.8.3 QUOTE SAW NOTHING TO INDICATE ANY CHANCE OF EVACUATION. BEACH APPEARS COMPLETELY HELD BY LIGHT CASTRO FORCES. UNQUOTE
- (11) 2. MY DESTROYERS ARE CLEAR OF BEACH AND REJOINING CEF SHIPS. (84) (74)

(93) Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Operational Immediate; ~~Exclusive~~ ~~Bumpy Road~~ ~~Exclusive~~ ~~for Dennison from Clark~~ Repeated for information to JCS, COMCARIBSEAFRON, COMKWESTFOR, and COMNAVBASE GTMO. ~~Exclusive for Gray, Smith, McElroy, and O'Donnell from Clark.~~

(93) ✓ At 3:20, Clark had reported: "CTU 81.1.3 straddled by shore battery. Ordered withdrawal full speed." (CTG 81.8 telegram 192020Z to CINCLANTFLT, April 19; ibid.)

CU-137

Telegram from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)

Washington, April 19, 1961 8:42 p.m.

JCS 994464. Exclusive for Adm Dennison and Adm Clark from JCS. Bumpy Road.

Direct one destroyer to remain off beach during night outside of shore based gun range. Destroyed boat to patrol off beaches to pick up any evacuees. Destroyer keep boat under radar control. Destroyer depart area one hour before sunrise. Report results of search during night and on completion of patrol. ✓

Realize this is most difficult and hazardous assignment but it is necessary. ✓ (81-74)

Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Operational Immediate; Limited Distribution; Exclusive Bumpy Road; ~~Exclusive for Dennison from Gray~~. Repeated ~~for information~~ to CTG 81.8, ~~Exclusive for Clark from Gray~~.

At 5:10 p.m. Burke pressed Clark for more information: "Dammit, make lots of reports. We need data. Even negative helps." (CNO telegram 192210Z to CTG 81.8, Exclusive for Clark from Burke, April 19; ibid.)

The JCS informed Dennison at 8:52 that existing instructions with respect to air and surface protection remained in effect, but there was no further requirement for an air CAP in the beach head area. Dennison was directed to instruct his naval units in the area, with the exception of CTG 81.8, to resume normal operations. (JCS telegram 994465 to CINCLANT, April 19; ibid.)

(Declassified; see attached)

258

44

CU-146

Telegram From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)

Washington, April 21, 1961 9:19 p.m.

JCS 994676. Bumpy Road. Exclusive for Adm Dennison and Adm Clark from Gen Gray.

CIA advises that there are 3 UDT men with complete gear aboard Marsopa. They request they be introduced nite of 22nd April in vicinity of burned out patrol craft in effort to make contact with CEF personnel. The UDT personnel plus any CEF personnel should be retrieved nite of 23 April. Suggest provision for additional small boats and rafts on nite of 23 April in case CEF group is contacted. Request comments so that CIA may be advised.

no unclassified

2

Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Operational Immediate; Limited Distribution. ~~Bumpy Road, Exclusive for Dennison from Gray. Repeated for information to CTG 81.8, Exclusive for Clark from Gray.~~ In a telephone conversation with Dennison on April 22, Burke explained that this telegram was cleared by McNamara and the President, and that the President was directing the rescue operation personally.

Exclusive

(Transcript of a telephone conversation, April 22; ibid.)

Code name for the Blagar.

At 5:47 p.m. on April 21, the JCS informed CINCLANT that information had just been received that several hundred CEF personnel had seized a Cuban patrol boat and had run <sup>it</sup> aground on the west side of the Bay of Pigs while trying to escape. Dennison was instructed to search for and protect the CEF personnel on the patrol boat. (JCS telegram 994644 to CINCLANT, April 21; ~~ibid.~~ <sup>Naval Historical Center Area Files</sup> Bumpy Road Materials) Shortly thereafter, Burke informed General Gray that he had just learned that the patrol boat had been sighted, but it was burned out and no CEF survivors were visible. (Transcript of a telephone conversation, April 21; ibid.)

CU-154

Washington, April 24, 1961.

SUBJECT: Factors which hampered preparations for and Conduct of Effective Paramilitary Operations (Cuba)

1. The following factors tended to limit the effectiveness of paramilitary operations:

a. Lack of clear-cut, detailed policy directives, in writing, from proper governmental authority. (The March 17 directive was general in nature. Additional written directives should have been issued from time to time setting forth in detail concept, missions, objectives and authorized procedures. Verbal instructions do not suffice in matters of great import.)

b. Slowness of governmental machinery in resolving policy questions once presented. (For example, two and a half months were requested to obtain the services of Special Forces training teams after original request by the Paramilitary Staff. Results of Special Group meetings were often inconclusive. Proceedings were verbal and minutes were prepared by individual departments. This led to misunderstanding. The Group itself did not have authority to resolve major questions, and there were no written policy directives forthcoming after meetings were conducted.)

c. Over Centralization of Control. (Analysis: The Special Group had to be consulted before launching each over-flight mission. Tactical headquarters were in Washington, whereas it has long been recognized that tactical operations must be controlled by a tactical headquarters in the field or at sea. It would have been better to place paramilitary operations under control of a special task force within the Unified Command. This task force should have included representatives from Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and G.I.A. -- all under a naval commander, since the target country was an island.)

d. Lack of adequate organization, procedures, equipment, facilities and staff within G.I.A. for management of paramilitary operations. (The organization and procedures of G.I.A. are not suitable for control of paramilitary operations and its paramilitary staff is very small. G.I.A. must call upon the Defense Department for equipment, supplies and personnel to establish training bases, conduct training and prepare plans. It would be better to assign

Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Secret.

Not found. An apparent outgrowth of the March 16 meeting at the White House to discuss the Zapata plan. For a summary of that meeting, see Document  $\frac{1}{W}$ . (Ed Note 3/16)

paramilitary responsibilities to the Defense Department which has vast resources, both human and material, for such purposes.)

311  
 (11) c. <sup>(12)</sup> Failure to approve use of U. S. bases for training. <sup>(11)</sup>  
 (The paramilitary training base in Guatemala was entirely unsatisfactory. Troops had to live in prison-camp conditions and there were no adequate training areas or facilities available. Location of the base in Guatemala also introduced political complications and created tremendous logistical problems which were very difficult for C.I.A. to handle.)

(11) f. <sup>(12)</sup> Failure to use U. S. bases for air logistical and tactical operations. <sup>(11)</sup> (The air base in Guatemala was at too great a distance for satisfactory supply flights for support of agents and guerrilla organizations. The air base in Nicaragua was too distant for satisfactory B-26 operations. Two sorties per day were the maximum that could be programmed, and pilot fatigue made this impossible for a period longer than one or two days. Location of the air bases in third countries complicated security and political problems and increased the likelihood that use of the bases would be denied soon after commencement of operations. Location of bases in third countries also multiplied logistical problems.)

(11) g. <sup>(12)</sup> Denial of the request to use American contract pilots for aerial supply of agents and guerrillas. <sup>(11)</sup> (Cuban pilots demonstrated at an early date their inability to fly successful missions. Of twenty-seven attempted only four were successful. American pilots, on the other hand, have demonstrated their ability in this field in many areas of the world, working with a variety of indigenous guerrilla forces. The failure to supply guerrilla organizations was a critical failure in the over-all operation.)

12  
 (11) h. <sup>(12)</sup> Denial of the request to use American contract pilots for B-26 strikes. <sup>(11)</sup> (The paramilitary staff expressed in writing on January 4, 1961 its doubts regarding the ability of the Cuban pilots to conduct satisfactory tactical air operations. Request for use of American pilots had been previously made to the Special Group which authorized their hiring but not their employment.)

(11) i. <sup>(12)</sup> Long delay in obtaining Special Forces personnel for infantry training. <sup>(11)</sup> (This request was submitted by the paramilitary staff on October 28, 1960. Personnel were not made available until January 12, 1961.)

(11) j. <sup>(12)</sup> Rejection of the preferred invasion plan (Trinidad). <sup>(11)</sup>  
 (This plan was recommended by the paramilitary staff as the best possible plan and was endorsed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the plan most likely to succeed.)



CW-1543

305

① Political decisions led eventually to a half strength attack on D-2 on only three aircraft. After this strike, photographic interpretations and pilot briefing indicated that the opposition still retained a number of offensive aircraft in operational condition.



17

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②

latter

(21) ~~10~~ C. Hughes  
(22) Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
(23) Chief, W/AFM

WH/4/PM

375

(49)

CU-169

(50) Memorandum From the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke) to the Director of the Joint Staff (Wheeler)

(19) Washington, April 29, 1961.

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- (26) Subj: Landing in Cuba on short notice
- (17) 1. Yesterday the Secretary of Defense was interested in what we could do in Cuba on five days notice. We were giving him a horseback estimate which is not the best way to do it.
- (17) 2. Have the Joint Staff and/or CINCPAC come up with an outline plan on what we could get done in five days after the President says go, with an indication of what additional forces we could get in three more days. This plan should also indicate how we could build up our strength after 8-day.

how fast

(17) Arleigh Burke ✓ (85) (94)

(93) Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret.

(93) ✓ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

CV-185

Memorandum for the Record, by the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke)

Washington, May 5, 1961.

OP-92 [66] Subj: Debrief of NEC meeting, 8 May 61

[Here follows a brief summary of the discussion of the Iran and Korea agenda items.]

OP-	
OP-	
OP-	
OP-05	
OP-	
OP-	
OP-	
OP-06	453

[66] CUBA

[71] 7. Mr. Nitze then discussed his paper on Cuba. It was asked whether or not anybody in the room believed that we should intervene militarily in Cuba now. I said perhaps not now, but it must be realized that the longer we delay in intervening in Cuba, the more strength Castro will have, both internally because of his training, and externally because he is representing the anti-United States group of Latin

Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Hold Closely.

Document (NSC paper 5/4)



TOP SECRET - HOLD CLOSELY

America, and because he is getting away with it. I said that in six months, if Castro were wise, he could have a small, well trained Army, and that within a year he could have a good military machine if he really wanted to put his back to it.

8. It was decided that sooner or later we probably would have to intervene in Cuba, but that now is not the time.
9. A blockade of Cuba was discussed and it was decided that a blockade was not worthwhile, for the reasons given in the talking paper.
10. It was asked what was the Air Force's proposal to handle the Cuban situation. Some Congressmen had written a letter to the White House stating that if SAC were turned loose, they could handle all of Cuba. The question was asked if the Department of Defense knew of this proposal.
11. Mr. McNamara stated that there had been much discussion on how to land forces in Cuba. The Air Force believed that all the forces should be air landed very quickly, which they thought they could do in 24 hours. All the other Chiefs thought that in addition to air landing of troops, there should be material and other people brought in by ships. Mr. McNamara thought that it was better to use both airborne troops and amphibious troops. If all the coast was bombing of Cuba, it was decided that this should not be done.
12. The question was asked whether or not we were setting up a watch group on Cuba. Mr. Dulles stated that we do have a group which will keep up to date on Cuba. It is a matter of great importance to the White House to know the status of Cuba in detail. For example, the White House will want to know what military equipment the Cubans now have, what military equipment get in the future, and what is the state of training of the Cuban forces.
13. Apparently the White House has received letters indicating that the equipment in the hands of the Militia was better than the equipment available to the CMV forces. Mr. Dulles stated that he knew about all the equipment in the hands of the Cubans and that their equipment was not superior. I seconded his remarks.

Ibid.

Not further identified.

185/3

Op-00:ty  
Op-00 Memo 000245-6

TOP SECRET - HOLD CLOSELY

14. It was decided to continue the high-level overflights over Cuba, but that we should not fly any more than we have to.
15. A task group for Cuba was again discussed. It was decided that the task group and CIA would both be responsible to determine the Cuban military forces and how fast they were advancing, as well as other Cuban intelligence.
16. The question was then asked whether or not there was really terror in Havana. Several foreign ambassadors had reported that the situation in Havana was worse than they had seen, even in occupied countries. For example, four or five hundred people of many nationalities, but mostly Cubans, were herded into a theater and kept there three or four days without food or water, and without sleeping or bathroom accommodations. The question was asked why the European reporters hold back. They should start writing their articles. Mr. Murrow is to take action and will attempt to get foreign correspondents to get truthful stories from Cuba. We need the support of our NATO allies and the rest of OAS. Good stories from the foreign correspondents would be very helpful.
17. Mr. Rusk said that he would talk with NATO Foreign Ministers in regard to Cuba next week.
18. It was stated that Cuban farmers could not get United States transient visas. State is to act on this fast with Switzerland so that Cubans that want to get out of Cuba can do so on an American visa.
- 19.
20. It was stated that the troubles in Iran, whatever they may turn out to be, will be charged to our difficulties in Cuba and Laos.
21. Mr. Rusk then read three paragraphs that State wanted to add to the Cuban papers. These paragraphs strengthened the paper and no opposition to them was made.
22. There is to be a formal covert annex on the Cuban paper. Mr. Rusk wanted to hold off on covert actions for a little

4 An apparent reference to the revisions proposed by Achilles in a May 3 memorandum to Rusk; See Footnote 4, Document

(NSC paper 5/4)

TOP SECRET - HOLD CLOSELY

while at least. CIA and the task group will look at all covert proposals for Cuba.

23. The United States policy in regard to Cuban exiles (page 27) was discussed at length. It was agreed that it would be nearly impossible to form a freedom brigade, but that Services should look into possibility of recruiting Cubans. Mr. Ribicoff is to review the nonmilitary part of the recommendations in regard to the Cuban freedom brigade. We should be very careful never to make a commitment to any Cuban group that the United States will intervene in Cuba.

24. Cubans in this country are now on visitors visas, and a lot of them are Castro Agents, using the passports to move around the United States freely. We are therefore going to make them refugees, to control some of them and to permit others to work, and to report some.

25. It was asked what position the government should take in regard to the committee in exile. The answer was that we can't recognize it as a government in exile because they are really no government. It is not an established government that has been driven from its territory. Recognition of such a committee would be an act of political intervention, and it would get no OAS support. It would be a precedent for a future action. There might be lots of such governments in exile in the United States if we established one.

26. The next question was how to deal with Cuban Legion. The answer was that the Cuban Legion can't possibly succeed unless the United States intervenes. We tried the Cuban Legion and it didn't work. However, the United States will intervene if the circumstances make intervention desirable. We can't tell the Cuban refugee group that we will never intervene for we will under some circumstances, nor can we tell them we will.

27. Mr. Ribicoff is to take charge of the refugee problem. He is going to encourage them to continue their trades. They will become an immigrant group. They will have the right to work; he will watch the labor situation to insure they can continue their old trades if they want to, and that they can expand their skills. Some students will be offered scholarships. We will try to keep the refugees from concentrating in Miami.

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- (11) 28. The Trading With the Enemy Act was discussed as to whether it should be absolute or not. After some discussion on whether to continue trade, Burke made his "Hurt Castro" speech. It was brought out by others that we don't want to make Castro a hero but we should hurt Castro every way we know how—in little ways—any way we can, but don't make a hero out of him. Sometimes by doing things against Castro, we build him up and make a popular figure out of him. We don't want the United States to appear to be a bully pushing Cuba or Castro around, or for the United States image to become weakened because we were unable to successfully overthrow Castro.
- (14) 29. Mr. McGeorge Bundy suggested that maybe we would want to cut off United States imports, but permit food exports to Cuba on humanitarian grounds. It was stated that if restrictions on trade were invoked, it should be done on the ground of specific unacceptable actions on the part of Castro, and we should go all the way and not just part of it. He can get anything that he actually needs elsewhere.
- (11) 30. It was decided that if we do invoke the trade restrictions we will go all the way. We will invoke the restrictions the first time we can hang them on some situation. It may be necessary to induce a situation, although Castro will probably soon create the situation himself.
- (14) 31. There was then a discussion of the TWA Act, but no conclusions.
- (11) 32. Mr. Murrow said that we should let medicine go in to Cuba. It was finally agreed to let medicine go in, but not sell it. It will go in free of charge to the Red Cross.
- (11) 33. There was a discussion on United States subsidiaries in Canada. They will be included in blanket order, but any individual company with a Canadian subsidiary can get a license which will permit him to trade.

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

- (14) 34. There was much discussion on bilateral defense treaties. Mr. Rusk finally said that these treaties should not become a big project. If we want bilateral action when the time comes, it will be easier to get agreement then. If and where

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it is easy to get bilateral agreements, he has no objection. Elsewhere, let it ride for the time being.

35. Mr. Rusk stated that he has been consulting with OAS States and the OAS Organization on Latin-American countries breaking diplomatic relations with Cuba. Eight have suspended diplomatic relations and nine had recalled their Ambassadors without breaking diplomatic relations.

36. It was stated that the instructions to our Ambassadors in Latin America should be reviewed by the White House. The question was asked what do we want our Ambassadors to Latin America to do. Mr. Rusk stated that it would have to be OAS or Rio type action.

37. There was some discussion as to whether Brazil would oppose an anti-Castro movement or not.

38. There was some discussion as to whether a Caribbean defense force and it was agreed that this needed more looking at.

39. Mr. Dulles stated that much more would be done in Mexico than was indicated in this paper.

40. It was brought up again that we have got to be sure that our Ambassadors know what is in our mind so we can all work towards the same goal. We must bring others in the program. We must denounce Cuba as a satellite and get other people to ostracize Cuba.

41. The Vice President stated we have got to be tough. He wants to drag our feet on help to those countries that help Castro, and those countries that opposed Castro, we should help quickly. We should do all we can to hurt Castro and we can't ignore or reward those who play with the enemy.

42. Mr. Bowles was in favor of going easy. We should not be in too much hurry, and should build up a series of courses of action before action is taken.

43. It was still not clear what we wanted our Ambassadors to do, so the question was again asked. It was then stated that American nations should break diplomatic relations, ostracize Cuba, and increase their own internal security.

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44. Burke said that the Services could accomplish a great deal in Latin America through the NAAQ's and Attaches.

Comment. The JCS should prepare and coordinate with State a paper to provide guidance on such action, which individual Services can use as a source paper for instructions to our people, with copies to CINCARIB, CINCLANT and CINCPAC.

45. It was emphasized that we have got to get all government programs to use all means to weaken Castro.

46. Mr. Murrow stated that it was possible to blanket Cuban radios, and that we could put two naval aircraft in the air to transmit television shows over Cuban channels or we could beef up United States radio and television shows in Spanish to Latin-American countries. It was decided that the latter was the only one to do. Mr. Murrow is going to increase short-wave transmissions and put up some new stations.

47. Trujillo and Duvalier were discussed then. It was stated that the United States should not be a party to their overthrow. We must, however, be prepared to take action in case they fall.

48. The question was asked whether the American Consul was involved in the Dominican Republic opposition. He was not, although he was sure that the opposition may get help from some Americans. The reason is that the opposition needs help so badly that they will get it from Castro if they don't get it from Americans.

49. Questions were asked about British Guiana which gets its qualified independence in July. Jagan is a communist. The British are doing nothing about it because they believe his opponent is as bad as he is, but State is going to look into British Guiana to see what trouble may develop down there.

50. Mr. Reuther might be on the board of the Institute for Political Education in Costa Rica or in connection with Latin-American MAP.

**PERSONNEL**

51. Mr. Goodwin is to take over Mr. Nitke's Cuban job at least while Mr. Nitke goes with SpecState to Oslo.

Here follows discussion of agenda items relating to Thailand and Vietnam. 89 94

CU-192

44

(50) Telegram From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief,  
Atlantic (Dennison)

(14) Washington, May 9, 1961-12:28 p.m.

① JCS 995627.

Subject is Guidance for Development of Operations  
Plan on Cuba (1)

1. Submit to the JCS for approval a plan for military assault of Cuba. The plan must:
  - a. Assure overthrow of the Castro government in minimum time.
  - b. Assure necessary control of Cuba following overthrow of Castro government.
  - c. Assure continuous control of the US base at Guantanamo.
  - d. Provide the capability of initiating the assault without prior warning and within five days after the

707 *[Signature]*  
G.G. O'CONNOR  
Col., USA  
Executive, J-5  
*(K)*  
*(W)*  
Downgraded at  
12 Year Inter-  
vals; not  
automatically  
declassified  
DOD Directive  
5200.10  
ACTION  
INFO  
CJCS *2*  
DATE DIF *15 June*  
*9* Secy *1993*  
Dep Secy *1994*  
MONTH YEAR  
May *93* 1967

43) Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Priority; Exclusive for Admiral Dennison, General Powell, and General Everest. Repeated ~~for information~~ to CGUSCONARC, Ft Monroe, <sup>Virginia</sup> VA., and TAC, Langley AFB <sup>Virginia</sup> ~~VA.~~



order to execute.

- CU-192/2<sup>681</sup>
- (11) e. Be capable of execution at any time during a prolonged period after required forces and equipment are positioned.
  - (11) 2. Forces and equipment will be tailored as necessary to accomplish the plan, and may be repositioned as required.
  - (11) 3. Following Forces may be considered available for planning purposes:
    - (11b) a. Army
      - (16) XVIII Airborne Corps Hdqtrs
      - (16) 82nd Airborne Division
      - (16) 101st Airborne Division
      - (16) 3rd Armored Cavalry Regt
      - (16) 4th/68 Tank Bn
      - (16) 2nd Infantry Brig
      - (16) 4 Helicopter Companies
      - (16) 1 Inf Battle Group ( $\frac{1}{N}$ ) for helicopter operations
      - (16) Special Forces
    - (11b) b. Navy
      - (16) Striking and Covering Forces
      - (16) Combatant Air and Naval Elements as required.
      - (16) Underway replenishment group.

JCS 995627

(May 61)

PAGE NR 2

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(16) Amphibious Task Force  
Landing Force

(23) II MEF  
Headquarters, II MEF

(16) 2nd Marine Division ( $\frac{1}{4}$ )

(16) 2nd Marine Air Wing ( $\frac{1}{4}$ )

Force Troops Atlantic

(11) c. Air Force

(16) 1 Command Hdqtrs

Troop Carrier/MATS Wings as required

(23) (Reserve units with quick reaction time may  
be used)

(16) 4 Tactical Fighter Wings

2-1/3 Recon Squadrons

(16) 1 TAC Control System (Reduced)

Aerial Refueling as required

(11) d. CIA Force Atlantic

(11) e. Special Operations Task Force Atlantic

(11) f. On Call Forces

(16) (1) Naval: Uncommitted Forces US Atlantic  
Fleet Amphibious ships and Marine Forces as  
required, Pacific Command

(16) (2) Army: 4th Infantry Division  
CCA, 1st Armored Division

JCS 995627

(May 61)

PAGE NR 3

MESSAGE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

1855  
~~TOP SECRET~~

CU-192/4

⑪ g. Air and Surface Lift

⑪⑥ MATS and MSTs provide air and surface lift as directed by the JCS.

⑪④ 4. Submit initially, on a priority basis, an outline plan and a concept of operations. Include estimate of time required to accomplish 1 a and b above.

Concurrently submit requirements for:

⑪④ a. Total forces and equipment.

⑪④ b. Repositioning and/or prepositioning of forces and equipment necessary to obtain required state of readiness. Include estimate of time required to accomplish these actions.

⑪④ 5. Any recommendation you may have as to an alternate solution which will enhance the feasibility of the plan together with its impact on reaction time and total forces required is invited.

⑪④ 6. This guidance should not be interpreted as an indication that US military action against Cuba is probable. ~~SEP-3~~ ⑪④④

ORIGIN: JCS  
JCS 995627

(May 61) DTG: 091728Z kwc/4

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CV-197

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50 Memorandum for the Record, ~~by the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke)~~ ✓

19 Washington, May 16, 1961.

26 Subj: <sup>27</sup> Debrief of Luncheon conversation with the President,  
16 May 1961

11 1. I attended a luncheon with the President, in company with General Taylor, Mr. Allen Dulles and Mr. Robert Kennedy.

11 2. General Taylor presented a question paper entitled "TOPICS FOR TUESDAY", copy enclosed. ✓

499 11 3. The President's answers to the questions in general were as follows:

11 a. Question 1. Was there any doubt about the necessity of some such military action against Castro?

11 He had some doubt about the necessity for military action against Castro and so did some people in State, but there were pressures such as what to do with the forces being trained, the rainy season coming up and the conduct of covert actions in the atmosphere at the time, that lead the President to believe that Castro should be overthrown. It was much better, for example, to put the guerrillas on the beach in Cuba and let them fight for Cuba than bring them back to the United States and have them state that the United States would not support their activities. The end result might have been much worse had we done this than it actually was.

11 b. Question 2. What was the estimate of the probability of success of ZAPATA before D-Day?

11 It was thought that the possibility of some success of the ZAPATA plan was fairly good, since if they could not establish a beachhead and hold it, they could go into guerrillas. This was probably the biggest error, as it turned out, but it was thought that they could hold the beachhead for some time and that a Cuban Government could be established on the beachhead which perhaps could be recognized later. He realized that not knocking out the Cuban air precluded this as it turned out.

93 Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Hold Closely.

93 ✓ Not found.

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16 May 1961

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(11) c. Question 3. What was the feeling of likelihood of a popular uprising following the landing? How essential was such an uprising regarded for the success of the operation? How rapid a reaction was expected by Castro?

(11) He felt that there was a good chance for a popular uprising following the landing but that the beachhead was not held long enough to permit a popular uprising. Although an uprising would be necessary for the overthrow of Castro, if there was no general uprising the members in the landing party could become guerrillas and they would do more good as guerrillas than they would outside of Cuba. This also answered question 4 which was "What was expected to happen if the landing force effected a successful lodgment but there was no uprising?"

(11) d. Question 5. What was the understanding of the position of the JCS as to ZAPATA? Was it appreciated that they favored TRINIDAD over ZAPATA? What did the President expect from the Chiefs?

(11) The President understood that the JCS preferred the TRINIDAD Plan to the ZAPATA Plan from the military point of view. However, policy implications were overriding in that it would be quite evident in the Trinidad operation that it was a United States operation since control of the air would be required, which could be accomplished only with the assistance of the United States. He thought that the Chiefs could very well have stated that if the ZAPATA Plan was adopted and there was not absolute control of the air, that it would fail. He felt that this could have been more forcefully said than it was.

(11) e. Question 6. Was it understood that control of the air was considered essential to the success of the landing?

(11) He did understand that control of the air was important but he did not believe it to be absolutely essential. If he had, then he would have launched the D-Day strikes.

(11) f. Question 7. What were the circumstances surrounding the cancellation of the D-Day air strikes? How serious was the decision viewed? What was the understanding about pre-landing strikes?

(11) Mr. Rusk had talked with the President in regard to the D-Day strikes and in connection with the activities in the United Nations and

~~2.~~

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16 May 1961

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(S) the strong recommendations of Mr. Stevenson. He felt, in retrospect, that the decision to cancel the strikes should probably not have been made, but he felt that the case for making the strikes was perhaps not recommended forcefully enough, although he understood why General Cabell would not want to dispute the Secretary of State after the President had made a tentative decision. He was very open minded on this and very fair.

(11) g. Question 8. What was the understanding as to the ability of the landing force to pass to a guerrilla status in an emergency? To what extent did this factor influence approval of the operation?

(11) He certainly had understood that the landing force could pass to guerrilla status and it greatly influenced his thinking of the whole operation.

(11) h. Question 9. What was the understanding of the ammunition situation by the end of April 18?

(11) He realized that there was a shortage of ammunition on the 18th of April, but just how acute it was, of course, he did not know. He realized that there was a long delay in communications and that the situation was never clear here as to exactly what was happening. Things were ordered done and it took a long time to find out that they were actually done or whether they were modified.

(11) i. Question 10. What degree of non-attribution was sought and why? Were the operational disadvantages arising from some of the restrictions imposed by the efforts to achieve non-attribution clearly presented and understood?

(11) Before the operation there was every effort made to keep the situation covert, with no attribution being possible for United States forces. The second part of the question I don't think he answered nor did he answer the rest of the questions because the conversation turned to the proposal of General Taylor on the establishment of a Cold War Chairman working group.

(11) [Here follows discussion of the broader implications of organizing paramilitary operations.] (89) (94)

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49

CU-205

50 Memorandum for the Record by The Chief of Naval Operations (Burke)

119 Washington, June 13, 1961.

24 Subj: Meeting with the President and the Taylor Group at 1700, 13 June 1961

24 Present: The President, General Taylor, The Attorney General, Admiral Burke, Mr. Allen Dulles. The President said that he wanted to speak with Taylor on Wednesday, Wednesday.

24 The President, General Taylor, The Attorney General, Admiral Burke, Mr. Allen Dulles. It was decided that there would be two meetings, one on Thursday or Friday.

1. General Taylor outlined what we had found in the Cuban matter. He went over the recommendations at great length. The President was quite interested in the recommendations on the gold pay organization. That is, the Strategic Resources Board, suggested by the first recommendation. General Taylor told him all the advantages of the thing. That they needed such a board, that this would coordinate the activities of State, Defense and Intelligence and other agencies. He gave all the benefits of it. The President was quite taken with it.

2. After General Taylor got through I said that this thing might not work as well as it would seem on the surface. There was great danger in this because if the Man became an assistant President, it would be very difficult to operate with State and Defense. In addition to that if the staff grew, and I thought that it would grow because of the habits of staffs in Washington, then the staff would surely impinge upon the duties of State and Defense and they would quite rightfully become concerned about this new agency taking over their duties. Furthermore, that there was such a thing as passive resistance and that if for any reason people in State or Defense thought that this new agency was taking over, there would be conflict and differences of opinion and the activities would not be well done. In addition to that, if this man started to give military advice there would be difficulties between him and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

93 Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Secret; Hold Closely.

93 ✓ See Document m

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3. This, the President listened to but I think he discounted the difficulties a great deal. In any case, he discussed the advantages at great length but did not discuss the disadvantages except to state that the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State should both be briefed very carefully before the idea was suddenly sprung on them. This was to get them acclimated to the idea.

Comment: I still think that the idea has a slight chance of working. It was quite evident that Taylor is to be given the job because during the conversation, the President said that he wanted to speak with Taylor for about half an hour sometime tomorrow, Wednesday.

4. They went over the other recommendations, with which the President agreed.

5. It was decided that there would be two meetings, one on Thursday or Friday morning, which would brief the Cuban affair. Present at this meeting would be the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Dulles, Mr. Bissell, other leading people from CIA, Mr. McGeorge Bundy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There would be a second meeting on Monday or Tuesday, which would go over the recommendations with approximately the same group. Before this meeting, however, General Taylor and the rest of us would have to get together with Mr. McNamara and Mr. Rusk.

6. I pointed out to General Taylor that I thought Mr. McNamara, and perhaps others, were going down to a tactical exercise in Camp LeJeune on Friday. This didn't seem to have much effect but Taylor said that he would look into it.

7. I also mentioned that I was to go to the hospital and they asked if that could be postponed and I said of course it could, so I may have to postpone my trip to the hospital.

8. It was decided that there would be no report and that the President would make some sort of release that he had received recommendations and was studying them and expected to put some of them into effect.

9. There was considerable discussion as to what might have happened had they had air superiority. It was pointed out that there was a

2 No record of this meeting has been found.

3 A record of this meeting, which took place on June 19, <sup>is</sup> can be found in Naval Historical Center, Bumpy Road Materials.

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difference of opinion between General Taylor and Bobby Kennedy and Mr. Dulles and myself as to that. The President read that.

10. The President seemed to be in pain, but seemed to be satisfied with the report in general. This meeting lasted for about an hour so there was considerable discussion of some of the details, most of which were not too important. I did bring out that General Somoza had talked with me and that General Somoza wanted to conduct another revolution, which I thought was a good thing but the President said, "here we go again."

ARLEIGH BURKE

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**No Distribution**

93 4 The reference is to the President of Nicaragua.

93 5 Printed from copy that bears the following...

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CU-224

814

⑤ Memorandum for the Record, ~~by the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke)~~

① Washington, July 26, 1961.

② Subj: <sup>427</sup> Mtg at White House with the President on 26 Jul 61 prior to my receiving DSM on retirement

- ① 1. The President talked about Cuba. He asked me if I thought we would have to go into Cuba. I said yes. He asked would Castro get stronger. I said yes. Castro would increase his power over his people. He asked whether we could take Cuba easily. I said yes, but it was getting more and more difficult. He asked what did I think would happen if we attacked. I said all hell would break loose but that some day we would have to do it. The danger would be that Castro would flee and go to some other country - Russia or Brazil.

③ 3 lines of source not declassified ⑦

① [Here follows discussion of unrelated topics.] ⑧ ⑨

① ARLEIGH BURKE *NS*

④ Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Confidential.

⑩ Printed from a copy <sup>that</sup> ~~which~~ bears this typed signature.

April 16, 1996

FRUS DATA SORTED BY SOURCE

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	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	155	23	TAYLOR PAPERS CUBA	WH	E
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	156	11	TAYLOR PAPERS CUBA	WH	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	196	2	TAYLOR PAPERS CUBA	WH	R
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Paramilitary version,  
see attachment~~

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ANON

After Action Report by Grayston Lynch of the Central Intelligence Agency

(19) Washington, May 4, 1961.

less than 1 line of source  
text not declassified

## (55) After Action Report On OPERATION

## (66) 1. Preparation:

(11) On 28 March 1961 the LCI's <sup>(13)</sup>BLAGAR<sup>(7)</sup> and <sup>(13)</sup>BARBARA J.<sup>(7)</sup> departed Stock Island, Key West, Florida for Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, arriving on 2 April 1961. The two case officers of the ships, Mr. William Robertson of the <sup>(13)</sup>Barbara J.<sup>(7)</sup> and Mr. Grayston Lynch of the <sup>(13)</sup>Blagar<sup>(7)</sup> and the two ships' captains <sup>(13)</sup>of the <sup>(13)</sup>Blagar<sup>(7)</sup> and <sup>(13)</sup>of the <sup>(13)</sup>Barbara J.<sup>(7)</sup> had been told that they were to lead and direct the landing phase of the coming invasion of Cuba which would be staged from Puerto Cabezas and all the details of the operation would be given us in Puerto Cabezas. Enroute we received a cable directing us upon arrival at Puerto Cabezas to assemble and test 36 small boats that were to be used in the coming operation. After arrival in Puerto Cabezas, the crews of the two ships carried out this mission completing it on 10 April. The briefing team from Washington arrived about 11 April and briefings were conducted on 12, 13, and 14 April. These briefings and the operations and administrative plans given us were clear and thorough. The <sup>(13)</sup>Blagar<sup>(7)</sup> was given the position of command ship and the mission of landing troops on both Blue and Green Beaches. The <sup>(13)</sup>Barbara J.<sup>(7)</sup> was to land troops on Red Beach and then patrol to the east to cover the landing areas.

## (66) 2. Plan For Blue Beach:

(11) The plan for Blue Beach called for landing two battalions, the <sup>4TH</sup> and

(43) Source: <sup>National Defense University,</sup> ~~NDU~~ Taylor Papers, Box 12, Cuba, Paramilitary Study. Secret; Eyes Only. Lynch prepared the report for the investigative committee chaired by General Taylor.

CU-93/2

[REDACTED]

(212) aboard the Caribe and the 6th aboard the Rio Escondido, beginning at approximately 0100 hours 17 April in 4 LCVP's. Three LCU's preloaded with tanks, trucks and other vehicles were aboard a Navy LSD which would rendezvous with us five miles from Blue Beach and transfer the craft to us. They were to land on Blue Beach at first light. After the landing at Blue Beach was well underway, the <sup>(13)</sup>Blagar<sup>(11)</sup> was to come alongside the Atlantico and take aboard the <sup>3RD</sup> battalion and with one LCVP following proceed 16 miles east to Green Beach, put the battalion ashore and return to Blue Beach to act as Command Ship and direct the off loading of the cargo ships. Aboard each LCI was a thousand man pack of arms and ammunition plus some resupply of ammunition. This was to be on call for the brigade ashore. The landing at Green Beach was to be conducted as soon as we felt we could leave Blue Beach, but was not expected to be done until after daylight of the 17th.

(11) The reconnaissance of the beach itself and the marking of the landing sites was to be conducted by the UDT, teams that had been especially trained for this job for the last four months. There were three of these teams: one three-man team in the <sup>(13)</sup>Barbara J.<sup>(11)</sup> for Red Beach, one five-man team for Blue Beach, and one three-man team for Green Beach were aboard the <sup>(13)</sup>Blagar<sup>(11)</sup>. They were to land as soon as the LCI's arrived in the landing areas and while the LCVP's and small boats were loading the troops. It was felt that they would have about one hour to perform their missions.

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3. Plan For Red Beach:

(11) The LCI Barbara J. was escort for the cargo ship Houston which held the 2nd and 5th battalions into the Bay of Cochinos and land them at the head of the bay on Red Beach. This was to be done utilizing the small boats (12) of the Houston. It was planned to load each boat with ten men and their equipment. After this landing was completed the Barbara J. was to escort the Houston back to Blue Beach where its cargo was to be off loaded by the LCUs. The Barbara J. was then to patrol for ten miles to the east of Green Beach.


(11) In all this planning we were told that early morning air strikes on the air bases in Cuba were planned and that these would take out all of Castro's air force.

4. Movement To The Beach Areas:

(11) The Rio Escondido had damaged her props on logs coming out of New Orleans enroute to Puerto Cabezas and could only do five knots so this ship was loaded first and left Puerto Cabezas on 12 April. All the other ships left on the night of 14 April and proceeded independently to an assembly area at point AA. The brigade commander and staff were aboard the Blagar. All ships arrived on station at 1730 hours 16 April and formed a column for the run into the beaches. The column was led by the Blagar and followed at 800 yard intervals by the Caribe, Atlantico, Barbara J., Houston and the Rio Escondido. At five miles from Blue Beach the LSD rendezvoused with the column and the transfer of the landing craft began. At this point the Barbara J. and the Houston left the column and proceeded toward Red Beach. The Blagar moved on up to within two miles of Blue Beach to launch the UDT teams. This five-man team and Mr. Lynch departed the Blagar at 2345 hours 16 April in a seven-man, Navy rubber




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UDT boat with a 16 HP silent motor. Two men were armed with BAR's and the other four with Thompson sub-machine guns. The team was equipped with a PRC-10 radio and lighting sets for beach and buoys for marking the channels. Escorting them part of the way was a 20 foot catamaran boat from the Elagar. This boat also had a PRC-10 radio and mounted one .50 and one .30 caliber machine gun. This boat was to lie off the beach and provide cover for the UDT teams.

5. Landing At Blue Beach:

The town of Playa Giron was well lighted and a cluster of very bright lights on the right of the town proved to be from the small group of buildings at the jetty which marked the right boundary of the landing area. At about 1000 yards out, six men were observed outside these buildings looking seaward. As there were no lights or noise from the ships it was assumed that they were merely coast watchers which later checking proved to be correct. The UDT team started into the beach about 300 yards west of these buildings and at when 500 yards out, all the lights in the buildings were switched off. The UDT team discovered a coral ridge about 100 yards from the beach running across the front of the landing area and one foot below the surface. They crossed this and started the boat into the beach. Fifty yards from shore a jeep came from the town down the beach road, and headed east and picked them up in its headlights. This jeep stopped directly in front of the team and turned toward the water throwing its headlights on the boat. It then caught the full fire of two BAR's and four Thompsons and was



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[REDACTED]

knocked out instantly. The team moved on to the beach and called the <sup>(13)</sup>Blagar <sup>(1)</sup> on the radio and told them what had happened. They also called for an immediate landing of troops on the beach before the enemy could rush in its troops. The team placed a red light by the jeep, moved toward the jetty 150 yards to the east and placed the other one; then moved out onto the jetty and placed the large white light to guide the landing craft in. While this was taking place someone pulled the master switch and blacked out Playa Giron completely. Three trucks were then observed moving toward the beach area without lights. These trucks discharged some troops who moved in on the UDT team who were in position in some old ruins on the jetty. The <sup>(13)</sup>Blagar <sup>(1)</sup> then moved in near the jetty to lend fire support to the landing. The <sup>(13)</sup>Blagar <sup>(1)</sup> was armed with eleven .50 caliber machine guns, five .30 caliber machine guns and two .75 MM RR. The militia was fired upon by the UDT team when they attempted to remove the red marker lights off the beach. This fire fight was in progress when the Blagar opened fire on the beach from a distance of 400 yards, clearing it completely in a few minutes. The only return fire was from one .50 caliber machine gun firing from the direction of the town. This fire wounded one man on the <sup>(13)</sup>Blagar <sup>(1)</sup> and then ceased fire. After about ten minutes of firing on the beach area, the <sup>(13)</sup>Blagar <sup>(1)</sup> moved back and the first two LCVP's came in. They struck the coral about 75 yards from the beach and tried to ride over it but could not. They then dropped their ramps and the troops waded ashore. The first troops came ashore yelling but once on the beach moved out quickly and quietly. The UDT team called the second two LCVP's to land and warned them about the coral and had them come in slower and to discharge their troops

[REDACTED]

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as soon as they grounded on the coral. The brigade commander and his staff landed in a boat from <sup>(13)</sup>Blagar<sup>(1)</sup> at this time and took command of the beach. His radio was not working so his messages were relayed over the radio of the UDT team. There was no opposition to this landing as the fire from the <sup>(13)</sup>Blagar<sup>(1)</sup> had driven the militia away and no firing was heard until the troops started moving through the town. Mr. Lynch then returned to the <sup>(13)</sup>Blagar<sup>(1)</sup> to direct the rest of the landing, and to prepare to go to Green Beach. The five men of the UDT team were left on the beach to find a landing site for the LCU's. They had the PRC-10 radio and the boat and motor. The landing of troops continued and by first light all the troops of the 4th battalion were ashore and the 6th battalion was starting its troops ashore using the small boats from the <sup>(13)</sup>Rio Escondido<sup>(1)</sup>. Two of the LCVP's were holed by coral and after making several trips ashore one was forced to beach itself and the other sunk but the crew was picked up and sent to the beach. The UDT team continued to search for a landing site for the LCU's with no luck until a local fisherman was found who showed them a passage through the coral that could be used at high tide about 0630. This was a narrow channel and could only be used by one LCU at a time. The channel was marked by buoys and at 0600 hours the first LCU landed. After this LCU was off loaded, it backed out and another moved into the channel. The empty one was sent to the Rio Escondido to complete the off loading of the 6th battalion. As this was taking place Red Beach called and reported they were under air attack by a B-26. About ten minutes later or at 0630 the first enemy aircraft appeared at Blue Beach. It was a B-26 which came from the east and strafed the LCU's landing on the beach causing some damage to the motor of one LCVP which proceeded into the beach under its own power. There were no casualties from this attack and

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all anti-aircraft guns were firing on the plane. It left to the west in the direction of Red Beach. As this plane was leaving two more planes were sighted coming from the west and fire was put on them before it was discovered they were a friendly B<sub>7</sub><sup>1</sup>/<sub>26</sub> escorting a C<sub>7</sub><sup>1</sup>/<sub>46</sub> for the parachute drop. When they were recognized as friendly the fire ceased. No apparent damage was done to the planes but we were told later that one paratrooper was wounded but jumped anyway. The blue wing bands that were to identify our planes could not be seen until the planes were overhead and proved to be of little value in telling friend from foe. The enemy air attacks, although practically continuous, were never in groups of over two planes each. Each plane attacked independently and when he had fired his rockets left immediately. The only types observed were B<sub>7</sub><sup>1</sup>/<sub>26</sub>'s, which straddled and fired rockets, Sea Fury's which usually only fired rockets (four) and T<sub>7</sub><sup>1</sup>/<sub>33</sub> jets which fired rockets also. The B<sub>7</sub><sup>1</sup>/<sub>26</sub>'s and Sea Fury's were usually brought under AA fire with some effect but the T<sub>7</sub><sup>1</sup>/<sub>33</sub>'s always came from high out of the sun and we were never able to bring effective fire on them. After the first air attacks I called the brigade commander on the radio and advised him against moving the Blagar east to make the landing at Green Beach. The reasons given were that the departure of the Blagar would leave the ships in the beach area without their most effective anti-aircraft fire. Also by this time we had lost 3 of the 4 LCVP's and if the enemy planes hit us on our way down to Green Beach (a 2 hour trip), it might result in the loss of the battalion plus the command ship. I told him I could put the battalion ashore right away on Blue Beach by using the LCU's, and he could then start them toward Green Beach on the road. He agreed

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to this and two of the LCU's took this battalion ashore on Blue Beach.

(11) At about 0700 our own B<sub>N</sub>26's were on station over the landing area and we thought the air attacks were finished but at 0800 a Sea Fury came in and dove on one of our C<sub>N</sub>46's that was returning from dropping the paratroopers. He came through our AA fire and made a firing pass on the C<sub>N</sub>46 which had dropped down next to the water and was staying within the harbor area. The Sea Fury was caught by our fire as he pulled up from his firing pass and started smoking and crashed into the water, exploded and sank. This cheered up the AA crews and other attacks later on were met with all guns that could fire. At about this time we received a message from the (13) Barbara J. (11) that the Houston was hit and sinking and that they would beach her. The (13) Barbara J. (11) was damaged by near misses by rockets that had split her seams and she was taking in water. She started out of the Bay of Cochinos to Blue Beach. At this time a Sea Fury came through our fire and fired four rockets at the Rio Escondido one of which exploded the drums of aviation gasoline on her decks. An LCU was at this time enroute to the Rio to take off this gasoline and her other cargo. The fire soon spread and it was apparent that the ship was lost. The crew started jumping over the sides and swimming away from the ship. All the small boats in the beach area headed for the Rio and soon picked up all of her crew. These boats were about 1000 yards away from her taking the crew to other ships when she blew up and sank. The depth of the water at this point is 6 fathoms. The crew of the (13) Rio (11) was put aboard the (13) Blagar (11) and the gun and boat crews of the (13) Rio (11) were sent to the beach. A message was sent to Headquarters advising them of the loss of the two ships and an answer was

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[REDACTED]

received directing us to take all the rest of the ships to sea and return and unload under the cover of darkness. At this time we were attacked by a B<sub>N</sub><sup>1</sup>26 and the fire from the ships and from a friendly B-26 send him away smoking. The <sup>(3)</sup>Barbara J. <sup>(1)</sup> and the two cargo ships the <sup>(13)</sup>Caribe <sup>(N)</sup> and the <sup>(B)</sup>Atlantico <sup>(1)</sup> were told to proceed ahead of us and wait 15 miles out. At this time I called the UDT team of 5 men ashore on Blue Beach and told them to return to the ship as we were going out to sea and return that night. They replied that they would stay on the beach and light it for us when we returned that night. All these men were captured when Blue Beach fell. The <sup>(13)</sup>Blagar <sup>(1)</sup> was to escort the three LCU's which could only do six knots. Two friendly B<sub>N</sub><sup>1</sup>26's flew cover for us on the way out although the wing tank of one was loose on the front end and was hanging down. These planes stayed with us until their reserve gas supply was gone and then one of them asked permission to drop his bombs on the Cienfuegos Airport on the way home. This permission was given and he departed. Results unknown. When we reached the 15 mile point we called the other ships and told them to assemble on us but only the <sup>(13)</sup>Barbara J. <sup>(1)</sup> showed up. The two cargo ships could not be found nor would they answer the radio calls. Soon after the <sup>(13)</sup>Barbara J. <sup>(1)</sup> rejoined us we were attacked by a B<sub>N</sub><sup>1</sup>26 and a Sea Fury coming from the beach area. The B<sub>N</sub><sup>1</sup>26 started an approach on the <sup>(13)</sup>Blagar <sup>(1)</sup> but was hit and as the plane fired its rockets it exploded in flames. The rockets struck 50 yards from the <sup>(13)</sup>Blagar <sup>(1)</sup> and the plane hit the water in the same place and bounced over the ship clearing the deck by only 20 feet. It struck the water about 100 yards over the ship and burned and sank. Parts of the plane

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

were scattered over the deck of the <sup>(13)</sup>Blagar<sup>(17)</sup>. The Sea Fury did not press his attack but made one short strafing pass at the <sup>(13)</sup>Barbara J.<sup>(17)</sup> hitting her with two or three .20 MM shells. He then threw four rockets at the LCU's from a high altitude all of which missed and he departed. Two more attacks were made on us later in the day by lone B-26's none of which pressed the attack. The AA fire held them at a distance and they fired their rockets wide of the targets.

(11) After dark of D-Day we continued south hoping to make some contact with the cargo ships but to no avail. Sometime during the night a message was received directing the <sup>(13)</sup>Barbara J.<sup>(17)</sup> to unload her ammunition and a 500-man pack into one of the LCU's for a run into the beach that night. It was felt that the <sup>(13)</sup>Blagar<sup>(17)</sup> should go because of the damage the Barbara J. had sustained; however, upon charting the course we found that due to the slow speed of the LCU, we could not arrive until after daylight of D plus 1. Headquarters was notified of this and we were told not to go. While the planning for the run into the beach was underway, some of the crew of the Rio that we had rescued went into the engine room and stopped the engines. They said they would not go back into the beach area without jet air cover. They were subdued and the engines were started again. Some of the Cuban crew of the <sup>(13)</sup>Blagar<sup>(17)</sup> were in sympathy with them and there were some rumors of mutiny. The day of D plus 1 was spent looking for the cargo ships which joined us late in the evening. We had orders to off load all their cargo plus the ammunition from the two LCI's into the LCU's and run it into the beach that night. We were told we must be in, unload and be off the beach by daylight. The LCU's were loaded

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


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and we started into the beach but again we notified Headquarters that we could not arrive until after first light. We were told not to go in but to stay where we were. All this time we were the only radio link with the brigade on the beach and they were sending out a steady stream of messages from the beach. Most of them were asking for air cover and air drops of ammunition. We relayed to brigade all the messages from Headquarters and from the air base. We were told that several air drops were to be made on the night of D plus 1 on the air field and the brigade was notified and marked the strip. The first air drop on the field was made but most of the chutes drifted off the strip into the woods. (These were recovered the next morning.) The brigade then requested that the drops be made on the town itself and the two later drops that night went there; one of them was right on target and the supplies landed in the streets and were quickly recovered but the last one was too close to the water and most of the chutes drifted into the sea. Some of these were recovered by small boats later on. We were also told that a C-46 escorted by two F-51's would arrive that night and land at the strip but they never appeared. One message also said that C-46's would land on the strip and discharge supplies and take off the wounded. The brigade was told to move its wounded (about 50 at this time) to the strip and they said they would. Later talks with survivors revealed that the brigade surgeon would not move the wounded to the strip for fear of losing them by air attacks. One C-46 did land at the strip at first light, discharged its cargo and departed taking one wounded man that the brigade commander had sent out with



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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

the situation report on the beach. This plane load was the last supplies  
ever to reach the beach. During the morning of D plus 2 the brigade kept  
reporting very heavy air, tank and artillery attacks from both north and  
east and asked continually for jet cover. These messages were sent back  
and we were told jet cover would be provided by unmarked jets and the  
brigade reported seeing them arrive over the beach area. We were not told  
that this was for one hour only. Later the brigade reported they were under  
air attack again and asked where the jet cover had gone. I could not answer  
this because we thought it would be continuous. The brigade also asked for  
close air support and sent back locations of troop concentrations and tank  
and artillery positions on the roads to the north. At this time the brigade  
was still in contact with the paratroopers to the north and was reporting  
them as being under heavy artillery fire and fire by tanks. The brigade  
reported three MIGS were over Blue Beach but it is possible they saw the  
unmarked jets and mistook them for MIG's. At 0500 on D plus 2 the brigade  
commander said that unless he got ~~ammunition~~ right away that he could not  
hold. I told him help was on the way and we would evacuate him. His reply  
was that he would never evacuate and that he would fight as long as he had  
ammunition. At about noon on D plus 2 the Blagar, the Barbara J. and the  
three LCU's loaded with supplies started for the beach. Our ETA was about  
1800 hours. At 1300 I was told by the Navy and relayed to the brigade that  
close jet air support was coming. It never appeared. At 1430 the brigade  
commander told me that he was out of contact with all units, out of

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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ammunition, fighting in the water and under direct fire from tanks 500 yards away. He said he was destroying his equipment and heading for the woods. He then went off the air. At this time Headquarters was notified and the convoy reversed course as there was no need now for going in. One hour later a friendly PBV came from the direction of Blue Beach and passed us going S.W.

6. Rescue Operations:

- (11) On D plus 3 we received an order to take the UDT personnel left aboard the LCI's (3 on <sup>(13)</sup>Blagar<sup>(7)</sup> and 3 on <sup>(13)</sup>Barbara J.<sup>(7)</sup>) and transfer them to the destroyer <sup>(13)</sup>Eaton<sup>(7)</sup> which was escorting us. This transfer was made using rubber UDT boats in very rough seas. Mr. Lynch and Mr. Robertson also transferred with the teams to lead them on the operation. The information we had indicated that the survivors of the Houston were on the west side of the Bay of Cochinos and were still intact. The night of D plus 3 was spent cruising the inlets and small islands west of the Bay of Cochinos looking for the Castro patrol boat SV-3 which was reported captured by our people. No sign of this craft was found and at first light of D plus 4 we sailed into the Bay of Cochinos and up to the Houston. It was aground about 200 yards from shore and the decks were just above water. There was no sign of life and no trace of anyone ashore. We came out of the bay very close to the west shore and searched it with glasses but saw no one. We checked the lighthouse<sup>t</sup> on the island of Cayo Piederas and found one of our 20 foot CEF boats drawn up on shore. We blew the ship's whistle repeatedly and went up and down both sides several times but found no sign of life. We then sailed to the west of the bay and started checking the keys that run off the swamps on the west side of the

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bay. On Cayo Blanco we spotted our first two survivors. The destroyer was about 300 yards from shore and the men ran out on the beach and started waving their shirts. We picked them up by sending the UDT team in to shore in the rubber boat using the 16 HP silent motor. We then spotted other survivors and spent all day picking up small groups in the same manner. The destroyer then put its whale boat in the water to assist. Although these boats were forbidden to actually land on the beach they could transfer the survivors from the rubber boat and take them back to the ship leaving the UDT to continue their search. One UDT team of three men were put ashore and combed the islands all day to find the ones who could not or would not come to the beach. Later in the day two Navy A.D.'s, propeller planes, were sent to us. They flew very low over the beaches and swamps and spotted several small groups. The UDT teams were then directed to these groups by radio and picked them up. The search was broken off at dark on D plus 4 and Mr. Lynch and three UDT men were transferred to the destroyer MURRAY which joined us that night. On D plus 5 the search was continued by both ships. The MURRAY was given the west side of the Bay of Cochinos down to the first islands and the <sup>(13)</sup>EATON<sup>(7)</sup> and the <sup>(13)</sup>CONWAY<sup>(6)</sup> which also joined us that night had everything to the west. At first light on D plus 5, Mr. Lynch and three UDT men landed four miles south of the Houston and started to search for survivors. The coast was searched all the way to the islands but none found. We then started to comb the same keys as the day before and picked up several more small groups. Due to physical exhaustion during this period,

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


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I cannot remember exact days. I believe we spent three or four days on this operation and were at one time or the other on four destroyers, one submarine and the aircraft carrier <sup>(12)</sup>ESSEX<sup>(11)</sup> twice. In all we picked up 26 survivors and found and buried one man on the beach. These survivors were in very bad condition and had been without food or water for five or six days. Most of them had only underwear or parts of uniforms left and some were naked. In all only two weapons were found among them, one pistol and one carbine. During this time three Castro helicopters were seen to the north of us flying very low over the swamps and were observed shooting the survivors by submachine guns from the air. They were seen to land on two occasions. One of these was a two place helicopter and the other two large Russian types painted green with no markings. On 24 and 25 April I conducted interviews with 19 of the survivors aboard the <sup>(12)</sup>EATON<sup>(11)</sup>. The following picture of events on the beaches came from these men:


<sup>(12)</sup> A. Action At Red Beach:

<sup>(11)</sup> The UDT team from the <sup>(12)</sup>Barbara J.<sup>(11)</sup> led by Mr. Robertson landed at about 0130 and placed the marker light on the right side of the beach but was fired on from shore when attempting to place the left marker. This fire was from small automatic weapons and was silenced by the fire of the UDT team firing BAR's and submachine guns from the rubber boat. The first troops of the 2nd battalion started ashore in the small (19½ foot) boats of the Houston and the UDT team marked the left of the beach with a flashlight from 100 yards out in the rubber boat. The second wave received fire from shore while on




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the way in. This fire was silenced by the Barbara J. firing over the heads of the landing force. The militia fled leaving some of their weapons behind. Once ashore the troops moved through the town and cleaned it out. The landings continued until all the 2nd battalion minus one squad was ashore and the weapons company of the 5th battalion landed also. (For more details on this period see report by Mr. Robertson on Red Beach.) One survivor, the Company Commander of the weapons company of the 2nd battalion stated that soon after daylight the beach was secured and they had captured over 40 prisoners. They discovered that 12 militia had been stationed in the town to guard a small militia radio station but that 30 or 40 had come in the day before on a picnic and were spending the night there. After the town was secured and the radio station was captured, the force which was under the command of the Brigade Deputy Commander sent a group out and captured a motor pool of trucks and gasoline at a motel and park construction project west of town. He also stated that 40 men from this small village offered to join them and fight against Castro. These men were put to work driving the captured trucks and other labor jobs on the beach. They were in complete control of the town and were not hurt by the air attacks which were directed against the town itself. These attacks and later ones caused many civilian casualties. The first attack by the militia came at 1000 on D-day and was from the north. This force was estimated at between 500 and 600 militia and had some tanks but friendly airplanes knocked out the tanks before they could go into action. This attack was beaten off with very heavy



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casualties suffered by the militia. As they were running short of ammunition a call for help was sent to Blue Beach and one tank and two 2½ ton trucks of ammunition was sent to them along the beach road. This arrived at 1400 just as the next big attack was about to hit them and the tank went into action as soon as it arrived. This attack was launched down the road from the north. The troops, all militia, were in open, 2½ ton trucks and open, semi-trailer trucks. The fire of the tank and the 57 MM R.R.'s, 3.5's and the 50 caliber machine guns of the landing force hit them before they could get out of the trucks. This force was estimated at 1500 and all the survivors of this action claimed they killed or wounded over half of them and destroyed most of the trucks. The next attack came late in the evening and continued all night. During the night action at least five enemy tanks were knocked out, two Russian ones and three American Sherman tanks. These were destroyed by 57 MM R.R. and 3.5's. How many were knocked out by the tank is unknown. The militia at one time sent an ambulance under a white flag to pick up wounded but tried to sneak two trucks loaded with militia in behind it. The tank destroyed all three vehicles with one round and the machine guns finished the job. At another time some militia that were trapped in some buildings came out to surrender but when the CEF troops moved toward them they dropped to the ground and opened fire. All this group was then wiped out by the CEF troops. The survivors stated that all the troops opposing them were militia and all prisoners had the Communist party card on their persons. When asked about these cards they stated that if they

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
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they had no cards they could not get work. Most of the militia stated also that they were willing to fight against Castro. At about 0730 on D plus 1 the force at Red Beach was low on ammunition and was withdrawn to Blue Beach in the captured trucks, their own trucks and the tank. They took their wounded with them but released all their prisoners upon departure. They destroyed the radio station and all the trucks that they could not use. Upon arrival at Blue Beach they held a muster to account for everyone. Blue Beach at this time on D plus 1 was quiet and the survivors stated that they had lunch and slept, cleaned up and were issued ammunition. That afternoon they went into action at Blue Beach, fought all night and at about 1100 the next morning 90 men of the 2nd battalion under the command of the Deputy Brigade Commander (Oliva) was sent back to Red Beach to stop a large column of militia, tanks and artillery that was massing there. This force it is believed never reached Red Beach but it is known that they went into action because they called for mortar fire and the 2nd battalion mortars fired 120 rounds for them and then was out of ammunition. Two tanks went out with this group and was seen coming back to Blue Beach about 1300 damaged and out of ammunition. Nothing more was heard of this group and soon after the enemy force came down the road from Red Beach and attacked it from the west. This force was very large and had heavy artillery (larger than 4.2) and tanks. One survivor stated that at 1400 he went to Brigade Headquarters which was by the beach for ammunition and the Brigade Commander and staff were there but when he made a second trip at 1530 the Brigade Headquarters was gone and also a sailboat that was tied

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


up near it. He states that starting at 1600 the front lines collapsed due to the lack of ammunition and at about 1700 all resistance ceased. He left Blue Beach with four companions in a row boat and saw many other small boats leaving at the same time. The enemy planes strafed these boats and caused many casualties. His boat drifted all night and at dawn they found themselves on the beach on the west side of the Bay of Cochinos. They then made their way down the keys to the point to where they were rescued by the UDT teams. One survivor stated that his company was hit in Blue Beach on the night of D plus 1 by a shell fired from a tank that emitted some smoke and threw droplets on their clothing. The droplets did not burn, but the smoke did and caused choking and pain. They ran out of the area and when they returned later they found several dead from this shell, but he claims there were no wounds and the men died from what he thinks was a gas shell. He also stated that the next morning several men told him of the same thing occurring in their sectors, also by tank fire. Detailed action on Blue Beach is unknown due to lack of any survivors who landed there in the original force.

(12) B. Sinking of Houston:


(11) <sup>(13)</sup> The <sup>(17)</sup> Houston was hit sometime after first light by rockets while still at Red Beach. These rockets started fires in the number one and number three holds and the Houston pulled out from the beach. The fires were put out by the crew and the ship turned and started back in. At this time she was hit the second time by two rockets fired from a T-33 jet. These

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struck the stern somewhere around the screws knocking out the steering. The ship was crosswise in the bay and could only go forward or backward. She attempted to back up but started sinking by the stern so the Captain ran her up on the beach on the west side of the bay. This was about five miles south of Red Beach. The planes came back again so the order was given to abandon ship. Aboard at this time was one squad of the 2nd Battalion and most of the 5th Battalion plus a 20-man ship's crew, approximately 220 men. Six men were killed by the air attack and seven more drowned swimming to shore. Small boats were used plus lines to the shore to get the men off. After everyone was ashore the C.O. of the 5th Battalion took command and organized a perimeter. He then sent men back aboard to try to salvage what arms and equipment they could. Some was gotten off but as the holds were filled with water, this was not easy. He then sent scouts out in the direction of Red Beach, but they returned and told of running into militia between them and Red Beach. This beach perimeter was held until D plus 2. Some food and water was gotten off the Houston but not nearly enough. On D plus 2 a patrol craft about 35 feet long and mounting one machine gun came from the east and pulled up the Houston. It is believed that this was the Castro craft SV-3. The boat checked the Houston and then came in to the beach to check the three small boats drawn up on shore. When it reached the beach, the troops ashore fired on it and killed four of its six-man crew. Two were captured. The Captain of the Houston then took this craft together with the C.O. of the 5th Battalion, the padre, two or three of the doctors and five other officers of the 5th Battalion out to the Houston and put aboard all the gasoline and supplies they could find. The Battalion C.O. then gave the order for the beachhead to break up in small groups and try to get out to the south. Some groups went to the north, some went inland but most started down the Coast to the south. The Battalion C.O. then left to the south in the captured boat and said he was headed for Grand Cayman. Out of the groups who started south down the beach 21 were later rescued, including some of the crew of the Houston. 89 94

223 (Other under 412) (CU-94) (Declassified in writing) 305  
After Action Report by William Robertson of the Central Intelligence

Agency

Washington, May 4, 1961.

MR. ROBERTSON'S REPORT OF ACTIVITIES ON BARBARA J

(15) The writer was Operations Officer on the Barbara J. The Barbara J is an LCI fitted with eight .50 cal machine guns, three .30 machine guns, a 75mm recoilless rifle, and a 57mm recoilless rifle, plus various automatic hand carried weapons. The job for the Barbara J during the operation was as follows:

(16) 1. The Barbara J was to escort the transport ship Houston into Bahia Cochinos to Red Beach. The Houston had aboard the 2nd and 5th Battalions Reinforced.

(16) 2. The Barbara J was to spot the Houston offshore, while the Barbara J's beach reconnaissance team reconnoitered the beach and set light markers at each flank of a suitable landing site.

(16) 3. The Barbara J was to provide gunfire support when necessary and assist in the unloading of the Houston's men and supplies at Red Beach.

(16) 4. When the beach was considered in good shape, the Barbara J was to escort the Houston out of Bahia Cochinos and proceed to patrol the beach from Green Beach eastward for five miles, engaging any enemy sea or road convoys heading toward Green Beach.

(16) 5. The Barbara J was to engage in any harassment operations which would confuse the enemy and help our own forces.

(19) The objective of the 2nd Battalion on Red Beach was to secure the beachhead, proceed northward to Sopillar airstrip, link up with the paratroopers, and proceed to Objective A on the railroad at 32.0 72.0 on the 1:50,000 map. The objective of the 5th Battalion was to land behind the 2nd Battalion and take over and safeguard the beachhead.

(11) At 2330 on D-1 the Barbara J and the Houston separated from the major convoy on schedule. At 0115 on D-Day the Barbara J and the Houston were on station opposite Red Beach. One Barbara J small boat with radio was dispatched to stand by with the Houston. The other small boat with the reconnaissance team and the writer proceeded ashore to the right of Red Beach and scouted and marked the right flank without being detected. Then the team proceeded by water to the point which was to be the left flank of Red Beach and discovered the point was occupied by enemy men. The 2nd Battalion commander was asked to notify us when he was within ten minutes of dispatching his first wave to the Beach. When the Battalion commander signified he was ready, the recon team approached the point. At about 30 yards off the point four or five machine guns and sub-machine guns opened fire on the recon boat. The recon boat returned fire and silenced these guns. The recon boat backed up to approximately 100 yards off the point and marked the left flank with a blinking flashlight towards sea. The first forty soldiers landed without opposition, though sporadic fire started as soon as they had landed ashore. This fire was their initial contact with the 50 militiamen in the village at the time of the landing.

National Defense University

224 (43) Source: NDU, Taylor Papers, Box 12, Cuba, Paramilitary Study. Secret; Eyes Only. Robertson prepared the report for the Taylor committee.

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words

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⑩ Within twenty minutes of the reconnaissance team's initial contact with the enemy, six or seven trucks were seen entering the area from the left flank. The writer called for supporting fire from the Barbara J. The Barbara J's first shots hit the lead truck and threw the convoy into darkness and confusion and apparently helped delay the convoy's arrival at Red Beach until later in the morning.

⑪ The reconnaissance group proceeded then to help in landing the troops. These troops were landed with approximately two units of fire and a minimum of equipment other than their personal weapons and the unit weapons. The unit weapons we succeeded in getting ashore were four .30 cal light machine guns, four 81mm mortars, and four 57mm recoilless rifles, plus 3.5 rocket launchers. On the second trip to Red Beach, our boat was hit by machine gun fire coming from about 200 yards left of the Red Beach left flank. One man in the boat was killed. On arrival at the beach this second trip, the writer sent for a representative of the 2nd Battalion command post, and between the two, an airstrike plan was set up in the event that communication might be out when the daylight airstrike arrived. In the plan, the aircraft would take on any targets moving along the beach towards Red Beach or along the road from the north towards Red Beach, and at first daylight the 2nd Battalion commander would send a well-briefed officer to the beach carrying a red flag for further conference with the writer. The commanding officer at this conference requested that future landing craft be landed nearer the right flank of the beach in as much as all enemy activity to date was being encountered from the left. There were explosions within the beachhead at this time which the writer took to be incoming mortar fire with some light calibre.

⑫ During this period, some .50 cal machinegun fire was directed at the Barbara J. The Barbara J was lying about 500 yards offshore and the Barbara J engaged this machine gun and silenced it.

⑬ The Houston reported that there were no small boats, so our recon team tied onto one of the Barbara J's rubber boats to the lee side of the Houston where we found seven or eight small aluminum boats huddled with no troop movement going on. The writer climbed aboard and got a boat-load and a half of soldiers off-loaded before being stopped by a Cuban believed to be the 5th Battalion Commander. The writer believes that this man's intention was to wait until first daylight before continuing off-loading the 5th Battalion. At this point, 270 soldiers had been off-loaded. This was the 2nd Battalion Reinforced and the weapons company from the 5th Battalion and the Assistant Brigade Commander.

⑭ On the trip into shore, first daylight had arrived and at approximately 6 o'clock a B-26 appeared low and machine-gunned our small boat without success on this first run. When he came again we turned our

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small weapons and the weapons of all the soldiers in the small boat and fired back at him. On this pass the B-26 wounded one soldier with a freak shot that passed through another man's weapon before hitting the soldier. On the third pass of the B-26, he immediately, after passing overhead, started smoking and wobbling and soon went down over land with one survivor parachuting out.

(ii) A second B-26 appeared and started after the Barbara J and Houston. He strafed and dropped two large bombs, both misses. The Barbara J's skipper was circling the Houston tightly and bringing all her firepower in support of the Houston during this action.

(ii) At this point, our cargo planes bearing paratroopers and accompanied by two friendly B-26's arrived in the area and the enemy aircraft departed. At the departure of our aircraft, we were attacked by a fighter plane which I believe was a Sea Fury. The skipper of the Barbara J decided to disperse until our air cover had better control and so moved the Barbara J and the Houston away from Red Beach about five miles.

226 (ii) The writer suggests that the following is a likely account of the short history of Red Beach. The account is compiled from observation and interrogation of survivors. Very little action occurred at Red Beach before daylight. Most of the shooting was our own. The air attack at daybreak, which included bombing and strafing the beachhead, damaged nothing important. At approximately 1000 a truck-mounted attack from the north involving 500 or 600 militia was broken up by Red Beach forces. This was accomplished with small losses to our forces and considerable loss to the militia. Fifty to seventy of the militia were captured, most of which were willing to join the Red Beach forces. The paratroopers were apparently engaged immediately upon landing, and link between the paratroopers and Red Beach forces was not accomplished. At 1400 on D-Day, another attack was made from the north involving 1,500 militia. An unknown amount were destroyed en route to this battle by a friendly B-26. Two of our own tanks which had been sent up from Blue Beach assisted in stopping this attack. From all accounts, this force was well handled by our forces, and we claimed 1,000 casualties were inflicted. Seven tanks, which arrived after midnight were engaged by our 57mm recoilless rifles and 3.5 rockets, and five were destroyed. On D+1 an orderly withdrawal to Blue Beach was affected, since Red Beach was out of ammunition. Red Beach losses at this time were 25 dead, and an unknown amount wounded. The wounded were carried to Blue Beach.

(ii) On arrival at Blue Beach, the 2nd Battalion was put into the Blue Beach defense line which had been comparatively quiet till this point. In the afternoon, a battle started which put 1,500 militiamen against the 2nd Battalion. This battle lasted all night. The following morning an attempt was made to regain Red Beach, but the 2nd Battalion encountered

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tanks, trucks, troops, and artillery, and it is believed, did not reach Red Beach. The heavy mortars supported the 2nd Battalion until out of ammunition. Two tanks which were supporting the 2nd Battalion were returned to Blue Beach damaged by this action. It is believed that the 2nd Battalion was lost with Blue Beach.

(11) At the time when the skipper of the Barbara J ordered the dispersal of the convoy, a B<sub>26</sub> arrived requesting targets for his bombs at Red Beach. He was instructed to go to Objective A on the north road and engage any mobile forces moving towards Red Beach. He located a convoy moving into Red Beach with Blue marked trucks and was refrained from interfering with this convoy since it was known to be ours.

(12) At this point the skipper of the Barbara J turned the convoy back towards Red Beach. The Barbara J and the Houston arrived off the point Carazones. When a T<sub>33</sub> jet arrived and strafed and fired rockets, with near misses for the Barbara J and hits on the Houston, a welded seam on the Barbara J was split, causing the Barbara J to take water at the rate of four feet each two and a half hours. The Houston announced the loss of their steering capability, and was at this time headed towards the beach. The skipper of the Barbara J ordered the Houston to reverse engines and back away from the beach. The Houston attempted to do this, but was observed to begin sinking rapidly by the stern. At the same time another Sea Fury started attacking the Houston. Gasoline was covering the water all around both ships, and the Houston reversed its engines again and made straight into the shore, grounding about 100 yards off-shore. As she struck shore, men were seen diving over the side in life jackets. The Sea Fury continued its strafing runs against the ship and the men in the water. From subsequent reports, we believe from seven to twenty men were killed in the strafing, and ten drowned from inability to swim. The Barbara J had no small boats; the Houston didn't attempt to use its three small boats. There was speculation as to whether we should attempt an evacuation, but this was tempered by the idea that the occupants of the Houston were scheduled to go ashore with the possibility that they could make a tie-up at Red Beach. The Barbara J was ordered to move to the Blue beach to provide protection for the unloading operations there, the ships at Blue Beach being under air attack also.

227 (13) From interrogation of survivors, it is learned that the Houston group proceeded towards Red Beach, but the scouts observed militiamen, and the entire group withdrew to the swamp. My last radio contact with this group was an announcement by the 5th Battalion Commander that he had successfully regrouped 1-1/2 miles west of the sunken ship. Information on his position was requested for an intended air supply drop. Within a half hour he was under attack. His request was for small boats so that he could strip the Houston of necessary supplies. Arrangements were made for PB<sub>12</sub> rubber boats and paddles to be dropped at first darkness. Within a half hour after this arrangement, the Houston was under attack and apparently the enemy was trying to split it up. I feel that our voice of communication was being monitored. The

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following night an enemy patrol craft approached the Houston and landed five militiamen. These five were attacked by the survivors of the Houston. Two militiamen were killed and three taken prisoners. The three prisoners were executed because of the logistical problems they made for the survivors. On the 19th the skipper of the Houston, the 5th Battalion Commander, five 5th Battalion officers, the Chaplain, and three doctors left the beach in the captured patrol craft, bidding their men to scatter and make out for themselves. This might indicate a reason why the 5th Battalion seemed reluctant to go ashore at Red Beach. Of the remaining men, a few immediately made their way north through the swamps, and a few made their way south. Those that were rescued on the southern islands has sworn most of the way in the swamps. The Houston skipper and the small boat reportedly departed for Cayo Guano, but radio Cuba reported it landed at Cayo Largo and the men were captured.

(i) As the Barbara J departed from Bahia Cochinos, a Sea Fury was circling, but apparently was bluffed by two of our B-26's which were flying protection for Barbara J. A jet T-33 was seen to attack one of the B-26's, and the B-26 was seen to fly lower and to either crash or make a crash landing on the airstrip at Blue Beach area. The remaining B-26 hovered over the Barbara J, reported he was out of ammunition, and asked for instructions. I requested that he stay as long as possible to bluff enemy aircraft, which he did, until he had only fifteen minutes reserve gasoline supply. This man's name was Ferrari and should be commended for courageous work.

(ii) At the entrance of Bahia Cochinos we had observed the Rio Escondido catch fire and blow up.

(iii) On arrival in the Blue Beach area, all ships were ordered south. We departed with the Atlantico and Caribe leading, and the Barbara J providing close support. The U-boats protected by the Blagar followed. The Blagar requested all ships to merge for mutual self-protection. The Barbara J joined the Blagar and U-boats, and the Caribe and Atlantico disappeared over the horizon. One strafing and bombing pass was made on the right flank LCU, with the Blagar and Barbara J giving her support. What appeared to be a salvo boat of shore-based artillery splashed five shells within the convoy on the way out. This was possibly 1 o'clock to 2 o'clock in the afternoon of D-Day.

228 (iv) At approximately 3:30, when the convoy was outside the continental limit, a Sea Fury and a B-26 attacked. The Sea Fury circled high and the B-26 came for a low strafing attack, lining up the Barbara J and the Blagar. As the B-26 passed over the Blagar, it exploded in a great ball of flame. It is believed that hits from Blagar guns had entered the gas tanks, and that the pilot fired his rockets, causing the explosion. The Sea Fury then circled for a few minutes and started

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a run on the Barbara J, but peeled off early, probably because of the Barbara J's gunfire. He scored 20mm hits on the Barbara J. At this time we were ordered further out to sea.

(11) Preparations were made for a night run into Blue Beach. When the order arrived, headquarters was notified that we were without the cargo ships, and that it was felt that it was impossible to arrive at Blue Beach before daylight. Air and/or sea support was requested, with the warning that we felt we were sure to be sunk without this protection and thus be no good to Blue Beach. During the night we were ordered to cancel this run. The following evening the cargo ships had been reassembled, and the Caribe was unloaded into LCUs. The Barbara J was unloaded into an LCU when the order came for the Barbara J to make an 500-man pack supply run to Blue Beach. The Barbara J was leaking and one bank of engines was out and emptied of supplies and had no small boats, so the responsibility was shifted to the Blagar. The writer transferred to the Blagar to assist in this run and to assist the Blagar Operations Officer with communications functions. At approximately midnight the run was started, with an additional warning to headquarters that we were going to arrive in daylight. An air or sea support was necessary. Sometime during the night this trip was cancelled.

(11) The writer relieved the Operations Officer of the Blagar in communication duties at times during the night. The gist of the communication can be summed up as follows: The Brigade Commander continually reported he was out of anti-tank ammunition and surgical supplies and had wounded to evacuate. All messages were forwarded to strike base and U.S. Navy. From strike base and U.S. Navy we continually received assurances that re-supplies and evacuation of wounded were being carried on and that a close air support strike was arranged for first light. A tank column had been located coming into Blue Beach from the north. Its exact location was reported by the Brigade Commander. Arrangements were made for strike base to take on these tanks at first light, and U.S. Navy jets were "on the way." The jets had not appeared when first light arrived and their whereabouts was requested. We were told that they were still "on the way."

(11) At 20 minutes daylight a request from headquarters came that either of the two operations officers go on beach to evaluate the situation. A Cuban CM operator was recruited to go with the writer. No boat operator was found who would go. Subsequent activity negated this operation.

119 (11) At daylight the beach was under air, tank, and artillery attack. During the night, two re-supply drops had been made, part of which went into the ocean, part of which was received. A C-46 had landed on the airstrip, dumped its supplies, and departed evacuating one wounded.

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The Brigade Commander began talking in terms of his men standing in the water fighting, and "being massacred" and "murdered". At one point he could see four Navy jets high overhead, and was being attacked simultaneously by three enemy Sea Fury's. When he asked that the jets enter the fight and was told that we were doing everything to get permission, his comment was "God damn it, God damn you, God damn you. Do not wait for permission". He continually spotted tanks, artillery locations, and continually asked when would they be attacked by our airplanes. About midday the base announced that we were going in in full force, shooting, for evacuation purposes. The Brigade Commander was told that within three hours the Navy forces, air and sea, plus our cargo convoy would be there to pick them up. He announced that an enemy tank was within 400 yards of his command post firing at him and he had no ammunition with which to fight it. He said he would not be there in three hours. In his next message he said he was destroying his communications set and going into the woods. We were trying to get him to hold on when communication abruptly broke. We have two reports: (1) That the Brigade Commander was seen going to sea in a small sailboat, and (2) That he had gone inland to Excambrey. The convoy started out to sea.

(11) On the morning of D+3 the operations officers of the Blagar<sup>a</sup> and the Barbara J were transferred by rubber boat, along with six UDT men and personal weapons and radios, aboard the USS Eaton. Subsequently we boarded the aircraft carrier Essex along with the commander of the destroyer group, Captain Crutchfield, for the purpose of conferring with Admiral Clark and Marine Colonel Mallard about effecting rescue operations. It was generally thought among all concerned that the Houston survivors could be sought only if the information concerning them was recent, accurate, and reliable. The Eaton was dispatched towards Bahia Cochinos with our operations officers and UDT men aboard with the understanding that Mallard and Clark would seek information on the validity and accuracy of intelligence concerning survivors on the beach, and would send authorization or cancellation of that operation prior to the arrival of the Eaton on station. The operation was cancelled by Admiral Clark and we spent the night sailing close to the beach for light signals. At daylight movement was seen on Cayo Blanco del Sur. A rubber boat was dispatched and contact made with four survivors, who were pulled aboard. A whaleboat was dispatched from the Eaton with U-boats personnel aboard. The whaleboat would carry the writer and three UDT men to a position 200 to 300 yards off the beach, from where we would make the approach and contact with the survivors by rubber boat. Seventeen survivors were removed in five separate operations by this group over a period of two days. Pre-dawn landings and reconnaissance were made each day to assure that Castro's militiamen hadn't occupied the island during the night. Similar activity was conducted by the Blagar operations officer and three UDT men on other beaches. The final day these two groups swept

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Cayao Miguel and Cayao Blanco del Sur and the island of Carrario. We carried loud speakers and searched in the Mangrove swamps and tried to reassure hidden refugees that the arms we carried were not against them, but against Castro. They were afraid of our arms. For example, one man had been lying with only his face out of the water, and when he saw the writer, he tried to sink under water. We tried to assure him, but he thought that the writer was a Russian. He said that there were no friends any more, and we were Russians. We broadcast that if they would call to us, we would approach them without clothing and arms. During this operation Castro had helicopters calling as if they were they were saviors of the refugees and then submachine gun those who would show themselves. I believe that we missed many survivors because of the smallness of our patrol. We could not cover every square foot of these islands, and the refugees were afraid to expose themselves to us. All were in weakened condition and at times had to be carried to the boat.

(11) On this night, the militiamen moved on to the islands and set fire to the brush and claimed to have driven out 166 survivors. I believe that this is an exaggeration. On the following morning, the writer and four UDT men and rubber boats and equipment boarded the submarine USS Threadfin and started towards Bahia Cochinos for an attempted rescue near the sunken Houston. This operation was cancelled at 7 o'clock in the evening and the Threadfin returned to sea because of an occurrence which is US Navy TOP SECRET and not to be recorded in this report. The writer and men returned to the Eaton. The writer and the operations officer of the Blagar were air-lifted to the Essex and subsequently to Guantanamo and to Headquarters.

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CU-155

See attached  
for summary of  
meeting of  
Study Group  
April 24, 1961

Memorandum for the Record, Prepared for the Cuba Study Group

Washington, April 24, 1961.

SUBJECT: SECOND MEETING OF THE GREEN STUDY GROUP  
TIME AND PLACE: 1020-1700 hours, 24 April 1961, CIA Administration Building  
PARTICIPANTS: Study Group Members

General Maxwell D. Taylor  
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy  
Admiral Arleigh Burke  
Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Allen W. Dulles

Department of Defense

General David W. Gray  
Commander Mitchell  
Colonel Stanley W. Beerli  
Colonel Ingelido

Central Intelligence Agency

General C. P. Cabell  
Mr. Richard M. Bissell, Jr.  
Colonel J. C. King  
Mr. C. Tracy Barnes  
Mr. Jacob D. Esterline  
Colonel Jack Hawkins

[Here follows discussion of record-keeping procedures.]

7. Mr. Bissell then commenced the discussion by resuming the chronological account of the development of the Project. He said on Saturday, 22 April, a review had been made of November and December, 1960, developments. By early January, the original concept of a 300-man force broken up into small teams for infiltration after possible training in the United States became shifted to the concept of a much stronger strike force. To Gen. Taylor's query as to whether this shift was covered by a formal paper, Mr. Bissell replied that there was no formal recording of the shift. The expansion of the forces in Guatemala was accelerated and on 12 January 1961, we received 36 officers from the Special Forces Group. Following the arrival of these officers at the camp, the character of the training changed.

8. At the end of January, 26 January to be precise, the President was briefed on our Agency plan. At this time, little more was involved than a presentation, largely oral, of the status and a decision was obtained to continue with the activities but there was no implication that military action would be undertaken. Gen. Taylor asked if this was the first time the plan had been presented to the President and Mr. Bissell said yes, but added that the President did not offer an opinion concerning it. Mr. Bissell said we were seeking authority to continue all our activities--overflights, etc. and to call attention to the fact that we were recruiting and moving men and accumulating material and expending money against mere contingencies, and that we were anxious to present our plan to Gen. Lemnitzer.

Source: NDU, Taylor Papers, Cuba, Memoranda of Meetings.

Top Secret. Drafted by [redacted]

at the [redacted] meeting  
at the [redacted] [redacted]

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(Gen. Gray was asked to provide a copy of this plan from his file. He remarked that this was the plan which the JCS had approved on 3 February 1961).

⑨ 9. Mr. Bissell stated that on or about 17 February 1961, another meeting, including the President, was held. By this time the JCS had evaluated the military plan which had been developed by Col. Hawkins. Gen. Taylor asked if this plan was considerably different from the final plan adopted and was answered affirmatively. At this February meeting, we felt a sense of urgency as the military plan called for a D-Day of 5 March. At the 17 February meeting, it became clear that there would be no immediate decision and that the plan would have to "slip" by one month. It was recalled that the President, the Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, Mr. Bissell, Mr. Barnes, Gen. Gray, Col. Hawkins, Mr. Marm and Mr. Berle and possibly others, were present. Gen. Taylor asked if the outcome of that meeting was to decide to let D-Day slip and Mr. Bissell answered affirmatively adding that certain questions had been raised with respect to military implications.

⑩ 10. Mr. Bissell then read from a paper he had prepared on 11 March which was a statement of the status of preparations, actions, timing and possible alternate courses of actions. This was presented at a meeting attended by much the same persons who attended the 17 February meeting. At this juncture, Mr. Dulles called to the attention of the committee a copy of Mr. Bundy's record of action of the 28 January meeting (of the NSC). He stated he had no authority to disseminate copies but he would read it, which he did. The paper reported that the Director of Central Intelligence had reported on the situation in Cuba, that Cuba was rapidly becoming a communist state and that the United States had undertaken a program of covert action, propaganda, sabotage and assistance to exiles. The paper reported that the present estimate of the Department of Defense was that no program existed at this time which had capability of correcting the situation. The President, according to the document, authorized the continued activities of the Agency, including overflights. The Department of State was instructed to propose actions which could be taken in concert with other countries of the hemisphere, such as Brazil and Colombia. Mr. Dulles read the paper in full and stated it was available at any time to members of the committee.

⑪ 11. Mr. Bissell read from a memorandum of the 11 March meeting concerning the status of immediate alternative courses of action:

- ① A. Use of force in such a way as to minimize appearance of an invasion, including amphibious infiltrations by night.
- ② B. Commit the FM force to a surprise attack, accompanied by use of tactical air force.
- ③ C. Employ two successive landings <sup>1</sup>/<sub>m</sub> one a diversionary force to be followed by landing of the main force 24 hours later.

⑬ - 1 JCSM 57-61; for text, see Document . (2/3)

⑭ - 2 See Document . (Ed Note, 2/18)

⑮ - 3 See Document .

⑯ - 4 See Document . (Ed Note, 3/11)

⑰ - 5 See Document . The January 28 meeting was not an NSC meeting.



10 D. Send the force into an inaccessible area where it could hold the beachhead for considerable time.

115 "A" and "D" were included because at the 17 February meeting, the President and the Secretary had urged an examination of all possible alternatives. No affirmative decision came out of the 11 March meeting.

6 12. Mr. Dulles then proceeded to read the statement of action of the meeting of 3 February. (A discussion of the two February dates ensued-- 3 February and 17 February--with Mr. Bissell conceding that there was no meeting on 17 February, but that the paper had been prepared for a meeting which had been cancelled or postponed.) Mr. Dulles stated that the President was not present at the 3 February meeting, but the discussion resulted in a decision by the President to authorize the encouragement of the establishment of an exile Junta and Revolutionary Council and discussion with exile leaders looking toward such a development. No other action pending further word from the President, was authorized.

116 13. Mr. Dulles then read from a paper covering the 11 March meeting, noting the President had decided on the following courses of action:

- 116 (1) Every effort should be made to assist the Cubans to form a political organization. This is to include publicity for the leading political figures.
- 116 (2) The United States Government should prepare a "White Paper" on Cuba and assist the Cubans to do the same.
- 116 (3) The Department of State would explore possibilities of a de marche in the United Nations (?).
- 116 (4) President expects to offer United States' support for Cubans to return to their homeland. However, best plan for achieving this has not yet been presented. New proposals for action should be submitted.

115 Gen. Taylor commented that it would appear the President was favorable to the concept but was not satisfied with the proposals to date.

116 14. Mr. Bissell then read an account of a 15 March meeting. According to this paper the plan for the Cuban operation submitted on 7 March 1961 was unacceptable as it was not a program of infiltration but a World War II type of assault. That in order for a plan to be politically acceptable it must:

- 116 A. Be an unspectacular landing at night in an area where there was a minimum likelihood of opposition.
- 116 B. If ultimate success would require tactical air support, it should appear to come from a Cuban air base. Therefore, territory seized should contain a suitable airfield.

9-6 See Document 1/r

9-7 The meeting scheduled for February 17 was postponed until February 18. See Document (Ed Note, 2/18)

9-8 President Kennedy was present at the February 8 meeting.

9-9 The question mark in the source text indicated some question as to the accuracy of the statement. According to the available record of the March 11 meeting, the statement is accurate as written.

9-10 See Document 1/r (Ed Note, 3/15)

9-11 An apparent reference to the CIA memorandum of March 11, See Document



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(11) The paper contained a brief outline of a second military plan prepared by Col. Haskins which was approximately the plan later adopted.

(12) 15. Mr. Bissell next read from notes on a meeting held on 16 March, at which time two operations were proposed:

- (12) A. Trinidad - Probably an opposed landing in daylight with air support required.
- (12) B. Zapata - Unopposed landing with no tactical air until opposed.

(12) Consequently, as of 16 March, there were two plans still under consideration as indicated above. Between the 16th of March and the end of March another postponement was called due to the visit of Prime Minister Macmillan. The target date for action was postponed to 10 April, later to 15 April and finally to 17 April.

13 (12) 16. Mr. Bissell then read from a paper covering a meeting held on 12 April. By this time, the plan had crystallized and this covered the concept of the operation:

- (12) 1. Modification of air plans to provide for air operations limited basis on D-2, and again on D-Day. Shortly after the first strike on D-2, Cuban pilots would land at Miami. Other details not discussed.
- (12) 2. Diversion or cancellation. Not feasible to halt embarkation but if necessary, ships could be diverted.

(12) Gen. Taylor asked why it was not feasible to halt the embarkation and Mr. Bissell replied that the staging and loading of the troops was already underway. Mr. Bissell said that approval was given on continuing stages but that on April 12, D minus 5, the President still had the power to stop it. Staging started D minus 7 and 2/3s had already been moved from camps and first vessel sailed on D minus 6 and the last on D minus 4. Mr. Kennedy commented that the plan appears to have been approved but the "GO" signal not given. He asked with whom the plan had been coordinated. Mr. Dulles stated that an Internal Departmental Task Force had been set up early in March 1961 and various tasks were assigned to the separate departments. The IDTF was composed of representatives from State, Defense and CIA, specifically, Mr. Braddock, former Charge at Habana representing State, Gen. Gray representing Defense, and Mr. Barnes, representing CIA. At the end of the 16 March meeting agreement was reached to set up the IDTF. Mr. Bissell said it was the sense of the 16 March meeting that the Zapata plan was preferable. Admiral Burke commented that the JCS did not agree at that time. Mr. Bissell stated there was a review of the plan by the JCS and that Gen. Gray would later elaborate on that.

43-12 See Document

(Ed Note, 3/16)

53-13 See Document

(Ed Note, 4/17)

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17. Mr. Bissell stated that by 12 April the plan had crystallized but we still had no "go ahead" signal, whereupon Mr. Kennedy asked how we came to that conclusion and how was it actually worked out. He asked if anyone formally presented a plan for approval. When actually did the President and others examine the plan and give it their approval. Gen. Gray stated that 16 March was the date. Gen. Taylor asked if it was approved on that date and Mr. Bissell stated it was approved as the plan to be implemented but that no "go ahead" signal was given. Gen. Taylor inquired as to what the JCS had done with respect to the plan and Adm. Burke replied that on 15 March 1961, the JCS was briefed on the alternate plan and that the evaluation concluded that the alternate Zapata plan was considered the most feasible. He then started to discuss the three alternatives when Gen. Gray interrupted with the suggestion that the discussion was getting out of step; that the Trinidad plan should be discussed first and then the three alternative plans.

18. Col. Hawkins' Presentation - Before going into the details of the Trinidad plan, Col. Hawkins said he would like to provide background information showing what factors were available and factors not available in connection with planning of that Project. He stated that when one is confronted with the requirement for non-attributability you introduce tremendous difficulties for a covert plan. For example, in a regular military operation, you know what forces you have, bases, state of training, etc., but in a BM covert plan you don't know much of anything. He said that last September when he joined the Project, the question of bases for the strike force and for supplying guerrillas in the mountains was not resolved. The only bases available were two bases in Guatemala. These were training bases, a shelf on the side of a volcano with room for 200 men at most (we ended up with 1400.) These were the training facilities which were very poor.

19. The air base in Guatemala was 750 miles from Central Cuba - too far for supply operations. C-46's could not reach Eastern Cuba with satisfactory loads. C-54's could. The distance was too great for tactical air operations using F-26 or smaller planes. All sorts of studies were made to locate a satisfactory base. The United States was ruled out but Col. Hawkins did not agree with the reasoning therefore.

Consequently, we had no base from which to conduct satisfactory operations. However, we later learned that President Somoza of Nicaragua would cooperate and we selected Puerto Cabezas as the site since it had an airfield, dock facilities, and other advantages. We were still 500 miles from Central Cuba, still far but feasible.

20. Late in the autumn of 1960 we feared we would lose Guatemala bases and recruiting stopped, and we looked around for other bases. We could never be sure how many troops we could get as the recruiting was often slowed down due to political infighting of exile leaders.

21. Training - We did not have facilities for BM training. Last fall we only had four CIA personnel. On 28 October, Col. Hawkins requested three

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Special Forces teams - a total of 38 people - for training the forces in Guatemala. Because of political considerations, it was two and a half months, 12 January 1961, before they got there. We were facing amphibious operations, the most difficult of all military operations, and we had no ships. The question was: should we buy ships, recruit crews, or should we charter ships? We finally bought two LCI's in Miami, not fitted for landing troops but we modified them, we recruited Cuban crews, it took months (until January 1961) to get the ships to sea. The crews were made up of former Cuban navy personnel. We also recruited American contract personnel for these ships, the two LCI's. These two ships could carry only 150 men so this did not answer our problem. We had to charter ships. We contacted a Cuban ship owner named Garcia who had six small freighters of the 1500-2000 ton variety. This man, Garcia, offered the most and asked the least of all the Cubans we were in touch with. He asked that we cover the operating expenses. At first we wanted two ships for our 750-man force. We armed the LCI's and kept them as command ships. We also used them for other operations such as the raid on the Santiago refinery.

(11) 22. Air Picture--This was a problem in the autumn of 1960. We had few trained crews. There was always the question of whether the Cubans would measure up. We didn't know whether the air force was adequate. The covert approach is extremely difficult. FM operations of any size at all cannot be covert. Col. Hawkins commented that we may have to adjust our thinking to the need for coming out in the open as our enemies are doing.

(11b) 23. Policy Questions--Policy questions had a bearing on our plans. Some unanswered questions by early January were these:

- (11c) Will a strike be conducted?
- (11c) Will an air operation be permitted?
- (11c) Will American pilots be used?
- (11c) Will Nicaragua be used as a base?

(11c) Col. Hawkins then read from a paper dated 4 January 1961, which he had prepared. This paper outlined the current status of our operation and set forth policy questions which had to be resolved. (Col. Hawkins provided a copy of this paper for inclusion in the record. Consequently, no attempt is made to reproduce it in these minutes.)

(11b) 24. From the above mentioned paper, Col. Hawkins outlined the concept of the strike operation:

- (11c) 1. Securing of a small lodgement on Cuban soil by 750-man force.
- (11c) 2. This to be preceded by tactical air strike which would destroy the air force, naval vessels.

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- (16) 3. Following this other military targets would be attacked, such as tank parks, artillery parks, motor transport, etc.
  - (16) 4. Close air support for strike force on DaDay and thereafter.
  - (16) 5. The initial mission was to seize a small area preferably with an air field and access to the sea, with contingency plans for air drops if field and port not available.
  - (16) 6. Force should try to survive and not break out until time opportune or U.S. intervened.
  - (16) 7. Expected widespread popular support and general uprisings.
  - (16) 8. If this did not develop, there was the possibility that the fighting might bring on assistance from other Latin American countries and the U.S. with the resultant fall of Castro.
  - (16) 9. Plan called for continuation of regular RM operations: sabotage, guerrillas, etc.
  - (16) 10. If driven from the beachhead, the force would continue guerrilla operations.
- (16) 25. Gen. Taylor stated that this concept raised fundamental questions. What was the magnitude of the air cover you expected and did you expect to stay on shore indefinitely, and if so what size force did you plan to employ? Col. Hawkins said that the force was to have been composed of 750 men and that they expected to have an airforce of 15 B-26's, whereupon Gen. Taylor questioned whether 15 B-26's could have done all that was expected. Col. Hawkins explained that the plan was to eliminate the enemy air force. We anticipated that he had twelve operational planes, including six B-26's, 4 T-33's, and from two to four Sea Furies. This turned out to be a fairly accurate estimate. We felt that fifteen B-26's could do the job.
- (16) 26. Gen. Taylor asked on what intelligence did we base our belief that there would be popular uprisings. Col. Hawkins said that we had our own agents up and down the length of Cuba & some 60 to 70 agents including 25 radio operators who gave us a picture of large numbers of people begging for arms in order to fight Castro. We had difficulty supplying the arms via the air drops. The Cuban pilots were not sufficiently qualified for this work. The flights were rarely opposed but the aircraft encountered difficulty in finding the drop zones. (Mr. Esterline commented that at no time were our surface craft interdicted by Cuban navy craft and surface deliveries were much more successful).

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27. Col. Hawkins then quoted other extracts from his paper of January 4, summarizing the size of our air force - ten B-26's but only five pilots; seven C-47's; a few C-46's - with grossly inadequate transport crews. Five hundred Cubans training in Guatemala. FRO (Fronte) recruitment not going satisfactorily. Special recruiting teams being sent from Camps to Miami to assist. Expect to have 750 men in time but unless Special Forces training they could not be ready before late 1961. All this time, Col. Hawkins said, Castro was building up his military capability and in September we thought he still had 75% of the population behind him, although his popularity was then declining. Gen. Taylor asked in retrospect what would have been the best timing (for the strike to have occurred?) and Col. Hawkins replied early March.

28. Col. Hawkins said at the time of the preparation of his paper of 4 January we did not know whether the new administration would approve the project and this needed to be resolved immediately in order that the operation could be stopped and considerable expense saved. He therefore recommended that the Director of CIA attempt to get a decision from the President-Elect. Col. Hawkins felt that if the decision was made in mid-January the force could be ready to move by the end of February. We were then under pressure from the Guatemalan government. Time was not entirely in our favor. We anticipated that Castro would soon have a jet capability. Heavy equipment was being assembled throughout the country and the establishment of a police state was advancing rapidly. In his paper he recommended that the operation be carried out not later than 1 March 1961.

29. Col. Hawkins terminated reading his paper. Mr. Dulles asked what disposition was made of it and Col. Hawkins said it was directed to Chief of WH/4 (chief of the Cuban operation). Mr. Esterline, C/WH/4, said he directed it to higher authority. Gen. Taylor asked for the identity of the higher authority and was told it went to the Chief of the Division (Col. King), the Assistant Deputy for Plans (Mr. Barnes), and the Deputy for Plans (Mr. Bissell). Mr. Bissell stated that the paper did not go much further than his office, and added that we did eventually get the air crews, the B-26's, etc. Avon Park was readied. American contract pilots were readied. He stated that with respect to the major policy decisions raised by Col. Hawkins, these issues will emerge when limitations on use of the tactical air force are discussed. Mr. Esterline commented that we battled with State for months and we only got watered down more and more for our efforts.

30. Mr. Kennedy asked why, if Col. Hawkins' presumptions and conclusions were correct, and if State and others felt it wasn't feasible or desirable, wasn't the project called off? Mr. Bissell explained that what actually happened was that Col. Hawkins' position was stated and first there was agreement on air strikes on D minus 2, D minus 1, and D-Day; and then later an absolute minimum calling for strikes on D minus 1 and D-Day. And what finally was called for was a maximum effort on D-Day.

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31. Mr. Kennedy asked Col. Hawkins if he would have approved the operation as it ultimately came to occur - that is, would he have or did he approve of the watered down plan? Col. Hawkins replied that he did not approve but must say this with qualifications. He said he always maintained that we must get rid of the opposing air force. He insisted the three major airfields must be attacked. He was not in favor of limiting the number of aircraft (he eventually got the number raised) - he was not satisfied with the limited application of air power and he thought we would have had a satisfactory sweep on D-Day of all the Cuban airfields. Gen. Taylor asked how many planes we had on D-Day and Col. Hawkins stated fifteen. Admiral Burke asked if all the factors raised by Col. Hawkins were ever listed in check off form and were they checked off as achieved? The reply was that we had no formalized check list but we knew where we stood as we went along. Col. Hawkins said we had the capability on the morning of D-Day with the 15 B-26's but we weren't given an opportunity to do the job.

32. Col. Beerli stated that prior to D-Day we had an accurate count of the enemy air force and knew where every craft was kept. He had a total of 36. Col. Beerli described them by category. We estimated 50% of these planes were in flying condition. On the D-minus 2 strike we destroyed over 70% of their air power. We had 15 planes left to employ to knock out the remainder. showed the enemy planes were concentrated at San Antonio. On D-Day one Sea Fury was knocked out and another fell into the ocean. They were down to three T-33's. Gen. Taylor asked then why did the strikes fail? Col. Beerli replied that we had strikes planned for San Antonio, Libertad, and 11 other targets, but were not permitted to carry them out. Gen. Taylor commented that we had done well with our air force and Col. Beerli replied that we had them pinned down and we based this belief on and photography. He added that every aircraft we lost was due to the T-33's. Mr. Kennedy asked how many aircraft did Castro have on D-Day. Col. Beerli said he had 2 Sea Furies, B-26's, and 3 T-33's. Col. Hawkins reported that we had planned a fifteen plane raid at dawn on D-Day but were not permitted to carry it out. Mr. Dulles asked if subsequent events bore out the correctness of our air O/B and Col. Hawkins replied in the affirmative.

33. Mr. Kennedy asked for information on the report that MIG's were in the air. Col. King said that MIG's did not appear until the final date. They may have been in crates and quickly assembled. Mr. Dulles commented that aerial photography never picked up any MIG's. Mr. Bissell said we had no reports from agents of MIG air flights. Gen. Taylor asked concerning the characteristics of the T-33's and was told they are jet trainers armed with two 50 cal. machine guns. Gen. Gray said that on D plus 1 a request was made of our destroyers to attempt to locate the field. Col. King said the report of MIG's in crates indicated San Julian air base. Col. Beerli terminated his remarks by saying that as of D-Day the air picture was in our favor.

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⑪ 34. TRINIDAD PLAN. Col. Hawkins then proceeded to discuss the Trinidad Plan. He utilized charts showing the composition of the strike force and maps of the areas discussed. First he described the composition and organization of the assault force and how it was trained. He said at first there was no one to train the troops so he sent Col. Egan and Capt. Monk with directives to conduct individual training, small unit training, etc., and an 8 week course was provided. With large influx of recruits, concurrent recruit, small unit and combined training had to be conducted. Gen. Taylor asked where they found room in view of Col. Hawkins previous statement of the small shelf on the volcano side, and Col. Hawkins explained that we finally got permission to use a finca belonging to Mr. Alajos of Guatemala for training purposes. However, firing practice was done in the mountains.

⑪ 35. Noting that Tanks appeared on the chart, Mr. Kennedy asked if tanks did get ashore and if they were camouflaged or disguised. Col. Hawkins said that tanks were put ashore and Gen. Gray added that these were the same type of tanks given to other countries. Col. Hawkins stated that we trained the tank crews at Ft. Knox and we had no trouble whatsoever. The Cubans knew where they were being trained and Col. Hawkins said that was a good example of how our own soil is better suited for training from security and other standpoints.

⑪ 36. In arriving at the Trinidad plan, Col. Hawkins said that he studied the entire island carefully. He then decided that the Trinidad area with the nearby Escambray mountains was the place. Gen. Taylor asked if he had the benefit of photography in reaching his decision and Col. Hawkins said he had no photography until one flight was flown in November with not too satisfactory results. He then proceeded to describe the Trinidad area - the town of some 18,000 population, the nearby port to the south, named Casilda, with its docks, many good beaches for our purposes, good guerrilla country nearby with hills of 2,500 - 4,000 feet in which from 500-1,000 guerrillas were reported to be active who had been able to maintain themselves for six months, but were eventually eliminated. Although these were small groups with little equipment and poor supplies, it nevertheless took Castro six months to eliminate them. Therefore in considering the Trinidad plan it was felt that the force could if necessary move to the mountains and could exist in such terrain indefinitely. There were no approaches from the North that Castro could use, only other main road was from Santa Clara - this had a bridge over a river and a railroad bridge - and we were planning to knock out these two bridges. Other approach was from Cienfuegos with bridges. The area was suitable for isolation. Also there was reason to believe that the Trinidad population was friendly. They had been supporting the guerrillas in the hills. We expected to pick up recruits from the Trinidad civilian population and we planned to bring in arms packs for 4,000 men and rapidly expand our forces. Another advantage if the force succeeded in maintaining itself and eventually breaking out was the possibility that we could have severed Cuba in the middle, creating great problems for Castro.

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37. Gen. Taylor inquired as to the date of the plan. Col. Hawkins said it was written in January and the JCS was briefed on the plan on 31 January. He remarked that the JCS, in an independent study, had also selected the Trinidad site as the most suitable for this type of operation. Gen. Taylor asked how did the JCS get into this matter and Gen. Gray replied that the JCS had already been asked to come up with a likely spot and that they had in mind a small invasion force.

38. Col. Hawkins then reviewed the strike plan as follows:

- (15) D-Day - landing
- (16) Prior D-Day - destruction air force
- (16) D-minus 1 - attack aircraft on ground - also tank parks, artillery, etc.
- (16) H minus 5 - feinting operation off the West Coast of Pinar del Rio - destroy bridges
- (16) H Hour - Assault force lands on beaches - seizes high ground - another company moves inland and establishes self on forward slopes - another company on a separate beach - clear Casilda - airborne troops drop in heights over Trinidad.

39. Gen. Taylor inquired as to the known presence of Castro forces in the area. Col. Hawkins said we could never pin down the exact location of his forces. There were some 40,000 militia in the general area - with about 5,000 militia encircling the Escambray mountains. These were not making an aggressive effort to join battle with the guerrillas but would catch them as they came out for food. We evaluated the militia fighting qualities on what they did in the Escambrays and this was very low. He then went on describing the plan by saying that after seizure of the objectives we would enlist and arm civilians, we would use the hospital and other buildings for the force & we would coordinate with local civilian leaders and make contact with local guerrillas. We would use the local airport for resupply but the airport could not take a 3-26. In the event Trinidad could not be held, the plan was for the force to withdraw to the Escambrays where they would be supplied by air drops. This, Col. Hawkins said, was the beauty of the Trinidad Plan - it provided an alternative and safe area to move into if the original phase failed to achieve its objectives. Gen. Cabell commented that the concept called for a dawn landing. Col. Hawkins said the air strike called for attack on three air fields and the Managua military base, which had tanks and equipment which would have easily been destroyed by use of napalm but we were not authorized to use napalm in the operation. Gen. Taylor asked who said napalm could not be employed and Col. Hawkins replied that it was a decision of the National Government. Col. Hawkins listed in detail

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all the targets which we had selected for air attack - which included in addition to obvious military targets - the Havana power plant, microwave stations, refineries, etc. and said all these things we wanted to do. Gen. Taylor asked if the air requirement varied with the change of plans and Col. Hawkins replied no.

⑪ 40. Gen. Taylor asked aside from terrain what else was favorable and Col. Hawkins repeated his references to friendly population, nearby guerrillas, beaches as good as those of Zapata. He said the presence of enemy forces was a disadvantage of this plan as compared with the Zapata Plan. We did not think there was anyone at Zapata. Gen. Gray said that as far as could be determined there was only a police battalion at Trinidad. Admiral Burke commented that the size of the air field at Trinidad was another disadvantage - the field at Zapata being larger. Col. Hawkins reiterated that the principal advantage was being able to fall back into the mountains. At Zapata we presupposed an uprising but the beachhead did not last long enough. At Trinidad we might have had favorable civilian reaction - one agent told us he had 2,500 men wanting arms.

⑪ 41. Mr. Kennedy asked if we had any communications from the island after D-Day indicating a desire on the part of the people to rise, and Col. Hawkins said yes there were requests for arms but air drops without the use of American pilots had never been successful. Gen. Taylor asked if there was an annex to the plan for supplying arms to anyone who did rise. Mr. Bissell stated that we had airplanes and supplies and were ready to respond to agent calls. He could have responded - there were 19 requests most of them before D-Day. Mr. Kennedy asked if there were any after D-Day and Col. Hawkins said yes, but we couldn't service them since our aircraft were committed to try to deliver supplies to the strike force which had lost its supply ship.

⑪ 42. Gen. Gray recalled that the Agency had prepared a summary of agent radio communications received - and messages from the beaches on D plus 2 and asked that a copy of that summary, which he found quite impressive, be furnished for the record.

⑪ 43. Mr. Bissell said that we had anticipated domination of the air and therefore could have made daylight deliveries of arms in response to the many calls we had received. As it turned out we did not have the means with which to respond.

⑪ 44. Mr. Esterline then informed the group that we had on hand one of the American pilots who survived the morning raid, and since he was planning to leave the city tonight, asked if the committee would like to hear his story this afternoon. Gen. Taylor said he would like to hear him after we finish the actual scenario and this should be sometime after lunch. The hour of 4 p.m. was set.

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⑬ 14 Not found.

45. Gen. Taylor asked what happened to the Trinidad Plan. Col. Hawkins replied that it was always opposed by the State Department - also the President wanted something that was less like an invasion. Mr. Bissell read from the record of the 15 March meeting which reported that Trinidad was not acceptable since it appeared like a WWII assault operation. Gen. Taylor asked if the Plan was rejected on 15 March and Mr. Bissell replied no, on 11 March. Admiral Burke commented that on 3 February the JCS had generally this same plan. Mr. Bissell said that the JCS first evaluated this plan early in February and Admiral Burke said that the JCS had made a number of recommendations aimed at strengthening the plan.

46. Mr. Bissell stated that we considered a variety of alternatives - one suggestion was that we seize a remote area and build an airfield from which to operate. Col. Hawkins then described the ground rules which had been established for the next plan:

1. It must call for a quiet, night landing operation - nothing that might be viewed as spectacular.
2. It must include seizure of an airfield that would accommodate up to B-26 planes in order that air strikes which were to commence at dawn could be attributed to that field.

Col. Hawkins said we looked all over for an airfield in Oriente province but could find none that could handle a B-26. We built up the concept for an operation at Preston but the field would not support B-26's. We reconsidered the Isle of Pines - but rejected it because there were from 7,500-15,000 troops there and there were no suitable beaches for night landings. We thought of another plan for Trinidad involving landing troops who would go directly into the mountains - but there was no airfield. Finally, through photography, we found what we thought was a usable field - this was in the Zapata area and this is what led us to this area. The plan was hastily put together. We got started about 15 March - after the 11 March meeting. An error in photographic interpretation had occurred. We believed there were 4,500 usable feet of runway in northern Zapata. One of the disadvantages was the 13 mile bay which meant we would have trouble getting people up there in daylight hours. We found a 4,100 foot field at Playa Giron. We would never have adopted the Zapata Plan if we had known that we had coordinated forces that would close in and fight as they did. The air field requirement was what led us into Zapata.

47. Col. Hawkins then described the moving of the troops from Guatemala to Nicaragua which was accomplished on three successive nights without incident. We were employing four merchant ships and two LCI's. They fanned out upon leaving Puerto Cabezas and later rendezvoused at approximately 40 miles off the coast. Col. Hawkins paid tribute to [redacted] for his performance in handling the fleet. The ships formed convoy and proceeded to a point 5,000 yards off the beach.

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46 AFTERNOON SESSION - 24 April 1961.

25 (Note: This account of the afternoon session is not complete inasmuch as the recording secretary was not present during the first portion of the session, having missed approximately 45 minutes of the meeting. However, the notes prepared by Col. Laglaido, who was present during the entire afternoon session, should cover this missing period).

48. (Gen. Gray was in the midst of discussing the JCS evaluation of the Trinidad Plan when note taking was resumed). He said the scheme of maneuver was basically sound. There was a need for civil officer type people to coordinate with the population, etc., and this was done. The original idea was that the guerrillas would join up with the Strike Forces. The JCS thought it best to maintain a corridor and establish a link - he pointed out that one road runs from Santa Clara to the area - and a secure route for moving up into the hills. Without interference from the air, we estimated the Cuban Army could move men and material to the scene by D plus 2. At time of assessment there was one regiment of Cuban army near Santa Clara. We also were told the Cuban army was not concentrated but spread out. We figured it would take them a day to concentrate and another day to move the 100 miles to the scene.

49. Gen. Gray indicated that the publicity which developed during the final weeks of the project, much of it centering around the Revolutionary Council and its alleged plans, gave Castro notice that something was in the wind and time to mobilize his forces. Mr. Esterline explained that we were given the requirement of establishing a broad based revolutionary council. He said Cubans cannot keep quiet and before you knew it we had a Roman Circus on our hands - leaks to press, etc., both in Miami and New York. Gen. Taylor asked if the Revolutionary Council was aware of the operation. Col. King stated that the first word they had that the operation was going was on the evening of Friday, 14 April. Col. King and Mr. Barnes had gone to New York City to brief Dr. Miro - had met with the group - had dinner - and at midnight Col. King told Dr. Miro that at dawn on the following day some action would take place. Col. King cautioned Dr. Miro that there always seems to be a leak and that in the interests of the sons of some of the members of the Council, including Miro, and other relatives - Col. King told Dr. Miro to keep this information very much to himself. Dr. Miro said he would not even tell Dr. Varona, another member of the Council, and added that he would keep all members of the Council together the entire night.

50. Gen. Taylor said that what was inferred was that all this hoopla made execution of the plan more difficult and Gen. Gray said yes - that this permitted Castro to prepare - but if the target had been the Trinidad area he would not have been ready until the afternoon of D-Day. Mr. Barnes said that there was a great deal in the press - Tad Szulc and others - guessing

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⑬ ✓ Colonel Michael J. Ingelido, Deputy Secretary, JCS, also functioned during the deliberations of the Taylor Study Group as General Taylor's Assistant. Colonel Ingelido was present at the afternoon session of the Study Group's deliberations on April 24, which he noted began at 1:50 p.m. Ingelido's notes on the meeting are more extensive than those prepared by . According to Ingelido's notes, at the outset of the afternoon session CIA officials gave a résumé of the landing operations planned for the Red, Blue, and Green Beaches during the Zapata operation. They also discussed the critical element of the air support planned for the operation, including the possible use of napalm to neutralize enemy forces in the area. General Gray outlined DOD and JCS participation in the planning, which led to a general discussion of the information provided to the President, and the actions approved by the President. (Memorandum for the record, by Ingelido; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report)

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as to dates - and all this developed during the last week - and this could not have been anticipated. Mr. Esterline commented that one or two of Mr. Boston's articles in the New York Times two or three days before the date were not at all helpful. He said that despite this we were able to move people from Guatemala to Nicaragua and the first anyone knew about the invasion was when they hit the beaches.

51. Gen. Gray said that another miscalculation was that the Cuban Army was not coordinated and thus we expected the strike force would be able to resist attack. In this respect Trinidad would have been difficult terrain for launching of attacks. While the Cuban Army could eventually have re-taken the beach head, it was Gen. Gray's opinion that the beach could have been held for seven days. In considering the Trinidad Plan it was not considered that U.S. overt intervention would be necessary since the force could get to the hills. The ships were loaded with supplies on D minus 21, but it was always clearly understood that the President could always call off the plan. The ultimate success of the Plan depended on political factors - uprisings, possible OAS action, etc.

52. Gen. Taylor asked what provisions, if any, had been made for follow up support. Gen. Gray said that CIA was training additional personnel. He said Mr. Berle had sounded out certain South American countries but got no promise of military support. The plan called for the arming of local volunteers who were expected to join up with the force. Mr. Esterline said we had approximately 300 additional untrained troops - about 167 in Guatemala and the balance in Miami. Gen. Cabell pointed out that the original concept called for a 750 man force but that we actually committed in advance all our 1400 men rather than hold out for follow up. Gen. Gray said the key to the plan was popular uprisings all over the Island - which would pin down the militia in other areas. The militia in this area had proved to be friendly to the guerrillas and for this reason Castro had to bring others in from elsewhere.

53. Gen. Taylor asked Gen. Gray concerning the 30-70 evaluation they had given to the plan. Gen. Gray said this referred to the Trinidad Plan - that the percentages were roughly 30-70 and never ran more than 40-60. He then said that about this time Mr. Berle was appointed coordinator of Latin American affairs and Ambassador Willauer faded out of the picture. He said he had had meetings with the Berle group. Gen. Taylor asked if Mr. Berle got into the military aspects of the plan and Gen. Gray said not to any important degree - that he was mostly concerned with the political aspects. Col. King said that Mr. Berle was given one briefing on the Trinidad Plan.

54. Gen. Gray then stated that on 23 February a JCS evaluation team went to Guatemala to assess the troops and summarized their conclusions as follows: Based on general review of the military portion of the project and evaluation of the combat efficiency of the forces, such forces could attain

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the initiative - but the ultimate success of the operation would depend on the extent the strike forces served as a catalyst. Gen. Taylor said this new evaluation of the plan expected them to get ashore all right but success depended on their serving as a catalyst to a general uprising. Gen. Gray answered affirmatively. Gen. Gray stated that Col. Tarwater thought the air force was very well prepared but made certain suggestions for improvement.

(11) 55. Evaluation of the Zapata Plan. Gen. Gray said that the JCS first saw the Zapata Plan on 15 March and gave it a favorable evaluation as an alternate plan. This, he said, was done hurriedly. The JCS was briefed on the plan on 13 March; prepared its evaluation on the 14th of March, presented it on the 15th March and submitted it to the President on the 16th of March.

(11b) 56. Mr. Bissell said three other alternatives were considered:

- (11c) 1. The Isle of Pines
- (11c) 2. The Preston Area
- (11c) 3. Alternate Trinidad Plan  
(landing at night, into the hills and at daylight attack backwards to the beach head)

(11) With respect to No. 3, Col. Hawkins said the plan really was for the force to move into the hills and not attack backwards and was a modification of the original Trinidad Plan.

(11) 57. Gen. Gray said that of the alternatives mentioned it was considered that the Zapata Plan was the most feasible but not as feasible as the original Trinidad Plan. Zapata depended on control of the air and the ability to secure the exits to make difficult the movement of enemy forces into the area. The plan called for the mining of all approaches but this was not executed. The evaluations were the essential part of the JCS contribution - however, we attended most meetings. Gen. Taylor asked if the evaluation which Gen. Gray had summarized was approved by the JCS and Gen. Gray responded affirmatively. Of the three alternatives the Zapata Plan was the best.

(11b) 58. Mr. Kennedy said wouldn't you say that the JCS had approved this plan? Admiral Burke responded by saying that the paper does not say so - but in effect the JCS approved this plan. Felt it had a reasonable chance of success. Admiral Burke added that the original plan had the area they would have selected, Trinidad. Gen. Gray stated that at no time did the JCS say that the Zapata Plan should not be carried out. Mr. Bissell said that the 16 March meeting summed it up as follows:

(11c) Trinidad Plan would provide more decisive results at greater initial risk

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CU 155/18

(15) Zapata Plan provides less decisive results - and slower results - with less initial risk

(16) Mr. Bissell commented that we felt and hoped the Zapata Plan would be less risky but recognized its limitations - less chance of a build up from friendly population.

(17) 59. Gen. Taylor said there appeared to be two points: At no point did the JCS recommend doing it - it merely commented on three alternatives - but where we made our mistake - we should have said - but did not - that this plan was not feasible. We had an opportunity to do more and we were responsible for approving it. Mr. Dulles stated that all the plans were exposed at high level. Admiral Burke commented that one difficulty was that Gen. Lemnitzer was there by himself - then corrected himself to say that Gen. Gray was with Gen. Lemnitzer at the high level meetings.

(18) 60. Gen. Gray stated that as we became associated we became more interested in trying to make it go. Mr. Kennedy asked if this wasn't the key to the whole thing - this wanting it to go? Mr. Dulles said we had these alternatives - we could carry out the plan or we could demobilize the strike force. Gen. Gray said that if we had ever written a National Concept - we would have had to rewrite it continually. Admiral Burke said that there naturally was confusion during the change of administration. We should have formalized this thing much earlier and in greater detail. The trouble was that only a few people of the Admiral's staff knew about it.

(19) 61. Gen. Taylor asked if the possibility of uprisings was discussed among all of you and Mr. Dulles answered yes. Mr. Dulles said the first plan was the shock plan - and in this plan we hadn't counted on immediate uprisings - this was longer range. He said there were objections on the political side to the shock effects - and we couldn't count on it succeeding.

(20) 62. Mr. Kennedy asked what the objective was on landing 600,000 men on the shore. Mr. Dulles said to obtain a beachhead which could be built up. Mr. Kennedy then asked how a beachhead could be held against 300,000 troops - or against even 30,000 or 25,000. Mr. Dulles said the enemy would not have been able to concentrate all his troops on one spot. Mr. Kennedy then said that he thought that uprisings were an essential part of the JCS evaluation. Gen. Gray said that it did not anticipate immediate uprisings - but uprisings on a slower basis. Mr. Kennedy then directed a question to Admiral Burke asking if it was the Admiral's understanding that 1400 men could land - and without benefit of uprisings - could maintain their position for several weeks. Admiral Burke said they thought they might be able to hold their position but if they could not, that they would then become guerrillas. Gen. Gray said that we thought the Cuban air force would be knocked out. He said the men demonstrated they could fight effectively at night. Mr. Bissell added that we expected a landing in Pinar del Rio on D plus 7. Col. Jenkins added that we had reports of men wanting to join but reiterated that the real key was control of the air.

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63. Gen. Taylor then asked where is the concept? Gen. Gray said it is in the plan. The objective did not change. Here is the mission: To invade island of Cuba - with amphibious forces - hold beachhead - provide catalyst for uprising - move in as guerrillas if beachhead not sustained. Gen. Taylor (checking language of mission) read: "Alternative 3 has all the pre-requisites necessary and would be able to sustain itself for several weeks but inaccessibility of population would affect support of Cuban population." Gen. Cabell remarked that we meant joining up of forces and not necessarily civilian uprisings. Gen. Taylor stated it still becomes a choice between 3 but with Trinidad preferred.

64. Mr. Bissell stated that the language about sustaining for several weeks indicates a change of thinking - a slower development with less prospect of initial success. If the area could have been held for two weeks there was a good probability of ultimate success - for with no air opposition we could have knocked out his microwave and forced him to voice - we could have learned his plans - we could have reinforced the brigade with another 500 men - the logistic problem would not have been difficult - but we did not knock out his air. Gen. Cabell stated that maritime re-supply would have been a factor - with no air opposition - and would have had an effect on the outcome.

65. Gen. Gray stated that following the decision on 16 March that the Zapata Plan should be pursued, the Inter-Departmental Group on 22 March developed and finalized an agreed list of tasks. For example, the State Department would take care of recognition, etc. This paper served the useful purpose of coordinating our planning.

66. On 23 March the JCS approved letters of instructions to Cinclant and Comant and we implemented the plan to improve the Miami defenses. We tested the plan and had planes, etc., to move in to protect the Miami area. Naval support was carried out by the Carrier ~~SPAR~~ and 7 destroyers. Destroyers escorted the invading ships - close at night but at a distance during the day. Gen. Taylor asked if they were authorized to engage. They were authorized to engage if attacked but under these circumstances the whole force was to have been diverted - since we were protecting shipping and not assisting an invasion. The rules of engagement changed several times as the operation proceeded. Our job was mostly one of support during two phases:

- (16) Covert support - D-Day to D-minus 3
- Logistic support - during build up phase

67. CIA was in a position to double and quadruple the force. We planned logistic supply as part of this build up. If things went well they might have built up in the Cienfuegos area in D plus 30. We provided arms packs for 30,000 men in addition to CIA planning for 5,000 packs. Packs for 15,000 men were actually loaded on ships and headed for the area. Also recoilless rifles, mortars, jeeps, trucks, etc. We were also providing for the overt

phase under several conditions. For example, if the U.S. recognized this force (one of the Council members, Capt. Artima, went in with the brigade). State was planning on recognizing the government but no State or diplomatic representative would have been sent in until Havana was taken. We also considered possibility of supporting the force in the event a third country recognized them before we did. In addition we had one Marine hospital to move to Vieques.

(B) (D)  
[Gray]

68. Gen. Taylor asked about the evacuation plan and Gen. Taylor said it was planned to employ the LCI's and planes from the air strip. Gen. Gray said a separate war room was set up in the JCS the regular war room was cut out. Only a limited number were cut in this list included Adm. Dennison. Col. Mallard of the Agency was on the JCS. It was a cumbersome type of organization but it worked. There was good commo. There was good liaison. Decisions were implemented quickly.

69. Admiral Burke stated that the trouble was the delays commo from there to Washington and back was fairly good but there were always delays sometimes of several hours what was needed was a commander on the spot to make decisions. Another thing although the commo was good from CJSF (?) to Washington there was not enough between the Naval forces and the ships took a couple of days to find out that two ships were one and the same that different names were being used for the same ship.

70. Gen. Gray said that there should have been an Inter-Departmental group working on the concept and keeping the President informed in writing. This would have eliminated the fact that up to the last date there was not a meeting of minds. It was not clear whether there was going to be an air strike or not. Mr. Barnes said it could not have been achieved the way it went along after the Trinidad plan was scrapped we were forced to come up with new concepts and new approaches to meet objections which were being raised.

71. Admiral Burke said that politically it could not have been done. We made our mistake in not drawing up what we thought the concept was and presenting it to the State Department and CIA. We did not grab it hard enough partly because we were holding it so tight therefore Gen. Gray's group couldn't get advice from the people who could have given it because they weren't cut in. If he had been working under an agreed concept it could have been done better.

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72. Mr. Bissell said that what he had read from the April 12 paper came near to this. Many of the suggested acts that came up involved political policy decisions of great import and these had been made in advance. Example, question whether Navy Jets in the air would give protection to B-26's giving close ground support. Decision was made that support should be given this required high level policy and was a reversal of policy re engagement of U.S. forces. We could have had a concept of use of U.S. forces. Gen. Taylor said: You talk of concepts but the concepts didn't change.

~~The paranthetical question mark occurs in the source text.~~

Admiral Burke stated we would have task for example to cover by Naval air - this came very late so that by the time we were supposed to execute this we were at some distance from the area. Gen. Gray said that if we had had an agreed national plan we would have had to face up to the decisions which we got piecemeal - re rules of engagement. It should have been in an overall plan.

73. Gen. Taylor asked how can we do better about the political restraints - how can we do this. Gen. Gray replied: by putting the political factors into the plan at the beginning. Admiral Burke commented that the President must have been confused by the many different people who were advising him. Gen. Gray said that once we got State in on agreed plans, Mr. Braddock came up with the answers. We should get State into the plan at the outset.

74. Gen. Taylor remarked that after the rejection of the Trinidad Plan we were racing against the clock. Gen. Gray said that he had wanted to war game the plan and that that is what should have been done. Gen. Taylor then asked what were the factors that necessitated speed. Gen. Gray said the rainy season was approaching and this would affect not only ground fighting but flying conditions. There was the problem of the Jets which Castro was supposed to be receiving soon. Info that some Jet trainees had returned from Czechoslovakia. Col. Hawkins said there were other factors: We were holding 1400 men in impossible conditions. The President of Guatemala was pushing us. Also American newsmen were after the story and some of the troops and airmen were threatening to desert.

75. INTERROGATION OF At this juncture a member of the Alabama National Air Guard and a contract flyer who participated in the project, was received by the Committee. said that he had drawn up a small resume and that if the committee was agreeable he would half-read and half-comment on that resume. (Presumably the resume will become a part of the record.) Consequently only the questioning will be recorded here.

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76. Col. Hawkins asked what happened to the original plan for D-Day. He replied that he was exposed to the targets. He thought the people were familiar with the original plan. It changed 180°. We were to use maximum effort against air fields, microwave stations, (forcing use of radio voice) - we hoped this chaos plus propaganda would do the job. Col. Hawkins asked what were the orders. replied that they were ordered to use two aircraft on each target except that only one would be used on air base near Guantanamo. Request was granted late for use of other aircraft. We were pushed for briefing of crews - we didn't have time for target study - the whole situation was cramped. After D-Day it was obvious that not all enemy aircraft was destroyed - we thought we knew how many he had but he was turning them around quickly - our turn around time was 7 hours round trip with 30 minutes over the target.

77. Mr. Kennedy asked if these pilots were Americans or Cubans and replied they were both Americans and Cubans. They got along well together and both were motivated by patriotic reasons.

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78. said that the first attack (D minus 2) only served to make Castro mad and gave him time to re-group his forces. Some of the flyers saw Navy protection - others did not. At Puerto Cabezas there was uncertainty as to whether they were enemy or friendly. Admiral Burke stated that on D-1 and D plus 1 the Navy fliers were over and that on D plus 2 authority was given for one hour of coverage. was asked if MIGs were involved. He said that as much as he would like to he can't say that MIGs were involved. He said he did not believe they were. He said he debriefed B-26 and other pilots and they saw none. The reports of Navy intervention may have helped in air battles but as far as Cuban personnel were concerned they took it for granted that they had Navy cover.

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79. Mr. Kennedy asked if the pilots expected they would have help or assistance. Were they ever told they would not have assistance? replied that they were not told that they would not have assistance and he did not think they expected military assistance. Mr. Rissall said that on D plus 2 they were briefed to expect Navy cover and protection and beginning at that time they may have expected assistance. said the news was a great morale booster to people in the Puerto Cabezas area and when it did not materialize morale was affected adversely. Cuban crews aborted and without this assurance of assistance American pilots would not have participated.

80. Gen. Taylor asked what targets they found on the beach. replied that on D plus 1 they caught a large column of trucks. An American pilot "bounced" those trucks and from 15 to 20 Russian tanks - three B-26's made passes at the trucks and hurt them badly. This was Tuesday afternoon about 1800 hours local time. Col. Hawkins remarked that indicated they suffered 1800 casualties. Mr. Kennedy asked if was able to tell where the fighting was taking place. He was unable to give a conclusive answer but thought the forces had moved up from Blue and Red beaches but never very far out. He remarked that the enemy had lots of anti-aircraft fire. Mr. Kennedy asked if they had this on D-Day. Col. Hawkins said that they did not but that they moved it in very fast. Gen. Taylor asked where were they reporting flack and replied: from all over - and with excellent marksmanship. Gen. Taylor asked how the air-ground commo worked and said the Commo gear went down with the ship that was sunk and that there was no commo.

81. Mr. Kennedy asked if the Cuban pilots did well. said they constantly found excuses for not flying. Gen. Taylor asked what percentage failed and replied that only 35% were "ready to go" and you could count the number of "tigers" on one hand. Col. Beerli took exception to this saying that on D minus 2 we had eight aircraft up and that these made more than one pass over the target. observed that at that time the sight of victory was present - but when they got thinking that they were losing it was different. He said that on the morning of D minus 2 he had to beg them to go. He observed that they were good until things started going wrong.

[plus?]

82. Mr. Kennedy asked where was the fighting going on at D plus 1 and D plus 2. Admiral Burke said that on D plus 2 Navy recon could find no

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infantry - they were all apparently in the bush.  
information as to where the fighting was.

said he had no

33. Mr. Kennedy asked if the Castro forces had come down the road on D plus 1 and Gen. Taylor remarked that he did not see how they could have gotten down there that fast even if they knew where the landing was coming. Col. Hawkins said there were tanks in the Red Beach area on D-Day.

expressed the personal opinion that there was not much fighting done. Gen. Taylor asked if there was any prearranged plan for use of smoke to identify our own people on the ground and said that the air force was concerned exclusively with taking care of the "heavy stuff" and not attacking troops. Mr. Kennedy asked how long the party lasted on Red Beach and thought it wasn't more than a matter of hours.

34. Mr. Dulles raised the question of the confusion in orders of going after the air fields on D plus 1. Mr. Bissell said that at some point on D-Day we received permission to strike the airfields that night and then there was some talk of a strike at dusk but ultimately it was authorized for that night but bad visibility and other factors prevented them carrying it out. Col. Bearli asked if there was a lack of aircraft and replied that they were limited to the number of shells on any given target - we were limited to number of aircraft we could use. When we called it off we thought we were losing the war intentionally. This thought was based on the restrictions which had been placed on us.

35. The meeting terminated at approximately 1700 hours.

[17] [name not declassified] (84) (74)

(17)

(84) (74)

(7)

Distribution:

- Original - Copy #1 - General Maxwell D. Taylor
- Copy #2 - Admiral Arleigh Burke
- Copy #3 - Allen W. Dulles
- Copy #4 - Attorney General Robert Kennedy
- Copy #5 - Major General D. W. Gray
- Copy #6 - Richard M. Bissell, Jr.
- Copy #7 - Colonel J. C. King
- Copy #8 - Jacob J. Esterline

TC-33-3-8



Washington, April 25, 1961.

CU-156

Q: What limitations were placed on CIA with regard to using U. S. military personnel.

A: There was no legal limit on the numbers or types of personnel that could be assigned, the only limiting consideration being the problem of disclosure.

S: It would be helpful if the President was given a memo setting forth the evidences of the direct involvement of Communist personnel in the operation.

R: CIA agreed to prepare such a memorandum for the President with information copies for the Paramilitary Study Group.

R: It was requested that a paper and/or map covering a period several months prior to the invasion be prepared indicating all Cubans prepared to revolt.

R: CIA indicated that a map had been prepared indicating the agents with whom they were in contact and that this would be provided to General Taylor.

Q: Had an attempt been made to have anyone enter the objective area for reconnaissance prior to the operation.

A: No. For security reasons and because photographs had given no evidence of any significant activity in the area.

Q: What were the sources of intelligence prior to the operation.

A: SpecInt, agent reports and photographs. Photographs were received at least several times a week.

R: That some of these photographs be made available to the Study Group.

R: CIA agreed to make these photographs available.

S: The point was made that not only U. S. troops were restricted in the action they could take, but we prevented foreigners that we had trained from using their weapons to their maximum capability.

S: One of the greatest problems encountered in developing this force was the difficulty in getting the Cubans to sublimate their petty differences for the common good.

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EYES ONLY



(Not: Defense on 10/10/55)

(43) Source: ~~h~~ Taylor Papers, Box 12, Cuba, Memoranda of Meetings. Secret; Eyes Only; Ultrasensitive. The drafter is not listed, but it was probably Colonel Ingelido. The meeting took place at the Central Intelligence Agency at 10 a.m. The participants in ~~the~~ meeting, in addition to Taylor, Kennedy, Dulles and Burke, were Cabell, Gray, Barnes, Moorhouse, Esterline, Beerli, Hawkins, King, Ingelido, Commander Mitchell, and Lt. Colonel Tarwater. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Lieutenant Contract series: Cuba. Subject: Taylor Report)



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(U) STATEMENT: (U) One fact that misled our estimate of the opposition we would meet was that prior to the Zapata Operation there has never been a pitched battle before between Cubans.

(U) REQUEST: (U) That all professional military people involved in the operation and in training the force be identified.

(U) RESPONSE: (U) CIA indicated this would be provided.

(U) QUESTION: (U) At some point would it be desirable to have the conclusions of all key people involved in the operation.

(U) ANSWER: (U) Yes.

(U) REQUEST: (U) General Taylor requested a re-briefing on the Air Plan and further information on the reported air ammunition shortage.

(U) RESPONSE: (U) CIA indicated this would be provided.

(U) REQUEST: (U) General Taylor requested the reconstitution of the intelligence that influenced the decisions, this to be presented in such form as to indicate the decisions influenced.

(U) At this point Colonel Hawkins briefed on the actual operation. He prefaced his remarks by pointing out that the information on which his report was based was limited and incomplete.

(U) When the 15 April air strikes were originally considered it was suggested that they be conducted for two days without restriction. However, due to political considerations it was decided to conduct limited strikes on D-2 and limited strikes on dawn of D-Day. It was decided to use two B-26 aircraft against each of three airfields on which all Cuban tactical aircraft were based, San Antonio de los Baños, Campo Libertad, and Santiago de Cuba.

(U) Reconnaissance flights on 8, 11 and 13 April indicated the Cubans had 36 combat aircraft although many of these were not operable. Consequently it was decided to increase the aircraft in the air strikes from six to eight with one additional aircraft assigned as a spare.

(U) The D-2 air strikes were planned to destroy Castro's combat aircraft on the ground. It now appears that these air strikes destroyed all of Castro's tactical aircraft except for two Sea Furies, two B-26s, and three to four T-33s.

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EYES ONLY

(11) Opinions were expressed generally favoring the view that if the D-Day air strikes had been conducted as originally planned all of Castro's tactical aircraft would have been destroyed or at least eliminated to the extent that the invasion force could have survived.

(11) It was pointed out that all but eight or nine operable aircraft had been destroyed and that four of these were eliminated on D-Day by the invasion force.

(11) The question was raised as to why the T-33s had not been destroyed. Several possible answers were given, including the restriction against the use of napalm, self-imposed by CIA, and the possibility that the aircraft on one runway had not been attacked.

(113) QUESTION: (11) Were you surprised at the effectiveness of the T-33s.

(113) ANSWER: (11) Yes.

(113) QUESTION: (11) What led to the decision to conduct air strikes on D-2.

(113) ANSWER: (11) The strikes were timed to coincide with Nino Diaz landing in the Oriente and it was desired to tie the air strikes in with the defections.

(113) STATEMENT: (11) We knew before the landing that Castro retained operational ~~operational~~ tactical aircraft.

(113) QUESTION: (11) Why were limitations placed on the air strikes.

(113) ANSWER: (11) In order to reduce the appearance of a major military operation which would indicate U. S. involvement.

(113) STATEMENT: (11) It is a mistake to focus primary attention on one particular decision. We were operating under the very clear instructions to make this operation appear as one the Cubans could conduct without gross U. S. assistance.

(113) STATEMENT: (11) It was not one decision or one thing that caused failure, but many things.

(113) STATEMENT: (11) In covert operations of this kind political considerations always outweigh the military, with a consequent erosion of the military capability to the point that the operation becomes militarily infeasible.

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**EYES ONLY**

(U) STATEMENT: (U) This raises one of the vital considerations before this Group, the conflict between the desire for political acceptability and military effectiveness.

(U) STATEMENT: (U) The point was made that political considerations must be given their due weight, but if this results in making the operation militarily infeasible the President should be advised that the plan is no longer feasible. He cannot be expected to remember all the details of a plan nor the significance of one seemingly minor change in a military operation.

(U) STATEMENT: (U) The President had frequent consultations with military representatives.

(U) STATEMENT: (U) The DOD was not consulted in the decision to call off the air strikes.

(U) STATEMENT: (U) It is dangerous to conduct meetings where military advice is required when only one officer from one service is present. This was the case during six or eight meetings.

(U) QUESTION: (U) Were the D-Day air strikes previously approved.

(U) ANSWER: (U) The paper setting forth the air strikes was passed around at the April 12th meeting. This paper made clear that there would be air strikes, but not an all-out effort. However, this document was only passed around at the meeting, read and considered by some, and collected after the meeting. It is doubtful if the President read it or understood the details.

(U) QUESTION: (U) What led to the cancellation of the air strikes.

(U) ANSWER: (U) At 1300 Sunday it was understood that the plan, including the air strikes for dawn of D-Day, had been approved. At about 7:00 P.M. CIA representatives were called to Mr. Rusk's office. He was concerned over the apparent defection of two rather than one B-26 and an additional cargo plane because he felt these additional defections had caused him to mislead Mr. Stevenson. At 10:30 P.M. the CIA tactical commander was advised that the air strikes had been called off. He most strongly urged that this decision be reconsidered and reversed. In debating the air strikes question and in discussing the action to be taken to strengthen

(U) For a summary of this meeting, see Document m (Ed)

—note, 4/12—

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Mr. Stevenson's position, the President was contacted. In discussing the air strike question the President said he wasn't aware that there were going to be any air strikes on the morning of D-Day. At 2315 D-1 Mr. Rusk announced that there would be no dawn air strikes. At this time the invasion ships were within 5,000 yards of their landing beaches and it was physically impossible to call off the strikes.

(U) (B) QUESTION: (U) Was a strong position on this issue taken with Mr. Rusk.

(U) (B) ANSWER: (U) Probably not strong enough. It was indicated that the worst would be that the invaders would not have their B-26 support and if the ships were on their way out the force would be denied its resupply capability.

(U) (B) QUESTION: (U) At the 12 April meeting were the air strikes an issue.

(U) (B) ANSWER: (U) No, the plan appeared to have jelled.

(U) (B) STATEMENT: (U) There were only verbal instructions. These were not written, signed directives and the only papers that were available were fuzzy. The issues were never clearly resolved.

(U) (B) STATEMENT: (U) I understood there was to be one final briefing involving all the participants and setting forth the entire plan. This was never done. Had this briefing been held the ultimate decisions might have been different.

(U) (B) STATEMENT: (U) After cancellation of the air strikes an attempt was made to minimize the probable damage. At 0400 D-Day a CIA representative contacted the State Department to see if the Navy's protective CAP could be extended from the 20-mile limit to 15 or preferably a three-mile limit. The State Department objected and the President, in attempting to prevent U.S. attribution, confirmed that the Navy's protective CAP limit would not be changed. He did approve, however, EW support. Prior to this Presidential determination an alerting order had been sent to CINCLANT and he had turned his force around to be in a position to provide CAP and EW support if so ordered.

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EYES ONLY

(11b) By the time it became apparent we would not receive air CAP we sent out a message to put the troops ashore and move the ships out to sea.

(11c) The brigade troops commenced landing at Blue Beach at 0100.

(11c) 0300 <sup>T</sup><sub>m</sub> The CARIBE had completed unloading.

(11c) 0330 <sup>T</sup><sub>m</sub> The troops unloading from the <sup>(3)</sup>ALANTICO<sup>(TV)</sup> were under fire.

(11c) 0430 <sup>T</sup><sub>m</sub> Troops landed at Blue Beach.

(11c) 0600 <sup>T</sup><sub>m</sub> First LCU ashore.

(11c) 0630 <sup>T</sup><sub>m</sub> Enemy air attacks against shipping and Blue Beach commenced.

(11c) 0640 <sup>T</sup><sub>m</sub> Friendly aircraft arrived.

(11c) 1730 <sup>T</sup><sub>m</sub> Three LCUs had discharged vehicles and tanks.

(11c) 0825 <sup>T</sup><sub>m</sub> Castro T-33 shot down by <sup>(13)</sup>BLAGAR.

(11c) 0930 <sup>T</sup><sub>m</sub> <sup>(2)</sup>RIO ESCONDIDO<sup>(TV)</sup> hit and sunk. Crew members rescued and put aboard <sup>(13)</sup>BLAGAR.

(11c) [0930] <sup>T</sup><sub>m</sub> Brigade reported airstrip ready for use.

(11c) 1000 <sup>T</sup><sub>m</sub> Continuous enemy air attacks against withdrawing ships.

(11c) 1130 <sup>T</sup><sub>m</sub> Brigade reported only four hours ammunition left.

(11g) During the Blue Beach landings the <sup>(13)</sup>HUSTON<sup>(TV)</sup> proceeded up the Bay led by the <sup>(13)</sup>BARBARA J.<sup>(TV)</sup> They sent a reconnaissance team ashore and it was immediately attacked from the west flank. Two hundred seventy men did land in the vicinity of Red Beach. However, going ashore they saw lights from what appeared to be a construction project which they had not been previously aware of, and when they got ashore they ran into an enemy force estimated to have 300 troops and 12 tanks.

334 (11) As the <sup>(13)</sup>HUSTON<sup>(TV)</sup> was proceeding out of the Bay it was hit by a bomb and the ship went aground with approximately 130 personnel aboard.

(11) As regards the airborne landing little detailed information is available. However, all the aircraft returned safely reporting that the troops had jumped over their intended landing places. Furthermore, reports indicate some of the airborne personnel were occupying their assigned positions.

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CU-156/8

(10) During the course of D-Day the decision was made to conduct night air attacks against San Antonio de los Baños and Campo Libertad in an attempt to destroy Castro's air capability. The value of these attacks was negligible.

(11) Also during the night of 17-18 April three air drops were made at the landing beaches. One landed in the drop zone, one in the sea, and one drifted inland.

(11b) On D+1 at about 0730 the 2d Battalion reported it could not maintain its position without air support for more than 30 minutes.

(11c) 0324 <sup>T</sup><sub>m</sub> The Brigade Commander reported that Blue Beach was under attack by 12 tanks and four jet aircraft. The need for ammunition and supplies was repeated.

(11c) 1010 <sup>T</sup><sub>m</sub> Red Beach wiped out.

(11c) 1200 <sup>T</sup><sub>m</sub> Blue Beach under attack by MIG-15s and T-33s, out of tank ammunition, and almost out of small arms ammunition.

(11c) 1600 <sup>T</sup><sub>m</sub> <sup>(D)</sup><sub>ESSEX reported long line of tanks and trucks approaching Blue Beach from East.</sub>

(11g) Enemy air attacks and shortage of ammunition continued to be reported for the rest of the day. Ammunition and food were air-dropped on the airstrip. On the afternoon of D+1 three friendly B-26s intercepted a column of enemy tanks and trucks, causing 1,800 casualties. At this point it was emphasized that the over-all plan had been based on control of the air and this action was cited as evidence of what the B-26s would have been able to accomplish if the air plan had succeeded.

(11c) 1800 <sup>T</sup><sub>m</sub> 1st Battalion reported under heavy artillery attack.

(11c) 2000 <sup>T</sup><sub>m</sub> The Brigade Commander was advised that he would be evacuated after dark. He replied saying, "I will not be evacuated. We will fight to the end here if we have to."

(11) During the night of 18-19 April Navy CAF was again requested and permission was granted for one hour air CAF between 0630 and 0730. These aircraft were issued instructions to defend the invasion force from enemy air attack, but not to attack ground targets.

7  
~~SECRET~~ ULTRASENSITIVE

~~EYES ONLY~~



SECRET

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~~EYES ONLY~~

(1) When it came time for the friendly forces to launch their air strikes the Cuban air crews were either exhausted or demoralized by the lack of air cover, consequently American crews were dispatched. One American crew was shot down during the period of Navy air cover and another was shot down when air cover was not provided.

(11) At 0600 on the 19th of April enemy air strikes commenced. From 0710 to 1430 the enemy was closing in and the Brigade Commander was sending frantic appeals for air cover. Finally at 1430 he sent his final message saying, "Am destroying all equipment and communications. Tanks are in sight. I have nothing left to fight with. Am taking to woods. I cannot wait for you."

(11)(13) QUESTION: (1) What sort of anti-tank equipment did the force have?

(11)(13) ANSWER: (1) A number of 3.5-inch bazookas; five tanks; two 75 mm recoilless rifles; and an undetermined number of anti-tank mines.

(11)(13) STATEMENT: (1) In considering the possible reasons for the shooting down of the B-26 during the period of Navy air CAP it was suggested that the rules of engagement may have unduly restricted the Navy.

(11)(13) QUESTION: (1) What specific intelligence got to the President?

(11)(13) ANSWER: (1) NIEs, intelligence annexes and briefings.

(11)(13) STATEMENT: (1) It would be desirable to examine the ground rules and determine the price we paid to try and keep within political limitations.

(11)(13) STATEMENT: (1) It appears this operation was simply too big to remain covert.

(11) Colonel Beerli, head of Air Operations for the CIA, briefed on air aspects of the operation. His position for this operation was coordinated with Colonel Hawkins. Lieutenant Colonel Gaines was his chief deputy for this operation. Lieutenant Colonel Gaines had a staff of 14 people working on this operation in Washington. Except for the security, administration and cover people the personnel assigned were members of the Air Force. The actual training site in Guatemala was run primarily by Major Campbell with a force of 20 people.

ULTRA-SENSITIVE

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CO-56/10

⑪ The point was made that one of the greatest procedural difficulties resulted from the physical separation of the air staff from the rest of the planners under Colonel Hawkins.

⑫ Colonel Beerli stated that he had 316 personnel at Puerto Cabezas, of whom 159 were Americans. The Cuban crews were recruited in Miami from 92 personnel that were screened. From these personnel they recruited and/or developed 17 B<sub>N</sub><sup>1</sup>-26 crews and five C<sub>N</sub><sup>1</sup>-46 crews. As far as the concept of air operations was concerned the concept varied very little from the beginning. The primary effort was being directed toward eliminating the enemy air force and to provide close support. On the 13th of April the photos indicated that Castro's combat aircraft were located on three airfields. On D<sub>N</sub><sup>1</sup>-2 eight aircraft were committed against these fields with the results previously mentioned. It was pointed out that the B<sub>N</sub><sup>1</sup>-26s had been the primary concern and the capability of the T<sub>N</sub><sup>1</sup>-33s hadn't been appreciated as it wasn't believed that these aircraft were armed.

⑬ By late afternoon of D<sub>N</sub><sup>1</sup>-1 photos indicated that instead of dispersing his aircraft Castro had concentrated them at San Antonio de los Baños.

⑭ After the cancellation of the dawn air strikes on D-Day the pilots were briefed to provide close support for the invasion force with at least two aircraft over the beach at all times. Thirteen missions were launched on D-Day in providing close support to the invasion force and in protecting against hostile vessels.

⑮ That night six B<sub>N</sub><sup>1</sup>-26 aircraft were launched against Cuban airfields. However, two aircraft aborted on take-off and the others were not able to identify their targets due to haze.

⑯ On D+1 six aircraft were scheduled in support of the beach-head. On the night of D+1 two aircraft got off and struck San Antonio de los Baños. On Wednesday morning two B<sub>N</sub><sup>1</sup>-26s were committed again and two more were lost.

⑰ In summary there were 13 strikes on D-Day, four on D-Day night, six on D+1, and seven on D+2, for a total of 39 air strikes. Seven

SECRETULTRA SENSITIVE

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aircraft were lost in these operations. Furthermore, six C-54s made air resupply drops and one C-46 landed on the beachhead airstrip on the evening of D-Day.

(11b) STATEMENT: (71) It is believed that the Cuban pilots did as well as could be expected and they would have done better in an aura of victory.

(11b) Following this the Group were read a paper by Colonel Hawkins in which he set forth his personal opinion as to some of the deficiencies which became apparent during the operation. Among these deficiencies were:

(11b) The lack of clear-cut policy directives, signed. He does not believe that verbal instructions are sufficient.

(11b) The slowness of government machinery in making policy decisions.

3 ✓ (11b) Overcentralization of control. This prompted some discussion, resulting in the statement that the CIA doesn't have the capability to organize and train paramilitary forces. At this point a message was read from Colonel Hawkins just prior to the invasion in which he indicated that the invasion force was better armed and equipped than some U. S. Infantry units and that Lieutenant Colonel Gaines believed the air unit was as well qualified as the best U. S. Air Force squadron.

(11b) Lack of adequate organization and staff. The paramilitary responsibility should go to the DOD.

(11b) Training conditions were unsatisfactory. The desirability of using bases on Saipan or in the United States were considered with no conclusions reached.

(11g) The meeting adjourned. (84) (74)

93-2 ✓ See Document

(memo for record, 4/24)

93-3 ✓ See Document

(memo to Taylor, 4/26, choned

under 4/13).

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(11) It was clear to the President that the ~~TRINIDAD~~ <sup>TRINIDAD</sup> Plan had military advantages over ~~ZAPATA~~. However, the choice of the latter overcame many of the political objections raised against ~~TRINIDAD~~.

(11) With regard to the cancellation of the D-Day strikes, the President is inclined to think that a special NSC Meeting should have been called to deal with this important matter. However, the CIA officials in charge of the operation did not speak to him directly with regard to the critical nature of the cancellation.

495  
(11) The President was aware of the serious shortage of ammunition in the beachhead at the end of D+1. However, he was never approached for authority to extend the Navy air cover over the ammunition convoy in its movement to Blue Beach.

(11) In connection with paragraph 14 of the Committee's paper "Study of the Anti-Castro Invasion ~~ZAPATA~~" dated 11 May 1961, the Chart and paper entitled "A Mechanism for the Planning and Coordination of Cold War Strategy" were discussed. The President encouraged the Group to develop this organizational concept in greater detail for inclusion in their final report. The latter is to be oral, supported by a written memorandum. It was agreed that this final report and the supporting memorandum would not go beyond the President, but the possibility was left open of some sanitized document to set right the past misstatements of the press. ✓

(11) There was some discussion of the desirability of changing the name of CIA in order to reduce its visibility. Mr. Dulles undertook to study the matter and see if he could make a recommendation. (85/94)

(43) ✓ Admiral Burke's copy of this paper, which was an initial version of the final report submitted to the President in June, ~~can~~ <sup>is</sup> be ~~found~~ in Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials.

CU-212

## Informational Memorandum

Washington, June 22, 1961.

SUBJECT: Comments by Fidel Castro 14 and 15 June on the Invasion of 17 April 1961

1. The airborne battalion was dropped in at points too close to the landing beaches. If they had been dropped at a more remote point of the causeways and had cut these, Castro could not have moved in his tanks, motorized artillery and "10,000 rockets". Apart from lack of air cover, the invaders' main errors were this failure to drop the airborne battalion far enough inland and this failure to cut the causeways to Playa Giron and Playa Larga. Also, the paratroopers did not engage the enemy until approximately 0800 on D-Day. Castro was mystified at the delay in entering into action. The invaders did not know of certain special trails by which Castro had been able to infiltrate men (not heavy stuff) into the Cienaga de Zapata.

2. After the Houston was sunk about five miles south of Playa Larga, the Battalion which it was carrying got ashore and bivouacked. Castro could not understand why it did not march to Playa Larga and join the forces which had been landed and were in combat.

3. Castro himself was in the second or third tank that advanced from Australia to Parite, (which Castro said should be called "Palite") and the tank in front of him was knocked out.

4. The invading forces fought very well as long as they thought they had air cover. After it failed, it was an easy matter to get them to surrender.

5. Castro said 15 June that his air force consisted of four T-33's and two sea furies and one B-26. 14 June he had said, "We dispersed my T-33's, Sea Furies and F-27's and we dispersed them very well," with the apparent intended implication that a second strike would not have gotten all of them. He also said 14 June: "I had a few more aircraft than I had pilots, and I had nine pilots and lost two." Castro said he was mystified that no additional effort was made to get the planes.

National Defense University,

Source: NDU, Taylor Papers, Box 12, Cuba, A Item 8. No

classification markings. appears on the source text.

Unclassified. No drafting information is provided on the this document. It was initialed as seen by General Taylor, however, indicating that it may have been prepared in response to the continuing interest of the members of the Cuba Study Group in the subject.

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CU-210/2

⑪ 6. Castro said the Cienaga de Zapata area was "ideal ground" from the military viewpoint and that if the causeways had been cut the invasion force could have accomplished the mission of holding a piece of Cuban territory long enough to establish a base for ships and air and for proclamation of a provisional government which could be overtly supplied. At Parite ("Palite") at 1500 on 15 June Castro said: "Right here I would have used four or five of the 75 mm. anti-tank guns if I had been an invader. I also would have used a couple of their 81 mm. (42 in.) mortars, and the paratroopers, with the 75 mm. anti-tank guns and the mortars could have controlled this entrance, which is where we came through. I could, in the invaders' position, have held the place, and at this particular place it would have been almost impossible for us to flank them."

⑪ 7. The invasion had a "good plan, poorly executed". If the invaders had had good air cover, sent the paratroopers farther inland, and cut the causeways, the story would have been different.

⑪ 8. Castro's air force concentrated on attacking enemy shipping whereas the invasion force planes engaged in ground attacks.

⑪ 9. Castro knew the time but not the place of the invasion. At first he thought it might be near Baracoa where the U.S. Navy was engaged in simulated operations.

574 ⑪ 10. On 15 June, on the beach at Playa Giron, Castro said: "Tuesday afternoon 18 April we stood at Playa Giron. We had won after 36 hours of combat." 89 94

93 A ~~handwritten~~ note on the source text at this point, in an unknown hand, reads: "He must have been confused as to the date." 90



Memorandum for the Record, by General Maxwell D. Taylor

Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, June 23, 1961.

Subject: Meeting with General Eisenhower at Gettysburg, June 23, 1961

Present: General Eisenhower  
General Taylor  
Mr. Allen Dulles

1. The purpose of the visit to Gettysburg was to brief General Eisenhower on the findings of the Cuban Study Group in particular relation to the contents of an article by Stewart Alsop in the Saturday Evening Post of June 24, 1961. In the course of the meeting the following points were discussed and the findings of the Cuban Study Group on these points were explained to General Eisenhower.

a. The Alsop article allegation contained in the following paragraph:

"That plan (the Eisenhower plan), like the final Kennedy plan, was based on the assumption that there would be widespread anti-Castro uprisings and defections. It was hoped that these would make any overt American military intervention unnecessary. But the Eisenhower plan also envisaged American intervention on a contingency basis. American aircraft would intervene, either openly or in unmarked planes, if necessary to maintain control over the beach-head and prevent destruction of the anti-Castro forces."

In response to questions, General Eisenhower emphasized that there never had been an operational plan presented to him, hence no "Eisenhower plan" could have existed. He does not believe that he ever knew of the proposal of an amphibious operation, and certainly was not aware of any plan approximating the TRINIDAD Plan.

b. The role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to include their attention to logistics.

c. The air strike plan and the circumstances surrounding the cancellation of the D-Day strikes.

d. The cause of the ammunition shortage and the effectiveness of the T<sub>33</sub>'s.

e. The loss of communications equipment. General Eisenhower had the impression that all of the communications equipment was in one

Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 12, Cuba, Bay of Pigs. Drafted by Taylor.  
Secret. Taylor and Dulles briefed Eisenhower at President Kennedy's request. This was the last task associated with Taylor's responsibilities on the Cuba Study Group. On June 26, President Kennedy addressed a letter to Taylor asking him to become Kennedy's military adviser in the White House with the title of Military Representative of the President. Taylor accepted and began to exercise his new responsibilities on July 1. (Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, pp. 196-197)

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ship, which was sunk through air attack. It was explained to him that communications equipment was on two ships, and an auxiliary means of communication to Washington existed from the Brigade Commander by way of the landing craft.

16 f. The eleven conclusions reached by the Cuban Study Group.

- 578
- 11 2. General Eisenhower listened ~~to~~<sup>to</sup> the presentation, took issue with none of the points raised and appeared to indicate general approval. He observed that the over-all lesson seemed to be the danger of changing an operational plan at the last minute. This observation led him to discuss the pressure placed upon him just prior to D-Day in Normandy to cancel the airborne landings.
- 11 3. One reaction on General Eisenhower's part was to suggest the need for a public statement which would correct some of the misapprehensions about the Cuban affair. However, after discussing the difficulties inherent in such an action, he withdrew the suggestion.
- 11 4. He recognizes the need for improving governmental machinery for handling complex interdepartmental operations such as the Cuban affair. In the course of discussing this point he expressed some concern over the present status of the National Security Council resulting from the elimination of the Planning Board and the OCB. He agreed that some new agency was probably necessary to fill the gap, and that the 5412 Committee with an expanded charter might provide the vehicle.
- 11 5. He commented upon his closeness to the 5412 Committee and the support given him in covert matters by the Presidential Board on Intelligence.
- 11 6. The entire discussion was most cordial. I received the impression that General Eisenhower perceives the need of suppressing further public debate of the Cuban operation. He expressed disapproval of the recent TV appearance of Mr. Miller and Senator Clark in which the Cuban operation was argued. ~~As the visitors left, he reiterated his appreciation to President~~

17 MDT 85 54

93 Taylor added a final handwritten paragraph to the typed text which reads, as follows:

93 17. General Eisenhower expressed the feeling that the U.S. would have to get rid of Castro <sup>in</sup> preferably using as a reason for intervention some Castro mistake. As the visitors left, he reiterated his appreciation to President Kennedy for arranging the briefing. The final sentence had been typed as the closing sentence of paragraph 6 before Taylor crossed it out and revised the text.

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**FAX**

Date

4/18/96

Number of pages including cover sheet

22

TO: Jim Edgington  
DOD

FROM:

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REMARKS: ☐ Urgent ☒ For your review ☐ Reply ASAP ☐ Please Comment

Per Telcon, attached are document list for documents on Cuba, 1961-1962 Department plans to make available in ms. form, and list of DOD docs, including docs. obtained from NSA & Naval Historical Center, with declassification results. Also attached are draft Q's & A's for time of press statement. We will provide copies of the declassified ms. to be released as soon as possible. We will

DOD

Send copies of docs by COB today (by Fed Ex.)

**HOW TO USE THE DOCUMENT LIST FOR THE FOREIGN RELATIONS  
MANUSCRIPT ON CUBA, 1961-1962  
["FRUS Data Sorted By Title and Compilation"]**

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## FRUS DATA SORTED BY TITLE AND COMPILATION

April 17, 1996

COMP	F	DOC#	TP	DOC	DT	FROM	MESSAGE NO	TO	PGS	I	C	DC	SRCE	FILE	ORIGIN	EQUITIES	DECL	AUTH	
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VOLUME:	X																		
CU	N	1	TE	610103		HAVANA	2574	STATE	1	N	N	NLE	PROJECT CLEAN UP	C	DOS				
CU	N	2	EN	610103		WH CUBA NTG			1	S	N	DOSHO	NDU. LEWITZER	PAPE	DOS	CIA	DOD	NSC	
CU	N	3	MC	610103		RUSK/HERTER			1	S	N	NLE	HERTER PAPERS		DOS				
CU	N	4	MC	610103		DRE/HERTER			1	N	N	NLE	HERTER PAPERS		DOS	NSC			
CU	N	5	ME	610105		GODDPASTER		FILES	2	N	N	NLE	PROJECT CLEAN UP	C	WH	DOS	NSC		
CU	N	6	TE	610103		STATE	1347	HAVANA	2	U	N	DOSCF	611.37/1361		DOS				
CU	N	7	EN	610103		DDE STATEMENT			1	U	N	DOSHO	PUBLIC PAPERS OF PR	DOS	DOS				
CU	N	8	ME	610104		CHIEF, WH/4/PM		CHIEF, WH/4	8	S	N	NLK	NSP CS CUBA	TAYL	CIA	DOS			
CU	N	9	EN	610104		UN SECURITY COUNC			1	U	N	DOSHO	UN DOCS		DOS				
CU	N	10	EN	610105		CIA BRIEFING NSC			2	S	N	DOSHO	NLE WHITMAN	FILE	DOS	CIA	NSC		
CU	N	11	ME	610105		SEC STATE		PRESIDENT	1	S	N	NLE	WHITMAN	DULLES-HER	DOS				
CU	N	11A	ME	610105		BARNES		DULLES	3	S	N	CIA	JOB 8500664R	BOX 2	CIA	DOS	NSC		
CU	N	12	ME	610110		MERCANT		HERTER	1	S	N	DOSCF	711.56314/1-1061		DOS	NSC			
CU	N	13	EN	610111		JCS BRIEFING			1	T	N	DOSHO	NAVAL HIST CENTER		DOS	CIA	DOD	NSC	
CU	N	13A	M1	610116		DEFENSE STAFF STU			8	T	N	CIA	JOB 8500664R	SRCE D	CIA	DOD	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	14	EN	610119		DPE-JFK MEETING			1	S	N	DOSHO	DOS/HERK, OSD/PRC	6	DOS	NSC			
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CU	N	15A	ME	610123		BARNES		RECORD	2	S	N	CIA	JOB 8500664R	BOX 3	CIA	DOS	NSC		
CU	N	16	MC	610125		JFK AND JCS			1	I	T	E	NLK	CLIFTON SERIES	JCS	WH	DOD	DOS	NSC
CU	N	17	ME	610127		JCS		MCNAMARA	3	T	R	DOD	OSD FILES	PRC	65A3	JCS	DOS		
CU	N	18	ME	610127		JCS		MCNAMARA	1	S	N	DOD	OASD/ISA	PRC	64A23	JCS	DOS		
CU	N	19	MC	610128		JFK AND ADVISERS			3	T	R	NLK	NSP CS CUBA	GEN 1/6	WH	CIA	DOD	DOS	NSC
CU	N	20	EN	610128		MEETING RE CUBA P			1	T	N	DOSHO	NAVAL HIST CENTER		DOS	DOD			
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CU	N	21	ME	610131		JFK		RUSK	1	C	R	NLK	POP CS CUBA	SECURIT	WH	DOS			
CU	N	22	ME	610202		MAJN		JFK	3	T	N	DOSLF	ARA/CCA	66D501	DOS				
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CU	N	25	MC	610204		MANN/KANGLES			2	C	N	DOSCF	737.00/2-461		DOS				
CU	N	26	MC	610206		BONSAL/VARONA			1	S	N	DOSCF	737.00/2-461		DOS				
CU	N	26A	ME	610207				RECORD	7	S	N	CIA	JOB 8500664R	BOX 3	CIA	DOD	DOS	NSC	
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## FRUS DATA SORTED BY TITLE AND COMPILATION

April 17, 1996

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VOLUME: X																		
CU	N	30	EM	610205	NSC	MEETING			1	S	N		DOSHO	DOS S/S-NSC 66D95	DOS			
CU	P	31	ME	610211	SCHLESINGER			JFK	2	T	N	NLK	SCHLESINGER PAPERS	WH	DOS	NSC		
CU	Y	31A	ME	610211	COOPER			USIB	12	T	N	CIA	JOB 80901285A, DC1	CIA	DOS			
CU	N	32	ME	610214	BEFLE			RUSK	1	S	N	DOSLF	ARA/CCA FILES 66D53	DOS	CIA	NSC		
CU	N	33	ME	610215	MANN			RUSK	6	T	E	NLK	NSF CS CUBA GEN 1/5	DOS				
CU	N	34	ME	610217	CIA MEMO			JFK	10	T	N	NLK	NSF CS CUBA GEN 1/5	CIA	DOS			
CU	N	35	ME	610218	BUNDY				1	T	R	NLK	NSF CS CUBA GEN 1/5	WH	DOS			
CU	N	36	EM	610218	WH MEETING				1	T	N	DOSHO	NLK NSF CS CUBA TAY	DOS	CIA	NSC		
CU	N	37	CC	610218	RUSK			SMATHERS	1	N	N	DOSLF	RUSK FILES 72D192	DOS				
CU	N	38	ME	610221	BUNDY			RUSK	1	E	N	DOSLF	S/S-NSC MISC 66D95	WH	DOS	NSC		
CU	N	39	ME	610224	RUSK			JFK	2	S	R	NLK	POF CS CUBA SECURIT	DOS				
CU	N	39A	EN	610301	ED NOTE ON ASSASS				1	E	N	DOSHO	CIA JOB 85-00664R A	DOS	CIA			
CU	N	40	TE	610304	BUENOS AIRES		1011	STATE	3	C	N	DOSCF	737.00/3-461	DOS				
CU	N	41	PT	610304	BUENOS AIRES			STATE	1	K	N	DOSCF	737.00/3-1761	DOS				
CU	N	41A	ME	610310	CIA STAFF			DULLES	3	E	N	CIA	JCB 8500664R BOX 3	CIA	DOS			
CU	N	42	ME	610310	SCHLESINGER			JFK	1	C	R	NLK	PCF CS CUBA SECURIT	WH	DOS			
CU	N	43	ME	610310	JCS			MCNAMARA	25	T	R	DOD	OASD C A FILES 71A2 JCS	DOS				
CU	N	44	ME	610310	JCS			MCNAMARA	3	T	N	DOD	OASD C A FILES 71A2 JCS	CIA	DOD	DOS		
CU	N	45	ME	610311	CIA MEMO				12	T	R	NLK	NSF CS CUBA INTELL	CIA	DOS			
CU	N	46	EN	610311	WH MEETING				1	T	N	DOSHO	NLK NSF CS CUBA TAY	DOS	CIA	NSC		
CU	N	47	MR	610311	NSAW 11				1	T	R	NLK	NSF MMS NSC MEMOS N	DOS	DOS			
CU	N	48	ME	610315	CIA MEMO				7	T	N	NLK	NSF CS CUBA INTELL	CIA	DOS			
CU	N	49	ME	610315	JCS			MCNAMARA	11	T	R	NLK	NSF CS CUBA SUB TAY	JCS	DOS			
CU	N	50	ME	610315	SCHLESINGER			JFK	2	S	N	NLK	NSF CS CUBA GEN 1/5	WH	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	51	ME	610315	BUNDY			JFK	1	T	R	NLK	NSF CS CUBA GEN 1/5	WH	DOS			
CU	N	52	EN	610315	WH MEETING				1	T	N	DOSHO	NLK NSF CS CUBA SUB	DOS	NSC			
CU	N	53	EN	610316	WH MEETING				1	T	N	DOSHO	NAVAL HIST CENTER	DOS	CIA	EOD	NSC	
CU	N	54	TE	610318	STATE		1295	BUENOS AIRES	2	N	N	DOSCF	737.00/3-1861	DOS				
CU	N	55	ME	610320	SCHLESINGER			JFK	1	S	N	NLK	SCHLESINGER PAP CUB	WH	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	56	ME	610321	BARNES			DULLES	3	S	N	NLK	NSF CS CUBA SUB EXI	CIA	DOS			
CU	N	57	ME	610322	LAMBERTY			HURWITZ	2	C	N	DOSCF	737.00/3-2261	DOS	CIA			
CU	N	58	EN	610322	WORKING GROUP MTG				1	T	N	DOSHO	NAVAL HIST CENTER	DOS	DOS			
CU	N	59	ME	610325	JCS			MCNAMARA	10	T	R	DOD	OASD C A 71A2896	JCS	DOS			
CU	N	60	ME	610328	DENNISON			LENNITZER	3	T	R	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	DOS			

April 17, 1996

FRUS DATA SORTED BY TITLE AND COMPILATION

DECL AUTHB

ORIGIN EQUITIES

PGS I C DC SRCB FILB

MESSAGE NO TO

COMP	DOC#	TP	DOC	DT	FROM
1	1	1	1	1	1

TITLE: CUBA: 1961-1962

VOLUME: X

CU	N 61	EN 610329	WH MEETING					2	T N	DOSHO NLK NSF CS CUBA SUB	DOS	DOD	NSC
CU	N 62	ME 610331	BOWLES	RUSK				4	C N	LOC BOWLES PAPERS YALE	DOS		
CU	N 63	ME 610401	LENNITZER	DENNISON				2	T R	NLK NSF CS CUBA SUB TAY JCS	DOS		
CU	N 64	TE 610401	MOSCOW	STATE	2162			2	I C N	DOSCF 751J.00/4-161	DOS		
CU	N 65	EN 610402	MCMANAMA BRIEFING					1	T N	DOSHO NDG TAYLOR PAPERS C	DOS		
CU	N 66	EN 610403	CUBA WHITE PAPER					1	U N	DOSHO DOS PUB 7-71	DOS		
CU	N 67	EN 610404	ZAPATA PLANNING					1	T N	DOSHO NLK NSF CS CUBA SUB DOS	DOD	NSC	
CU	N 68	ME 610405	SCHLESINGER	JFK				4	S R	NLK POF CS CUBA SECURIT WH	DOS		
CU	N 69	ME 610405	COERR	RUSK				1	C N	DOSCF 737.00/4-561	DOS		
CU	N 70	EN 610405	ZAPATA PLANNING					1	T N	DOSHO NEU TAYLOR PAP. NLK	DOS		
CU	N 71	EN 610405	ZAPATA PLANNING					1	T N	DOSHO NLK NSF CS CUBA SUB DOS	DOS		
CU	N 72	ME 610407	LENNITZER	DENNISON				5	T R	NLK NSF CS CUBA SUB TAY JCS	DOS		
CU	N 73	ME 610410	SCHLESINGER	JFK				9	S N	NLK NSF CS CUBA GEN 1/6 WH	DOS	NSC	
CU	N 74	OM 610410	OPERATION ORDER					3	I T N	USN NAVAL HIST CENTER USN	DOD	DOS	
CU	N 75	TE 610410	USUNN	STATE	2803			2	C N	DOSCF 737.03/4-1661	DOS		
CU	N 76	TE 610411	USUNN	STATE	2821			2	C N	DOSCF 737.03/4-1161	DOS		
CU	N 77	TE 610411	STATE	USUNN	1981			3	C N	DOSCF 737.03/4-1161	DOS		
CU	N 78	ME 610411	BARNES	SCHLESINGER				3	S N	NLK NSF CS CUBA SUB INC CIA	DOS		
CU	N 79	EN 610412	ZAPATA PLANNING					1	T N	DOSHO NLK NSF CS CUBA SUB DOS	CIA	NSC	
CU	N 80	TE 610412	USUNN	STATE	2813			7	T N	CIA JOB 95006648	CIA	DOS	NSC
CU	N 81	ME 610412	PUNTY	RUSK				1	C N	DOSCF 737.10/4-1261	DOS		
CU	N 82	MT 610413	JCS	CINCLANT	JCS 468-51			1	T R	NLK NSF CS CUBA GEN 1/6 WH	CIA	DOD	NSC
CU	N 83	MT 610413	JCS	CINCLANT	JCS 459-51			1	T N	USN NAVAL HIST CENTER USN	DOD	DOS	
CU	N 84	ME 610426	KING	TAYLOR				2	T N	NLK NSF CS CUBA SUB TAY CIA	DOS		
CU	N 85	TE 610413	USUNN	STATE	2848			2	C N	DOSCF 737.00/4-1361	DOS		
CU	N 86	MT 610414	SPG 81.8	CINCLANTFLT	141726Z			1	T N	USN NAVAL HIST CENTER USN	DOD	DOS	
CU	N 87	ME 610414	SCHLESINGER	JFK				2	S N	DOSCF 731.00/4-1461	WH	DOS	NSC
CU	N 88	EN 610415	BEGINNING OF ZAPA					1	T N	DOSHO NAVAL HIST CENTER DOS	DOD	DOS	
CU	N 89A	ME 610415	BEERLI	RECORD				2	N N	CIA JOB 85006648 BOX 4	CIA	DOD	DOS
CU	N 90	EN 610415	CUBAN RESPONSE					2	N N	DOSHO UN DOCS	DOS		
CU	N 91	TE 610416	USUNN	STATE	2892			1	T R	DOSCF 611.37/4-1661	DOS		
CU	N 91	PT 610416	STEVENSON	JFK	2894			2	S N	DOSCF 737.00/4-1661	DOS		
CU	N 91A	ME 610416	BARKLEY	RECORD				4	S N	CIA JOB 85006648 BOX 3	CIA	DOD	DOS

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DECL AUTH

ORIGIN EQUITIES

PGS I C DC SRCE FILE

TO

MESSAGE NO

COMP P DOCH TP DOC DT FROM

TITLE: CUBA: 1961-1962

VOLUME: X

COMP	P	DOCH	TP	DOC	DT	FROM	MESSAGE NO	TO	PGS	I	C	DC	SRCE	FILE	ORIGIN EQUITIES	DECL AUTH
CU	N	92	NE	610509	CABELL			TAYLOR	3	S	R	NLX	NSF CS CUBA SUB TAY	CIA	DOS	
CU	N	93	RE	610504	CIA AFTER-ACTION				20	S	N	NDU	TAYLOR PAPERS CUBA	CIA	DOS	
CU	N	94	RP	610504	CIA AFTER-ACTION				8	S	N	NDU	TAYLOR PAPERS CUBA	CIA	DOS	
CU	Y	94A	PT	610416	CIA TEL IN 3811				1	T	N	CIA	JOB 8500664R	CIA	DOS	
CU	N	95	MT	610417	GRAY		JCS 994221	DENNISON	2	T	R	NLX	NSF CS CUBA SUB TAY	JCS	CIA	DOD
CU	N	96	EN	610417	ZAPATA LANDINGS				1	T	N	DOSH	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	CIA	DOD
CU	N	97	MC	610417	BUNDY/RUSK				1	N	N	POSLF	RUSK FILES 72D192	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	98	ME	610417	SCHLESINGER			JFK	2	S	N	NLX	SCHLESINGER PAPERS WH	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	99	MT	610417	WHEELER		JCS 994247	DENNISON	2	T	N	NLX	NSF CS CUBA SUB TAY	JCS	CIA	DOD
CU	N	100	EN	610417	SHIP MOVEMENTS				1	T	N	DOSH	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	DOD	DOS
CU	N	101	TE	610418	MOSCOW		2550	STATE	2	S	R	DOSLF	S/S FILES 77D163 PE	DOS		
CU	N	102	ME	610418	BATTLE			SCHLESINGER	7	S	N	DOSCF	737.00/4-1861	DOS		
CU	N	103	ME	610418	BUNDY			JFK	1	T	R	NLX	POF CS CUBA GEN APP WH	DOS		
CU	N	103A	PT	610418	CIA		4737	NICARAGUA	2	T	N	CIA	JOB 8500664R BOX 4	CIA	DOD	DOS
CU	N	103B	PT	610418	CIA		4739	NICARAGUA	1	T	N	CIA	JOB 8500664R BOX 4	CIA	DOS	
CU	Y	103C	PT	610418	CIA TEL IN 4292				1	T	N	CIA	JOB 8500664R	CIA	DOS	
CU	N	104	MC	610418	BURKE/WILHIDE				2	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	DOD	NSC
CU	N	105	MT	610418	GRAY		JCS 994309	DENNISON	1	T	R	NLX	NSF CS CUBA SUB TAY	JCS	DOS	
CU	N	106	MT	610418	GRAY		JCS 994317	DENNISON	1	T	R	NLX	NSF CS CUBA SUB TAY	JCS	DOS	
CU	N	107	MT	610418	BURKE		182023Z	DENNISON	1	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	DOD	DOS
CU	N	108	MT	610418	STG 91.9		192142Z	CINCLANTFLT	1	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	CIA	DOD
CU	Y	108A	PT	610418	CIA TEL OUT 7127				1	T	N	CIA	JOB 8500664R	CIA	DOS	
CU	N	109	MT	610418	DENNISON		182152Z	MCELROY	1	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	DOD	DOS
CU	N	110	MT	610418	STG 81.9		182212Z	CINCLANTFLT	1	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	DOD	DOS
CU	N	111	MT	610418	GRAY		JCS 994349	DENNISON	1	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	JCS	CIA	DOD
CU	N	112	MT	610418	CINCLANT		182305Z	JCS	1	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	DOD	DOS
CU	N	113	MC	610419	RUSK/WENSHIRE				3	C	N	DOSCF	737.00/4-1861	DOS		
CU	N	114	MT	610418	JCS		JCS 994363	CINCLANT	1	T	R	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	JCS	DOS	
CU	N	115	MT	610418	JCS		JCS 994364	CINCLANT	1	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	JCS	DOD	DOS
CU	N	116	MT	610418	BURKE		190137Z	DENNISON	2	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	DOD	DOS
CU	N	117	MT	610418	BURKE		190217Z	DENNISON	1	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	DOD	DOS
CU	Y	117A	PT	610419	CIA TEL IN 4455				1	T	N	CIA	JOB 8500664R	CIA	DOS	
CU	N	118	MT	610418	STG 81.9		190452Z	CINCLANTFLT	1	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	CIA	DOD
CU	N	119	MT	610419	CINCLANTFLT		190627Z	STG 81.9	1	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	DOD	DOS

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COMP	P	DOC#	TP	DOC	DT	FROM	MESSAGE NO	TO	PGS	I	C	DC	SRCE	FILE	ORIGIN	EQUITIES	DECL	AUTH
CU	N	120	MT	610419	CINCLANTFLT	190701Z	CNO	1	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	DOE	DOS			
CU	N	121	MT	610419	CINCLANTFLT	190711Z	CNO	1	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	DOE	DOS			
CU	N	122	MT	610419	JCS 994169	CINCLANTFLT	190841Z	2	T	R	NLK	NSF CS CUBA SUB TAY	JCS	DOS				
CU	N	123	MT	610419	CNO	CINCLANTFLT	190841Z	1	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	DOE	DOS			
CU	N	124	EN	610419	BRIEFING OF JCS	191340Z	CINCLANTFLT	1	T	N	DOSH	USN NAVAL HIST CENT	DOS	CIA	DOD			
CU	N	125	MT	610419	STG 81.8	191542Z	STG 81.8	1	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	DOE	DOS			
CU	N	126	MT	610419	CINCLANTFLT	191542Z	STG 81.8	1	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	DOE	DOS			
CU	N	127	MT	610419	CINCLANTFLT	191542Z	STG 81.8	1	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	DOE	DOS			
CU	N	128	MT	610419	CINCLANTFLT	191542Z	STG 81.8	1	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	DOE	DOS			
CU	N	129	MT	610419	JCS	JCS 994382	CINCLANT	1	T	R	NLK	NSF CS CUBA SUB TAY	JCS	DOS				
CU	N	130	TE	610419	USUNN	2917	STATE	4	T	R	DOSCF	611.37/4-1961	DOS					
CU	N	131	MT	610419	STG 81.8	191705Z	CINCLANTFLT	1	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	DOE	DOS			
CU	N	132	MT	610419	JCS	JCS 994392	CINCLANT	1	T	R	NLK	NSF CS CUBA SUB TAY	JCS	DOS				
CU	N	133	MT	610419	STG 81.8	191857Z	CINCLANTFLT	1	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	DOD	DOS			
CU	N	134	MT	610419	STG 81.5	191917Z	CINCLANTFLT	1	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	DOD	DOS			
CU	N	135	MT	610419	JCS	JCS 994409	CINCLANT	1	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	JCS	CIA	DOD	DOS		
CU	N	136	MT	610419	STG 81.8	192045Z	CINCLANTFLT	1	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	DOD	DOS			
CU	N	137	MT	610419	JCS	JCS 994464	CINCLANT	1	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	JCS	DOD	DOS			
CU	N	138	ME	610419	RFK		JFK	4	N	N	NLK	POF CS CUBA GEN APR	DOS	NSC				
CU	N	139	MT	610420	NOTES ON CUBA MTG		LENNITZER	3	U	R	LOC	BOWLES PAPERS YALE	DOS	NSC				
CU	N	140	ME	610420	MCNAMARA		RUSK	1	T	N	DOD	OASD C A FILES 71A2	DOD	DOS				
CU	N	141	ME	610420	COENK			2	C	N	DOSCF	ARA FILES 62024 CUB	DOS	DOS				
CU	N	142	MT	610420	JCS	JCS 994569	CINCLANT	1	T	R	NLK	NSF CS CUBA SUB TAY	JCS	DOS				
CU	N	143	EN	610421	MCNAMARA MTG JCS			1	T	N	DOSH	USN NAVAL HIST CENT	DOS	CIA	DOD			
CU	N	144	ME	610421	ROSTOW		JFK	2	I	T	N	DOD	OASD FILES 65A3464	WH	DOS	NSC		
CU	N	145	EN	610421	UN ACTION			1	U	N	DOSH	UN DOCS	DOS					
CU	N	146	MT	610421	JCS	JCS 994576	CINCLANT	1	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	CIA	DOD	DOS		
CU	N	147	MT	610422	RECORD OF NSC ACT			2	T	N	DOSCF	S/S-NSC FILES 66D95	NSC	CIA	DOD	DOS		
CU	N	148	MT	610422	NOTES ON NSC MTG			3	U	N	LOC	BOWLES PAPERS YALE	DOS	NSC				
CU	N	149	ME	610422	MCNAMARA		BURKE	1	C	N	DOD	OASD C A FILES 71A2	DOD	DOS				
CU	N	150	ME	610422	KING		FILES	8	I	T	N	NLK	NSF CS CUBA SUB TAY	CIA	DOS			
CU	N	151	EN	610422	KHRUSHCHEV LETTER			1	U	N	DOSH	S/S 77D163 PEN PAL	DOS	DOS				
CU	N	152	TE	610422	STATE	1661	ALL ARA POSTS	2	S	N	DOSCF	737.00/4-2361	DOS					
CU	N	153	ME	610424	ROSTOW		MCNAMARA	4	T	N	DOD	OASD C A 71A2896	CU	WH	DOS	NSC		

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## FRUS DATA SORTED BY TITLE AND COMPILATION

COMP	P	DOC#	TP	DOC	DT	FROM	MESSAGE NO	TO	PGS	I	C	DC	SRCE	FILE	ORIGIN	EQUITIES	DECL	AUTH	
CU	N	154	ME	610424		HAWKINS		FILES	3	S	N	USN		NAVAL HIST CENTER	CIA	DOS			
CU	N	155	ME	610424		NEEL		FILES	23	I	T	N	NDU	TAYLOR PAPERS CUBA	WH	CIA	DOE	DOS	
CU	N	156	ME	610425		INGELIDG		FILES	11	S	N	NDU		TAYLOR PAPERS CUBA	WH	CIA	DOE	DOS	
CU	N	157	ME	610426		TARWATER		FILES	8	I	S	N	NLK	NSF CS CUBA SUB TAY	WH	CIA	DOE	DOS	
CU	N	158	EN	610426		RESCUE OPERATIONS		MCNAMARA	1	S	N	DOSHQ	USN	NAVAL HIST CENT	DOS	DOD		NSC	
CU	N	159	ME	610426		JCS		BUNDY	16	I	T	N	DOD	OASD C A 71A2896	CU	JCS	DOD	DOS	
CU	N	160	ME	610426		GOODWIN		CUBA STUDY GROUP	4	S	N	NLK		NSF CS CUBA GEN 1/4	WH	DOS		NSC	
CU	N	161	ME	610426		CIA		NSC	2	T	N	NLK		NSF CS CUBA SUB TAY	WH	CIA	DOS		
CU	N	162	ME	610426		CIA		NSC	3	I	N	NLK		NSF CS CUBA SUB INT	CIA	DOS			
CU	N	163	ME	610427		ACHILLES		NSC	11	T	N	DOSHQ	S/P-NSC	FILES 62D1	DOS	NSC			
CU	N	164	EN	610427		NSC MTG		FILES	1	T	N	DOSHQ	NLK	NSF MMS NSC MTG	DOS	DOS			
CU	N	165	MI	610427		NOTES ON NSC MTG		WHEELER	2	U	R	LOC		BOWLES PAPERS YALE	DOS	DOS			
CU	N	166	MC	610428		STATE/JCS MTG		JCS	3	I	T	N	DOSHQ	611.00/4-2861	DOS	DOD			
CU	N	167	MC	610428		DRAFT SNIE 85-61		FILES	5	S	R	DOD		OASD C A 71A2896	N	CIA	DOS		
CU	N	168	ME	610428		TARWATER		WHEELER	3	I	S	N	NLK	NSF CS CUBA SUB TAY	WH	DOS	DOD	NSC	
CU	N	169	ME	610429		BURKE		JCS	1	T	N	USN		NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	DOD	DOS		
CU	N	170	EN	610501		CASTRO STATEMENT		FILES	1	U	N	DOSHQ		PUBLIC STATEMENTS	DOS	DOS			
CU	N	171	ME	610501		MCNAMARA		JCS	1	T	N	DOD		CASD C A 71A2896	CU	DOD	DOS		
CU	N	172	MC	610501		BALL/ACHILLES		FILES	1	N	N	NLK		BALL PAPERS SUB CUB	DOS	DOS			
CU	N	173	CC	610501		MANSFIELD		FILES	3	U	R	NLK		VP SECURITY FILE NS	WH	DOS	DOD	NSC	
CU	N	174	ME	610501		TARWATER		FILES	9	I	S	N	NLK	NSF CS CUBA SUB TAY	WH	DOS	DOD	NSC	
CU	N	175	RP	610502		INR/CIA REPORT		CHIEF WH/4/PM	7	I	S	N	DOSHQ	S/P-NSC	FILES 62D1	DOS	CIA		
CU	N	176	ME	610502		CHIEF WH/4		MCNAMARA	2	S	N	CIA		JOB 3500664R	CIA	DOS			
CU	N	177	ME	610503		ZUCKERT		FILES	1	T	N	DOD		CASD C 71A2896	CUBA	DOD	DOS		
CU	N	178	ME	610503		SCHLESINGER		FILES	5	C	N	NLK		POF CS CUBA SECURIT	WH	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	179	ME	610503		CIA		CUBA STUDY GROUP	11	I	S	N	NLK	NSF CS CUBA SUB TAY	WH	CIA	DOS		
CU	N	180	ME	610504		TARWATER		FILES	12	I	S	N	NLK	NSF CS CUBA SUB TAY	WH	CIA	DOS	DOD	
CU	N	181	GC	610504		BUNDY		TAYLOR	12	I	S	N	NLK	NSF CS CUBA SUB TAY	WH	DOS	DOD	NSC	
CU	N	182	MI	610504		NSC PAPER		FILES	5	T	R	NLK		NSF CS CUBA SUB TAY	WH	DOS			
CU	N	183	ME	610505		BUNDY		FILES	35	T	N	DOSHQ	S/P-NSC	FILES 62D1	DOS	CIA	DOD		
CU	N	184	MI	610505		MEETING OF NSC		JFK	4	T	E	NLK		NSF CS CUBA GEN MAY	WH	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	185	ME	610505		RECORD OF ACTION		FILES	2	T	R	NLK		VICE PRES SEC. FILE	WH	DOS			
CU	N	186	MI	610505		RECORD OF ACTION		FILES	3	T	R	NLK		NSC MMS NSC MTGS 48	DOS	DOS			
CU	N	187	ME	610505		BURKE		FILES	7	I	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	CIA	DOD	DOS	NSC

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## PRDS DATA SORTED BY TITLE AND COMPILATION

DECL AUTH

COMP	P	DOC#	TP	DOC	DT	FROM	MESSAGE NO	TO	PGS	I	C	DC	SRCE	FILE	ORIGIN	EQUITIES	DECL AUTH
CU	N	186	ME	610505	MCNAMARA			YARMOLINSKY	1	S	N	DOD	OASD C A 71A2896	VA DOD	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	187	ME	610508	SCHLESINGER			CUBA TASK FORCE S	4	C	N	NLX	SCHLESINGER PAPERS	WH	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	188	ME	610508	TARWATER			FILES	12	S	R	NLX	NSF CS CUBA SUB TAY	WH	DOS		
CU	N	189	ME	610508	TARWATER			FILES	13	S	R	NLX	NSF CS CUBA SUB TAY	WH	DOS		
CU	N	190	TE	610508	STATE		1755	ALL AREA POSTS	7	S	N	DOSCF	737.00/5-861	DOS			
CU	N	191	MC	610509	RUSK/GREEN			CINCLANT	3	C	N	DOSLF	S/S FILES 65D330	SE DOS	GOCA		
CU	N	192	MT	610509	JCS		JCS 995627	RECORD	4	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	JCS	DOD	DOS	
CU	N	192A	ME	610509	NOEL			ALL POSTS	3	S	N	CIA	JOB 8500664R BOX 3	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	193	TE	610510	STATE		1763	ALL POSTS	3	S	N	DOSCF	737.00/5-1061	DOS			
CU	N	194	ME	610511	BOWLES			JFK	3	C	P	NLX	NSF CS CUBA GEN 5/6	DOS			
CU	N	195	MC	610515	KENNEDY/MARIANI			FILES	2	C	N	DOSLF	S/S FILES 66D149	PR WH	DOS		
CU	N	196	ME	610516	TAYLOR			FILES	2	S	N	NDU	TAYLOR PAPERS CUBA	WH	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	197	ME	610516	BURKE			FILES	3	I	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	WH	DOD	DOS
CU	N	198	ME	610518	YARMOLINSKY			MCNAMARA	2	C	N	DOD	OASD C A 71A2896	VA DOD	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	199	ME	610518	TARWATER			FILES	22	S	N	NLX	NSF CS CUBA SUB TAY	WH	DOS	DOD	NSC
CU	N	200	MC	610519	MTG WITH CEC			ALL POSTS	5	S	N	DOD	OASD C A 71A2896	VA DOD	DOS		
CU	N	201	TE	610520	STATE		1840	ALL POSTS	1	N	N	DOSCF	737.00/5-2061	DOS			
CU	Y	201A	ME	610526	CUNNINGHAM			RECORD	2	S	N	CIA	JOB 8500664R BOX 4	CIA	DOS		
CU	N	202	ME	610531	CIA			CUBA STUDY GROUP	5	S	P	NLX	NSF CS CUBA SUB TAY	CIA	DOS		
CU	Y	202A	ME	610601	DULLES			TAYLOR	1	N	N	CIA	JOB 80B01285A DCI	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	203	ME	610604	LEWITTZER			MCNAMARA	6	T	N	DOD	OASD C 71A2896	CUBA JCS	CIA	DOD	DOS
CU	N	204	ME	610605	MCNAMARA			JFK	2	C	N	DOD	OSD/ISA 54A2382	CUB DOD	DOS		
CU	N	205	ME	610612	BURKE			FILES	3	S	N	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	DOD	DOS	NSC
CU	N	206	GC	610613	TAYLOR			JFK	1	S	R	NLX	NSF CS CUBA SUB TAY	WH	DOS		
CU	N	207	ME	610613	CUBA STUDY GROUP			JFK	31	S	N	NLX	NSF CS CUBA SUB TAY	WH	CIA	DOD	NSC
CU	N	208	ME	610613	CUBA STUDY GROUP			JFK	3	S	N	NLX	NSF CS CUBA SUB TAY	WH	CIA	DOD	DOS
CU	N	209	ME	610613	CUBA STUDY GROUP			JFK	3	S	R	NLX	NSF CS CUBA SUB TAY	WH	DOS		
CU	N	210	ME	610613	CUBA STUDY GROUP			JFK	1	I	S	R	NLX	NSF CS CUBA SUB TAY	WH	DOS	
CU	N	211	ME	610616	JCS			MCNAMARA	2	T	N	DOD	OASD C A 71A2896	CU JCS	DOD	DOS	
CU	N	212	MI	610622	INFORMATION MEMO			RUSK	2	N	N	NDU	TAYLOR PAPERS CUBA	WH	DOS		
CU	N	213	ME	610622	COER			FILES	2	T	N	DOSLF	S/S-NSC 66D95	NSC 5 DOS	DOS		
CU	N	214	ME	610623	TAYLOR			MCNAMARA	2	S	N	NDU	TAYLOR PAPERS CUBA	WH	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	215	ME	610626	BUNDY			JFK	1	C	R	NLX	POF CS CUBA SECURIT	WH	DOS		
CU	N	216	ME	610628	BUNDY			JFK	1	N	N	NLX	NSF CS CUBA GEN 6/6	WH	DOS		

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COMP	P	DOC#	TP	DOC	DT	FROM	MESSAGE NO	TO	PGS	I	C	DC	SRC	FILE	ORIGIN ROUTINES	DECL AUTH	
CU	N	217	MC	510707		MORALES/VARONA			1	S	N		DOSCF	737.00/7-761	DOS		
CU	N	218	MC	510707		HURWITZ/MCDONNELL			1	C	N		DOSCF	737.00/7-761	DOS		
CU	N	219	ME	510704		SCHLESINGER		GOODWIN	2	S	N	NLX		SCHLESINGER PAPERS	WH	DOS	
CU	N	220	RP	510711		USIB REPORT			5	I	S	N	NLX	SCHLESINGER PAPERS	CIA	DOS	
CU	N	221	MC	510713		HURWITZ/SEULC			1	N	N		DOSCF	737.00/7-1361	DOS		
CU	N	222	ME	510718		WOODWARD		BOWLES	2	C	N		DOSCF	737.00/7-1861	DOS		
CU	N	223	MC	510720		NOLLAN/CABANA			2	S	N		DOSCF	737.00/7-2061	DOS		
CU	N	223A	EN	510723					1	N	N		DOSHC		DOS		
CU	N	224	ME	510726		BURKE		FILES	1	I	C	N	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	DOD	
CU	N	225	ME	510816		KONER		FILES	2	T	N	NLX	NSF	CS CUBA GEN 6/4	NSC	DOD	
CU	N	226	ME	510822		GOODWIN		JFK	2	S	N	NLX	POF	CS CUBA SEC 196	WH	DOS	
CU	N	227	ME	510822		GOODWIN		JFK	5	S	N	NLX	POF	CS CUBA SECURIT	WH	DOS	
CU	N	228	ME	510901		GOODWIN		JFK	2	S	N	NLX	NSF	CS CUBA GE 6/61	WH	CIA	
CU	N	229	MC	510915		KENNEDY/KUBITSCHE			2	I	C	N	DOSLF	S/S FILES 64D149	PR	WH	
CU	N	230	MC	510926		KENNEDY/FRONDIZI			2	I	C	N	DOSLF	S/S FILES 64D149	PR	WH	
CU	N	231	MI	511005		PARROTT			1	T	R		DOD	OASD C A 71A2856	CJ	DOS	
CU	N	232	ME	511005		PARROTT		FILES	1	S	N	NLX	NSF	CS CUBA GE 6/61	WH	CIA	
CU	N	233	ME	511020		PARROTT		BUNDY	1	I	S	N	NLX	NSF	MMS SPECIAL GR	WH	CIA
CU	N	234	ME	511101		GOODWIN		JFK	2	T	N	NLX	POF	CS CUBA SECURIT	WH	CIA	
CU	N	235	EN	511103		MONGOOSE STARTED			3	U	N		DOSHO	NLX RFX PAPERS	SENA	DOS	
CU	N	236	ME	511103		RENT		DULLIES	19	S	R		NLX	POF	CS CUBA SECURIT	CIA	DOS
CU	N	237	ME	511106					4	S	N	CIA		JOB 7301450K, BOX 5	CIA	DOS	
CU	N	238	MI	511109		INTERAGENCY STUDY			9	S	N		DOSLF	ARA/CCA 66D501	I-A	DOS	
CU	N	239	ME	511128		COLLINS		RECORD	2	S	N	CIA		JOB 80B01285A	DCI	CIA	
CU	N	239A	MC	511129		RFX AND MCCONE		MCNAMARA	2	S	N	DOD	OSD/ISA 64A2382	CUB	JCS	CIA	
CU	N	240	ME	511130		LANSDALE			2	I	S	N	CIA		JOB 80B01285A	DCI	CIA
CU	N	241	ME	511130		JFK		RFX	1	S	N		DOSLF	ARA/CCA 66D501	CUBA	WH	
CU	N	242	EN	511201		WH PROC-CASTRO SF		RUSK	1	T	N	NLX	POF	CS CUBA SECURIT	WH	DOS	
CU	N	243	MI	511201		DRAFT MEMO RECORD			1	U	R		DOSHO	PUB DOCS NY TIMES	DOS	DOS	
CU	N	243A	ME	511207		LANSDALE		MCCONE	2	C	N		DOSLF	U. ALEXIS JOHNSON F	DOS	CIA	
CU	N	243B	ME	511214		EARMAN		RECORD	5	T	N	CIA		JOB 80B01285A	DCI	CIA	
CU	N	243C	MC	511227		RFX AND MCCONE			7	I	N	CIA		JOB 80B01285A	DCI	CIA	
CU	N	243D	ME	520112		EARMAN		RECORD	3	I	S	N	CIA		JOB 80B01285A	DCI	CIA
CU	N	243D	ME	620112					2	I	S	N	CIA		JOB 80B01285A	DCI	CIA

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COMP	P	DOC#	TP	DOC	DT	FROM	MESSAGE	NO	TO	PGS	I	C	DC	SRCE	FILE	ORIGIN	EQUITIES	DECL	AUTH
TITLE: CUBA: 1961-1962																			
VOLUME: X																			
CU	N	244	ME	620116		HURWITCH			LANSDALE	4	S	N		DOSLF	APR/CCA 66DS01 GEN	DOS			
CU	N	245	MI	620117		SNIE 96-62				3	S	R		DOD	OASD C A 71A2896 MC	CIA	DOS		
CU	N	246	BN	620118		NSC MTG				1	S	N		DOSHO	NLK NSF NMS NSC MTG	DOS	NSC		
CU	N	247	MI	620119		PROGRAM REVIEW				8	T	N		DOSCF	737.00/1-2062	WH	DOS	NSC	CIA
CU	N	247A	ME	620119		HELMS				3	S	N		CIA	JOB 80B01285A DCI	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	248	ME	620120		LANSDALE				2	T	N		DOSCF	737.00/1-2062	WH	DOS		
CU	N	248A	MC	620120		RFK AND MCCONE				3	I	S	N	CIA	JOB 80B01285A DCI	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	249B	ME	620124		CIA				13	S	N		CIA	JOB 80B01285A DCI	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	249	ME	620126		LANSDALE				1	T	N		DOSCF	737.00/1-2062	WH	CIA	DOD	DOS
CU	N	250	MT	620129		CINCLANT				2	T	N		NLK	NSF CS CUBA CABLES	USN	DOD	DOS	
CU	N	251	ME	620131		GILPATRIC				2	C	N		DOD	OSD 66A3542 CUBA 34	DOD	DOS		
CU	N	252	ME	620201		HURWITCH				1	T	N		DOSCF	737.00/1-2062	DOS			
CU	N	253	ME	620202		NEEKER				5	C	E		NLK	NSF CS CUBA GEN 1/6	DOS			
CU	N	254	ME	620208		GOODWIN				2	N	N		DOSLF	S/S FILES 700328 ST	DOS			
CU	N	255	ME	620216		HURWITCH				3	T	N		DOSCF	737.00/1-1962	DOS			
CU	N	256	MI	620220		PROGRAM REVIEW				25	I	N		NLK	NSF NMS SGA OFFER MO	WH	DOS	NSC	CIA
CU	N	257	MT	620224		CINCLANT				10	T	N		NLK	NSF CS CUBA CABLES	USN	DOD	DOS	
CU	N	258	ME	620226		HURWITCH				10	T	N		DOSLF	U. ALEXIS JOHNSON F	DOS	DOD		
CU	N	259	MC	620227		MORALES/CARDONA				2	S	N		DOSCF	737.00/2-2762	DOS			
CU	N	260	MI	620302		PROGRAM REVIEW				2	T	N		DOSLF	S/S FILES 65D438 MO	WH	DOS		
CU	N	261	ME	620306		LANSDALE				1	T	N		DOSLF	S/S FILES 65D438 MO	WH	DOS		
CU	N	262	ME	620312		LANSDALE				2	T	N		NLK	NSF NMS SGA OFFER MO	WH	DOS		
CU	N	263	ME	620313		LANSDALE				15	T	N		DOSLF	S/S FILES 65D482 MO	WH	DOS	NSC	CIA
CU	N	264	ME	620313		GILPATRIC				1	N	N		DOD	OASD/ISA 65A3501 CU	DOD	DOS		
CU	N	265	ME	620314		GUIDELINES MONGOO				2	N	N		DOSLF	S/S FILES 65D438 MO	WH	CIA	DOD	NSC
CU	Y	265A	MI	620316		MCCONE DISCUSS NO				2	S	N		CIA	JOB 80B01285A DCI	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	266	MI	620321		NIE 95-52				5	I	S	N	DOD	OASD C A 71A2896 MC	CIA	DOS		
CU	N	266A	MI	620322		MCCONE NOTES				1	S	N		CIA	JOB 9100741R MONGOO	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	267	MC	620329		BUNDY/MIRO/VARONA				1	S	N		CIA	JOB 9100741R MONGOO	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	267A	ME	620330		CIA STAFF				2	S	N		CIA	JOB 80B01285A DCI	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	267B	ME	620405		MCCONE				4	S	N		DOSLF	S/S FILES 65D438 MO	CIA	DOS		
CU	N	268	ME	620406		KENT				1	U	N		DOSHO	FUB DOCS	DOS			
CU	N	269	EN	620408		ZAPATA FRISCHERS				5	T	N		DOSLF	S/S FILES 65D438 MO	CIA	DOS		
CU	N	270	ME	620410		KENT													

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COMP	F	DOC#	TP	DOC	DT	FROM	MESSAGE NO	TO	PGS	I	C	DC	SRCE	FILE	ORIGIN	EQUITIES	DECL	AUTH
CU	N	270A	ME	620410		HARVEY		MCCONE	6	T	N		CIA	JOB 9100741R MONGOO	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	270B	ME	620411		MCCONE MEMO FOR D		RECORD	2	S	N		CIA	JOB 80801285A DCI	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	270C	ME	620412		MCCONE		RECORD	1	S	N		CIA	JOB 9100741R MONGOO	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	Y	270D	MC	620411		MCCONE AND RUSK			1	S	N		CIA	JOB 80801285A DCI	CIA	DOS		
CU	N	271	TE	620414		STATE	2573	RIO DE JANEIRO	2	T	N		DOSCF	737.00/4-1462	DOS			
CU	N	272	ME	620418		RUSK		JFK	2	S	N		DOSCF	737.00/4-1862	DOS			
CU	N	273	ME	620419		LANSDALE		SGA	2	T	N		DOSLF	S/S FILES 65D438 MG WH	DOS	NSC	CIA	
CU	N	274	ME	620419		HURSWITCH		MARTIN	2	S	N		DOSCF	737.00/4-2052	DOS	CIA		
CU	N	275	MI	620425		CURRENT INTELL ME			2	S	N		NLK	NSF CS CUBA SUB INT CIA	DOS			
CU	N	275A	ME	620426		MCCONE		RECORD	1	S	N		CIA	JOB 9100741R MONGOO	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	276	ME	620501		PILE		LENNITZER	2	T	N		DOSLF	ARA/CCA 66D501 MONG JCS	DOS			
CU	N	277	ME	620503		LANSDALE		SGA	1	T	N		DOSLF	S/S FILES 65D438 MG WH	DOS			
CU	N	277A	ME	620504		MCCONE		RECORD	1	S	N		CIA	JOB 9100741R MONGOO	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	278	TE	620503		RIO DE JANEIRO	2577	STATE	1	T	N		DOSCF	737.00/5-362	DOS			
CU	N	278A	ME	620507		MCCONE		RECORD	1	S	N		CIA	JOB 80801285A DCI	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	K	279	MI	620517		OPERATIONS SCHEDULE			13	T	N		DOSLF	ARA/CCA 65D501 MONG WH	DOS			
CU	Y	279A	ME	620521		MCCONE		RECORD	1	S	N		CIA	JOB 9100741R MONGOO	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	280	ME	620524		GOODWIN		MARTIN	2	T	N		DOSLF	ARA/CCA 66D501 CUBA DOS	DOS			
CU	N	281	ME	620531		LANSDALE		SGA	3	T	N		DOSLF	ARA/CCA 66D501 MONG WH	DOS			
CU	N	282	MI	620531		MEMO FOR SGA			3	T	N		DOSLF	ARA/CCA 66D501 MONG WH	DOS			
CU	N	283	ME	620605		ANDERSON		MCNAMARA	2	T	N		DOD	OSD 66A3542 CUBA IN JCS	DOD	DOS		
CU	N	284	MI	620607		NOTES CPER ORCUP			1	S	N		DOSCF	737.00/6-762	DOS	CIA	DOS	NSC
CU	N	284A	ME	620608		ELDER		RECORD	1	S	N		CIA	JOB 9100741R MONGOO	CIA	DOD	DOS	NSC
CU	N	285	ME	620609		LANSDALE		SGA	2	T	N		DOSLF	ARA/CCA 65D501 MONG WH	DOS			
CU	N	286	ME	620614		LANSDALE		MARTIN	1	T	N		DOSLF	ARA/CCA 66D501 I-A WH	DOS			
CU	N	287	ME	620614		LANSDALE		SGA	2	T	N		DOSLF	ARA/CCA 65D501 MONG WH	DOS			
CU	Y	287A	ME	620625		MCCONE		RECORD	1	S	N		CIA	JOB 9100741R MONGOO	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	288	ME	620627		MARTIN		JOHNSON	2	S	N		DOSLF	S/S FILES 65D438 MG DOS	DOS			
CU	N	289	MI	620703		CIA MEMO			14	S	N		NLK	POF CS CUBA SECURIT CIA	DOS			
CU	N	289A	MC	620703		RFK AND MCCONE			3	T	N		CIA	JOB 80801285A DCI	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	290	ME	620705		LANSDALE		SGA	3	T	N		DOSLF	S/S FILES 65D438 MG WH	DOS			
CU	N	290A	ME	620714		ELDER		RECORD	1	S	N		CIA	JOB 80801285A DCI	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	Y	290B	ME	620712		CARTER		RECORD	1	S	N		CIA	JOB 9100741R MONGOO	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	291	ME	620718		HURSWITCH		MARTIN	4	T	N		DOSCF	737.00/7-1962	DOS	CIA	NSC	

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COMP	P	DOC#	TP	DOC	DT	FRG#	MESSAGE NO	TO	PGS	I	C	DC	SRC	FILE	ORIGIN ROUTINES	DECL AUTH
CU	N	291A	MC	62C718	RFE	AND MCCONE		LANSDALE	3	I	S	N	CIA	JOB 80801255A DCI	CIA DOS NSC	
CU	N	292	ME	62C719	HURWITZ			LANSDALE	7	T	N	NLK	NSF MMS SGA OPER MO	DOS	DOS	
CU	N	293	ME	62C720	WILSON			LANSDALE	8	T	N	NLK	NSF MMS SGA OPER MO	USIA DOS	DOS	
CU	Y	293A	ME	62C720	MCCONE			RECORD	2	S	N	CIA	JOB 80801255A DCI	CIA DOS NSC	DOS	
CU	N	294	TE	62C721	STATE		169	ARAP	2	S	N	DOSCF	737.00/7-2162	DOS	DOS	
CU	N	295	ME	62C723	HARVEY			LANSDALE	11	T	N	NLK	NSF MMS SGA OPER MO	DOD DOS	DOS	
CU	N	296	ME	62C724	HARVEY			LANSDALE	7	T	N	NLK	NSF MMS SGA OPER MO	CIA DOS NSC	DOS	
CU	N	297	ME	62C725	LANSDALE			SGA	8	T	N	NLK	NSF MMS SGA OPER MO	WH DOS NSC	CIA	
CU	N	298	ME	62C726	HURWITZ			MARTIN	1	T	N	DOSLF	ARA/CCA 66D501 MONG	DOS CIA DOD XSC	DOS	
CU	N	299	ME	62C731	LANSDALE			SGA	13	T	N	DOSCF	737.00/7-3162	WH DOS	DOS	
CU	N	300	MI	62C801	NIE 85-2-52				13	S	N	DOD	OASD C A 71A2896 MC	CIA DOS	DOS	
CU	N	301	MI	62C801	AGENDA SGA MTG			LANSDALE	1	T	N	DOSLF	S/S FILES 65D438 MO	WH DOS	DOS	
CU	N	302	ME	62C806	HARVEY			HARVEY	2	T	N	DOSLF	ARA/CCA 66D501 MONG	CIA DOS NSC	DOS	
CU	N	303	ME	62C806	LANSDALE			SGA	2	T	N	NLK	NSF MMS SGA OPER MO	WH CIA DOS XSC	DOS	
CU	N	304	ME	62C808	LANSDALE			SGA	22	T	N	NLK	NSF MMS SGA OPER MO	WH CIA DOD DOS NSC	DOS	
CU	N	305	ME	62C808	CRAIG			SGA	6	T	N	NLK	NSF MMS SGA OPER MO	DOD DOS	DOS	
CU	N	306	ME	62C808	LANSDALE			SGA	1	T	N	NLK	NSF MMS SGA OPER MO	WH DOS	DOS	
CU	Y	306A	ME	62C808	HARVEY			MCCONE	19	T	N	CIA	JOB 9400499R HS/HC	CIA DOS NSC	DOS	
CU	N	307	MI	62C810	DOS MEMO				2	T	N	DOSLF	ARA/CCA 66D501 MONG	DOS CIA NSC	DOS	
CU	N	307A	EN	62C810	EDI TORIAL NOTE			HURWITZ	2	N	N	DOSHO	JOB 9100741R MONGOO	DOS CIA NSC	DOS	
CU	N	308	ME	62C811	LANSDALE			LANSDALE	1	T	N	DOSCF	737.00/8-1362	WH DOS	DOS	
CU	N	309	ME	62C813	HURWITZ			SGA	3	T	N	DOSCF	737.00/8-1352	DOS	DOS	
CU	N	310	ME	62C814	LANSDALE			HELMS	11	T	N	NLK	NSF MMS SGA OPER MO	WH DOS	DOS	
CU	Y	310A	ME	62C814	HARVEY			MARTIN	2	S	N	CIA	JOB 9100741R MONGOO	CIA DOS NSC	DOS	
CU	N	311	ME	62C815	HURWITZ			HARVEY	2	T	N	DOSLF	S/S FILES 65D438 MO	DOS	DOS	
CU	N	313	ME	62C815	LANSDALE			RECORD	1	T	N	NLK	NSF MMS SGA OPER MO	WH DOS	DOS	
CU	N	313A	ME	62C816	MCCONE			LANSDALE	1	S	N	CIA	JOB 9100741R MONGOO	CIA DOS NSC	DOS	
CU	N	314	ME	62C817	HARVEY			JFK	3	S	N	DOSCF	737.00/8-1762	CIA DOS	DOS	
CU	N	315	ME	62C817	TAYLOR			REK	3	T	N	NLK	NSF MMS SGA OPER MO	WH DOS	DOS	
CU	N	315A	ME	62C821	MCCONE			RECORD	1	S	N	CIA	JOB 9100741R MONGOO	CIA DOS NSC	DOS	
CU	N	315C	ME	62C821	MCCONE			BUNDY	3	S	N	CIA	JOB 80B01285A DCI	CIA DOS NSC	DOS	
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## FRUS DATA SORTED BY TITLE AND COMPILATION

April 17, 1996

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## FRUS DATA SORTED BY TITLE AND COMPILATION

April 17, 1996

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CU	N	349	ME	620912		HURWITCH			LANSDALE	1	T	N		DOSLF	ARA/CCA 66D501	MONG	DOS		
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CU	N	351	ME	620913		MCCONE			JFK	2	S	N		DOD	OASD C A 71A2895	YA	DOD	DOS	
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## PRUS DATA SORTED BY TITLE AND COMPILATION

April 17, 1996

DBCL AUTH

ORIGIN EQUITIES

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MESSAGE NO TO

COMP P DOC# TP DOC DT FROM

TITLE: CUBA: 1961-1962

VOLUME: X

CU Y 365A NE 620928 KHOCHE

CU Y 365B MC 620928 KHOCHE AND MCTON

PAGES BY COMPILATION CU: 1492

NUMBER OF DOCUMENTS FOR CU: 444

NUMBER OF PAGES FOR CU: 36

PAGES BY VOLUME X: 1492

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S N CIA

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DOS

April 16, 1996

## FRUS DATA SORTED BY SOURCE

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	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	153	4	OASD C A 71A2896 CUBA 381	WH	R
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	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	198	2	OASD C A 71A2896 YARMOLIN	DOD	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	200	5	OASD C A 71A2896 YARMOLIN	DOD	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	203	6	OASD C 71A2896 CUBA 381	JCS	R
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	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	251	2	OSD 66A3542 CUBA 342.18	DOD	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	264	1	OASD/ISA 65A3501 CUBA 62	DOD	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	266	5	OASD C A 71A2896 MC NOTEB	CIA	R
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	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	300	13	OASD C A 71A2896 MC NOTEB	CIA	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	320	2	OASD C A 71A2896 YARMOLIN	DOD	R
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	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	328	2	OSD HISTORIANS OFFICE CF	DOS	R
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PAGES BY SOURCE DOD: 141

NUMBER OF DOCS: 36

April 16, 1996

## FRUS DATA SORTED BY SOURCE

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	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	112	1	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	114	1	NAVAL HIST CENTER	JCS	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	115	1	NAVAL HIST CENTER	JCS	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	116	2	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	117	1	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	118	1	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	119	1	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	R
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	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	121	1	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	R
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PAGES BY SOURCE USN: 60

NUMBER OF DOCS: 39

April 16, 1996

## FRUS DATA SORTED BY SOURCE

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	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	155	23	TAYLOR PAPERS CUBA	WH	E
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	156	11	TAYLOR PAPERS CUBA	WH	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	196	2	TAYLOR PAPERS CUBA	WH	R
	CUBA: 1961-1962	X	CU	212	2	TAYLOR PAPERS CUBA	WH	R
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PAGES BY SOURCE NDU:		68						

NUMBER OF DOCS: 7



Rev. 4-17 (#2)

PA Press Guidance  
April 17, 1996

**Release of Documents on the Bay of Pigs**

Q: Why has the Department chosen today to announce the release of this delayed and unfinished *Foreign Relations* volume?

A: THE HISTORICAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE WAS UNANIMOUS IN STRONGLY RECOMMENDING AT ITS MARCH 1996 MEETING THAT THE DEPARTMENT MOVE QUICKLY TO RELEASE AT LEAST THE LIST OF DOCUMENTS ALREADY DECLASSIFIED FOR THIS DELAYED VOLUME. THE 35TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE BAY OF PIGS REMINDED US THIS WEEK HOW FAR BEHIND THE STATUTORY 30-YEAR PUBLICATION LINE THIS VOLUME WAS AND HOW IMPORTANT IT WAS TO SHARE NOW THE INFORMATION ALREADY DECLASSIFIED.

Q: Does this release of information, including the availability of a copy of incomplete manuscript in the State FOIA Reading Room, mean that the Department is adopting a new policy regarding the release of uncompleted *Foreign Relations* volumes? In the past the Department has rejected FOI requests for the manuscripts or page proof of unpublished *Foreign Relations* volumes.

A: NO. THIS IS AN EXCEPTIONAL ACTION INTENDED TO DEAL WITH THOSE VERY FEW FOREIGN RELATIONS VOLUMES THAT REMAIN IN PREPARATION AND DELAYED SIGNIFICANTLY BEYOND THE 30-YEAR LINE ESTABLISHED BY THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES STATUTE OF OCTOBER 1991. THERE IS NO CHANGE IN THE NEED TO TREAT ONGOING MANUSCRIPTS AND PAGE PROOF AS WORKING DOCUMENTS AND NOT RELEASABLE UNDER THE FOIA.

-2-

Q: How can scholars or the public gain access to the original documents from DOD or the CIA whose declassified texts are included in the draft page proof of the *Foreign Relations* volume?

A: I UNDERSTAND THAT THE CIA AND DOD ARE, LIKE OTHER AGENCIES, DEVELOPING PLANS FOR REVIEWING AND OPENING THEIR 25-YEAR OLD AND OLDER DOCUMENTS UNDER THE TERMS OF THE PRESIDENT'S RECENT EXECUTIVE ORDER 12958 ON MANAGING NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION.

Q: How soon will the Department release the comparable information about any other delayed *Foreign Relations* volumes?

A: THE HISTORIAN'S OFFICE EXPECTS TO ARRANGE THE RELEASE OF THE LIST OF DOCUMENTS ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1961-1963, VOL. V SOVIET UNION WITHIN THE NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS. SOME ADDITIONAL WORK MUST BE DONE ON THE LIST TO MAKE IT USABLE.

Q: How soon will researchers actually be able to see the original documents whose texts are released in the manuscript released today?

A: THERE MAY BE SOME DELAYS WHILE ARCHIVISTS AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES II AT COLLEGE PARK OR AT THE KENNEDY LIBRARY IN BOSTON CONFIRM THAT THE PARTICULAR DOCUMENTS IDENTIFIED BY US TODAY ARE IN PLACE IN THE FILES.

-3-

Q: Is the Department of State releasing this historical information now on the Bay of Pigs in order to embarrass the CIA which refuses FOIA requests for similar information?

A: THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE CIA ARE WORKING VERY CLOSELY AND COOPERATIVELY IN PREPARING THIS AND OTHER FOREIGN RELATIONS VOLUMES. THE RELEASE TODAY IS CERTAINLY NOT AIMED AT THE CIA, AND WE HAVE CAREFULLY COORDINATED WITH THEM ON THIS AND ALL OTHER DOCUMENT RELEASES.

April 18, 1996

FRUS DATA SORTED BY TITLE AND COMPILATION

DECL AUTH

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VOLUME: X																		
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CU	N	3	MC	610103	RUSK/HERTER				1	S	N	NLE	HERTER PAPERS		DOS			
CU	N	4	MC	610103	DDE/HERTER				1	N	N	NLE	HERTER PAPERS		DOS	NSC		
CU	N	5	ME	610105	GOODPASTER			FILES	2	N	N	NLE	PROJECT CLEAN UP	C	WH	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	6	TE	610103	STATE		1347	HAVANA	2	U	N	DOSCF	611.37/1361		DOS			
CU	N	7	EN	610103	DDE STATEMENT				1	U	N	DOSHO	PUBLIC PAPERS OF PR	DOS				
CU	N	8	ME	610104	CHIEF, WH/4/PM			CHIEF, WH/4	8	S	N	NLK	NSF CS CUBA	TAYL	CIA	DOS		
CU	N	9	EN	610104	UN SECURITY COUNC				1	U	N	DOSHO	UN DOCS		DOS			
CU	N	10	EN	610105	CIA BRIEFING NSC				2	S	N	DOSHO	NLE WHITMAN	FILE	DOS	CIA	NSC	
CU	N	11	ME	610105	SEC STATE			PRESIDENT	1	S	N	NLE	WHITMAN	DULLES-HER	DOS			
CU	N	11A	ME	610105	BARNES			DULLES	3	S	N	CIA	JOB 8500664R	BOX 2	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	12	ME	610110	MERCHANT			HERTER	1	S	N	DOSCF	711.56314/1-1061		DOS	NSC		
CU	N	13	EN	610111	JCS BRIEFING				1	T	N	DOSHO	NAVAL HIST CENTER		DOS	CIA	DOD	
CU	N	13A	MI	610116	DEFENSE STAFF STU				8	T	N	CIA	JOB 8500664R	SRCE D	CIA	DOD	DOS NSC	
CU	N	14	EN	610119	DDE-JFK MEETING				1	S	N	DOSHO	DOS/RUSK, OSD/PRC	6	DOS	NSC		
CU	N	15	EN	610119	JCS EVALUATION				1	T	N	DOSHO	NAVAL HIST CENTER		DOS	DOD		
CU	N	15A	ME	610123	BARNES			RECORD	2	S	N	CIA	JOB 8500664R	BOX 3	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	16	MC	610125	JFK AND JCS				1	I	T	E	NLK	CLIFTON SERIES	JCS	WH	DOD	DOS NSC
CU	N	17	ME	610127	JCS			MCNAMARA	3	T	R	DOD	OSD FILES	PRC 65A3	JCS	DOS		
CU	N	18	ME	610127	JCS			MCNAMARA	1	S	N	DOD	OASD/ISA	PRC 64A23	JCS	DOS		
CU	N	19	MC	610128	JFK AND ADVISERS				3	T	R	NLK	NSF CS CUBA	GEN 1/6	WH	CIA	DOD	DOS NSC
CU	N	20	EN	610128	MEETING RE CUBA P				1	T	N	DOSHO	NAVAL HIST CENTER		DOS	DOD		
CU	Y	20A	ME	610130	DRAIN			RECORD	1	S	N	CIA	JOB 8500664R		CIA	DOD	DOS	
CU	N	21	ME	610131	JFK			RUSK	1	C	R	NLK	POF CS CUBA	SECURIT	WH	DOS		
CU	N	23	MC	610203	RUSK/BUNDY				1	N	N	DOSLF	RUSK FILES	72D192	DOS	NSC		
CU	N	24	ME	610203	JCS			MCNAMARA	19	T	R	NLK	NSF CS CUBA	TAYLOR	JCS	DOS		
CU	N	25	MC	610204	MANN/KANGLES				2	C	N	DOSCF	737.00/2-461		DOS			
CU	N	26	MC	610206	BONSAL/VARONA				1	S	N	DOSCF	737.00/2-661		DOS			
CU	N	26A	ME	610207				RECORD	7	S	N	CIA	JOB 8500664R	BOX 3	CIA	DOD	DOS NSC	
CU	N	27	ME	610208	BUNDY			JFK	1	T	N	NLK	POF CS CUBA	SECURIT	WH	CIA	DOD	DOS NSC
CU	N	28	MC	610208	JFK AND ADVISERS				2	T	N	NLK	NSF CS CUBA	GEN 1/6	WH	CIA	DOS	NSC
CU	N	29	ME	610209	BERLE			RUSK	1	S	N	DOSLF	ARA/CCA FILES	66D50	DOS	CIA		
CU	N	30	EN	610209	NSC MEETING				1	S	N	DOSHO	DOS S/S-NSC	66D95	DOS			

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COMP P DOC# TP DOC DT FROM MESSAGE NO TO PGS I C DC SRCE FILE ORIGIN EQUITIES

TITLE: CUBA: 1961-1962  
VOLUME: X

CU	N	31	ME	610211	SCHLESINGER	JFK	2	T	N	NLK	SCHLESINGER PAPERS	WH	DOS	NSC
CU	Y	31A	ME	610211	COOPER	USIB	12	T	N	CIA	JOB 80B01285A, DCI	CIA	DOS	
CU	N	32	ME	610214	BERLE	RUSK	1	S	N	DOSIF	ARA/CCA FILES 66D50	DOS	CIA	NSC
CU	N	33	ME	610215	MANN	RUSK	6	T	E	NLK	NSF CS CUBA GEN 1/6	DOS		
CU	N	34	ME	610217	CIA MEMO		10	T	N	NLK	NSF CS CUBA GEN 1/6	CIA	DOS	
CU	N	35	ME	610218	BUNDY	JFK	1	T	R	NLK	NSF CS CUBA GEN 1/6	WH	DOS	
CU	N	36	EN	610218	WH MEETING		1	T	N	DOSHO	NLK NSF CS CUBA TAY	DOS	CIA	NSC
CU	N	37	CC	610218	RUSK	SMATHERS	1	N	N	DOSIF	RUSK FILES 72D192	DOS		
CU	N	38	ME	610221	BUNDY	RUSK	1	S	N	DOSIF	S/S-NSC MISC 66D95	WH	DOS	NSC
CU	N	39	ME	610224	RUSK	JFK	2	S	R	NLK	POF CS CUBA SECURIT	DOS		
CU	N	39A	EN	610301	ED NOTE ON ASSASS		1	S	N	DOSHO	CIA JOB 85-00664R A	DOS	CIA	
CU	N	40	TE	610304	BUENOS AIRES	STATE	3	C	N	DOSCF	737.00/3-461	DOS		
CU	N	41	PT	610304	BUENOS AIRES	STATE	1	N	N	DOSCF	737.00/3-1761	DOS		
CU	N	41A	ME	610310	CIA STAFF	DULLES	3	S	N	CIA	JOB 8500664R BOX 3	CIA	DOS	
CU	N	42	ME	610310	SCHLESINGER	JFK	1	C	R	NLK	POF CS CUBA SECURIT	WH	DOS	
CU	N	43	ME	610310	JCS	MCNAMARA	25	T	R	DOD	OASD C A FILES 71A2	JCS	DOS	DOD
CU	N	44	ME	610310	CIA MEMO	MCNAMARA	3	T	N	DOD	OSAD C A FILES 71A2	JCS	CIA	DOD
CU	N	45	ME	610311	WH MEETING		12	T	R	NLK	NSF CS CUBA INTELL	CIA	DOS	
CU	N	46	EN	610311	NSAM 31		1	T	N	DOSHO	NLK NSF CS CUBA TAY	DOS	CIA	NSC
CU	N	47	ME	610311	CIA MEMO		1	T	R	NLK	NSF MMS NSC MEMOS N	DOS	DOS	
CU	N	48	ME	610315	JCS	MCNAMARA	7	T	N	NLK	NSF CS CUBA INTELL	CIA	DOS	
CU	N	49	ME	610315	SCHLESINGER	JFK	11	T	R	NLK	NSF CS CUBA SUB TAY	JCS	DOS	
CU	N	50	ME	610315	BUNDY	JFK	2	S	N	NLK	NSF CS CUBA GEN 1/6	WH	CIA	DOS
CU	N	51	ME	610315	WH MEETING		1	T	R	NLK	NSF CS CUBA GEN 1/6	WH	DOS	NSC
CU	N	52	EN	610315	WH MEETING		1	T	N	DOSHO	NLK NSF CS CUBA SUB	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	53	EN	610316	WH MEETING		1	T	N	DOSHO	NAVAL HIST CENTER	DOS	CIA	DOD
CU	N	54	TE	610318	STATE	BUENOS AIRES	2	N	N	DOSCF	737.00/3-1861	DOS		NSC
CU	N	55	ME	610320	SCHLESINGER	JFK	1	S	N	NLK	SCHLESINGER PAP CUB	WH	CIA	DOS
CU	N	56	ME	610321	BARNES	DULLES	3	S	N	NLK	NSF CS CUBA SUB EXI	CIA	DOS	
CU	N	57	ME	610322	LAMBERTY	HURWITZ	2	C	N	DOSCF	737.00/3-2261	DOS	CIA	
CU	N	58	EN	610322	WORKING GROUP MTG		1	T	N	DOSHO	NAVAL HIST CENTER	DOS		
CU	N	59	ME	610325	JCS	MCNAMARA	10	T	R	DOD	OASD C A 71A2896	JCS	DOS	
CU	N	60	ME	610328	DENNISON	LENNITZER	3	T	R	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	DOS	
CU	N	61	EN	610329	WH MEETING		2	T	N	DOSHO	NLK NSF CS CUBA SUB	DOS	DOD	NSC

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**TITLE: CUBA: 1961-1962**

**VOLUME: X**

CU	N	62	ME	610331	BOWLES	RUSK	4	U	N	LOC	BOWLES PAPERS VALE	DOS	
CU	N	63	ME	610401	LEMNITZER	DENNISON	2	T	R	NLK	NSF CS CUBA SUB TAY	JCS	DOS
CU	N	64	TE	610401	MOSCOW	STATE	2	I	C	N	DOSCF 751J.00/4-161	DOS	
CU	N	65	EN	610402	MCNAMARA BRIEFING	2362	1	T	N	DOSHO	NDU TAYLOR PAPERS C	DOS	
CU	N	66	EN	610403	CUBA WHITE PAPER		1	U	N	DOSHO	DOS PUB 7171	DOS	
CU	N	67	EN	610404	ZAPATA PLANNING		1	T	N	DOSHO	NLK NSF CS CUBA SUB	DOS	NSC
CU	N	68	ME	610405	SCHLESINGER	JFK	4	S	R	NLK	POF CS CUBA SECURIT	WH	DOS
CU	N	69	ME	610405	COERR	RUSK	1	C	N	DOSCF	737.00/4-561	DOS	
CU	N	70	EN	610405	ZAPATA PLANNING		1	T	N	DOSHO	NDU TAYLOR PAP, NLK	DOS	
CU	N	71	EN	610406	ZAPATA PLANNING		1	T	N	DOSHO	NLK NSF CS CUBA SUB	DOS	
CU	N	72	ME	610407	LEMNITZER	DENNISON	5	T	R	NLK	NSF CS CUBA SUB TAY	JCS	DOS
CU	N	73	ME	610410	SCHLESINGER	JFK	9	S	N	NLK	NSF CS CUBA GEN 1/6	WH	NSC
CU	N	74	OM	610410	OPERATION ORDER		3	I	T	N	USN NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	DOS
CU	N	75	TE	610410	USUNN	2803	2	C	N	DOSCF	737.00/4-1061	DOS	
CU	N	76	TE	610411	USUNN	2821	2	C	N	DOSCF	737.00/4-1161	DOS	
CU	N	77	TE	610411	STATE	1981	3	C	N	DOSCF	737.00/4-1161	DOS	
CU	N	78	ME	610411	BARNES	SCHLESINGER	3	S	N	NLK	NSF CS CUBA SUB INT	CIA	DOS
CU	N	79	EN	610412	ZAPATA PLANNING		1	T	N	DOSHO	NLK NSF CS CUBA SUB	DOS	NSC
CU	Y	79A	MI	610412	BISSELL BRIEFING		7	T	N	CIA	JOB 8500664R	CIA	NSC
CU	N	80	TE	610412	USUNN	2833	1	C	N	DOSCF	737.00/4-1361	DOS	
CU	N	81	ME	610413	BUNDY		1	T	N	NLK	NSF CS CUBA GEN 1/6	WH	DOD
CU	N	82	MT	610413	JCS	JCS 468-61	1	T	R	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	DOS
CU	N	83	MT	610413	JCS	JCS 469-61	1	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	DOD
CU	N	84	ME	610426	KING		2	T	N	NLK	NSF CS CUBA SUB TAY	CIA	DOS
CU	N	85	TE	610413	USUNN	2848	2	C	N	DOSCF	737.00/4-1361	DOS	
CU	N	86	MT	610414	STG 81.8	141726Z	1	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	DOD
CU	N	87	ME	610414	SCHLESINGER		2	S	N	DOSCF	731.00/4-1461	WH	DOS
CU	N	88	EN	610415	BEGINNING OF ZAPA		1	T	N	DOSHO	NAVAL HIST CENTER	DOS	DOD
CU	N	88A	ME	610415	BEERLI		2	N	N	CIA	JOB 8500664R BOX 4	CIA	DOD
CU	N	89	EN	610415	CUBAN RESPONSE		2	N	N	DOSHO	UN DOCS	DOS	DOS
CU	N	90	TE	610416	USUNN	2892	1	T	R	DOSCF	611.37/4-1661	DOS	
CU	N	91	PT	610416	STEVENSON	2894	2	S	N	DOSCF	737.00/4-1661	DOS	
CU	N	91A	ME	610416	BARKLEY		4	S	N	CIA	JOB 8500664R BOX 3	CIA	DOD
CU	N	92	ME	610509	CABELL		3	S	R	NLK	NSF CS CUBA SUB TAY	CIA	DOS

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COMP	F	DOC#	TP	DOC	DT	FROM
1	1	1	1	1	1	1

**TITLE: CUBA: 1961-1962**

VOLUME: X

CU	N	93	RP	610504	CIA	AFTER-ACTION	JCS	994221	DENNISON	20	S	N	NDU	TAYLOR PAPERS	CUBA	CIA	DOS		
CU	N	94	RP	610504	CIA	AFTER-ACTION				8	S	N	NDU	TAYLOR PAPERS	CUBA	CIA	DOS		
CU	Y	94A	PT	610416	CIA	TEL IN 3811				1	T	N	CIA	JOB 8500664R		CIA	DOS		
CU	N	95	MT	610417	GRAY		JCS	994221	DENNISON	2	T	R	NLK	NSF CS CUBA	SUB TAY	JCS	CIA	DOD	
CU	N	96	EN	610417	ZAPATA LANDINGS					1	T	N	DOSHO	NAVAL HIST	CENTER	USN	CIA	DOD	
CU	N	97	MC	610417	BUNDY/RUSK					1	N	N	DOSLF	RUSK FILES	72D192	DOS	NSC		
CU	N	98	ME	610417	SCHLESINGER				JFK	2	S	N	NLK	SCHLESINGER PAPERS		WH	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	99	MT	610417	WHEELER		JCS	994247	DENNISON	2	T	N	NLK	NSF CS CUBA	SUB TAY	JCS	CIA	DOD	
CU	N	100	EN	610417	SHIP MOVEMENTS					2	T	N	DOSHO	NAVAL HIST	CENTER	USN	DOD	DOS	
CU	N	101	TE	610418	MOSCOW		2550		STATE	2	S	R	DOSLF	S/S FILES	77D163	PE	DOS		
CU	N	102	ME	610418	BATTLE				SCHLESINGER	7	S	N	DOSCF	737.00/4-1861			DOS		
CU	N	103	ME	610418	BUNDY				JFK	1	T	R	NLK	POF CS CUBA	GEN APR	WH	DOS		
CU	N	103A	PT	610418	CIA		4737		NICARAGUA	2	T	N	CIA	JOB 8500664R	BOX 4	CIA	DOD	DOS	
CU	N	103B	PT	610418	CIA		4739		NICARAGUA	1	T	N	CIA	JOB 8500664R	BOX 4	CIA	DOS		
CU	Y	103C	PT	610418	CIA	TEL IN 4292				1	T	N	CIA	JOB 8500664R		CIA	DOS		
CU	N	104	MC	610418	BURKE/WILHIDE					2	I	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST	CENTER	USN	DOD	DOS
CU	N	105	MT	610418	GRAY		JCS	994309	DENNISON	1	T	R	NLK	NSF CS CUBA	SUB TAY	JCS	DOS		NSC
CU	N	106	MT	610418	GRAY		JCS	994317	DENNISON	1	T	R	NLK	NSF CS CUBA	SUB TAY	JCS	DOS		
CU	N	107	MT	610418	BURKE		182023Z		DENNISON	1	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST	CENTER	USN	DOD	DOS	
CU	N	108	MT	610418	STG 81.8		182142Z		CINCLANTFLT	1	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST	CENTER	USN	CIA	DOD	DOS
CU	Y	108A	PT	610418	CIA	TEL OUT 7123				1	T	N	CIA	JOB 8500664R		CIA	DOS		
CU	N	109	MT	610418	DENNISON		182152Z		MCELROY	1	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST	CENTER	USN	DOD	DOS	
CU	N	110	MT	610418	STG 81.8		182212Z		CINCLANTFLT	1	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST	CENTER	USN	DOD	DOS	
CU	N	111	MT	610418	GRAY		JCS	994349	DENNISON	1	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST	CENTER	JCS	CIA	DOD	DOS
CU	N	112	MT	610418	CINCLANT		182306Z		JCS	1	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST	CENTER	USN	DOD	DOS	
CU	N	113	MC	610418	RUSK/MENSHIKOV					3	C	N	DOSCF	737.00/4-1861		DOS			
CU	N	114	MT	610418	JCS		JCS	994363	CINCLANT	1	T	R	USN	NAVAL HIST	CENTER	JCS	DOS		
CU	N	115	MT	610418	JCS		JCS	994364	CINCLANT	1	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST	CENTER	JCS	DOD	DOS	
CU	N	116	MT	610418	BURKE		190137Z		DENNISON	2	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST	CENTER	USN	DOD	DOS	
CU	N	117	MT	610418	BURKE		190217Z		DENNISON	1	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST	CENTER	USN	DOD	DOS	
CU	Y	117A	PT	610419	CIA	TEL IN 4455				1	T	N	CIA	JOB 8500664R		CIA	DOS		
CU	N	118	MT	610418	STG 81.8														



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TITLE: CUBA: 1961-1962  
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CU	N	121	MT	610419	CINCLANTFLT	190711Z	CNO	1	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	DOD	DOS	
CU	N	122	MT	610419	JCS	JCS 994369	CINCLANTFLT	2	T	R	NLK	NSF CS CUBA SUB TAY	JCS	DOS		
CU	N	123	MT	610419	CNO	190841Z	CINCLANTFLT	1	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	DOD	DOS	
CU	N	124	EN	610419	BRIEFING OF JCS			1	T	N	DOSHO	USN NAVAL HIST CENT	DOS	CIA	DOD	
CU	N	125	MT	610419	STG 81.8	191340Z	CINCLANTFLT	1	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	CIA	DOD	DOS
CU	N	126	MT	610419	CINCLANTFLT	191546Z	STG 81.8	1	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	DOD	DOS	
CU	N	127	MT	610419	CINCLANTFLT	191624Z	STG 81.8	1	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	DOD	DOS	
CU	N	128	MT	610419	CINCLANTFLT	191632Z	STG 81.8	1	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	DOD	DOS	
CU	N	129	MT	610419	JCS	JCS 994382	CINCLANT	1	T	R	NLK	NSF CS CUBA SUB TAY	JCS	DOS		
CU	N	130	TE	610419	USUN	2937	STATE	4	T	R	DOSCF	611.37/4-1961	DOS			
CU	N	131	MT	610419	STG 81.8	191706Z	CINCLANTFLT	1	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	DOD	DOS	
CU	N	132	MT	610419	JCS	JCS 994392	CINCLANT	1	T	R	NLK	NSF CS CUBA SUB TAY	JCS	DOS		
CU	N	133	MT	610419	STG 81.8	191857Z	CINCLANTFLT	1	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	DOD	DOS	
CU	N	134	MT	610419	STG 81.8	191917Z	CINCLANTFLT	1	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	DOD	DOS	
CU	N	135	MT	610419	JCS	JCS 994409	CINCLANT	1	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	JCS	CIA	DOD	DOS
CU	N	136	MT	610419	STG 81.8	192045Z	CINCLANTFLT	1	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	DOD	DOS	
CU	N	137	MT	610419	JCS	JCS 994464	CINCLANT	1	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	JCS	DOD	DOS	
CU	N	138	ME	610419	RFK		JFK	4	N	N	NLK	POF CS CUBA GEN APR	DOS	NSC		
CU	N	139	MI	610420	NOTES ON CAB MTG			3	U	R	LOC	BOWLES PAPERS YALE	DOS	NSC		
CU	N	140	ME	610420	MCNAMARA		LENNITZER	1	T	N	DOD	OASD C A FILES 71A2	DOD	DOS		
CU	N	141	ME	610420	COERR		RUSK	2	C	N	DOSLF	ARA FILES 62D24	CUB	DOS		
CU	N	142	MT	610420	JCS	JCS 994569	CINCLANT	1	T	R	NLK	NSF CS CUBA SUB TAY	JCS	DOS		
CU	N	143	EN	610421	MCNAMARA MTG JCS			1	T	N	DOSHO	USN NAVAL HIST CENT	DOS	CIA	DOD	
CU	N	144	ME	610421	ROSTOW		JFK	2	I	T	N	DOD	OSD FILES 65A3464	WH	DOS	NSC
CU	N	145	EN	610421	UN ACTION			1	U	N	DOSHO	UN DOCS	DOS			
CU	N	146	MT	610421	JCS	JCS 994676	CINCLANT	1	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	CIA	DOD	DOS
CU	N	147	MI	610422	RECORD OF NSC ACT			2	T	N	DOSLF	S/S-NSC FILES 66D95	NSC	CIA	DOD	DOS
CU	N	148	MI	610422	NOTES ON NSC MTG			3	U	N	LOC	BOWLES PAPERS YALE	DOS	NSC		
CU	N	149	ME	610422	MCNAMARA		BURKE	1	C	N	DOD	OASD C A FILES 71A2	DOD	DOS		
CU	N	150	ME	610422	KING		FILES	8	I	T	N	NLK	NSF CS CUBA SUB TAY	CIA	DOS	
CU	N	151	EN	610422	KHRUSHCHEV LETTER			1	U	N	DOSHO	S/S 77D163 PEN PAL	DOS			
CU	N	152	TE	610423	STATE	1661	ALL ARA POSTS	2	S	N	DOSCF	737.00/4-2361	DOS			
CU	N	153	ME	610424	ROSTOW		MCNAMARA	4	T	N	DOD	OASD C A 71A2896	CU	WH	DOS	NSC
CU	N	154	ME	610424	HAWKINS		FILES	3	S	N	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	CIA	DOS		

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PGS I C DC SRCE FILE

MESSAGE NO TO

COMP F DOC# TP DOC DT FROM

TITLE: CUBA: 1961-1962

VOLUME: X

CU	N	155	ME	610424	NOEL	FILES	23	I	T	N	NDU	TAYLOR PAPERS	CUBA	WH	CIA	DOD	DOS
CU	N	156	ME	610425	INGELIDO	FILES	11	S	N	NDU	TAYLOR PAPERS	CUBA	WH	CIA	DOD	DOS	
CU	N	157	ME	610426	TARWATER	FILES	7	I	S	N	NLK	NSF CS CUBA SUB	TAY WH	CIA	DOD	DOS	
CU	N	158	EN	610426	RESCUE OPERATIONS	MCNAMARA	1	S	N	DOSHO	USN NAVAL HIST	CENT	DOS	DOD	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	159	ME	610426	JCS	BUNDY	16	I	T	N	DOD	OASD C A 71A2896	CU JCS	DOD	DOS		
CU	N	160	ME	610426	GOODWIN	CUBA STUDY GROUP	6	S	N	NLK	NSF CS CUBA GEN	1/6 WH	WH	DOS	NSC		
CU	N	161	ME	610426	CIA	NSC	2	T	N	NLK	NSF CS CUBA SUB	TAY CIA	CIA	DOS			
CU	N	162	ME	610426	CIA	NSC	3	I	N	N	NLK	NSF CS CUBA SUB	INT CIA	DOS			
CU	N	163	ME	610427	ACHILLES	NSC	11	T	N	DOSLF	S/P-NSC FILES	62D1	DOS	NSC			
CU	N	164	EN	610427	NSC MTG	NSC	1	T	N	DOSHO	NLK NSF MMS	NSC MTG	DOS				
CU	N	165	MI	610427	NOTES ON NSC MTG	NSC	2	U	R	LOC	BOWLES PAPERS	YALE	DOS				
CU	N	166	MC	610428	STATE/JCS MTG	NSC	3	I	T	N	DOSCF	611.00/4-2861	DOS				
CU	N	167	MI	610428	DRAFT SNIE 85-61	NSC	5	S	R	DOD	OASD C A 71A2896	NI CIA	DOS				
CU	N	168	ME	610428	TARWATER	FILES	3	I	S	N	NLK	NSF CS CUBA SUB	TAY WH	DOS	DOD	NSC	
CU	N	169	ME	610429	BURKE	WHEELER	1	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST	CENTER	USN	DOD	DOS		
CU	N	170	EN	610501	CASTRO STATEMENT	JCS	1	U	N	DOSHO	PUBLIC STATEMENTS	DOS	DOS				
CU	N	171	ME	610501	MCNAMARA	JCS	1	T	N	DOD	OASD C A 71A2896	CU DOD	DOS				
CU	N	172	MC	610501	BALL/ACHILLES	JFK	1	N	N	NLK	BALL PAPERS	SUB CUB	DOS				
CU	N	173	CC	610501	MANSFIELD	FILES	3	U	R	NLJ	VP SECURITY	FILE NS	WH	DOS			
CU	N	174	ME	610501	TARWATER	FILES	8	I	S	N	NLK	NSF CS CUBA SUB	TAY WH	DOS	DOD	CIA	
CU	N	175	RP	610502	INR/CIA REPORT	CHIEF WH/4/PM	7	I	S	N	DOSLF	S/P-NSC FILES	62D1	DOS	CIA		
CU	N	175A	ME	610502	CHIEF WH/4	MCNAMARA	2	S	N	CIA	JOB 8500664R	CIA	DOS				
CU	N	176	ME	610503	ZUCKERT	JFK	1	T	N	DOD	OASD C 71A2896	CUBA DOD	DOS				
CU	N	177	ME	610503	SCHLESINGER	JFK	5	C	N	NLK	POF CS CUBA SECURIT	WH	CIA	DOS	NSC		
CU	N	178	ME	610503	CIA	CUBA STUDY GROUP	10	I	S	N	NLK	NSF CS CUBA SUB	TAY CIA	DOS			
CU	N	179	ME	610503	TARWATER	FILES	13	I	S	N	NLK	NSF CS CUBA SUB	TAY WH	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	180	ME	610504	TARWATER	FILES	12	I	S	N	NLK	NSF CS CUBA SUB	TAY WH	DOS	DOD	NSC	
CU	N	181	GC	610504	BUNDY	TAYLOR	5	T	R	NLK	NSF CS CUBA SUB	TAY WH	WH	DOS			
CU	N	182	MI	610504	NSC PAPER	JFK	35	T	N	DOSLF	S/P-NSC FILES	62D1	DOS	CIA	DOD		
CU	N	183	ME	610505	BUNDY	JFK	4	T	E	NLK	NSF CS CUBA GEN	MAY WH	WH	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	183A	MI	610505	MEETING OF NSC	NSC	2	T	R	NLJ	VICE PRES SEC.	FILE WH	WH	DOS			
CU	N	184	MI	610505	RECORD OF ACTION	NSC	3	T	R	NLK	NSC MMS	NSC MTGS	48	DOS			
CU	N	185	ME	610505	BURKE	FILES	7	I	T	N	USN	NAVAL HIST	CENTER	USN	CIA	DOD	NSC
CU	N	186	ME	610505	MCNAMARA	YARMOLINSKY	1	S	N	DOD	OASD C A 71A2896	YA DOD	DOS	NSC			

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**ORIGIN ROUTES**

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COMP P DOC# TP DOC DT FROM MESSAGE NO TO PGS I C DC SRCE FILE ORIGIN EQUITIES DECL AUTH

TITLE: CUBA: 1961-1962  
VOLUME: X

CU	N	218	MC	610707	HURWITCH/MCDONNEL			1	C	N	DOSCF	737.00/7-761	DOS	JUS			
CU	N	219	ME	610708	SCHLESINGER	GOODWIN		2	S	N	NLK	SCHLESINGER PAPERS	WH	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	220	RP	610711	USIB REPORT			5	I	S	N	NLK	SCHLESINGER PAPERS	CIA	DOS		
CU	N	221	MC	610713	HURWITCH/SZULC			1	N	N	DOSCF	737.00/7-1361	DOS				
CU	N	222	ME	610718	WOODWARD	BOWLES		2	C	N	DOSCF	737.00/7-1861	DOS				
CU	N	223	MC	610720	WOLLAM/CABANA			2	S	N	DOSCF	737.00/7-2061	DOS				
CU	N	223A	EN	610724				1	N	N	DOSHO		DOS				
CU	N	224	ME	610726	BURKE	FILES		1	I	C	N	USN	NAVAL HIST CENTER	USN	DOD	DOS	
CU	N	225	ME	610816	KOMER	FILES		2	T	N	NLK	NSF CS CUBA GEN 6/6	NSC	DOD	DOS		
CU	N	226	ME	610822	GOODWIN	JFK		2	S	N	NLK	POF CS CUBA SEC 196	WH	DOS	NSC		
CU	N	227	ME	610822	GOODWIN	JFK		5	S	N	NLK	POF CS CUBA SECURIT	WH	DOS	NSC		
CU	N	228	ME	610901	GOODWIN	JFK		2	S	N	NLK	NSF CS CUBA GE 6/61	WH	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	229	MC	610915	KENNEDY/KUBITSCH			2	I	C	N	DOSLF S/S FILES	64D149 PR	WH	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	230	MC	610926	KENNEDY/FRONDIZI			2	I	C	N	DOSLF S/S FILES	64D149 PR	WH	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	231	MI	611005	NSAM 100			1	T	R	DOD	OASD C A 71A2896	CU	DOS			
CU	N	232	ME	611005	PARROTT	FILES		1	S	N	NLK	NSF CS CUBA GE 6/61	WH	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	233	ME	611020	PARROTT	BUNDY		1	I	S	N	NLK	NSF MMS SPECIAL GR	WH	CIA	DOS	NSC
CU	N	234	ME	611101	GOODWIN	JFK		2	T	N	NLK	POF CS CUBA SECURIT	WH	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	235	EN	611103	MONGOOSE STARTED			3	U	N	DOSHO	NLK RPK PAPERS SENA	DOS	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	236	ME	611103	KENT	DULLES		10	S	R	NLK	POF CS CUBA SECURIT	CIA	DOS			
CU	N	237	ME	611108				4	S	N	CIA	JOB 7801450R, BOX 5	CIA	DOS			
CU	N	238	MI	611109	INTERAGENCY STUDY			9	S	N	DOSLF	ARA/CCA 66D501 I-A	DOS	CIA			
CU	N	238A	ME	611122	MCCONE	RECORD		2	S	N	CIA	JOB 80B01285A DCI	CIA	DOS	NSC		
CU	N	239	ME	611128	COLLINS	MCNAMARA		2	S	N	DOD	OSD/ISA 64A2382 CUB JCS	CIA	DOS			
CU	N	239A	MC	611129	RPK AND MCCONE			2	I	S	N	CIA	JOB 80B01285A DCI	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	240	ME	611130	LANSDALE	RPK		1	S	N	DOSLF	ARA/CCA 66D501 CUBA	WH	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	241	ME	611130	JFK	RUSK		1	T	N	NLK	POF CS CUBA SECURIT	WH	DOS	NSC		
CU	N	242	EN	611201	WH PROC-CASTRO SP			1	U	R	DOSHO	PUB DOCS NY TIMES	DOS				
CU	N	243	MI	611201	DRAFT MEMO RECORD			2	C	N	DOSLF	U. ALEXIS JOHNSON F	DOS	CIA	NSC		
CU	N	243A	ME	611207	LANSDALE	MCCONE		5	T	N	CIA	JOB 80B01285A DCI	CIA	DOD	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	243B	ME	611214	EARMAN	RECORD		7	T	N	CIA	JOB 80B01285A DCI	CIA	DOS	NSC		
CU	N	243C	MC	611227	RPK AND MCCONE			3	I	S	N	CIA	JOB 80B01285A DCI	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	243D	ME	620112	EARMAN	RECORD		2	I	S	N	CIA	JOB 80B01285A DCI	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	244	ME	620116	HURWITCH	LANSDALE		4	S	N	DOSLF	ARA/CCA 66D501 GEN	DOS				

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DEPT. ANTH.

VOLUME: X

	3	S	R	DOD	OASD C A 71A2896	MC	CIA	DOS	
	1	S	N	DOSHO	NLK	NSF	MMS	NSC	NSC
	8	T	N	DOSCF	737.00/1-2062			WH	DOS
	3	S	N	CIA	JOB 80B01285A	DCI		CIA	DOS
	2	T	N	DOSCF	737.00/1-2062			WH	DOS
	3	I	S	N	CIA	JOB 80B01285A	DCI	CIA	DOS
	13	S	N	CIA	JOB 80B01285A	DCI		CIA	DOS
	1	T	N	DOSCF	737.00/1-2662			WH	CIA
	2	T	N	NLK	NSF	CS	CUBA	CABLES	USN
	2	C	N	DOD	OSD 66A3542	CUBA	34	DOD	DOS
	1	T	N	DOSCF	737.00/1-2062			DOS	
	5	C	E	NLK	NSF	CS	CUBA	GEN 1/6	DOS
	2	C	N	DOSLF	S/S	FILES	70D328	ST	DOS
	3	T	N	DOSCF	737.00/1-1862			DOS	
	25	T	N	NLK	NSF	MMS	SGA	OPER	MO
	10	T	N	NLK	NSF	CS	CUBA	CABLES	USN
	10	T	N	DOSLF	U.	ALEXIS	JOHNSON	F	DOS
	2	S	N	DOSCF	737.00/2-2762			DOS	
	2	T	N	DOSLF	S/S	FILES	65D438	MO	WH
	1	T	N	DOSLF	S/S	FILES	65D438	MO	WH
	2	T	N	NLK	NSF	MMS	SGA	OPER	MO
	15	T	N	DOSLF	S/S	FILES	65D482	MO	WH
	1	N	N	DOD	OASD/ISA	65A3501	CU	DOD	DOS
	2	N	N	DOSLF	S/S	FILES	65D438	MO	WH
	2	S	N	CIA	JOB 80B01285A	DCI		CIA	DOS
	5	I	S	N	DOD	OASD C A 71A2896	MC	CIA	DOS
	1	S	N	CIA	JOB 9100741R	MONGOO		CIA	DOS
	1	S	N	DOSCF	737.00/3-2962			DOS	NSC
	1	S	N	CIA	JOB 9100741R	MONGOO		CIA	DOS
	2	S	N	CIA	JOB 80B01285A	DCI		CIA	DOS
	4	S	N	DOSLF	S/S	FILES	65D438	MO	CIA
	1	U	N	DOSHO	PUB	DOCS		DOS	
	5	T	N	DOSLF	S/S	FILES	65D438	MO	CIA
	6	T	N	CIA	JOB 9100741R	MONGOO		CIA	DOS
	3	S	R	DOD	OASD C A 71A2896	MC	CIA	DOS	
	1	S	N	DOSHO	NLK	NSF	MMS	NSC	NSC
	8	T	N	DOSCF	737.00/1-2062			WH	DOS
	3	S	N	CIA	JOB 80B01285A	DCI		CIA	DOS
	2	T	N	DOSCF	737.00/1-2062			WH	DOS
	3	I	S	N	CIA	JOB 80B01285A	DCI	CIA	DOS
	13	S	N	CIA	JOB 80B01285A	DCI		CIA	DOS
	1	T	N	DOSCF	737.00/1-2662			WH	CIA
	2	T	N	NLK	NSF	CS	CUBA	CABLES	USN
	2	C	N	DOD	OSD 66A3542	CUBA	34	DOD	DOS
	1	T	N	DOSCF	737.00/1-2062			DOS	
	5	C	E	NLK	NSF	CS	CUBA	GEN 1/6	DOS
	2	C	N	DOSLF	S/S	FILES	70D328	ST	DOS
	3	T	N	DOSCF	737.00/1-1862			DOS	
	25	T	N	NLK	NSF	MMS	SGA	OPER	MO
	10	T	N	NLK	NSF	CS	CUBA	CABLES	USN
	10	T	N	DOSLF	U.	ALEXIS	JOHNSON	F	DOS
	2	S	N	DOSCF	737.00/2-2762			DOS	
	2	T	N	DOSLF	S/S	FILES	65D438	MO	WH
	1	T	N	DOSLF	S/S	FILES	65D438	MO	WH
	2	T	N	NLK	NSF	MMS	SGA	OPER	MO
	15	T	N	DOSLF	S/S	FILES	65D482	MO	WH
	1	N	N	DOD	OASD/ISA	65A3501	CU	DOD	DOS
	2	N	N	DOSLF	S/S	FILES	65D438	MO	WH
	2	S	N	CIA	JOB 80B01285A	DCI		CIA	DOS
	5	I	S	N	DOD	OASD C A 71A2896	MC	CIA	DOS
	1	S	N	CIA	JOB 9100741R	MONGOO		CIA	DOS

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COMP P DOC# TP DOC DT FROM MESSAGE NO TO PGS I C DC SRCE FILE ORIGIN EQUITIES DECL AUTH

TITLE: CUBA: 1961-1962  
VOLUME: X

CU	N	270B	ME	620411	MCCONE MEMO FOR D					2	S	N	CIA	JOB 80B01285A DCI	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	270C	ME	620412	MCCONE		RECORD			1	S	N	CIA	JOB 9100741R MONGOO	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	Y	270D	MC	620411	MCCONE AND RUSK					1	S	N	CIA	JOB 80B01285A DCI	CIA	DOS		
CU	N	271	TE	620414	STATE	2979				2	T	N	DOSCF	737.00/4-1462	DOS			
CU	N	272	ME	620418	RUSK					2	S	N	DOSCF	737.00/4-1862	DOS			
CU	N	273	ME	620419	LANSDALE					2	T	N	DOSLF	S/S FILES 65D438 MO WH	DOS	NSC	CIA	
CU	N	274	ME	620419	HURWITCH					2	S	N	DOSCF	737.00/4-2062	DOS	CIA		
CU	N	275	MI	620425	CURRENT INTELL ME		MARTIN			2	S	N	NLK	NSF CS CUBA SUB INT	CIA	DOS		
CU	N	275A	ME	620426	MCCONE					2	S	N	CIA	JOB 9100741R MONGOO	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	276	ME	620501	RILEY		RECORD			1	S	N	CIA	JOB 9100741R MONGOO	CIA	DOS		
CU	N	277	ME	620503	LANSDALE		LEWITZER			2	T	N	DOSLF	ARA/CCA 66D501 MONG JCS	DOS			
CU	N	277A	ME	620504	MCCONE		SGA			1	T	N	DOSLF	S/S FILES 65D438 MO WH	DOS			
CU	N	278	TE	620503	RIO DE JANEIRO	2577	RECORD			1	S	N	CIA	JOB 9100741R MONGOO	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	278A	ME	620507	MCCONE		STATE			1	T	N	DOSCF	737.00/5-362	DOS			
CU	N	279	MI	620517	OPERATIONS SCHEDU		RECORD			1	S	N	CIA	JOB 80B01285A DCI	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	Y	279A	ME	620521	MCCONE					13	T	N	DOSLF	ARA/CCA 66D501 MONG WH	DOS			
CU	N	280	ME	620524	GOODWIN		RECORD			1	S	N	CIA	JOB 9100741R MONGOO	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	281	ME	620531	LANSDALE		MARTIN			2	T	N	DOSLF	ARA/CCA 66D501 MONG WH	DOS			
CU	N	282	MI	620531	MEMO FOR SGA		SGA			3	I	T	N	DOSLF	ARA/CCA 66D501 MONG WH	DOS	NSC	CIA
CU	N	283	ME	620605	ANDERSON					3	T	N	DOSLF	ARA/CCA 66D501 MONG WH	DOS			
CU	N	284	MI	620607	NOTES OPER GROUP		MCNAMARA			2	T	N	DOD	OSD 66A3542 CUBA 34 JCS	DOD	DOS		
CU	N	284A	ME	620608	ELDER					1	S	N	DOSCF	737.00/6-762	DOS	CIA	DOD	NSC
CU	N	285	ME	620608	LANSDALE		RECORD			1	S	N	CIA	JOB 9100741R MONGOO	CIA	DOD	DOS	NSC
CU	N	286	ME	620614	LANSDALE		SGA			2	T	N	DOSLF	ARA/CCA 66D501 MONG WH	DOS			
CU	N	287	ME	620614	LANSDALE		MARTIN			1	T	N	DOSLF	ARA/CCA 66D501 I-A WH	DOS			
CU	Y	287A	ME	620625	MCCONE		SGA			2	T	N	DOSLF	ARA/CCA 66D501 MONG WH	DOS			
CU	N	288	ME	620627	MARTIN		RECORD			1	S	N	CIA	JOB 9100741R MONGOO	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	289	MI	620703	CIA MEMO		JOHNSON			2	S	N	DOSLF	S/S FILES 65D438 MO DOS	DOS			
CU	N	289A	MC	620703	RFK AND MCCONE					14	S	N	NLK	POF CS CUBA SECURIT	CIA	DOS		
CU	N	290	ME	620705	LANSDALE		SGA			3	I	S	N	CIA	JOB 80B01285A DCI	CIA	DOS	NSC
CU	N	290A	ME	620714	ELDER					3	T	N	DOSLF	S/S FILES 65D438 MO WH	DOS			
CU	Y	290B	ME	620712	CARTER		RECORD			1	S	N	CIA	JOB 80B01285A DCI	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	291	ME	620718	HURWITCH		RECORD			1	S	N	CIA	JOB 9100741R MONGOO	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	291A	MC	620718	RFK AND MCCONE		MARTIN			4	T	N	DOSCF	737.00/7-1962	DOS	CIA	NSC	
										3	I	S	N	CIA	JOB 80B01285A DCI	CIA	DOS	NSC

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PRUS DATA SORTED BY TITLE AND COMPILATION

DECL AUTH

COMP	F	DOC#	TP	DOC	DT	FROM	MESSAGE	NO	TO	PGS	I	C	DC	SRCE	FILE	ORIGIN	EQUITIES
TITLE: CUBA: 1961-1962																	
VOLUME: X																	
CU	N	292	ME	620719		HURWITCH			LANSDALE	7	T	N	NLK	NSF	MMS SGA OPER MO	DOS	
CU	N	293	ME	620720		WILSON			LANSDALE	8	T	N	NLK	NSF	MMS SGA OPER MO	USIA	DOS
CU	Y	293A	ME	620720		MCONE			RECORD	2	S	N	CIA	JOB	80B01285A DCI	CIA	NSC
CU	N	294	TE	620721		STATE	109		ARAO	2	S	N	DOSCF	737.00/7-2162		DOS	
CU	N	295	ME	620723		HARRIS			LANSDALE	11	T	N	NLK	NSF	MMS SGA OPER MO	DOD	DOS
CU	N	296	ME	620724		HARVEY			LANSDALE	7	T	N	NLK	NSF	MMS SGA OPER MO	CIA	DOS
CU	N	297	ME	620725		LANSDALE			SGA	8	T	N	NLK	NSF	MMS SGA OPER MO	WH	DOS
CU	N	298	ME	620726		HURWITCH			MARTIN	1	T	N	DOSLF	ARA/CCA	66D501 MONG	DOS	CIA
CU	N	299	ME	620731		LANSDALE			SGA	13	T	N	DOSCF	737.00/7-3162		WH	DOS
CU	N	300	MI	620801		NIE 85-2-62				13	S	N	DOD	OASD C A	71A2896 MC	CIA	DOS
CU	N	301	MI	620801		AGENDA SGA MTG				1	T	N	DOSLF	S/S FILES	65D438 MO	WH	DOS
CU	N	302	ME	620806		HARVEY			LANSDALE	2	T	N	DOSLF	ARA/CCA	66D501 MONG	CIA	DOS
CU	N	303	ME	620806		LANSDALE			HARVEY	2	T	N	NLK	NSF	MMS SGA OPER MO	WH	CIA
CU	N	304	ME	620808		LANSDALE			SGA	22	T	N	NLK	NSF	MMS SGA OPER MO	WH	CIA
CU	N	305	ME	620808		CRAIG			SGA	6	T	N	NLK	NSF	MMS SGA OPER MO	DOD	DOS
CU	N	306	ME	620808		LANSDALE			SGA	1	T	N	NLK	NSF	MMS SGA OPER MO	WH	DOS
CU	Y	306A	ME	620808		HARVEY			MCONE	19	T	N	CIA	JOB	8400499R HS/HC	CIA	DOS
CU	N	307	MI	620810		DOS MEMO				2	T	N	DOSLF	ARA/CCA	66D501 MONG	DOS	CIA
CU	N	307A	EN	620810		EDITORIAL NOTE				2	N	N	DOSHO	JOB	9100741R MONGOO	DOS	CIA
CU	N	308	ME	620813		LANSDALE			HURWITCH	1	T	N	DOSCF	737.00/8-1362		WH	DOS
CU	N	309	ME	620813		HURWITCH			LANSDALE	3	T	N	DOSCF	737.00/8-1362		DOS	
CU	N	310	ME	620814		LANSDALE			SGA	11	T	N	NLK	NSF	MMS SGA OPER MO	WH	DOS
CU	Y	310A	ME	620814		HARVEY			HELMS	2	S	N	CIA	JOB	9100741R MONGOO	CIA	DOS
CU	N	311	ME	620815		HURWITCH			MARTIN	2	T	N	DOSLF	S/S FILES	65D438 MO	DOS	DOS
CU	N	313	ME	620816		LANSDALE			HARVEY	1	T	N	NLK	NSF	MMS SGA OPER MO	WH	DOS
CU	N	313A	ME	620816		MCONE			RECORD	1	S	N	CIA	JOB	9100741R MONGOO	CIA	DOS
CU	N	314	ME	620817		HARVEY			LANSDALE	3	S	N	DOSCF	737.00/8-1762		CIA	DOS
CU	N	315	ME	620817		TAYLOR			JFK	3	T	N	NLK	NSF	MMS SGA OPER MO	WH	DOS
CU	N	315A	ME	620821		MCONE			RFK	1	S	N	CIA	JOB	9100741R MONGOO	CIA	DOS
CU	N	315C	ME	620821		MCONE			RECORD	3	S	N	CIA	JOB	80B01285A DCI	CIA	DOS
CU	N	316	ME	620822		SCHLESINGER			BUNDY	4	S	R	NLK	NSF	CS CUBA SUB INT	WH	DOS
CU	N	317B	MC	621023		JFK AND ADVISERS				5	T	D	CIA	JOB	80B01285A DCI	CIA	DOS
CU	N	318	MI	620823		NSAM 181				2	T	N	NLK	NSF	MMS NSAM 181	CU	DOS
CU	N	319	MC	620824		RUSK/DIEFENBAKER				1	S	N	DOSCF	737.00/8-2462		DOS	



PRUS DATA SORTED BY TITLE AND COMPILATION

## ORIGIN ROUTES

**MESSAGE NO**

COMP	F	DOC#	TP	DOC	DT	FROM
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**TITLE: CUBA: 1961-1962**

VOLUME: X

FILES	2	S	N	DOD	OASD C A 71A2896	YA	DOD	DOS
STATE	2	S	N	DOSCF	737.00/8-2562	USN	DOD	DOS
BALL	4	S	N	NLK	NSF MMS NSAM 181	CU	DOS	
CARDONA	1	N	N	DOD	OASD/ISA 65A3501	CU	DOD	DOS
	1	N	N	DOSHO	JOB 80B1676R	WALTER	DOS	CIA NSC
1205	5	S	N	NLK	NSF CS CUBA CAB 7/6	DOS		
RECORD	1	N	N	CIA	JOB 80B1676R	WALTER	CIA	DOS NSC
561	2	S	N	DOD	OSD HISTORIANS OFFI	DOS		
SGA	21	T	N	NLK	NSF MMS SGA OPER MO	WH	CIA	DOD DOS NSC
BUNDY	2	T	N	NLK	NSF MMS NSAM 181	CU	DOS	
JFK	5	T	N	NLK	NSF MMS NSAM 181	CU	WH	DOS NSC
JFK	5	T	N	NLK	NSF MMS NSAM 181	CU	DOD	DOS
RUSK	8	S	N	NLK	NSF MMS NSAM 181	CU	DOS	
JFK	2	T	N	NLK	NSF MMS NSAM 181	CU	WH	DOD DOS NSC
JFK	8	T	N	NLK	POF CS CUBA SECURIT	DOS		
CARTER	3	T	D	CIA	CIA JOB 89TO1385R	C	CIA	DOS
MCNAMARA	2	T	N	DOD	OASD C A 71A2896	CU	DOD	DOS
MCONE	2	I	T	N	CIA	JOB 80B01285A	DCI	CIA
MCNAMARA	1	T	N	DOD	OASD C A 71A2896	CU	DOD	DOS
BUNDY	1	T	N	NLK	NSF MMS SGA OPER MO	WH	DOS	
	1	U	R	DOSHO	PUBLIC DOC	DOS		
	4	C	N	DOSCF	737.00/9-562	DOS		
JFK	2	S	E	NLK	NSF CS CUBA GEN 9/6	WH	CIA	DOS NSC
BUNDY	1	T	N	NLK	NSF MMS SGA OPER MO	WH	CIA	DOS NSC
MCONE	1	I	T	N	CIA	JOB 80B01285A	CIA	DOS
FILES	2	N	N	NLK	SORENSEN PAPERS	CIA	WH	DOS NSC
RECORD	1	N	N	CIA	JOB 80B167R	WALTER	CIA	DOS NSC
MCNAMARA	1	S	N	DOD	OSD 66A3542	CUBA 43	WH	DOS NSC
CARTER-CIA	2	I	T	N	CIA	JOB 80B1676R	MONGOO	CIA
STATE	3	S	N	DOSCF	760.551/9-762	DOS	DOD	DOS
	2	N	N	DOSHO	JOB 80B01285A	DCI	DOS	CIA
CIA EXEC DIRECTOR	2	N	N	CIA	JOB 80B1676R	WALTER	CIA	DOS NSC
MCONE	1	I	T	N	CIA	JOB 80B01285A	DCI	CIA
CARTER-CIA	1	I	T	N	CIA	JOB 80B1676R	MONGOO	CIA
IN 18314	1	I	T	N	CIA	JOB 80B1676R	MONGOO	CIA
071807Z	2	N	N	DOSHO	JOB 80B01285A	DCI	DOS	DOS
	2	N	N	DOSHO	JOB 80B01285A	DCI	DOS	DOS
OUT 74587	2	N	N	CIA	JOB 80B1676R	WALTER	CIA	DOS
IN 1937Z	1	I	T	N	CIA	JOB 80B01285A	DCI	CIA
	1	I	T	N	CIA	JOB 80B1676R	MONGOO	CIA

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## ORIGIN EQUITIES

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**TITLE: CUBA: 1961-1962**

VOLUME: X

CU	Y	346E	ME	620910	CARTER	RECORD	1	N	N	CIA	JOB 80B1676R	WALTER	CIA	DOS		
CU	Y	346F	PT	620911	CIA TEL FROM CART OUT 75341	MCCONE	2	I	T	N	CIA	JOB 80B01285A	DCI	CIA	DOS	
CU	N	347	MI	620912	CIA MEMO		3	S	N	NLK	NSF CS	CUBA SUB INT	CIA	DOS		
CU	N	348	ME	620912	LANSDALE	SGA	2	T	N	NLK	NSF MMS	SGA OPER MO	WH	DOS		
CU	N	349	ME	620912	HURWITCH	LANSDALE	1	T	N	DOSLF	ARA/CCA	66D501	MONG	DOS		
CU	N	350	ME	620913	LANSDALE	HURWITCH	1	T	N	DOSLF	ARA/CCA	66D501	MONG	WH	DOS	
CU	Y	350A	PT	620913	MCCONE	CARTER-CIA	2	I	T	N	CIA	JOB 80B1676R	MONGOO	CIA	DOS	
CU	N	351	ME	620913	MCNAMARA	JFK	2	S	N	DOD	OASD C A	71A2896	YA	DOD	DOS	
CU	N	352	ME	620913	LANSDALE	HURWITCH	1	T	N	DOSLF	ARA/CCA	66D501	MONG	WH	DOS	
CU	N	352A	IR	620913	OCI MEMO RE MISSI		3	T	D	CIA	CIA	JOB 80R01386R	C	CIA	DOS	
CU	N	353	EN	620913	JFK STATEMENT		1	U	R	DOSHO	PUB	DOC		DOS		
CU	N	353A	ME	620914	ELDER	RECORD	2	S	N	CIA	JOB 9100741R	MONGOO	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	Y	353C	PT	620916	MCCONE	CARTER-CIA	2	T	N	CIA	JOB 80B01285A	DCI	CIA	DOS		
CU	Y	353D	PT	620918	CIA TEL FROM CART OUT 77871	MCCONE	2	S	N	CIA	JOB 80B1676R	MONGOO	CIA	DOS		
CU	Y	353E	ME	620914	CARTER	RECORD	1	N	N	CIA	JOB 9100741R	MONGOO	CIA	DOS		
CU	N	354	ME	620919	MARTIN	JOHNSON	2	T	N	DOSLF	ARA/CCA	66D501	POL	DOS		
CU	Y	354A	PT	620919	CIA TEL FROM CART 78480	MCCONE	4	I	T	N	CIA	JOB 80B01285A	DCI	CIA	DOS	
CU	N	355	MI	620919	SNIE 85-3-62		9	S	R	DOD	OASD C A	71A2896	MC	CIA	DOS	
CU	Y	355A	PT	620920	MCCONE	CARTER-CIA	1	I	T	N	CIA	JOB 80B1676R	MONGOO	CIA	DOS	
CU	N	356	ME	620921	JFK	MCNAMARA	1	T	N	DOD	OASD C A	71A2896	CU	WH	DOS	
CU	N	357	MT	620921	CINCLANT	CINCLANTFLT	2	T	N	NLK	NSF CS	CUBA CAB	9/9	USN	DOD	
CU	N	358	EN	620921	MRBMS IN CUBA		1	T	N	DOSHO	NDU	TAYLOR PAPERS	C	DOS	DOD	
CU	N	359	ME	620924	SCHLESINGER	KAYSEN	3	N	N	NLK	NSF CS	CUBA GEN	9/6	WH	DOS	
CU	N	360	ME	620925	BRUBECK	KAYSEN	5	C	N	DOSCF	737.00/9-2562		DOS		NSC	
CU	Y	360A	MC	620925	JFK, RPK, MCCONE		2	S	N	CIA	JOB 80B01285A	DCI	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	361	ME	620925	WIESNER	KAYSEN	2	T	N	NLK	NSF CS	CUBA GEN	9/6	WH	DOD	
CU	Y	361A	MC	620926	RPK AND MCCONE		1	S	N	CIA	JOB 80B01285A	DCI	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	362	TE	620926	SECTO	STATE	2	C	N	DOSCF	737.00/9-2662		DOS			
CU	Y	362A	MC	620926	DDE AND MCCONE		3	C	N	CIA	JOB 80B01285A	DCI	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	N	363	TE	620927	SECTO	STATE	2	S	N	DOSCF	737.00/9-2762		DOS			
CU	N	364	ME	620927	KAYSEN	FILES	1	S	N	NLK	NSF MMS	SGA OPER MO	WH	CIA	DOS	
CU	N	365	GC	620928	KHRUSCHEV	KENNEDY	3	I	N	N	NLK	NSF CS	USSR SUB K	C	WH	DOS
CU	Y	365A	ME	620928	KNOCHE	RECORD	1	S	N	CIA	JOB 9100741R	MONGOO	CIA	DOS	NSC	
CU	Y	365B	MC	620929	DONOVAN AND MCCON		3	S	N	CIA	JOB 80B01285A	DCI	CIA	DOS	NSC	

April 18, 1996

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VOLUME: X

PAGES BY COMPILATION CU: 1480

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